

**The Encyclopedia of World War I:
A Political, Social, and Military History**

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32 short articles in *The Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History*. 5 vols. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. [Angell(-Lane), Sir (Ralph) Norman (1872-1967), 1:102-103; Baker, Newton Diehl (1871-1937), 1:168; Baruch, Bernard Mannes (1870-1965), 1:181-182; Birch, Sir James Frederick Noel (1865-1939), 1:207; Blunden, Edmund Charles (1896-1974), 1:214-215; Borden, Sir Robert Laird (1854-1937), 1:217-218; Bratianu, Ionel (1864-1927), 1:222-223; Brittain, Vera Mary (1893-1970), 1:227-228; De Broqueville, Baron Charles Marie Pierre Albert (1860-1940), 1:229; Buchan, Sir John, 1st Baron Tweedsmuir (1875-1940), 1:236-237; Calthorpe, Sir Somerset Arthur Gough (1864-1937), 1:249-250; Commission for the Relief of Belgium (1914-1918), 1:307-308; Gerard, James Watson (1867-1951), 2:470-471; Hall, Sir (William) Reginald "Blinker" (1870-1943), 2:535; Hankey, Maurice Pascal Alers, 1st Baron Hankey (1877-1963), 2:537-538; Hymans, Paul (1865-1941), 2:568; J. P. Morgan and Company, 2:603; Lake, Sir Percy Henry Noel (1855-1940), 2:667; Marghiloman, Alexandru; We(1854-1925), 3:746-747; Martin-Leake, Arthur (1874-1953), 3:754; Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele (1860-1952), 3:865-866; (with T. Jason Soderstrum and Spencer C. Tucker) Pacifism, 3:882-887; Pratt, William Veazie (1869-1957), 3:933-934; Reparations, 3:980-981; (with Spencer C. Tucker) Ribot, Alexandre (1842-1923), 3:982-983; (with T. Jason Soderstrum) Roosevelt, Theodore (1858-1919), 3:1004-1005; (with Allene Phy-Olsen) Salvation Army, 4:1046-1048; Sims, William Sowden (1858-1936), 4:1090-1091; Tyrwhitt, Sir Reginald Yorke (1870-1951), 4:1192; Uniacke, Sir Herbert Crofton Campbell (1866-1934), 4:1195-1196; War Debts, 4:1235-1236; Wemyss, Rosslyn Erskine, Baron (1864-1933), 4:1241]

A

Angell (Lane), Sir Ralph Norman (1872–1967)

Writer and journalist whose best-known book, published before World War I, argued that major war had become economically irrational for the belligerent powers. Norman Angell was the nom de plume of Ralph Norman Angell Lane. Born in Holbeach, Norfolk, on 26 December 1872, Ralph Lane was the son of a prosperous local businessman. Intellectually precocious, he studied at schools in Holbeach and St. Omer, France, and at Geneva University, before choosing at age 17 to work in the United States for seven years rather than attend Cambridge University. He became first a manual laborer and later a journalist. Returning to Europe in 1898, Lane worked in Paris as a journalist, in 1904 becoming editor of the *Continental Daily Mail*, owned by the press magnate Alfred Harmsworth, Viscount Northcliffe.

From 1903 onward Lane, using a shortened form of his original name, published numerous books, all concerned with the quest for rationality in politics. His best-known work, *Europe's Optical Illusion* (1909), essentially advanced ideas first propounded by such nineteenth-century liberals as Richard Cobden, John Bright, and others that technological advances and growing international economic interdependence had made war so costly that it would prove unprofitable for any country to begin a major conflict. Instead, he argued, nations must concentrate on free trade (103) and economic development. Angell sent copies to various public men, including Reginald Viscount Esher, an influential British elder statesman who feared that overheated naval propaganda would compromise a balanced defense policy. Esher convinced a wealthy businessman to establish the Garton Foundation for the Study of International Policy, essentially an organization to propagate Angell's ideas. In 1910 Angell published a revised and expanded version, *The Great Illusion*, the first of several subsequent editions of what became an enormously successful and influential volume. Angell believed that the key was to educate the people that there could be no winners in modern war. He retained a rather naive faith in the power of rational thought.

In 1912 Angell resigned his job to become an independent writer, for four decades defending his doctrines and publishing prolifically—at least thirty books and numerous articles—on international affairs. Initially, the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 seemingly contradicted Angell's thesis, but he subsequently contended that the collapse or drastic weakening of most of the major belligerent powers effectively vindicated his thesis. During the war

Angell became a pioneering supporter of the League of Nations in both Britain and the United States and, after its creation, sought to strengthen the League's coercive powers to impose forcible sanctions. Angell served briefly as a Labour Party member of Parliament, from 1929 to 1931, but disliked party political life. Knighted in 1931 and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize two years later, Angell died at Croydon on 7 October 1967.

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See also

[Harmsworth, Alfred, Viscount Northcliffe.](#)

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Baker, Newton Diehl (1871–1937)

U.S. secretary of war. Born in Martinsburg, West Virginia, on 3 December 1871, Newton Baker was trained as a lawyer but soon became active in Democratic Party politics. In 1913 he ran successfully for mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, on a progressive, reformist ticket.

In March 1916, President Woodrow Wilson appointed Baker secretary of war. He replaced the forceful Lindley M. Garrison, who had resigned over differences with the president as to how best to enhance national preparedness to meet the threat of potential European war. Baker, known for his pacifist leanings, effectively had no defense experience, facilitating his acquiescence in both presidential direction and the National Defense Act of 1916, which expanded both the regular army and the National Guard but rejected the army's proposed large federal volunteer reserve force. When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, its army was still largely unready for the conflict. Baker oversaw its expansion from 95,000 to some 4 million men, instituting a program of national conscription that his well-known antimilitarist tendencies made somewhat more palatable to American liberals. Baker's antiracist and procivil libertarian tendencies helped to restrain some of the worst excesses of wartime superpatriotism, although abuses still occurred.

In early 1918 the tardiness of the Wilson administration's initial preparations for war generated a senate investigation and heavy congressional criticism. Baker responded by recruiting several able, energetic, and well-qualified civilians to the War Department to organize industrial mobilization, concentrating procurement in the General Staff. He reorganized the overburdened and inadequate General Staff into several functional "G" divisions handling personnel, intelligence, and supply, and he asserted the General Staff's authority over the War Department's various bureaus, though the National Defense Act of 1920 reversed this development.

When the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) arrived in Europe, Baker loyally supported the president and AEF commander General John Pershing in maintaining the army's integrity rather than amalgamating its troops into experienced Allied units. On two visits to Europe, he negotiated agreements that determined the American contingent's strength and provided it with

shipping. Baker deplored but publicly supported Wilson's 1918 decision to contribute U.S. troops to the Allies' Russian intervention effort. In autumn 1918, when Pershing attempted to undercut Wilson's efforts to negotiate an armistice with Germany, Baker asserted civilian control by threatening to fire the recalcitrant commander. Baker was an effective rather than great secretary of war. Often handicapped by his department's entrenched structural deficiencies, Baker responded adequately and conscientiously to the challenges presented by a major mobilization.

Upon leaving office in 1921, Baker became a strong supporter of U.S. membership in the League of Nations and the World Court. He was a founder of the Council on Foreign Relations and a leading Democratic internationalist, consciously representing those principles set forth by Wilson. Baker died in Cleveland on 25 December 1937.

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See also

[Bliss, Tasker Howard](#); [Daniels, Josephus](#); [League of Nations Covenant](#); [March, Peyton Conway](#); [Pershing, John Joseph](#); [United States, Army](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#); [Wood, Leonard](#).

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Baruch, Bernard Mannes (1870–1965)

Chairman of the United States War Industries Board. Born in Camden, South Carolina, on 19 August 1870, Bernard Baruch had by the start of World War I accumulated a fortune through skillful stock speculation. While believing that his Jewish origins made a formal political career impossible, in the 1912 presidential campaign Baruch, a Democrat by upbringing, supported the man who would become his lifelong political idol, President Woodrow Wilson, a fellow Southerner who appointed prominent Jews to office. Among them was Baruch, whom the president named in summer 1917 to head the War Industries Board, established the previous May to coordinate wartime raw materials procurement for the government's war effort.

The following March, Baruch's position was strengthened as part of a broader reorganization of the war-related bureaucratic machinery in response to forceful claims from Republican congressional critics that it was inefficient, ineffective, and poorly administered. Baruch relied primarily upon voluntary persuasion and shrewd publicity campaigns to convince industrialists in various sectors of the economy to coordinate their war production efforts and provide raw materials to the government at acceptable prices. Once the war ended, almost immediately Baruch hastily disbanded the War Industries Board, prompted in part, it seems, by fears that many of its activities transgressed antitrust statutes and had no legal justification in peacetime.

Baruch accompanied Wilson to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as an economic advisor. As with many American economic experts, he advocated free trade and an open liberal economic order and limited U.S. financial assistance to the devastated nations of Europe. While urging the imposition of relatively punitive peace terms on Germany, Baruch believed (182) that the Germans would be unable to pay the large amounts some Europeans envisaged collecting from them as reparations for war damage. After the conference, Baruch unsuccessfully supported American membership in the League of Nations, recommending that if necessary the president modify the terms negotiated to satisfy the Senate and win its consent. He remained a heavy financial contributor to the Democratic Party, and as World War II approached he put his considerable public relations ability behind War Department efforts to rally support for industrial mobilization. Baruch died in New York City on 20 June 1965.

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See also

[Baker, Newton Diehl](#); [Hoover, Herbert Clark](#); [League of Nations Covenant](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#); [Reparations](#).

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Birch, Sir James Frederick Noel (1865–1939)

British army general. Born at Llanrhaiadr, Denbighshire, Wales, on 29 December 1865, Birch was an exceptional horseman. He studied at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and was commissioned in the Royal Horse Artillery in 1885, serving in the Ashanti expedition and the 1889–1902 Boer War. Birch acquired considerable expertise in artillery and ordnance.

In August 1914 Birch went to France as commander of the 7th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery. He took part in the retreat from Mons, the First Battle of the Aisne, and the First Battle of Ypres. In January 1915 he was promoted to brigadier general, and in July 1915 he became artillery commander of I Corps under General Sir Douglas Haig. In March 1916 Birch took command of the Fourth Army's artillery.

In May 1916 Haig ordered Birch to British Army General Headquarters as an artillery advisor, where he remained the rest of the war. Although strictly speaking he was only an advisor, not a commander—as the British designated no artillery commanders above the division level—Birch's expertise and judgment accorded him considerable weight in Haig's counsels. In May 1918 Birch also took over supervision of the Royal Tank Corps gunnery and in June similar responsibilities for chemical warfare.

Birch strengthened the authority of artillery advisors at the army and corps level. With fellow progressive British artillery experts such as Sir Herbert Uniacke, he advocated innovations, many of which were rejected by conservative staff officers and commanders, most notably Haig. Birch was an early Allied critic of the doctrine that heavy artillery preparation and creeping barrage were sufficient to enable infantry troops to attain their objectives without heavy casualties.

Promoted to major general in 1917, lieutenant general in 1919, and full general in 1926, Birch became director general of the Territorial Army in 1921. His greatest postwar contributions came between 1923 and 1927, when as master-general of the Ordnance and a War Council member he supervised the development and introduction of artillery innovations, including the first British self-propelled artillery gun, the Birch Gun. Retiring in 1927, Birch became a director of the armaments manufacturer Vickers-Armstrong. He died in London on 3 February 1939.

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See also

[Aisne, First Battle of the](#); [Haig, Douglas, 1st Earl](#); [Mons, Battle of](#); [Uniacke, Sir Herbert](#); [Ypres, First Battle of](#).

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Blunden, Edmund Charles (1896–1974)

British poet and army officer. Born in London on 1 November 1896, Edmund Blunden moved at age 4 to the village of Yalding, Kent, where his upbringing left him with a lifelong emotional attachment to the English countryside. In 1909 Blunden won a scholarship to Christ's Hospital school in London. In his teens he already sought to become a poet.

In 1915 Blunden won a scholarship to Queen's College, Oxford, but he deferred this to enlist in the British army in August that year.

Commissioned a second lieutenant in the 1st South Down Battalion of the Royal Sussex Regiment, Blunden went with his regiment to the Western Front in spring 1916. He spent two years in the trenches, more time than did any other prominent British war poet. Blunden's unit initially saw service at Festubert, Cuinchy, and Richebourg in Belgium and then in August 1916 transferred to the Somme, where it remained until December 1916. In November 1916 Blunden won the Military Cross for a dangerous reconnaissance mission. From early 1917, Blunden's unit was based at Ypres, and from 31 July onward, a day whose memory always haunted Blunden, took part in the five months of the Third Battle of Ypres. In February 1918 Blunden was posted back to England for training, remaining there until the war ended and his demobilization in February 1919.

Throughout his time in the trenches Blunden wrote and published poetry, which mingled his favored pastoral subjects with the horrors of a war he had come to loathe. For the rest of his life, no day passed on which he did not refer to the war. The conflict remained one of his chosen poetic subjects.

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In fall 1919 Blunden briefly took up his scholarship at Queen's College, Oxford, but soon abandoned undergraduate studies for a life of literary journalism and academic teaching, including a three-year stint at the University of Tokyo during 1924–1927. In 1928 Blunden, by now a prize-winning poet, published his best-known work, the acclaimed memoir *Undertones of War*, which surveyed his wartime experiences from the vantage point of ten years on, highlighting the moments of surprising idyllic beauty as well as the horror of the wartime experience. Blunden deliberately sought the reflective tone that temporal distance gave, though some readers preferred his 1918 memoir *De Bello Germanico*, published in 1930, for its freshness and immediacy.

Like his war poetry, Blunden's autobiographical writing was restrained in style, especially by comparison with such other British war poets and memoirists as Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves, two contemporaries Blunden met only after the war had ended. Sassoon became a lifelong close friend who encouraged Blunden to write and sometimes assisted him financially. Blunden also edited the war poems of Wilfred Owen, who died in 1918, and Ivor Gurney, confined to a mental institution after the war.

An inspiring teacher, from 1931 to 1943 Blunden was a fellow and tutor of Merton College, Oxford, a position he left first for the Times Literary Supplement and then, from 1947 to 1950, to serve as a cultural attaché with the British liaison mission in occupied Japan, delivering hundreds of lectures across the country in an effort to heal the antagonisms of war. From 1953 to 1964 Blunden was professor of English literature at the University of Hong Kong and from 1966 to 1968 professor of poetry at the University of Oxford. Blunden died at Hall Mill, Long Melford, Suffolk, on 20 January 1974. Less scathing or bitter in approach and more personally modest than Graves, Sassoon, or Owen, in his war writings Blunden epitomized a peculiarly English tradition of sober, understated, but nonetheless deeply felt restraint.

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See also

[Graves, Robert Ranke](#); [Literature and the War](#); [Owen, Wilfred](#); [Sassoon, Siegfried](#); [Somme Offensive](#); [Trench Warfare](#); [Ypres, Third Battle of](#).

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Borden, Sir Robert Laird (1854–1937)

Canadian political leader and prime minister. Born on a farm near Grand Pré in Nova Scotia on 26 June 1854, Robert Borden became a successful and prosperous lawyer. He entered the Canadian parliament in 1896 as a Conservative, representing the city of Halifax, but his outlook was always decidedly reformist and he had much in common with his contemporary rival, Liberal Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In 1901 Borden became leader of Canada's Conservative Party and in 1911 prime minister.

Anticipating a potential threat from Germany, Borden supported substantially increased naval spending, although the Canadian Senate rejected his expansionist naval bill of 1912–1913. When war began in 1914, Borden ensured that Canada made substantial contributions of troops and matériel to the Allied cause. Canadian forces fought in France, while Canada's financiers raised much-needed funds for the British Empire. When Borden's proposals to introduce conscription in 1917 proved controversial, he campaigned for reelection and won on a national unity government ticket, forming a coalition government with like-minded Liberals over whom he presided.

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Borden used Canada's contributions to the British Empire's war effort to win Canada greater influence in imperial affairs, efforts that the other white British Dominions—New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa—supported and emulated. In 1917 the British established an Imperial War Cabinet, in which Canada and the other Dominions were represented, to direct the war effort. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference each Dominion, including Canada, had independent representation, and none ever subsequently relinquished the semiautonomy that the war enabled them to wrest from their mother country of Great Britain.

During the war, at the Paris Peace Conference (where he was Canada's chief plenipotentiary), and afterward, Borden consistently sought an international order based upon close cooperation between the British Empire, including Canada, and the United States, and he hoped unavailingly that the League of Nations would be organized along such principles. Poor health led him to resign the premiership in 1920. As an elder statesman, Borden represented Canada at the 1921–1922 Washington Conference as well as in arbitration negotiations and, on several occasions, on the Council of the League of Nations. He died in Ottawa, Canada, on 10 June 1937.

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See also

[Canada, Role in War](#); [League of Nations Covenant](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#).

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Brătianu, Ionel (1864–1927)

Romanian politician and prime minister. Born at Florica, his family estate near Bucharest, on 20 August 1864, Ionel (known as Ion I. C.) Brătianu was educated in Paris. As with many aristocratic Romanians, he was outwardly highly gallicized. Brătianu entered Romanian politics in 1895, quickly attaining cabinet rank. Handsome, able, unscrupulous, and a skillful negotiator, he first became prime minister in 1909, heading eleven cabinets over the next eighteen years and, even when not formally in power, dominating Romanian politics.

World War I gave Brătianu, prime minister from early 1914 to April 1918, the opportunity to employ his talents for intrigue in a single-minded quest to win territories that Romanian leaders had long coveted. Following prolonged bargaining with both sides, in October 1915 Brătianu signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Russia, promising Romania substantial territories in return for mere neutrality. To mollify Germany, Brătianu continued to supply much-needed Romanian grain. In 1916, however, Entente pressure for Romanian intervention intensified, and Brătianu feared that unless Romania actively joined the war, Russia would revoke her pledges. In August 1916 Romania declared war on the Central Powers, quickly bringing military disaster as German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish forces assailed Romania, seizing much of the country. Promised Allied strategic assistance never materialized. In December 1917 Brătianu signed an armistice with Germany, resigning as premier shortly before his carefully selected successor, Alexandru Marghiloman, signed the humiliating Peace of Bucharest in May 1918.

On 10 November 1918, one day before the Allied armistice with Germany, Romania declared war on the Central Powers, subsequently claiming that its earlier peace treaty merely represented a truce. Brătianu formally resumed power in December 1918, attending the Paris Peace Treaty and brazenly demanding the territories promised Romania under the 1915 Bucharest Treaty. Although American and British officials disliked him personally, the occupation of much of this territory by Romanian forces during 1919, in the confused conflicts that succeeded the war, strengthened his hand. Under the subsequent peace treaties with the former Central Powers, Romania ultimately doubled in size and population, obtaining Transylvania, Bessarabia, and the Bukovina. From September 1919 until January 1922 when he resumed office, Brătianu relinquished the premiership to direct affairs behind the scenes. He died in Bucharest on 24 November 1927.

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See also

[Bucharest, Treaty of](#); [Marghiloman, Alexandru](#); [Romania, Role in War](#).

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Brittain, Vera Mary (1893–1970)

British author, feminist, and pacifist. Born on 29 December 1893 in Newcastle under Lyme, Vera Brittain was the daughter of a prosperous paper manufacturer. Rejecting the conventional path of marriage and family in favor of feminist education and a writer's career, in 1914 she overcame some parental skepticism and passed the entrance examination for Somerville College, Oxford.

Although Brittain went up to Oxford that autumn, the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 completely disrupted her studies and life. She had expected to enter Oxford simultaneously with her younger brother Edward and his closest school friend, Roland Leighton, to whom she was already much attracted. Instead, that autumn the two young men, together with a third schoolfellow, Victor Richardson, joined the army, a decision Brittain at that time romanticized and applauded. Within a few months all were sent to fight in France, and before Leighton left for the front he and Brittain became engaged.

In the summer of 1915 Brittain temporarily dropped her Oxford studies to join the Volunteer Aid Detachment (VAD) nursing wounded soldiers. In December 1915 Leighton, whom she expected home on Christmas leave, was killed in action. Over the next three years Geoffrey Thurlow, another young volunteer officer who had become Edward Brittain's closest friend, Richardson, and finally, in June 1918, her brother were killed in action. Almost two decades later, she discovered that her brother might well have deliberately sought death in action rather than face a court-martial for homosexual relations with enlisted men.

Devastated by her successive losses, Brittain returned to Oxford where she finished her history degree in 1920 and formed a close friendship with Winifred Holtby, a fellow student who shared her goal of becoming a professional writer. In the 1920s both women lived in London, became well-known journalists, and published novels, including one by Brittain based on her war experiences. Brittain also became a staunch pacifist and a strong supporter of the League of Nations. It was, however, the publication in 1933 of the autobiographical *Testament of Youth*, based on her wartime diaries, that won her real fame as a prominent voice of the wartime "lost generation."

In 1925 Brittain married George Catlin, an academic several years younger than herself with whom she had two children, one of them the future Labour Party politician Shirley (228) Williams. Throughout her life Brittain remained a

dedicated pacifist, opposing British and American intervention in World War II and publicly condemning the Allied wartime firebombing of German and Japanese cities. Brittain died in London on 29 March 1970.

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See also

[Brooke, Rupert](#); [Graves, Robert Ranke](#); [Literature and the War](#); [Pacifism](#); [Sassoon, Siegfried](#).

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Broqueville, Charles de, Baron (1860–1940)

Belgian politician and premier. Born near Moll, Belgium, at Postel, his family estate, on 4 December 1860, Charles Marie Pierre Albert de Broqueville entered politics in his twenties, winning election to the Belgian parliament as a member of the Catholic Party in 1892. In 1910 he became minister of railroads, post, and telegraphs, his first cabinet position, and in 1911 he became premier. The 1911 Agadir Crisis converted Broqueville, previously a longtime opponent of military expansion, into a staunch advocate of military preparedness, and in 1912 he assumed the war minister's portfolio himself and began to build up and reform the Belgian army. Even so, he rebuffed all Anglo-French overtures regarding potential Belgian wartime military collaboration, insisting that Belgium, although relatively small, could repel any invader unassisted.

On 2 August 1914, Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium demanding military access to its territory. With King Albert I, Broqueville told Parliament that Belgium rejected this and would fight any invasion with all its strength. He invited representatives of his leftist political opponents into an expanded war cabinet. As German forces overran most of Belgium, leaving the king and the armed forces defending only a small portion of western Belgium, the Belgian government moved to Le Havre in France. Broqueville stifled criticisms that he had failed to mount a delaying action against Germany near Brussels by dispatching a mission to the neutral United States, which generated substantial U.S. material assistance for Belgium.

As the war progressed, Broqueville and most of the cabinet became increasingly bellicose, rejecting suggestions that Belgium should negotiate peace with Germany and urging that postwar Belgium abandon its status of permanent neutrality and seek substantial territorial expansion at the expense of Germany and the Netherlands. King Albert, who by 1916 favored peace negotiations with Germany, generally served as a moderating influence upon the premier, and by October 1917 Albert had convinced him that an Allied victory was unattainable. The protracted military stalemate finally led Broqueville, who had by then exchanged the war portfolio for the Foreign Ministry, to seek a compromise peace, whereupon his outraged political colleagues forced him from the Foreign Ministry in January 1918 and the premiership four months later.

In 1919 Broqueville became minister of the interior, in 1926 minister of war, and from 1932 to 1934 he once again served as premier. He died in Brussels on 5 September 1940.

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See also

[Albert I, King of Belgium](#); [Belgium, Army](#); [Belgium, German Occupation of](#); [Commission for the Relief of Belgium](#).

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Buchan, Sir John, 1st Baron Tweedsmuir (1875–1940)

British novelist and director of foreign propaganda. Born at Perth, Scotland, on 26 August 1875, John Buchan graduated from the University of Glasgow. He studied at Brasenose College, Oxford, where he won first class honors and major university prizes and was president of the Oxford Union. By the time he left Oxford, Buchan had already published several books and was thought to have a glittering career ahead of him, perhaps as a future prime minister.

Shortly after qualifying as a barrister in 1901, Buchan went to South Africa to assist Lord Alfred Milner in pacifying that country after the Boer War. Under Milner's influence, Buchan acquired a lifelong belief in the need to strengthen the bonds uniting the British Empire. Returning to London in 1903, Buchan spent three years as a barrister and then joined the publishing firm of Thomas A. Nelson. Buchan himself wrote prolifically, publishing a wide array of historical works (both fiction and nonfiction), biographies, and poetry as well as the thrillers for which he would be best remembered, among the latter *The Powerhouse* (1913), *The Thirty-Nine Steps* (1914), *Greenmantle* (1916), *Mr. Standfast* (1918), *The Three Hostages* (1924), and *The Island of Sheep* (1936). A consistent theme in his writing was the thinness of the veneer of civilization and of the safeguards separating and protecting modern society from the destructive forces of unreason and barbarism lurking just below the surface, forces that sometimes infected public figures. Buchan's three best-selling thrillers published during the conflict all dealt with episodes in the war, including its outbreak, the Russian capture of the Turkish citadel of Erzurum, and the final German offensives. They also presented an idealized picture of brave and straightforward protagonists working shoulder to shoulder to defend endangered civilization against the assaults of savage and insensate barbarism and disorder.

When the war began, Buchan tried to enlist but was refused because of an ulcer. Instead, his literary skills were utilized in various propaganda capacities. Buchan's firm published the highly readable *Nelson History of the War*, a best-selling work largely written by Buchan that appeared in twenty-four parts throughout the war. From spring 1915 Buchan was attached as a journalist-observer to the British army, publishing numerous articles describing aspects of the war in *The Times* and the *Daily News*. The official War Propaganda Bureau commissioned him to write separate government-sponsored accounts of the Second Battle of Ypres and the Battles of Jutland, the Somme, and Picardy together with various propaganda booklets. To shore up the Russians, Buchan also helped to produce pamphlets on the war, subsequently translated and

specifically aimed at a Russian audience. He also insisted that propaganda should be fundamentally truthful and not distort facts, even if all could not be revealed.

In June 1916 Buchan was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Intelligence Corps, in which capacity he assisted Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters in France in handling press relations, especially in its dealings with foreign journalists and the preparation of press communiqués and official dispatches on the war. In February 1917 Buchan, now gazetted a lieutenant colonel, was appointed director of the new Department of Information, a bureau based in the Foreign Office, in which capacity he dealt particularly with overseas press representatives and also helped to establish a British Information Bureau in New York. Because of bureaucratic difficulties, the following October Cabinet Minister Sir Edward Carson was appointed head of British Propaganda, a cabinet position, with Buchan under him as director of Foreign Propaganda. In March 1918 Buchan became director of intelligence in the new Ministry of Information, eventually resigning in October 1918. Buchan worked closely with military intelligence officials and often received information gathered through espionage, utilizing it where appropriate when devising propaganda of various types. He also handled much liaison work with foreign countries and arranged for overseas visits by official British representatives. His wartime experience helped to convince Buchan of the importance of close Anglo-American relations; from late 1917 onward he was also concerned by the radical threat from the new Bolshevik regime in Russia.

Buchan found the war personally disillusioning. It brought the deaths of his brother Alastair and of some of his greatest friends. When the war ended Buchan became a strong supporter of the League of Nations in the hope that it would help to prevent future wars, and he also traveled to the United States, stressing the country's common heritage with Britain in his writings. From 1927 to 1935 Buchan was a Conservative member of parliament representing the Scottish universities and a close confidant of Prime Ministers J. Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin. In 1935 the latter appointed him, ennobled as the 1st Baron Tweedsmuir, governor-general of Canada, in which capacity the popular Buchan did much to improve Britain's standing not just in Canada but also in the United States. As European war (237) approached, he served as a trusted advisor to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the latter's efforts to tilt American neutrality policies against Germany and in Britain's favor. Buchan died in office in Montreal, Canada, on 11 February 1940.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Art and the War](#); [Censorship](#); [Film and the War](#); [Haig, Douglas, 1st Earl](#); [Intelligence and Counterintelligence](#); [Literature and the War](#); [Milner, Alfred, 1st Viscount](#); [Propaganda](#).

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C

Calthorpe, Sir Somerset (1864–1937)

British navy admiral. Born in London on 23 December 1864, Somerset Arthur Gough Calthorpe was the second son of the seventh Baron Calthorpe. He entered the Royal Navy in 1878, displayed considerable ability, and won quick promotion to lieutenant in 1886, commander in 1896, and post captain in 1902. Fluent in French, in the early 1900s Calthorpe spent three years as naval attaché to Russia, Sweden, and Norway, subsequently holding cruiser and battleship commands and serving as captain of the fleet to the innovative Sir W. H. May, who valued highly his subordinate's advice and judgment. Promoted to rear admiral in 1911, Calthorpe served the following year on the Board of Trade *Titanic* inquiry.

From 1914 to 1916, Calthorpe commanded the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and as a vice admiral in 1916 he became second sea lord. In the summer of 1917 he was appointed commander-in-chief of all British naval forces in the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Aegean. Though theoretically under the authority of French Admiral Dominique-Marie Gauchet, the Allied commander-in-chief in that sea, in practice Calthorpe, who controlled the Malta-based central routing control center for shipping, sought to win British control of the antisubmarine campaign. Calthorpe worked with French, Italian, Japanese, Greek, and U.S. naval allies to try to protect more than 1,000 Allied merchant vessels active in the Mediterranean. He gradually introduced a naval convoying (250) system, although it was plagued by insufficient numbers of convoy escorts. Indeed, since they could not provide full protection to Mediterranean shipping, Calthorpe remained somewhat dubious as to the value of convoys and unsuccessfully sought Admiralty permission to divert forces to the Otranto barrage.

As Germany and Austria-Hungary neared collapse in October 1918, the Admiralty empowered Calthorpe to conduct armistice negotiations, from which French representatives would be excluded, with Turkey. To Gauchet's fury, Calthorpe did so and on 30 October 1918 concluded an armistice with Turkish plenipotentiaries at Mudros. He proceeded to lead the combined Allied fleet through the Dardanelles, anchoring off Constantinople on 16 November 1918, and spent the next year as British high commissioner to Turkey.

Promoted to full admiral in 1919, from 1920 to 1923 Calthorpe was commander-in-chief, Portsmouth. He then became principal naval aide-de-

camp to King George V. In 1925 Calthorpe was named admiral of the fleet and served as Admiralty representative on the League of Nations armaments commission. He retired in 1930 and died at Ryde, Isle of Wight, on 27 July 1937.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Gauchet, Dominique-Marie](#); [Great Britain, Navy](#).

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Commission for the Relief of Belgium (CRB) (1914–1918)

Most prominent relief organization assisting Belgians suffering from the 1914 German invasion. Herbert Hoover established the Commission for the Relief of Belgium (CRB) in London as a private organization to provide relief to the growing number of Belgians who had either fled German invasion or were living under German occupation and were very short of food. Although Great Britain's stated reason for entering the war was to defend Belgium's neutrality, the latter country eventually declared war on Germany but never joined the (308) Entente alliance. At Belgian instigation, from 1914 to 1917 American diplomats, officials, and private figures played the largest part in establishing, staffing, and financing the CRB, which was headed by Hoover, a wealthy American mining engineer who, having made a fortune, sought a new outlet for his considerable energies.

Leading British officials often resented Hoover's forceful but decidedly tactless neutral attitude toward the conflict and his single-minded concentration on assisting the Belgians whether or not this facilitated the German war effort. They also subjected ships carrying CRB cargoes to searches for contraband. German officials theoretically tolerated CRB activities but were exceedingly officious toward and suspicious of CRB representatives, and German officials arrogated to their own purposes at least some of the goods earmarked for Belgium. Despite these difficulties, in two and a half years the CRB administered without scandal funds totaling more than \$200 million, transported to Belgium and distributed more than 2.5 million tons of foodstuffs, helped to feed more 9 million individuals, and in many cases provided employment to the destitute.

In April 1917, as German submarines began to sink ships carrying CRB goods and as U.S. intervention in World War I approached, the American CRB staff withdrew, handing over responsibilities to neutral Dutch and Spanish personnel. Hoover's work with the CRB also marked the beginning of his reputation as a great humanitarian, the foundation of his subsequent political career.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Belgium, German Occupation of](#); [Hoover, Herbert Clark](#); [Hymans, Paul](#); [Whitlock, Brand](#).

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G

Gerard, James Watson (1867–1951)

United States diplomat and ambassador to Germany. Born in Geneseo, New York, on 25 August 1867, James Gerard as a young man entered the law firm founded by his grandfather, married an heiress, and became active in Democratic Party politics in New York, contributing substantially in 1912 to Woodrow Wilson's presidential campaign.

Gerard's reward came in 1913 with his appointment, despite having no previous diplomatic experience, as ambassador to Germany, which he remained until early 1917 when the two countries severed relations prior to declaring war on each other. Gerard disliked the imperial pomp and circumstance and militarist atmosphere of Kaiser Wilhelm II's court, and he presented himself as a forthright democrat and civilian.

Gerard's relations with imperial German officials were never satisfactory because the latter demonstrated their support for Mexican dictator General Victoriano Huerta, whom the Wilson administration opposed. In addition, the imperial court declared its nonacquiescence in the Monroe Doctrine. When World War I began, Wilson soon came to feel that Gerard's undisguised anti-Germanism and forthright style were liabilities rather than assets, which compromised his effectiveness. Gerard protested bluntly against German submarine attacks on ships carrying American civilians, notably after the May 1915 sinking of the passenger liner *Lusitania* and the March 1916 attack on the channel steamer *Sussex*. He firmly rebuffed suggestions by German officials that should their two countries go to war, the U.S. government would be toppled by resentful German-American protests. Gerard attempted to cultivate influential German politicians, but his contacts had little impact on the course of diplomatic relations.

In Berlin, Gerard had the thankless task of representing the interests of several Allied nations, including Great Britain, Japan, Serbia, and Romania, that had broken relations with Germany and relaying complaints between their governments and German officials. He became heavily involved in efforts to improve conditions in POW camps and to assist relief activities in Belgium and Poland. Before leaving Germany, Gerard refused German requests to sign documents altering the texts of American treaties with Prussia so as to provide greater wartime protection for German citizens and property in the United

States. Although Wilson administration officials tended to denigrate him, on his return the American public gave Gerard a hero's welcome.

Gerard remained prominent in Democratic Party politics at the state and national level until after World War II. He supported U.S. membership in the League of Nations, vigorously opposed Adolf Hitler, and campaigned strongly for American intervention in World War II and for Lend-Lease aid to Britain. Shortly before Gerard's death, President Harry S. Truman appointed him to a committee to supervise Point Four economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. Gerard died on 6 September, 1951, at Southampton, Long Island, New York.

Priscilla Roberts

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See also

[Lusitania, Sinking of](#); [Wilhelm II, Kaiser](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#); [Zimmermann Telegram](#).

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H

(535)

Hall, Sir William Reginald (1870–1943)

British navy admiral. Born on 28 June 1870 at Britford, Wiltshire, William Reginald Hall was known as “Blinker” because of a pronounced facial twitch. Hall joined the Royal Navy in 1884. Specializing in gunnery, he held routine assignments and achieved the rank of captain in 1905. During 1906–1907 he was an inspector of mechanical training, and during 1911–1913 he served as an assistant controller of the navy.

At the outbreak of World War I, Hall commanded the battle cruiser *Queen Mary*, but he was forced to give up that command three months into the war because of his health. In October 1914 Hall was appointed director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). While at DNI, Hall oversaw Room 40 in the Old Admiralty Building of London, an intelligence office that monitored German diplomatic and military radio communications.

Hall’s Room 40 monitored and deciphered intercepted German radio signals, in part using the codebook captured from the German light cruiser *Magdeburg*. In May and June 1916, Room 40 intercepted German radio signals that resulted in the Battle of Jutland. Room 40 also helped in the surveillance of Irish spies, such as Sir Roger Casement, and relayed other intelligence. One of the greatest accomplishments by Room 40 was the interception and decoding of the so-called Zimmermann Telegram on 17 January 1917.

Hall was widely regarded as the premier intelligence officer of his time, and in recognition of his contributions to British Intelligence, especially for the interception of the Zimmermann Telegram, he was knighted and promoted to rear admiral in 1918. In 1919 Hall retired from active duty with the Royal Navy.

In the 1920s Hall served in Parliament as a Conservative from West Derby, Liverpool. An internationalist, throughout the 1920s and 1930s Hall traveled and lectured in the United States. At the beginning of World War II, Hall, too old for active service, served in the British Home Guard. Hall died in London on 22 October 1943.

Josh Bandy and Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Intelligence and Counterintelligence](#); [Jutland, Battle of](#); [Magdeburg, SMS](#); [Zimmermann Telegram](#).

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Hankey, Maurice, 1st Baron (1877–1963)

British civil servant and secretary to the British Committee of Imperial Defence. Born in Biarritz, France, on 1 April 1877, Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey was educated at Rugby School (538) and joined the British navy, graduating first in his class from the Royal Naval College in 1899. In 1902 Hankey was transferred to the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Department. He left the navy in 1907 and the next year became assistant secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, in 1912 becoming its secretary.

After World War I began, Hankey assumed additional responsibilities as secretary to the War Council, the Dardanelles Committee, and the War Committee. He soon became concerned that the British cabinet's awkwardly large membership of twenty-two men, the assorted wartime committees' overlapping responsibilities, and the lack of either a dedicated cabinet secretariat staff or accurate cabinet record-keeping impeded the efficient prosecution of the war effort and the effective functioning of government. The 1915 Dardanelles disaster and the massive British loss of life at the Battle of the Somme in 1916 further convinced Hankey that stronger, centralized executive direction of the war effort was essential. In collaboration with Secretary of State for War David Lloyd George, in late 1916 Hankey negotiated with Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith for the creation of a small War Committee to take over direct responsibility for the war's prosecution. A humiliated Asquith eventually chose to resign. Lloyd George succeeded him, quickly accepting Hankey's proposal for a permanent cabinet secretariat and establishing a small five-man War Cabinet headed by himself, which included only one minister with formal departmental responsibilities, to oversee the war effort.

Hankey served as secretary to both this body and the full cabinet, and Lloyd George frequently sought his advice on defense questions, trusting him to provide an objective and unbiased perspective, something he could not obtain from the various military services. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Hankey served as secretary to both the British Empire delegation and the Council of Four, including Lloyd George and his U.S., French, and Italian counterparts, which made many of the most crucial conference decisions. Hankey remained secretary to the cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence until he retired in 1938 with a peerage. After lengthy delay because of governmental official secrecy policies, he eventually published a rather sanitized diary account of his wartime experiences. Hankey died in Limpsfield, England, on 26 January 1963.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Asquith, Herbert Henry, 1st Earl](#); [Dardanelles Campaign](#); [Gallipoli Campaign](#); [Lloyd George, David](#); [Milner, Alfred, 1st Viscount](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#); [Somme Offensive](#).

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(568)

Hymans, Paul (1865–1941)

Belgian Liberal politician, ambassador to Great Britain, and foreign minister. Born in Ixelles, Belgium, on 23 March 1865, Paul Hymans was elected to the Belgian parliament in 1894 as a Liberal. He successfully pushed such reforms as terminating the Belgian king's personal dominion over the Congo in 1908 and the 1909 reform of Belgium's conscription system.

When World War I began, in August–September 1914 Hymans headed a successful mission to the United States that won Belgium food and moral support from President Woodrow Wilson's administration and led to the establishment of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium. Appointed ambassador to Britain in 1915, Hymans sought to mitigate the potentially detrimental diplomatic consequences of Belgium's refusal to declare itself an outright member of the Allies. In February 1916 he obtained the Declaration of Sainte-Adresse, whereby Britain, France, and Russia promised to include Belgium in the peace negotiations, restore its independence, and force Germany to make financial and economic restitution to Belgium.

In October 1917 Hymans became Belgian minister-in-exile for foreign affairs. In January 1918 he became foreign minister, in which capacity he headed the Belgian delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. He attained his objectives of ending the neutral status supposedly but ineffectively guaranteed Belgium since 1839 and giving Belgium the highest priority to receive reparations from Germany. Belgium failed, however, to win the territorial gains Hymans sought, including much of Holland and all of Luxembourg, though Hymans did secure for Belgium the border enclaves of Eupen and Malmédy and some African protectorates. Infuriated by the manner in which the Great Powers at Paris excluded smaller nations and settled matters among themselves in the Council of Four, Hymans quickly became a spokesman for the minor powers, a role that brought his election as president of the first assembly of the League of Nations.

In 1921 Hymans was instrumental in establishing a customs union between Belgium and Luxembourg. From 1924 to 1935 he served almost continuously as Belgian foreign minister, helping to win international support for the 1924 Dawes Plan revising German reparation payments and to negotiate the 1925 Locarno Treaties. He also wrote prolifically on history and politics. When

Germany invaded Belgium in May 1940, Hymans fled to France. He died in Nice on 6 March 1941.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Albert I, King of Belgium](#); [Broqueville, Charles de, Baron](#); [Commission for the Relief of Belgium](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#); [Sainte Adresse, Declaration of](#); [Versailles, Treaty of](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#).

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J

(603)

J. P. Morgan and Company

Leading private banking house, which handled the bulk of U.S. war financing for the Allies until the United States entered the war. In December 1914 Henry Davison, a prominent partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, the leading private merchant bank of the United States, negotiated agreements with the British and French governments. J. P. Morgan and Company would act as their agent, coordinating the vast and growing war purchases both countries were making in the United States, with the objective of systematizing these so as to obtain such goods at the lowest possible price. The staunchly pro-Allied Morgan firm also provided the Allies with credits and overdraft facilities for such purchases and lobbied the U.S. government to relax its restrictions on the floating of private war loans for the Allied governments on the American market.

When the administration of President Woodrow Wilson finally relaxed restrictions in the summer of 1915, the Morgan firm offered the \$500 million Anglo-French loan on behalf of the British and French governments, the first of a total of \$1.05 billion of such securities marketed between then and January 1917. These funds helped the British to maintain sterling exchange at a parity of \$4.86, reducing the cost of their massive U.S. purchases. Despite efforts by the Morgan firm to depict such securities as highly desirable investments, Americans remained wary of them and by late 1916 the Morgan partners found it increasingly difficult in the United States to raise even small sums for the Allies. The Morgan firm's assistance, though lucrative to itself, was genuinely valuable to the Allies, but in terms of publicity the bank's considerable political unpopularity proved decidedly disadvantageous to the Allied image.

Allied financial dependence and the leverage this gave U.S. officials was demonstrated in November and December 1916 when the Federal Reserve Board warned U.S. investors against buying further foreign securities. Allied credit plummeted, and British dollar reserves speedily became virtually exhausted. Wilson engineered this crisis, which horrified the Morgan firm, in part to pressure Britain and France to agree to his proposal of a negotiated peace with Germany. The German decision of January 1917 to resume unlimited submarine warfare against Allied shipping effectively blocked this scheme, and in April 1917 the United States declared war on Germany, an

event the Morgan partners welcomed. Except for loans to Russia, the Morgan Allied loans were all repaid by the early 1920s.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Submarine Warfare, Central Powers](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#).

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L

(667)

Lake, Sir Percival (1855–1940)

British army general. Born on 29 June 1855 in Tenby, Wales, Percival Henry Noel Lake joined British army's 59th Regiment of Foot in 1873. He fought in the 1878–1879 Second Afghan War and graduated with honors from the Army Staff College in 1884. In 1885 he distinguished himself in the Sudan, subsequently serving in the War Department Intelligence Office. From 1904 to 1907, as chief of the General Staff, Canadian Militia, Lake greatly enhanced that organization's efficiency. He then spent three years as the Canadian government's chief military advisor. In 1912 Lake, now a lieutenant-general, became chief of the General Staff in Simla, India, where he was a major architect of reforms that substantially enhanced the Indian army's efficiency. In 1915 Lake was part of an Indian military force of 65,000 men that the British government dispatched to secure the Mesopotamian oil fields. After General Sir John Nixon failed to relieve 13,000 troops under Major-General Sir Charles Townshend, besieged by the Turks in the Kut-al-Amara fortress, in January 1916 Lake replaced him as commander-in-chief in Mesopotamia.

Lake made three further efforts to break the siege of Kut, all unsuccessful. Despite his force's size, he could only field 14,000 men and forty-six guns, with an additional 11,000 troops and twenty-eight guns as reinforcements, while the well-entrenched Turkish forces had approximately equivalent effective manpower. On 29 April 1916, Townshend surrendered. Apart from those men captured at Kut, the relief operations cost 23,000 British casualties, as opposed to around 10,000 for the Turks.

In August 1916 General Sir Frederick Maude took over from Lake, who returned to Britain to testify before the Mesopotamia Commission. Maude's evidence as to Lake's excellent foundation work exonerated him from blame for Kut, and he was knighted in 1916. The following May, Lake assumed a position in the Ministry of Munitions. In November 1919 he retired from the army and returned to Canada, settling in Victoria, British Columbia, where he died on 17 November 1940.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Kut, Siege of](#); [Maude, Sir Frederick Stanley](#); [Mesopotamian Theater](#); [Nixon, Sir John Eccles](#); [Townshend, Sir Charles](#).

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M

Marghiloman, Alexandru (1854–1925)

Romanian politician and premier. Born in Buzau, Wallachia, on 4 July 1854, five years before Wallachia and Moldavia formed an autonomous Romanian state, Alexandru Marghiloman studied law and political science in Paris. In 1884 he began his political career in Romania's Conservative Party and was its leader when World War I began in 1914. Romanians, including Conservatives, were divided over whether to support the Entente or the Central Powers. From 3 August 1914 Marghiloman, who had favored close prewar links with Germany, consistently supported Romanian neutrality, although he also tried to use the exigencies of war to extract from Austria-Hungary better treatment for Romanian minorities within the Dual Monarchy.

Marghiloman deplored the October 1915 Treaty of Bucharest, whereby Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu pledged that Romania would eventually join the Allies. He correctly believed that this would bring military disaster, which indeed resulted from Romanian intervention in August 1916. German troops then occupied much of the country, including Bucharest, and Marghiloman, also president of the Romanian Red Cross, remained in Bucharest to mediate between Germans and Romanians. He was credited with persuading German officials to leave King Ferdinand in place. Thanks to Brătianu's backing and machinations, on 18 March 1918 Marghiloman became premier, in the hope that Germany would therefore grant Romania more favorable peace terms. In spring 1918 Germany did indeed allow Romania to annex Bessarabia from Russia, but otherwise the projected peace terms were harsh.

Marghiloman tried to maintain himself in power through rigged elections and by persecuting prominent Liberal politicians, but in autumn 1918 Allied military successes undercut the fundamental rationale of his premiership, and he left office on 6 November. Romania abrogated its peace agreements (747) with Germany, declaring war one day before the armistice, while King Ferdinand reinstalled Brătianu as premier to represent Romania at the Paris Peace Conference.

Marghiloman remained politically active, justifying his wartime behavior as impelled by a patriotic desire to moderate German hostility toward defeated Romania, but his collaboration with Germany permanently compromised his political standing. Marghiloman died in Buzau on 10 May 1925.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Brătianu, Ionel](#); [Bucharest, Treaty of](#); [Ferdinand I, King of Romania](#); [Romania, Role in War](#).

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(754)

Martin-Leake, Arthur (1874–1953)

British military surgeon and the first man ever twice awarded the Victoria Cross. Born at Standen, Hertfordshire, England, on 4 April 1874, Arthur Martin-Leake was educated at Westminster School and University College Hospital, London, and became a surgeon. Martin-Leake then joined the Indian Railway Service, spending thirty-four years as chief medical officer of the Bengal-Nagpur Railway. As a surgeon-captain with the South African Constabulary during the 1899–1902 Boer War, he received his first Victoria Cross, the highest British gallantry award, given for self-sacrifice and devotion to duty. On 8 February 1902, at Vlakfontein in the Transvaal, Martin-Leake ignored intense fire from forty Boer riflemen to go forward within 100 yards of the enemy in order to dress an injured soldier's wounds. While attending another badly wounded officer Martin-Leake himself was shot and wounded, but he continued working until he was entirely exhausted.

After the Boer War Martin-Leake returned to India. When World War I began in 1914 he feared that his age would bar him from military service. He therefore traveled independently to Paris, where he enlisted at the British Embassy and forthwith attached himself to the 5th Field Ambulance, the first medical unit he encountered. In late October 1914 Martin-Leake took part in the First Battle of Ypres. Throughout the battle, he showed conspicuous courage and determination to assist the wounded, repeatedly risking fierce enemy fire to rescue many British wounded who were lying near German positions. His heroism was recognized with a bar to his Victoria Cross, making him the first individual so honored and one of only three men—the others being Captain Noel G. Chavasse, also of the Royal Army Medical Corps, during World War I, and Captain Charles H. Upham of the Canterbury Regiment of New Zealand, during World War II—ever to win the award twice.

Martin-Leake served throughout the war and after demobilization returned to the Indian Railways until he retired in 1932. During World War II he commanded a mobile Air Raid Patrol unit. Martin-Leake died at Ware, Hertfordshire, on 22 June 1953.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Medals and Decorations](#); [Medicine in the War](#); [Ypres, First Battle of](#).

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Marwitz, Georg von der (1856–1929)

O

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele (1860–1952)

Italian political leader and premier. Born on 19 May 1860, at Palermo, Sicily, Vittorio Orlando taught law at the University of Palermo and won recognition as an eminent jurist. In 1897 he became a member of the Chamber of Deputies, serving as minister of public instruction from 1903 to 1905 and minister of justice from 1907 to 1909 and again from 1914 to June 1916. In May 1915, a year before Orlando become minister of the interior under Premier Paolo Boselli, Italy joined the Allies in World War I. Domestic antiwar sentiment was increasing, and Orlando, seeking to maintain parliamentary support for the government, initially chose to respond with conciliatory, persuasive tactics rather than repression.

Skilled at maneuvering political shoals, Orlando became premier after Italy's disastrous October 1917 defeat at Caporetto. He successfully organized a patriotic national united front government, the *Unione Sacra*, dedicated to full-scale domestic mobilization for war. A stirring orator, Orlando revitalized national morale. Antiwar Socialists now encountered domestic repression. Orlando also asked Britain and France for additional forces, reorganized the army, replaced General Luigi Cadorna as chief of staff with the younger General Armando Diaz, and in October 1918 forced the latter to (866) launch the successful Vittorio Veneto campaign in which Italy defeated Austria.

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Orlando was one of the Council of Four, the premiers or presidents of the "Big Four" Allied and Associated Powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy—who effectively decided on the most important issues. The fact that Orlando spoke French but no English handicapped him, especially in his dealings with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Moreover, although Orlando genuinely hoped for a lasting peace settlement, the Treaty of London of 1915 promised to Italy the territory of Dalmatia on the Adriatic coast, and this commitment clashed with Wilson's newly expressed ideals of national self-determination. In addition, although this was not covered by the treaty, Orlando coveted the Italian-speaking port of Fiume. Domestic unrest caused by Italy's large war debt and the country's 500,000 casualties made any compromise on these demands extremely problematic.

Orlando hoped to win Fiume in exchange for Italian support for Wilson's greatest objective, the League of Nations, a bargain Wilson refused even

though Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clemenceau initially favored awarding Italy the city. Orlando emotionally demanded both Dalmatia, under the Treaty of London's provisions, and Fiume, as a matter of self-determination, even though it was surrounded by Slavic areas and Yugoslavia therefore also claimed the port. Even Lloyd George and Clemenceau considered Orlando's pleas both inconsistent and unreasonable. Orlando also contended that without Fiume, Italy would experience political upheaval. When Wilson addressed a manifesto directly to the Italian populace, urging them to reject what he considered Orlando's unjust and excessive territorial demands, Orlando left the conference in late April 1919, expecting an apology from Wilson that never came. Orlando only returned in late May, just in time to sign the final treaty.

Overall, the Italian public apparently supported Orlando's position, but this did not affect the conference's settlement on Fiume, which was declared a free port but was annexed by Italian forces in November 1920. Although Italy obtained Trent, Trieste, Istria, and the Brenner, Orlando fell from power in June 1919 under fierce attacks for not securing more for his country.

Orlando initially tacitly endorsed the rise of Benito Mussolini and the Fascist movement, but he left politics in 1925 when the Fascist assassination of the liberal Giacomo Matteotti made it clear that Italian democracy had become a mere facade. After World War II he resumed his political career as president of the postwar constituent assembly. He died in Rome on 1 December 1952.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Boselli, Paolo](#); [Cadorna, Luigi](#); [Caporetto, Battle of](#); [Clemenceau, Georges](#); [D'Annunzio, Gabriele](#); [Diaz, Armando](#); [Italy, Home Front](#); [League of Nations Covenant](#); [Lloyd George, David](#); [London, Treaty of](#); [Mussolini, Benito](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#); [Versailles, Treaty of](#); [Vittorio Veneto, Battle of](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#).

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P

Pacifism

Pacifism may be defined as a doctrinaire insistence on peace regardless of the consequences. In the decades before World War I, pacifism was becoming a force in international politics and intellectual thought. Marked by opposition to war, killing, or violence, pacifism means literally “to make peace.” Pacifists believed that nations should settle their conflicts by peaceful means, and many pacifists therefore opposed individual or state participation in military activities. Although socialists were represented in the movement, the majority of prewar pacifists were not socialists, and many, indeed, believed that any association with socialism would damage their endeavors. Many were pacifists based on Christian religious convictions. Others were moderates, even conservatives, who nonetheless sought to promote the cause of peace through machinery for international arbitration and disarmament. While all pacifists shared the objectives of peace and justice, the degree of nonviolence they endorsed and the circumstances in which they felt this appropriate varied from individual to individual and group to group, making it quite impossible to characterize pacifism as a single movement.

To facilitate internationalism and encourage steps toward world peace, by the later nineteenth century pacifists had organized. Even before 1870 peace societies existed in Great Britain, the United States, Switzerland, and France. By 1914 there were some 160 such organizations, with many branches and an enormous total membership. One weakness of the peace movement was its failure to fuse the many separate (883) organizations into one international society with a definite program. By the 1890s, however, peace advocates held yearly international congresses.

Many were drawn into the peace movement not merely by their hatred of war but also for economic reasons. Abolishing war would lift a heavy financial burden from the peoples of the world, freeing up additional funding to promote education and social progress. Ivan Bloch, a Pole, and Norman Angell, an Englishman, both wrote influential books arguing that the great costs of modern warfare would inevitably bring ruin to victor and vanquished alike. Angell’s *The Great Illusion*, first published in 1910, became an international bestseller that went through many editions and revisions and helped to win him the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize.

In 1899 a notable advance in the cause of international arbitration occurred when the First Hague Peace Conference resulted in the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, popularly known as the Hague Court because it met at the seat of government of the Netherlands. This court was not a permanent tribunal but rather consisted of a list of 132 distinguished jurists, from among whom disputant states might select arbitrators. The Hague Court had no compulsory jurisdiction and no powers to enforce its decisions; its authority rested solely on the willingness of both parties to a dispute to accept and honor its rulings. The court was eventually housed in a magnificent palace erected at The Hague and funded by Andrew Carnegie, the U.S. steel magnate who devoted his final years to the promotion of peace. By 1914 this tribunal had successfully settled several important international cases. The limitations and imperfections of the system were revealed by its inability on several occasions, including August 1914, to prevent states from resorting to war to resolve disputes.

In much of early-twentieth-century Europe socialist parties enjoyed considerable influence; indeed, on the eve of World War I the Social Democratic Party was the largest single part of the German Reichstag. Socialist leaders such as the Russian Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and the French Jean Jaurès had large followings, and socialists generally opposed colonialism, advocated internationalism, and held that peace could only be achieved at the expense of nationalism and capitalism.

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Toward this end, many urged their followers to avoid military service, which was a compulsory obligation in most pre-1914 continental European nations. Others urged the negotiation of arbitration treaties and supported arms reduction proposals. Militant leaders such as the French socialist Gustav Herve advocated industrial sabotage during hostilities so as to impede the war effort. Socialists had organized themselves transnationally in the Second Socialist International, founded in 1889, whose members officially espoused the causes of peace, anti-imperialism, and international brotherhood among the working class as well as supported all efforts to improve the position of labor and the workers. Fears of socialist activities and even of revolution led many European nations to move against socialist organizations once the war began, policies the United States emulated after it finally entered the conflict in spring 1917.

When war came, socialists, the left, labor, and the Second Socialist International split over the war. In each country the majority among them

supported their own government, albeit with reservations toward the war that often intensified over time. Some socialists initially tried to prevent the outbreak of war. French Socialist Party leader Jaurès was a staunch opponent of militarism, although since he recognized the need for a national army he therefore acquiesced in his country's military conscription policies. Jaurès favored democratizing the armed forces and converting them into a purely defensive force. As the July Crisis of 1914 intensified, his call for reconciliation rather than war as a means of settling the issues outstanding between France and Germany, and other powers involved, led to his assassination in Paris by a right-wing fanatic at the end of the month.

Once war began, in every European country patriotism trumped class interests, as the great majority of politicians and others rallied around their national governments, while the working class supported the war effort, either as conscripts or as industrial workers. French, British, German, Austrian, and Russian socialists and workers overall had little appetite for opposing their own governments in ways that might give aid and comfort to enemy nations when, for the most part, they shared the general popular dislike of their own country's opponents.

Everywhere, in Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary alike, national unity became the watchword. Several antiwar British Liberal politicians resigned from the cabinet of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith over the decision to intervene, but despite his earlier criticism of the Boer War and radical reputation the only potential heavyweight opponent, David Lloyd George, the eloquent, charismatic chancellor of the Exchequer, decided to support the war effort. The majority of Labour Party members decided to do likewise, and for the most part those British politicians who dissented from the war, such as J. Ramsay MacDonald, who resigned the chairmanship of the Labour Party and gravitated to the more pacifist Independent Labour Party (ILP), simply chose not to accept government office. Although ILP and Liberal Party members who favored peace as soon as possible came together in November 1914 to establish the Union for Democratic Control, favoring open diplomacy, national self-determination, disarmament, and greater parliamentary control of foreign policy, their program implicitly accepted the British commitment to the existing war.

Not all on the left, however, chose to support the war. Russian socialist leader Lenin and the German Rosa Luxemburg, among others, branded the war an imperialist conflict and condemned those who supported it as traitors to socialism who had betrayed the international proletariat. Appalled when at the

outbreak of war most socialist leaders supported their national governments, they dedicated their energies to, as Lenin put it, “turning the imperialist war into a civil war.” From exile in neutral Switzerland he called on soldiers to turn their rifles on their own officers and inaugurate the world socialist revolution. Lenin became one of the most prominent leaders of the “Zimmerwald Left” transnational grouping of antiwar socialists established in spring 1915. Seeking to turn Lenin’s program to its own advantage, in spring 1917 the German government—which, ironically enough, arrested Luxemburg repeatedly for disseminating pacifist propaganda—arranged for his return to Russia, where in November 1917 he and other Bolsheviks seized power and, shortly afterward, fulfilled German hopes by taking Russia out of the war and negotiating peace with the Central Powers.

Throughout the war, pacifism remained relatively strong in the United States and Britain, at least by comparison with the situation in the Central Powers countries, where repression of dissent was particularly pronounced until at least the war’s final months. In the United States, the country’s neutral status until April 1917 provided particularly fertile soil for peace activities. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was an ardent champion of international arbitration treaties as a means of preserving peace, though he resigned in spring 1915 in protest over what he considered the overly harsh line the administration of President Woodrow Wilson adopted toward Germany over the sinking of the passenger liner the *Lusitania* that May. In 1915 Jane Addams, the leading American social reformer and antiwar activist of her time, organized the Women’s Peace Party (WPP), whose membership grew to 40,000 by April 1917. In 1915 Addams and others joined with like-minded European women gathered in the International Congress of Women at The Hague to form the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

Socialist WPP members such as Tracy D. Mygatt and Frances Witherspoon also joined with Jessie Wallace Hughan and John Haynes Holmes in 1915 to organize the Anti-Enlistment League, a body that sought to discourage young (885) American men from joining the armed forces. In late 1915 the maverick industrialist Henry Ford chartered a passenger liner, the *Oskar II*, to carry a group of American peace activists to Europe to participate in a conference of like-minded European pacifists held at Stockholm in January 1916. Only representatives from the neutral Scandinavian countries joined this gathering, since both the Allied and Central Powers banned participation by their own citizens.

In every belligerent country governments assumed sweeping powers to suppress and punish dissent and could use censorship to silence public opposition to the war. Wartime government repression offered harsh punishment to those who dissented from the war, and censorship soon stilled the voices of conscientious objectors such as the British philosopher Bertrand Russell and such left-wing critics of the war as the Polish-German socialist Rosa Luxemburg. Pervasive waves of intolerant patriotic fervor swept all the belligerents, and only small minorities of radical socialists or labor leaders dared to dissent from the general commitment to war.

In Britain, fears of the introduction of conscription led to the formation in 1914 of the No-Conscription Fellowship. Its numbers swelled substantially when the British government in spring 1916 passed legislation making military enlistments compulsory rather than voluntary. Russell, one of its founders, was imprisoned for urging those of his countrymen who chose to become conscientious objectors to refuse to undertake any work whatsoever related to the war, an option available to those who had strong ethical or religious objections to fighting.

After the United States entered the war in April 1917, the Wilson administration followed suit in repressing dissent. The Sedition Act passed later that spring and its successor, the 1918 Espionage Act, criminalized the making of speeches or publication of materials questioning the validity of the war or encouraging potential enlistees to resist the draft, and newspapers considered insufficiently “patriotic” were closed down. Socialists, radicals, labor activists, and German Americans all became favored targets not just of government repression but also of private vigilante groups, whose actions politicians sanctioned and even encouraged. Conscientious objection was permitted on religious and informally also on ethical grounds, and 25,000 young Americans took advantage of this provision. Five hundred of this number received lengthy prison sentences for refusing to accept any other form of noncombatant service related to the war effort, as did those who refused to register for the draft, such as the young civil rights activist Roger Baldwin, and those who publicly criticized the war, such as the socialist leader Eugene V. Debs.

When pacifistic groups began to raise funds to hire legal counsel for conscientious objectors, many of the organizers were likewise subject to persecution and arrest, while aliens who were for whatever reason considered insufficiently patriotic were liable to deportation. In autumn 1917 the Allied governments also refused passports to labor leaders and leftists from their own countries who wished to attend a conference organized by prominent

international socialists in neutral Stockholm, Sweden, its stated purpose to agree on liberal terms for a compromise peace settlement that the governments and, perhaps more important, the peoples of all the belligerent powers would find acceptable.

Although governments sought desperately to maintain enthusiasm for the war and especially the patriotic fervor of those soldiers actually doing the fighting, as the conflict progressed pacifism of a kind made its way into the trenches. Along certain portions of the line, especially the quieter sectors, it was not uncommon for an unstated peace of sorts, or at least the observation of certain understandings as to the timing and nature of aggressive actions, to take hold between the two sides, a situation sometimes known as the “live-and-let-live” system. During the famous 1914 Christmas Truce on the Western Front, soldiers on opposite sides left their trenches to talk and exchange cigarettes and presents with each other, and even, it was alleged, play a soccer game.

After the disastrous Nivelle offensive, in spring 1917 French troops mutinied and refused to go on the attack, disaffection that eventually spread and affected half the entire French army on the Western Front. That same summer complete units of the Russian army also mutinied after the failure of the great Kerensky or second Brusilov offensive, disorders that contributed to the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. It was also in 1917 that the British officer, war hero, and poet Siegfried Sassoon, already a minor celebrity, became disillusioned with his own country’s reluctance to contemplate a negotiated peace settlement, publicly stating his belief that soldiers were dying in a conflict that was being continued for no valid objective.

The graphic demonstration of the horrors of modern warfare that World War I provided soon served as an enormous boost to the peace movement. Although or perhaps even because they were often reluctant to break with the prevailing prowar consensus in their own countries, many of those Allied liberals and progressives who supported the war devoted considerable energy to efforts to prevent future conflicts. Within a few months of the outbreak of war, private groups in both Great Britain and the United States, most possessing ties to the prewar international arbitration and peace movement, were organizing in support of the establishment of a postwar international organization that would attempt to prevent future wars. In many though not all cases, members of such groups thought an Allied victory the essential prerequisite of their plans. From late 1914 onward James, Viscount Bryce, Liberal statesman and former ambassador to the United States, took the lead in devising British proposals for a postwar “League of Peace” that would prevent future (886) wars by means of

arbitration, backed up, if necessary, by collective economic or military sanctions.

In May 1915 British liberals established a League of Nations Society to promote similar ideas, and for the next two years it carried on quiet propaganda to this effect, gaining a membership of 400 by the end of 1916. The society's supporters were not pacifists, and they carefully avoided criticizing the government's wartime policies or calling for a negotiated peace. Even so, at this time British energies were essentially focused on prosecuting the war effectively rather than on making definite plans for peace.

In the United States, a comparable movement quickly developed. The most prominent group involved was the League to Enforce Peace, established in spring 1915 on the initiative of Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent* journal and a leader in the New York Peace Society. Its founding members included several prominent Republicans, including the lawyer ex-President William Howard Taft; Abbott Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard University; and Theodore Marburg, former U.S. ambassador to Belgium. In June 1915 the newly formed League to Enforce Peace, meeting in Philadelphia, formally adopted a platform calling for U.S. membership in a league of nations with the power to arbitrate international disputes and impose economic and military penalties on countries that went to war and for the promulgation of regular conferences "to formulate and codify rules of international law." Since the United States was still neutral at the time, the organization had greater leeway than its British counterpart to launch a vigorous propaganda campaign throughout the United States, which soon generated considerable public support. Democrats as well as Republicans soon joined the movement, which had the advantage of appealing both to those who supported an Allied victory—and, in many cases, U.S. intervention in the conflict—and those who favored a negotiated peace. In May 1916 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson publicly addressed the first National Congress of the League to Enforce Peace, where he committed the United States in principle to the postwar creation of an international organization to prevent future wars.

British officials had not yet formally endorsed such proposals and would not do so until 1918. In conversations during 1915 and 1916 with Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson's confidential advisor, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, probably motivated by a mixture of genuine conviction and a desire to conciliate the U.S. president, expressed broad support for such ideas and his hope that the United States would be a member of any such organization. Grey

did, however, stress that he was speaking in a personal rather than official capacity and could not commit his government.

In fall 1916 Lord Robert Cecil, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, was assigned to draft proposals on behalf of the British government. He produced a memorandum that was circulated around the Foreign Office and the British cabinet, an attempt to imagine how such a body would be organized and would function. Although Cecil's proposals were modified substantially over the next two years, both by himself and by other officials, this marked the beginning of British government efforts to formulate plans for international organization.

After the United States had entered the war, and especially once Woodrow Wilson pressured the Allies to endorse a "new diplomacy," based on "open covenants openly arrived at," nonpunitive peace principles, and the creation of an international association of nations, principles expressed most eloquently in his "Fourteen Points" speech of January 1918, the other Allied governments had greater incentives to make clearer plans for postwar international organization. After close to three years of costly and still inconclusive warfare, they also had to motivate their own populations to continue the fight. From 1917 onward, therefore, British officials allowed nongovernmental organizations to launch much more extensive publicity efforts on behalf of a postwar league of nations, a cause quickly taken up enthusiastically by liberals and the Labour Party. Strong support for a league of nations also developed in France and in neutral states, especially Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, in all of which societies were formed to publicize the need for postwar international organization and develop blueprints.

Although the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 created a League of Nations, the failure of the United States to join that organization, the absence from it of other leading states for much of the subsequent twenty years, the reluctance of several nations to accept its rulings as binding, and the League's lack of any significant coercive mechanisms to enforce its decisions doomed the new body to failure in its efforts to prevent future conflicts. The events of 1914–1918 often left former soldiers and civilians alike permanently scarred, and some—for example, the former British officer Ralph Partridge and the writer and peace activist Vera Brittain—vowed that no matter what the issue supposedly at stake, such violence settled nothing and must never again be repeated. During the 1930s the spread of such sentiments helped to paralyze the Western powers when they sought to confront and check the demands of the fascist or authoritarian regimes of the military in Japan, Adolf Hitler in Germany, and Benito Mussolini in Italy.

T. Jason Soderstrum, Priscilla Roberts, and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

[Addams, Jane](#); [Angell \(Lane\), Sir Ralph Norman](#); [Brittain, Vera Mary](#); [Bryan, William Jennings](#); [Christmas Truce](#); [Conscientious Objectors](#); [Debs, Eugene Victor](#); [Ford, Henry](#); [France, Army Mutinies](#); [Jaurès, Jean](#); [League of Nations Covenant](#); [Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich](#); [Nivelle Offensive](#); [Peace Overtures during the War](#); [Religion and the War](#); [Russell, Bertrand](#); [Sassoon, Siegfried](#); (887) [Second International](#); [Stockholm Conference](#); [Union of Democratic Control](#); [Women's Peace Party](#); [Zimmerwald Movement](#).

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Pratt, William Veazie (1869–1957)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Belfast, Maine, on 28 February 1869, William Pratt graduated from the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1889. During the Spanish-American War Pratt participated in the blockade of Cuba and helped to suppress the Philippine Insurrection. While an instructor at the Naval War College, Pratt met and became a protégé of the (934) energetic, innovative, and politically well-connected naval officer William Sims, under whom Pratt served from 1913 to 1915 with the Atlantic Fleet's Torpedo Flotilla, where he became known for his tactical planning and leadership skills.

From 1917 to 1919 Pratt was assistant to Admiral William S. Benson, chief of naval operations, with whom Sims, now commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, clashed repeatedly over operational matters. Pratt managed to win the respect of both these powerful personalities and remain on good terms with each, probably because he worked intensively and displayed outstanding administrative ability in organizing the naval war effort, personally handling much of the avalanche of paperwork the war generated. Both Sims and Benson urged his promotion to rear admiral, which came in 1921.

After the war Pratt strongly supported naval limitation, on which he became a recognized expert. In the 1920s he served as president of the Naval War College and held several sea assignments, the last as commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet. Promoted to vice admiral in 1927 and admiral in 1928, Pratt served as chief of naval operations from 1930 to 1933, when he retired. He then wrote extensively on naval events and policy. Pratt died in Chelsea, Massachusetts, on 28 February 1957.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Benson, William Shepherd](#); [Sims, William Sowden](#); [United States, Navy](#).

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R

Reparations

Indemnity payments imposed upon defeated Germany, Austria, and Hungary in compensation for the damage the war had inflicted on the Allied Powers. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the victorious Allied leaders agreed that the Central Powers, especially Germany, were guilty of starting World War I and therefore should be liable for the financial burden of the devastation other European powers had suffered. Precedence for this existed, as Germany had imposed heavy indemnities on France in the Treaty of Frankfurt of May 1871 and on Russia in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk of March 1918. The United States acquiesced in this principle at Paris but demanded no reparations for itself. U.S., British, and French leaders found it impossible to reach a mutually acceptable figure at the conference, while German officials protested that their devastated country lacked the resources to pay even 60 billion gold marks over several decades, the smallest of the figures Allied economic experts at Paris envisaged.

To resolve the deadlock the Allies created a Reparation Commission mandated to determine the total liabilities of Germany and its allies no later than May 1921. After the U.S. Senate repeatedly refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the U.S. government formally withdrew from this body; however, it still kept unofficial but influential “observers” in place. In May 1921 the commission set a total German liability of 132 billion gold marks—50 billion to be funded over thirty-seven years, the remainder at some unspecified future date if and when the commission should decide that Germany could afford to pay.

An unexpressed but widely acknowledged hope was that the U.S. government would cancel a substantial portion of the approximately \$12 billion in war debts that the former Allied governments had incurred to purchase war supplies from U.S. sources, thereby enabling the Allies to be equally lenient toward Germany’s obligations. U.S. officials rejected all attempts to link war debt payments to reparations and strongly resented the 1922 British Balfour Note. The note stated that Britain would seek no more in reparations from its enemies and debt repayments from its allies than it required to repay its own obligations to the United States. Austria and Hungary encountered more modest reparation bills, and having accepted these in principle they were able to raise international loans through the League of Nations for postwar reconstruction, whereupon the Allied governments suspended their reparation payments for twenty years.

The new republican government of Germany, a far wealthier state, initially acquiesced in reparations arrangements, but leading Ruhr industrialists were determined to resist such transfers of funds to the Allies. An exchange crisis quickly resulted, followed by hyperinflation as Germany printed money to meet its internal budget deficit. In early 1922 the German government defaulted on scheduled reparation payments. After lengthy but fruitless negotiations, in January 1923 French Premier Raymond Poincaré sent French troops into Germany's wealthy Ruhr district with the stated intention of extracting payment in kind and forcing Germany to live up to its treaty obligations. Poincaré feared that if Germany could break its obligations in this area, it would do so with the remainder of the treaty as well. The German government now encouraged a program of "passive resistance" from workers in the Ruhr, promising to pay for their patriotic idleness while it appealed to Britain and the United States to press France to withdraw its troops. This pressure was forthcoming, but Poincaré refused to budge; the result was catastrophic, with ruinous inflation in Germany that pauperized the middle class and had much to do with the coming to power of Adolf Hitler a decade later. The occupation also proved costly to France financially, and in the national elections of 1924, the left came to power in that country.

The impasse was broken in 1924 when an international committee of government officials and financiers, headed by the American banker Charles G. Dawes, convened at Paris to reassess Germany's reparations burden. Under the so-called Dawes Plan, German payments were substantially reduced, and both Germany and France obtained large international loans on the European and U.S. financial markets. Although the U.S. government supposedly remained aloof from the Dawes Plan, U.S. officials followed its evolution closely. Dawes and Owen D. Young, another prominent American businessman, took the lead in the committee's deliberations, working closely with the top New York investment bank, J. P. (981) Morgan and Company, the partners of which negotiated the loans underpinning the Dawes Plan. In practice, reparations were paid not from German production but from the proceeds of massive private loans on behalf of assorted German enterprises issued in the U.S. market during the later 1920s.

Even in 1924 many of those involved thought Germany's payments still impracticably high, and in 1929 another committee, headed by Young, reduced the annuities by an additional 20 percent. As the Great Depression gradually intensified after 1929, U.S. loans to Germany dried up, leading Germany to threaten to default on its reparation payments. In 1931 President Herbert Hoover negotiated a one-year moratorium for intergovernmental payments on

both reparations and war debts. At the 1932 Lausanne Conference, the former Allies effectively canceled the remaining reparations burden, demanding only a final token payment, and even this Germany ultimately failed to pay.

Then and later critics such as the highly influential economist John Maynard Keynes attacked the reparations settlement as unworkable economically and part of a broader vengeful attempt to wreak retribution upon Germany and keep that country weak, which was likely to breed future German resentment and precipitate forcible efforts to reverse it. More recently, historians have suggested that economically it would have been quite feasible for Germany to pay those sums fixed by the various reparations settlements, but that whatever their political outlook German leaders would nonetheless have found it politically impossible to continue such protracted payments over the lengthy timespans envisaged.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Brest Litovsk, Treaty of](#); [Hoover, Herbert Clark](#); [J. P. Morgan and Company](#); [Keynes, John Maynard](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#); [Poincaré, Raymond](#); [Rathenau, Walther](#); [Stresemann, Gustav](#); [Versailles, Treaty of](#); [War Debts](#).

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Ribot, Alexandre (1842–1923)

French political leader and premier. Born at St. Omer, France, on 6 February 1842, Alexandre Ribot was a brilliant student who earned a law degree in 1863 and became a judge. Ribot was elected to the National Assembly in 1878, initiating a parliamentary career of forty-five years. An Anglophile and moderate republican, Ribot focused on the areas of government finance and foreign affairs. He was premier during 1892–1893 and again in 1905, but he made his most important contribution to France in this period as foreign minister during 1890–1893, when he was responsible for negotiating the 1892 Franco-Russian Military Convention against Germany.

The Dreyfus Affair nearly ended Ribot's political career, his centrist position alienating both sides. He moved to the Senate in 1909 and failed in a bid for the presidency of France in 1912. He supported the three-year military service law of 1913 and the direct income tax of 1914.

In August 1914 Ribot took the portfolio of minister of finance in the Union Sacrée government, with the heavy responsibility of directing France's finances during the war. A fiscal conservative, Ribot was forced to change his views thanks to the mounting government expenditures for the war. He helped meet these by negotiating loans from Great Britain and from private U.S. bankers, notably the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company. Despite the presence of associated Morgan banking houses in both Paris and London, France found its relationship with the predominantly Anglophile Morgan firm far more difficult than did its British ally and tended to contemplate turning to other sources of U.S. finance, tactics that generated yet further tensions with the somewhat arrogant Morgan partners.

On 20 March 1917, Ribot succeeded Aristide Briand to become the third French premier of the war. Once premier, (983) Ribot initially opposed but eventually capitulated to the demands of French army commander General Robert Nivelle for an offensive against Germany in the Champagne area. The disastrous April 1917 Nivelle offensive caused heavy casualties and extensive mutinies by French troops. Ribot faced attacks from the French left when he rejected overtures for a separate peace with Germany, on the grounds that he would not embark on any negotiations unless these were predicated on the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Radicals also resented Ribot's refusal of passports to French Socialists who sought to attend an international socialist peace conference in Stockholm. The right, meanwhile, assailed him as a defeatist whose handling of internal security matters was inadequate. Ribot

resigned as premier on 7 September 1917, although he remained as foreign minister for an additional month.

Ribot spent the remainder of the war in the Senate. Appalled by the heavy damage to his home district of France, he became a strong advocate of hefty reparations against Germany, but he also opposed territorial acquisitions for France that might lead to a new war. Ribot died in Paris on 13 January 1923.

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See also

[Briand, Aristide](#); [J. P. Morgan and Company](#); [Nivelle, Robert](#); [Nivelle Offensive](#); [Reparations](#); [Stockholm Conference](#); [War Aims](#).

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Roosevelt, Theodore (1858–1919)

U.S. politician and president of the United States during 1901–1909. Born on 27 October 1858 in New York City, Theodore Roosevelt graduated from Harvard University in 1880 and briefly attended Columbia Law School before entering politics. Appointed assistant secretary of the navy under President William McKinley in 1897, he resigned the next year during the Spanish-American War to organize, along with Leonard Wood, the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment (the “Rough Riders”). He fought with that unit in Cuba as a lieutenant colonel and then colonel. Returning home a hero, he was elected governor of New York in 1899. He became vice-president of the United States in 1901 and assumed the presidency upon William McKinley’s assassination on 14 September 1901. Roosevelt was elected president in his own right in 1904.

During his presidency Roosevelt sought to advance U.S. interests abroad. He secured the independence of Panama from Colombia and began construction of the Panama Canal; he brought the warring parties together to end the Russo-Japanese War, which won him the Nobel Prize for Peace (1906). He also expanded the navy and sent the Great White Fleet around the world. Domestically he attacked the great business trusts and promoted conservation of natural resources.

Retiring to private life in 1909, Roosevelt remained active in politics and public life. Upon the outbreak of World War I, Roosevelt’s sympathies were immediately strongly pro-Allied. Roosevelt hoped his country would follow policies that would lead to war with Germany, a preference he deliberately muted in his public statements on the conflict. By 1916 he actively sought to promote military preparedness, convinced that the United States would soon go to war. He also expressed alarm over pacifist sentiment in the nation.

Roosevelt strongly attacked the policies of President Woodrow Wilson for doing too little to protect U.S. rights against Germany, criticisms he expressed particularly strongly during the 1916 presidential campaign. When the United States entered the war in April 1917, Colonel Roosevelt, as he now styled himself, volunteered to raise a division of “horse riflemen” to fight in France after only six weeks’ training. Premier Georges Clemenceau of France supported this as a boost to morale, but President Woodrow Wilson rejected the request. Roosevelt then sought to mobilize the United States behind the war effort. Crisscrossing the nation on speaking (1005) tours, he not only helped unite the country behind the war but also was an active recruiter in Liberty Loan drives. He supported both governmental and private efforts to suppress

antiwar dissent, force all Americans to demonstrate patriotic enthusiasm for the war, and abjure radical political principles.

While Roosevelt himself was unable to serve in the military, all five of his children from his second marriage aided the U.S. cause in Europe. Daughter Ethel served as a nurse in the American Ambulance Hospital in Paris where her husband was a doctor. Son Kermit was a captain in the British army in the Middle East, and when the United States entered the war he became a major in a U.S. artillery unit. Archibald, a captain in the army, was severely wounded in France. Awarded the Croix de Guerre, he was invalided from the service. Theodore Jr., a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, was also wounded and won the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in the battles at Soissons and at the Argonne. Roosevelt's youngest son, Quentin, a pilot in the Army Air Corps, was shot down and killed over France in 1918, a great blow to his father.

Shortly after the war ended, Roosevelt publicly stated his opposition to the establishment of a postwar league of nations as envisaged by Wilson, though he apparently supported a continuation of the U.S. wartime alliance with Britain and France. Roosevelt died on 6 January 1919 at his Sagamore Hill estate at Oyster Bay, New York.

T. Jason Soderstrum and Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Clemenceau, Georges](#); [United States, Home Front](#); [Wilson, Thomas Woodrow](#); [Wood, Leonard](#).

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S

Salvation Army

The Salvation Army, a religious and social service organization of British origin, became a respected, even beloved institution in the United States during the Great War. “General” William Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, had taken quite literally St. Paul’s admonition to “put on the whole armor of Christ.” Resting always on his bedside table had been the two books he most cherished, the Holy Bible and the regulations of the British army. Booth believed that military discipline could be used to fight spiritual as well as temporal enemies. Much of the initial success of his movement, as it moved first into the slums of industrialized British cities, came from its coloration. Converts, always referred to as “recruits,” were themselves from the oppressed classes, ministering to those even less fortunate. They were provided with uniforms, given military titles, and allowed to play any noise-making instrument in Salvation Army “military bands.”

In the jargon of the Salvationists, religious instruction became known as “basic training.” When Salvationists roomed together, their residences were called “barracks.” Joining the group entailed signing “The Articles of War” and a birth into the Salvation Army was referred to as “the arrival of reinforcements,” while death was “promotion to Glory.” The Bible was “the soldier’s manual”; daily devotions were called “rations”; and prayer was “knee drill.” When a city was evangelized by the Salvation Army, new converts were “prisoners captured.” Always, the goal of all “enlisted folk” was service to the poorest and those most in need.

With its military symbolism and discipline, it is not surprising that Booth’s spiritual army empathized with men in combat service to their countries. Salvationists served in the (1047) Royal Navy and the British army. In November 1894, the English Salvationists formed the Naval and Military League, designed to support and comfort Salvation Army servicemen away from home as well as to attend to their religious needs. During the Boer War of 1899–1902, Salvationists mobilized to provide welfare facilities for all men at arms, not merely their own faithful. Throughout the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, the Salvation Army grew in influence, spreading throughout Europe and beyond. Australia became an important center of Salvationist activities. The Salvation Army’s first great missionary, Commander George Scott Railton, had founded branches in

Germany, and Kaiser Wilhelm II had even sent a personal wreath to Booth's funeral in 1912.

The Salvation Army's independence from government financial accountability allowed it to operate with a freedom other agencies lacked. However, this also meant that its achievements were less carefully documented. But the glowing reputation of the Salvation Army volunteers among soldiers returning from foreign battlefields to their homeland and the absence of scandal were a solid tribute to services that the Salvation Army performed.

Booth had envisioned his army as a hereditary autocracy, and members of his family were carefully trained for commanding positions. Though family schisms subsequently destroyed the unity of the Salvation Army, the most effective "commander on the field" was the youngest of Booth's five daughters, Evangeline Cory. A handsome and talented woman, she had earlier in life rejected a number of suitors to dedicate herself fully to the cause. Preaching from the age of 15, she became known for her dramatic illustrated sermons and her musical talents. Later she became a skilled harpist and composed creditable music.

In 1904 Evangeline was appointed supreme commander of the Salvation Army in the United States, a country she fully embraced. Under her leadership, the U.S. branch of the Salvation Army, which had heretofore been associated with immigrant groups in large cities, lost any foreign taint. This was especially true during World War I, when it provided exceptional service to fighting men in France and elsewhere.

From the beginning of World War I the Salvation Army, based overwhelmingly in the Anglo-American territories of the British Empire and the United States, ranged itself on the Allied side. British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Salvationists immediately perceived it as their duty to establish facilities tailored to cater to the physical, emotional, and spiritual welfare of their countries' forces. In Britain, France, and Belgium, and later also in Canada and Australia, the Salvation Army—nicknamed the "Sally Ann" by the troops—set up hostels, canteens, and rest and recreation facilities where soldiers could eat decent food, bathe, relax, and prepare for the often difficult return to the front. Signs on the doors or windows urged passing soldiers to "HOP IN." By 1918 almost 500 Salvation Army hostels or rest centers were in operation, their reach extending as far as Egypt, India, and Palestine, and 800 officers were working in the field. In conditions of considerable danger, Salvation Army personnel, including chaplains, accompanied their forces as

close as they could manage to the fronts in every theater of war. Major William “Fighting Mac” McKenzie, a Salvation Army chaplain attached to the 4th Battalion of the Australian Imperial Force, won the Military Cross for his services to the troops during the ferocious Gallipoli campaign. Numerous women served as Salvation Army nurses or worked in the various hostels.

Around the British Empire, the Salvation Army mounted several highly successful fund-raising drives to finance these activities and others, including the provision of tens of thousands of comfort packages of socks, underwear, Christmas presents, tobacco, and similar items for troops at the front. Salvation Army personnel also visited the families of bereaved soldiers and when necessary provided assistance for their dependants. During the war the Salvation Army’s efforts, memorialized in the Red Shield that became its official badge during World War I, won official recognition from Britain’s King George V, who personally wrote a letter of thanks to General Bramwell Booth after the war thanking him for his organization’s contributions to the war effort.

(1048)

The U.S. branch of the Salvation Army was activated even before U.S. entry into the war. As citizens of a neutral power, American Salvationists were allowed special privileges at the beginning of the European conflict. Whatever their personal feelings, Salvationists in wartime service had been warned to remain neutral in conduct. In November 1914 the American Salvation Army announced an Old Linen Campaign, designed to collect and clean used linen, transforming it into surgical supplies that were then shipped to both sides in the conflict. Beginning in 1915, special funds were allotted for Belgian refugees. That fall, Major Wallace Winchell, an experienced Salvation Army operative, was dispatched to Belgium from the United States to oversee Salvation Army relief efforts in that German-occupied country. Winchell also promoted agricultural projects.

Relief activities in Europe changed drastically when the United States entered the war in April 1917. That June, Evangeline Booth sent William S. Barker to investigate opportunities in France. He found ready acceptance from American Expeditionary Forces commander General John Pershing. To launch her War Service League, Booth borrowed \$25,000 and later another \$100,000 from the Salvation Army’s international headquarters in London. The Red Cross and the YMCA were both already active in France. The Salvation Army sought to complement the work of these organizations rather than compete with their far

greater resources. Barker convinced Evangeline Booth that young men away from home for the first time required more than the bureaucratic efficiency of established support services. "Send us some lassies," he cabled from France. Though both male and female Salvationists labored in France, it was the "lassies" who won the hearts of the servicemen. These women, of impeccable character, reminded soldiers of sisters and sweethearts back home. The "lassies" were ready to go as far into the front lines as they were allowed. They darned socks, wrote letters home for servicemen, dispensed supplies on credit or gave them away, and sang the songs that reminded soldiers of their fundamentalist churches back home. They even arranged to send money back and forth between servicemen and their families. When a soldier's family had needs on the home front, a stateside Salvationist was dispatched to offer assistance. Most of all, the women provided a sympathetic ear, coffee, and highly acclaimed doughnuts, which could be freshly baked almost anywhere without special equipment. The doughnut became as much an emblem of the Salvation Army as was its red shield.

Evangeline Booth herself established the clear policy followed by the Salvation Army in France. She had three overriding principles. First, the Salvation Army, as the church of the working man, would direct its activities at enlisted men. Though officers were always welcome in their huts and canteens, they would receive no special treatment, and Salvationists would eat with the common soldiers, avoiding the officer's mess. Second, the Salvation Army's evangelistic Christian Gospel would not be diluted. Spiritual needs were deemed even more important than material ones. Despite this, attendance at religious services would never be a condition for any form of service. Third, Salvationists on overseas duty were expected to work as closely as possible to the front where needs would be greatest. They were to willingly serve in the trenches, fully recognizing the inherent dangers.

Considering the many later emotional testimonials to the "lassies" by returning American soldiers, it is surprising that the numbers of Salvation Army workers in Europe during the war were so few. An estimated 250 Salvationists engaged in war service in France, compared to about 10,000 YMCA workers. Yet the dedication of the "lassies," their willingness to bake their doughnuts as close to the front as the secondary trenches, and the very creativity of the services they rendered were most remembered.

Servicemen returning home sang the praises of the Salvation Army lasses, and a freighter, the *SS Salvation Lass*, was named for them. So popular had they become that the first postwar fund drive of the Salvation Army after the

armistice brought in two and a half times its stated target. From World War I on, the Salvation Army has been well established in American affections.

Allene Phy-Olsen and Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Gallipoli Campaign](#); [George V, King](#); [Pershing, John Joseph](#); [Red Cross](#); [Religion and the War](#); [Wilhelm II, Kaiser](#).

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Sims, William Sowden (1858–1936)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Port Hope, Ontario, Canada, on 15 October 1858, William Sims was the son of an American father and Canadian mother. His family moved to Pennsylvania when he was 10, and Sims graduated from the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1880. The transformation of the U.S. Navy in this period to new steel ships and breech-loading guns marked the beginning of his lifelong interest in enhancing naval equipment, technology, and doctrine.

Intelligence reports that Sims sent the Office of Naval Intelligence during the 1895 Sino-Japanese War carefully analyzed the performance of the various vessels involved and drew lessons as to how the effectiveness of the U.S. fleet might be enhanced. From 1897 to 1900, Sims was U.S. naval attaché to France and Russia, and information on European naval innovations that he provided as well as extensive espionage operations against Spain that he mounted during the Spanish-American War favorably impressed Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, who became president in 1901. In 1901 Sims served on the staff of the commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and there became friends with British Captain Percy Scott, learning from him new techniques of gunnery introduced into the Royal Navy. His efforts to interest the U.S. Navy in these were not successful, leading Sims to write to President Roosevelt, technically an act of insubordination. Recalled to Washington in 1902 and appointed as inspector of target practice, during 1902–1909 Sims achieved tremendous success in U.S. naval ordnance reform, reducing the firing time for large-caliber guns from five minutes to thirty seconds while, at the same time, improving accuracy. Sims was an observer during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War.

Promoted to captain in 1911, Sims was an instructor at the Naval War College during 1911–1912. He then commanded the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla. Promoted to rear admiral in 1916, the next year he returned to the Naval War College as its president.

With war between the United States and Germany looming, Sims went to Britain in 1917 to discuss naval cooperation with the Allied Powers. The United States declared war on Germany on 6 April before his arrival. Promoted temporary vice admiral in May and made commander of U.S. naval forces in European waters, Sims bombarded Washington with recommendations on convoying, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence gathering, and strategic planning. He urged the immediate implementation of convoys, which gained

the support of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and he also urged that U.S. battleships be assigned primarily to escort duties conveying supplies and men for the Allies, ventures that brought drastic reductions in Allied shipping losses but generally involved resigning overall control of U.S. naval operations in Europe to British admirals.

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Sims's attitude and his excellent relations with his British counterparts led Washington officials, including Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and Chief of Naval Operations William Shepherd Benson, to consider him an Anglophile. For his part Sims ascribed the navy's initially somewhat disappointing wartime performance to his superiors' failure to implement some of his suggestions and what he viewed as their earlier reluctance to prepare the navy for a major conflict, charges he aired to Congress during a 1920 investigation that he largely precipitated and that provoked bitter feuding within the navy.

By November 1917 Sims and his staff were supervising the operations of 350 ships and 75,000 men. Promoted to temporary admiral in December 1918, Sims returned to the United States and reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral. He then headed the Naval War College from April 1919 until his retirement in October 1922. He continued to speak out on naval and defense issues, publishing his wartime memoirs, *The Victory at Sea* (1920), which won the Pulitzer Prize for History, and forcefully urging the development of naval aviation. A dynamic and energetic reformer and proponent of naval expansion, in later life Sims's unfortunate tendency to demonize those who opposed him vitiated his numerous concrete achievements. Sims died in Boston on 25 September 1936.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Benson, William Shepherd](#); [Convoy System](#); [Daniels, Josephus](#); [Lloyd George, David](#); [Roosevelt, Theodore](#); [Wood, Leonard](#).

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T

(1192)

Tyrwhitt, Sir Reginald Yorke (1870–1951)

British navy admiral. Born in Oxford on 10 May 1870, Reginald Tyrwhitt joined the British navy in 1883. Advancement came rapidly. By 1912 he headed the second destroyer flotilla of the Home Fleet at Portsmouth and was a favorite of the pugnacious naval reformer Admiral John A. “Jacky” Fisher.

In 1913 Tyrwhitt become commodore in command of all the Home Fleet’s destroyer flotillas, named the Harwich Force after its home port and numbering thirty-five to forty destroyers and between three and seven cruisers. Tyrwhitt’s responsibilities included denying the North Sea to enemy naval forces, submarines, and mines and assisting the Grand Fleet. A fighting admiral who was dogged, indomitable, and creative, Tyrwhitt retained this position throughout the conflict, a tribute to his success, although he habitually chafed against what he considered the war’s insufficiently aggressive prosecution. His forces reputedly spent longer at sea and saw more engagements than any other World War I naval force.

On 5 August 1914, Tyrwhitt’s ships fired the first British shots of the war in action against German minelayers near the Thames estuary. Three weeks later the Harwich Force participated prominently in the Battle of Helgoland Bight, which sank three German light cruisers, and in January 1915 was also instrumental in sinking a German cruiser at the Dogger Bank. To Tyrwhitt’s intense frustration, dilatory Admiralty orders meant that on 31 May 1916 his forces arrived too late to join in the encounter of the main British and German fleets at the Battle of Jutland. Promoted to vice admiral in 1918, after the armistice Tyrwhitt took the surrender of German U-boats at Harwich. Many observers regarded him as the outstanding British naval officer of the war.

Created a baronet in 1919, Tyrwhitt was promoted to vice admiral in 1925 and admiral in 1929. He served as commander-in-chief, China Station, and in 1934 was promoted to admiral of the fleet and became principal naval aide-de-camp to King George V. Tyrwhitt died at Sandhurst, Kent, on 30 May 1951.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Fisher, John Arbuthnot, 1st Baron](#); [Helgoland Bight, Battle of](#); [Jutland, Battle of](#).

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U

Uniacke, Sir Herbert (1866–1934)

British army general. Born on 4 December 1866 at Gibraltar, Herbert Crofton Campbell Uniacke was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1885. In 1914 he was chief instructor at the School of Artillery, training both field and horse artillery. He was known as an innovative artillery thinker and a skilled and effective instructor and trainer of troops.

When World War I began in August 1914, Uniacke went to France as commander of the 5th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery. After almost two years in combat, in July 1916 he became artillery commander for the British Fifth Army, where he developed new and often highly-effective artillery tactics. A favorite was the heavy concentration of artillery fire on all but one of the forward approaches to a German position, luring (1196) the Germans into using that route whereupon Uniacke's guns all switched their fire to it, inflicting maximum casualties on the German troops.

Uniacke worked closely with Sir James Frederick Noel Birch, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's senior artillery advisor, who shared many of his innovative views. In April 1917 Uniacke sought to employ unregistered surprise fire during the Arras offensive, but Haig declined to do so on the grounds that such tactics were too untried and risky. Uniacke supervised all the Fifth Army's artillery planning for the 1917 Passchendaele attack and the defensive operations against Germany's ferocious spring 1918 Saint-Quentin offensive. In July 1918 Uniacke was appointed deputy inspector of training for all British troops in France.

After World War I Uniacke served in India commanding the Indian 1st Division. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1925 and retired from the army in 1932. Suffering from the long-term effects of gas poisoning in France, Uniacke died at Marlow on 14 May 1934.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Artillery](#); [Birch, Sir James Frederick Noel](#); [Haig, Douglas, 1st Earl](#); [Ludendorff Offensives](#); [Ypres, Third Battle of](#).

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W

War Debts

During World War I the assorted Allied and Associated Powers fighting the Central Powers borrowed heavily from each other to finance the costs of the conflict. Before U.S. intervention in April 1917, Great Britain was the greatest creditor, lending almost \$9 billion to her allies and Dominions. After that date the various Allies incurred intergovernmental obligations of approximately \$11.5 billion to the United States, almost all of it to finance their war purchases in that country.

Among the Europeans it was widely hoped that the U.S. government would treat these obligations, or at least a substantial portion of them, as its contribution to a common cause. This outlook was intensified by the recollection that for almost three years the Allies fought the Central Powers without U.S. assistance, and even after the United States entered the war it was more than a year before any appreciable number of U.S. troops reached the Western Front. Although some influential Americans sympathized with this viewpoint, most government officials felt that cancellation or forgiveness of these debts was politically impossible. During and after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, they therefore declined to consider cancellation and also refused all Allied attempts to link payments of war debts to German payments of reparations, on the grounds that any such connection would make Germany ultimately responsible for payment of the war debts. Officials in President Warren Harding's administration strongly resented the 1922 British Balfour Note, which stated that Britain would seek no more in reparations from its enemies and debt repayments from its allies than was needed to repay its own obligations to the United States.

By the early 1920s U.S. officials insisted that all debtor nations must make arrangements to repay their obligations to the United States. In 1922 the United States established a World War Foreign Debt Commission, and over the subsequent five years this body negotiated settlements with the country's debtors providing for repayment of principal at reasonable rates of interest over sixty years. In December (1236) 1922 the British became the first to reach an agreement, accepting a rate of interest they considered undesirably high when sympathetic American friends counseled the British delegation that further procrastination was unlikely to win them any better terms. U.S. officials pressured European governments to reach such arrangements even when the signatories feared that in the long run they were would prove unable to

maintain these repayment schedules. The Departments of Commerce and State vetoed private loans to any governments that refused to negotiate agreements for the repayment of their debts to the United States.

The British government, though more flexible in outlook than the United States, faced considerable postwar budgetary stringency and, while writing off some debts, especially those to Russia, in the mid-1920s negotiated settlements with both France and Italy that, while reasonably generous, likewise involved the repayment of substantial sums to Britain.

From late 1929 the intensifying Great Depression tightened credit and made such international financial transfers increasingly problematic. In 1931 U.S. President Herbert Hoover negotiated a one-year financial moratorium on all intergovernmental payments, including war debts and reparations, eventually extended to eighteen months. In late 1932 Hoover and the incoming presidential nominee, Franklin D. Roosevelt, failed to agree on its further renewal, and within a few months all debtor governments except Finland defaulted on their payments to the United States and Britain.

During the 1930s the collapse of the war debt settlements contributed to the prevailing American disillusionment with the Allies and the fruits of intervention in World War I. In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Johnson Act, which banned all private American loans to any foreign government that had defaulted on its debts to the United States.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Hoover, Herbert Clark](#); [Legacy of the War](#); [Reparations](#).

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Wemyss, Rosslyn Erskine, Baron (1864–1933)

British navy admiral; first sea lord, 1917–1919. Born in London on 12 April 1864 to aristocratic Scottish parents, Rosslyn “Rosy” Erskine Wester Wemyss joined the navy in 1877, together with his distant cousin Prince George (later King George V). Wemyss subsequently served in the Mediterranean and on the royal yacht. He won promotion to captain in 1901, and in 1903 he became the first commander of the new Royal Navy cadet college at Osborne. Following service on several warships, in 1910 the well-connected Wemyss became naval equerry to the king, winning a reputation for tact, charm, good judgment, and common sense. In 1912 he was promoted to rear admiral.

As commander of the 12th Cruiser Squadron at the outbreak of the First World War, Wemyss patrolled the Channel, escorting British troops to France and then accompanying the first Canadian forces to Europe. During the 1915 Dardanelles campaign he was governor of Lemnos island, commanding the Mudros naval base from which he expected to launch the projected seaborne assault on the straits. As late as November 1915 Wemyss opposed the evacuation from Gallipoli and forcefully, though unavailingly, advocated another naval operation to win the straits.

As commander-in-chief of the East Indies and Egypt station, in 1916 Wemyss supported British advances into Palestine. In 1917 he became deputy sea lord, his mandate to reorganize the naval war staff to boost its wartime effectiveness. First Sea Lord John Jellicoe opposed this enterprise, and in late 1917 Prime Minister David Lloyd George replaced him with Wemyss. Although many senior officers supported Jellicoe and considered Wemyss a “Court sailor,” he was relatively successful, helping to plan the April 1918 Zeebrugge raid and working well with both his U.S. counterparts and First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Eric Geddes.

Wemyss represented the Allied navies in the armistice negotiations with Germany at Compiègne and the British navy at the Paris Peace Conference. Disgruntled by demands for his replacement, in November 1919 Wemyss resigned, but he subsequently received special promotion to admiral of the fleet, and as Baron Wester Wemyss he entered the peerage. Wemyss died in Cannes, France, on 24 May 1933.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

[Armistice](#); [Beatty, David, 1st Earl](#); [Dardanelles Campaign](#); [Gallipoli Campaign](#); [Geddes, Sir Eric Campbell](#); [Great Britain, Navy](#); [Jellicoe, John Rushworth, 1st Earl](#); [Lloyd George, David](#); [Ostend and Zeebrugge Raids](#); [Paris Peace Conference](#).

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A Political, Social, and Military History

By: Spencer C. Tucker, Editor

Priscilla Mary Roberts, Editor, Documents Volume (V)

Foreword by John S. D. Eisenhower

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1. The Treaty of London (Excerpts), 19 April 1839

Prominent among the reasons Great Britain decided in 1914 to declare war on Germany was the latter country's disregard for the neutrality of Belgium. German military strategy against France decreed that in contravention of international agreements and commitments, German troops must transit Belgian territory to attack its French neighbor. The neutral status of Belgium had been guaranteed in 1839 when Belgium won independence from the Netherlands as a separate state, an arrangement endorsed by the five great European powers of the time and inherited by the German Empire created in 1870.

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and The Netherlands, on the other. Signed at London, 19th April, 1839.

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, having taken into consideration their Treaty concluded with His Majesty the King of the Belgians, on the 15th of November, 1831; and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, being disposed to conclude a Definitive Arrangement on the basis of the 24 Articles agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the 14th of October, 1831; their said Majesties have named for their Plenipotentiaries. . . .

Who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles. . . .

(1354)

Reciprocal Renunciation of Territories

Article 6

In consideration of the territorial arrangements above stated, each of the two Parties [the Netherlands and Belgium] renounces reciprocally and for ever, all pretension to the Territories, Towns, Fortresses, and Places situated within the

limits of the possessions of the other Party, such as those limits are described in Articles 1, 2, and 4.

The said limits shall be marked out in conformity with those Articles, by Belgian and Dutch Commissioners of Demarcation, who shall meet as soon as possible in the town of Maastricht.

Belgium to Form an Independent and Neutral State

Article 7

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other States.

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.Firstworldwar.com/source/london1839.htm>.

2. The Dual Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, 7 October 1879

After the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership in 1870, a system of alliances developed among the European powers. Those states involved aligned themselves with or against others in an effort to maximize their own strength and protect themselves against potential opponents. By 1914, Great Britain was aligned with France and Russia, the latter deserting its original ties with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire increasingly looked to Germany for assistance against the growing power of internal separatist forces, as did the crumbling Ottoman Empire, which feared British, French, and Russian designs upon its territories. Russia, meanwhile, increasingly presented itself as the protector of those new states, Serbia and Bulgaria, that had wrested independence from the Ottomans and often coveted further lands from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The existence of this overarching alliance structure was a major reason that in summer 1914 a relatively minor dispute between Austria and Serbia snowballed into a massive international confrontation.

The longest-lived European alliance was that uniting the two Central European empires of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which endured from 1879 until the end of World War I. One reason for its longevity was the fact that separatist and nationalist forces increasingly threatened the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose government had no real alternative to seeking support from its ever more powerful Germanic neighbor.

ARTICLE 1. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 2. Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high Ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, the attacking party in such a case be supported by Russia, either by an active cooperation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article 1 of this Treaty, for reciprocal assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally

operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

ARTICLE 3. The duration of this Treaty shall be provisionally fixed at five years from the day of ratification. One year before the expiration of this period the two High Contracting Parties shall consult together concerning the question whether the conditions serving as the basis of the Treaty still prevail, and reach an agreement in regard to the further continuance or possible modification of certain details. If in the course of the first month of the last year of the Treaty no invitation has been received from either side to open these negotiations, the Treaty shall be considered as renewed for a further period of three years.

ARTICLE 4. This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretation, be kept secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special Agreement.

The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication at present; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectations, prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties (1355) would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.

ARTICLE 5. This Treaty shall derive its validity from the approbation of the two Exalted Sovereigns and shall be ratified within fourteen days after this approbation has been granted by Their Most Exalted Majesties. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their own hands and affixed their arms.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/allyahg.html>.

3. The Three Emperors League, 18 June 1881

In 1881 the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian emperors signed the following agreement, dealing primarily with the problems and opportunities with which the growing weakness of Turkey presented them. In the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 the German and Russian governments reaffirmed the agreements they had reached six years earlier, though Austria, whose interests increasingly clashed with those of Russia, was no longer a party to this accord. Three years later, Germany refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty.

The Courts of Austria-Hungary, of Germany, and of Russia, animated by an equal desire to consolidate the general peace by an understanding intended to assure the defensive position of their respective States, have come into agreement on certain questions. . . .

With this purpose the three Courts . . . have agreed on the following Articles:

ARTICLE 1. In case one of the High Contracting Parties should find itself at war with a fourth Great Power, the two others shall maintain towards it a benevolent neutrality and shall devote their efforts to the localization of the conflict.

This stipulation shall apply likewise to a war between one of the three Powers and Turkey, but only in the case where a previous agreement shall have been reached between the three Courts as to the results of this war.

In the special case where one of them shall obtain a more positive support from one of its two Allies, the obligatory value of the present Article shall remain in all its force for the third.

ARTICLE 2. Russia, in agreement with Germany, declares her firm resolution to respect the interests arising from the new position assured to Austria-Hungary by the Treaty of Berlin.

The three Courts, desirous of avoiding all discord between them, engage to take account of their respective interests in the Balkan Peninsula. They further promise one another that any new modifications in the territorial status quo of Turkey in Europe can be accomplished only in virtue of a common agreement between them.

In order to facilitate the agreement contemplated by the present Article, an agreement of which it is impossible to foresee all the conditions, the three

Courts from the present moment record in the Protocol annexed to this Treaty the points on which an understanding has already been established in principle.

ARTICLE 3. The three Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, founded on international law, confirmed by treaties, and summed up in the declaration of the second Plenipotentiary of Russia at the session of July 12 of the Congress of Berlin.

They will take care in common that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any Government whatsoever, by lending to warlike operations of a belligerent Power the portion of its Empire constituted by the Straits.

In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such infringement should be in prospect, the three Courts will inform Turkey that they would regard her, in that event, as putting herself in a state of war towards the injured Party, and as having deprived herself thenceforth of the benefits of the security assured to her territorial status quo by the Treaty of Berlin.

ARTICLE 4. The present Treaty shall be in force during a period of three years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE 5. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and the existence of the present Treaty, as well as of the Protocol annexed thereto.

ARTICLE 6. The secret Conventions concluded between Austria-Hungary and Russia and between Germany and Russia in 1873 are replaced by the present Treaty. . . .

SZECHENYI
v. BISMARCK
SABOUROFF

Separate Protocol on the Same Date to the Convention of Berlin, 18 June, 1881

1. *Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Austria-Hungary reserves the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem opportune.

(1356)

2. *Sanjak of Novibazar*. The Declaration exchanged between the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiaries and the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin under the date of July 13/1, 1878, remains in force.

3. *Eastern Rumelia*. The three Powers agree in regarding the eventuality of an occupation either of Eastern Rumelia or of the Balkans as full of perils for the general peace. In case this should occur, they will employ their efforts to dissuade the Porte from such an enterprise, it being well understood that Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia on their part are to abstain from provoking the Porte by attacks emanating from their territories against the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

4. *Bulgaria*. The three Powers will not oppose the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia within the territorial limits assigned to them by the Treaty of Berlin, if this question should come up by the force of circumstances. They agree to dissuade the Bulgarians from all aggression against the neighboring provinces, particularly Macedonia; and to inform them that in such a case they will be acting at their own risk and peril.

5. In order to avoid collisions of interests in the local questions which may arise, the three Courts will furnish their representatives and agents in the Orient with a general instruction, directing them to endeavor to smooth out their divergences by friendly explanations between themselves in each special case; and, in the cases where they do not succeed in doing so, to refer the matters to their Governments.

6. The present Protocol forms an integral part of the secret Treaty signed on this day at Berlin and shall have the same force and validity.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/liga3.html>.

4. The Austro-Serbian Alliance, 16 [28] June 1881

Serbia, conquered in 1389, only regained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. The Austro-Hungarian Empire simultaneously gained the status of protector of the neighboring Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it formally annexed as provinces in 1908. Initially Austria sought to function as Serbia's patron, negotiating a Treaty of Alliance in 1881. Subsequently, Serb encouragement of Slav separatism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Austrian province of Croatia, territories many Serbs hoped to annex, caused relations to deteriorate dramatically.

Article I. There shall be stable peace and friendship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The two Governments engage to follow mutually a friendly policy.

Article II. Serbia will not tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.

Austria-Hungary assumes the same obligation with regard to Serbia and her dynasty, the maintenance and strengthening of which she will support with all her influence.

Article III. If the Prince of Serbia should deem it necessary, in the interest of His dynasty and of His country, to take in behalf of Himself and of His country, to take in behalf of Himself and His descendants the title of King, Austria-Hungary will recognize this title as soon as its proclamation shall have been made in legal form, and will use her influence to secure recognition for it on the part of the other powers.

Article IV. Austria-Hungary will use her influence with the other European Cabinets to second the interest of Serbia.

Without a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary, Serbia will neither negotiate nor conclude any political treaty with another Government, and will not admit to her territory a foreign armed force, regular or irregular, even as volunteers.

Article V. If Austria-Hungary should be threatened with war or find herself at war with one or more other Powers, Serbia will observe a friendly neutrality towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia,

Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar, and will accord to it all possible facilities, in conformity with their close friendship and spirit of this Treaty.

Austria-Hungary assumes the same obligation towards Serbia, in case the latter should be threatened with war or find herself at war.

Source: Joe H. Kirchberger, ed., *The First World War: An Eyewitness History* (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 321–322.

5. The Triple Alliance (First Eight Articles), 20 May 1882

In the later nineteenth century, Italy looked to Germany and Austria-Hungary for protection from France.

(1357)

ARTICLE 1. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their States.

They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

ARTICLE 2. In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked.

This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.

ARTICLE 3. If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers non-signatory to the present Treaty, the casus foederis will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 4. In case a Great Power non-signatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.

ARTICLE 5. If the peace of any of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation.

They engage henceforward, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.

ARTICLE 6. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and existence of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7. The present Treaty shall remain in force during the space of five years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE 8. The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within three weeks, or sooner if may be. . . .

Ministerial Declaration

The Royal Italian Government declares that the provisions of the secret Treaty concluded May 20, 1882, between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, cannot, as has been previously agreed, in any case be regarded as being directed against England.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/tripally.html>.

6. The Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia, 18 June 1887

In 1887 the German and Russian governments reaffirmed the agreements they had reached six years earlier, though Austria, whose interests increasingly clashed with those of Russia, was no longer a party to this accord. Three years later, Germany too refused to renew its alliance with Russia.

The Imperial Courts of Germany and of Russia, animated by an equal desire to strengthen the general peace by an understanding destined to assure the defensive position of their respective States, have resolved to confirm the agreement established between them by a special arrangement, in view of the expiration on June 15/27, 1887, of the validity of the secret Treaty and Protocol, signed in 1881 and renewed in 1884 by the three courts of Germany[,] Russia, and Austria-Hungary.

To this end the two Courts have named as Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, the Sieur Herbert Count Bismarck-Schoenhausen, His Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, the Sieur Paul Count Schouvaloff, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, who, being furnished with full powers, which have been found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. In case one of the High Contracting Parties should find itself at war with a third Great Power, the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality towards it, and would devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict. This provision would not apply to a war against Austria or France in case this war should result from an attack directed against one of these two latter Powers by one of the High Contracting Parties.

(1358)

ARTICLE 2. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia. The two Courts engage to admit no modification of the territorial status quo of the said peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as occasion arises, every attempt to disturb this status quo or to modify it without their consent.

ARTICLE 3. The two Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, founded on international law, confirmed by treaties and summed up in the declaration of the second Plenipotentiary of Russia at the session of July 12 of the Congress of Berlin (Protocol 19).

They will take care in common that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any Government whatsoever, by lending to warlike operations of a belligerent power the portion of its Empire constituted by the Straits. In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such infringement should be in prospect, the two Courts will inform Turkey that they would regard her, in that event, as putting herself in a state of war towards the injured Party, and as depriving herself thence forth of the benefits of the security assured to her territorial status quo by the Treaty of Berlin.

ARTICLE 4. The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of three years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE 5. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and the existence of the present Treaty and of the Protocol annexed thereto.

ARTICLE 6. The present Treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged at Berlin within a period of a fortnight, or sooner it may be.

Additional Protocol: Berlin, 18 June, 1887

In order to complete the stipulations of Articles 2 and 3 of the secret Treaty concluded on this same date, the two Courts have come to an agreement upon the following points:

1. Germany, as in the past, will lend her assistance to Russia in order to re-establish a regular and legal government in Bulgaria. She promises in no case to give her consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battenberg.
2. In case His Majesty the Emperor of Russia should find himself under the necessity of assuming the task of defending the entrance of the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany engages to accord her benevolent neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the measures which His Majesty may deem it necessary to take to guard the key of His Empire.

3. The present Protocol forms an integral part of the secret Treaty signed on this day at Berlin, and shall have the same force and validity.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/reinsure.html>.

7. The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention, 18 August 1892

In 1890 Germany, impelled partly by clashes with Russia over German settlement in Russian borderlands, and also by fears that Russian and German interests elsewhere might conflict, refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, whereby each party defined its interests in Ottoman Turkey and agreed to maintain a “benevolent neutrality” should its cosignatory find itself at war with any power other than Austria or France. Rejected by Germany, Russia looked elsewhere—to France. Between 1891 and 1895 the new understanding between those two countries, enshrined in 1892 in a military convention that was not made public until 1918, grew steadily.

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.

(1359)

4. The General Staffs of the Armies of the two countries shall cooperate with each other at all times in the preparation and facilitation of the execution of the measures mentioned above.

They shall communicate with each other, while there is still peace, all information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which is already in their possession or shall come into their possession.

Ways and means of corresponding in time of war shall be studied and worked out in advance.

5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace separately.
6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.
7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely secret.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/franruss.html>.

8. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life": Address to Hamilton Club, Chicago, 10 April 1899

By the end of the nineteenth century some Americans, notably Theodore Roosevelt, soon to become president, were convinced that their country must play a greater role in world affairs. Roosevelt believed that this would benefit not only the world but the United States itself and that peace, although alluring, would be harmful to American national fiber. At the turn of the century many Europeans shared his expansive outlook and believed that their own countries must follow similar imperialist policies or else fall behind internationally.

. . . I wish to preach, not the doctrine of ignoble ease, but the doctrine of the strenuous life, the life of toil and effort, of labor and strife; to preach that highest form of success which comes, not to the man who desires mere easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out of these wins the splendid ultimate triumph.

A life of slothful ease, a life of that peace which spring merely from lack either of desire or of power to strive after great things, is as little worthy of a nation as of an individual. I ask only that what every self-respecting American demands from himself and from his sons shall be demanded of the American nation as a whole. . . . A mere life of ease is not in the end a very satisfactory life, and, above all, it is a life which ultimately unfits those who follow it for serious work in the world.

As it is with the individual, so it is with the nation. It is a base untruth to say that happy is the nation that has no history. Thrice happy is the nation that has a glorious history. Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat. If in 1861 the men who loved the Union had believed that peace was the end of all things, and war and strife the worst of all things, and had acted up to their belief, we would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, we would have saved hundreds of millions of dollars. Moreover, besides saving all the blood and treasure we then lavished, we would have prevented the heartbreak of many women, the dissolution of many homes, and we would have spared the country those months of gloom and shame when it seemed as if our armies marched only to defeat. We could have avoided all this suffering simply by shrinking from strife. And if we had thus avoided it, we would have shown that we were weaklings, and that we were unfit to stand

among the great nations of the earth. Thank God for the iron in the blood of our fathers, the men who upheld the wisdom of Lincoln, and bore sword or rifle in the armies of Grant! Let us, the children of the men who proved themselves equal to the mighty days, let us, the children of the men who carried the great Civil War to a triumphant conclusion, praise the God of our fathers that the ignoble counsels of peace were rejected; that the suffering and loss, the blackness of sorrow and despair, were unflinchingly faced, and the years of strife endured; for in the end the slave was freed, the Union restored, and the mighty American republic placed once more as a helmeted queen among nations.

We of this generation do not have to face a task such as that our fathers faced, but we have our tasks, and woe to us if we fail to perform them! We cannot, if we would, play the part of China, and be content to rot by inches in ignoble ease within our borders, taking no interest in what goes on beyond them, sunk in a scrambling commercialism; heedless of the higher life, the life of aspiration, of toil and risk, busying ourselves only with the wants of our bodies for the day, until suddenly we should find, beyond a shadow of question, what China has already found, that in this world the nation that has trained itself to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities. If we are to be a really great people, we must strive in good faith to play a great part in the world. We cannot avoid meeting great issues. All that we can determine for ourselves is whether we shall meet them well or ill. . . . All we can decide is whether we shall meet them in a way that will redound to the national credit, or whether we shall make of our dealings with these new problems a dark and shameful page in our history. To refuse to deal with them (1360) at all merely amounts to dealing with them badly. We have a given problem to solve. If we undertake the solution, there is, of course, always danger that we may not solve it aright; but to refuse to undertake the solution simply renders it certain that we cannot possibly solve it aright.

We cannot sit huddled within our own borders and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of well-to-do hucksters who care nothing for what happens beyond. Such a policy would defeat even its own end; for as the nations grow to have ever wider and wider interests, and are brought into closer and closer contact, if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial policy, we must build up our power without our own borders. We must build the isthmian canal, and we must grasp the points of vantage which will enable us to have our say in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the East and the West. . . .

Our army needs complete reorganization—not merely enlarging—and the reorganization can only come as the result of legislation. A proper general staff should be established, and the positions of ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster officers should be filled by detail from the line. Above all, the army must be given the chance to exercise in large bodies. . . .

I preach to you then, my countrymen, that our country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world. Let us therefore boldly face the life of strife, resolute to do our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold righteousness by deed and by word; resolute to be both honest and brave, to serve high ideals, yet to use practical methods. Above all, let us shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or without the nation, provided we are certain that the strife is justified, for it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness.

Source: Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life* (New York: The Century Co., 1901), 1–21.

9. The Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, 8 April 1904

In 1904 Great Britain, alarmed both by its increasing isolation among the European powers and the increasing strength of Germany, allied itself with its traditional enemy, France. Britain's Francophile King Edward VII, who detested his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm II, played an important role in negotiating this new understanding, which was signed by Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, and Paul Cambon, the French foreign minister. For their part the French, facing German challenges to their colonial position in Morocco and elsewhere, welcomed British support. The two countries made very specific agreements as to their respective interests in Egypt and Morocco, both former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, that had previously been a source of contention between them. Simultaneously, the two countries reached agreements over their interests in Newfoundland, West and Central Africa, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.

a. The Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, Together with the Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time, 8 April 1904

ARTICLE 1. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country. . . .

ARTICLE 2. The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

ARTICLE 3. His Britannic Majesty's Government for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

ARTICLE 4. The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and (1361) Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

ARTICLE 5. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

ARTICLE 6. In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article of that treaty will remain in abeyance.

ARTICLE 7. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE 8. The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE 9. The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

Secret Articles

ARTICLE 1. In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration of today's date would remain intact.

ARTICLE 2. His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized Countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

ARTICLE 3. The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other presidios should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7 of the Declaration of today's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

(1362)

ARTICLE 4. If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of today's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

ARTICLE 5. Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article I of the Declaration of today's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified Debts after the 15th July, 1910.

Source: Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CIII, Cmd. 5969 (London, 1911).

b. British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne to Sir Edward Monson, British Ambassador to France, 8 April 1904

The British foreign secretary sent his ambassador in Paris an overall assessment of the agreements of 8 April 1904, in which he stated that these were not only desirable "if considered by themselves and on their intrinsic merits" but also had a broader purpose.

It is, however, important to regard them not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming a part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the international relations of two great countries.

From this point of view their cumulative effect can scarcely fail to be advantageous to a very high degree. They remove the sources of long-standing differences, the existence of which has been a chronic addition to our diplomatic embarrassments and a standing menace to an international friendship, which we have been at much pains to cultivate, and which, we rejoice to think, has completely over-shadowed the antipathies and suspicions of the past.

There is this further reason for mutual congratulations. Each of the parties has been able, without any material sacrifice of its own national interests, to make to the other concessions regarded, and rightly regarded, by the recipient as of the highest importance. . . . For these reasons it is fair to say that, as between Great Britain and France, the arrangement, taken as a whole, will be to the advantage of both parties.

Nor will it, we believe, be found less advantageous if it be regarded from the point of view of the relations of the two powers with the Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Siam. In each of these countries it is obviously desirable to put an end to a system under which the ruler has had to shape his course in deference to the divided counsels of two great European powers. Such a system leading, as it must, to intrigue, to attempts to play one power off against the other, and to undignified competition, can scarcely fail to sow the seeds of international discord, and to bring about a state of things disadvantageous and demoralizing alike to the tutelary powers, and to the weaker state which forms the object of their solicitude. Something will have been gained if the understanding happily arrived at between Great Britain and France should have the effect of bringing this condition of things to an end in regions where the interests of those two powers are specially involved. And it may, perhaps, be permitted to them to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the general peace.

Source: *A League of Nations*, Vol. 1 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, April 1918), 230–231.

c. French Foreign Minister Théodore Delcassé, Circular to French Ambassadors, 12 April 1904

The French foreign minister was equally enthusiastic over the new entente cordiale, sending a circular to all the French ambassadors overseas describing its merits.

The great interests both moral and material connected with the understanding of England and France called for a friendly regulation of the questions which divided the two countries and from which in certain circumstances a conflict might result. At London as at Paris, the Governments were aware of that. The visits exchanged last year between King Edward and the President of the Republic showed that opinion on both sides of the Channel was favorably disposed.

In the course of the interview which I had the honor of having with Lord Lansdowne on July 7, 1903, the eminent secretary of state for foreign affairs and I examined successively all the problems which were placed before us. It was recognized that it was not impossible to find for each of them a solution equally advantageous to both parties.

Our common efforts, which have not ceased to be directed by a spirit of conciliation, resulted in the agreements of April 8, the authentic texts of which I send you annexed, adding some explanations on their nature and import. . . .

The capital part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco. On all questions affecting the interests of France, (1363) none in fact has an importance comparable with that of Morocco; and it is evident that on its solution depended the solidity and the development of our African empire and even the future of our situation in the Mediterranean. . . . In obtaining from England, whose strong position in Moroccan ports is known, the declaration that it belongs to France to look after the tranquility of this country and to lend its aid for all needed administrative, economic, financial and military reforms, as well as the engagement not to hinder her action to this end, we have attained a result whose value it is superfluous to emphasize. . . .

As concerns Egypt, you will note that the political condition is subjected to no change. The principal interest in the negotiation just completed is financial. A great part of the Egyptian debt is placed in France. It was a question of assuring our holdings the largest guaranties, while adapting them to the new conditions resulting from the financial resurrection of Egypt.

The defense of our own interests has not diverted our attention from a final question of general purport, even universal since it concerns the entire world, that of the free use of the Suez Canal. Remaining faithful to her traditions, the Government of the Republic was fortunate in being able to bring the British Government to engage to maintain in its entirety the freedom of one of the most important routes of international traffic. It must record with a particular satisfaction the adhesion of Great Britain to putting into force the treaty of October 29, 1888.

By the terms of the declaration of London of January 16, 1896, France and Great Britain had in a way neutralized the central provinces of Siam. . . . They engaged to acquire no privilege or particular advantage of which the benefit was not common to the two signatories. They further engaged to enter into no separate arrangement which permitted a third power to do what they reciprocally forbade themselves by this declaration. All these provisions had a rather negative character. The arrangement just concluded with the London cabinet, while maintaining the clauses which precede for those territories, establishes that the Siamese possessions situated east and southeast of this zone and the adjacent islands shall henceforth be considered amenable to French influence, while the regions situated to the west of the same zone and of the Gulf of Siam shall be consider amenable to British influence. While repudiating the idea of annexing any Siamese territory and engaging strictly to respect the existing treaties, the two Governments agree, regarding each other, that their respective action shall be freely exercised in each of the spheres of influence thus determined, which gives a practical bearing to the new agreement. . . .

Finally the two powers have profited by the negotiations under way to regularize the situation of Great Britain in Zanzibar and that of France in Madagascar. This was to put an end to embarrassing claims which, for many years, had hampered our action in the great island of the Indian Ocean.

Thus, thanks to a mutual good will, we managed to regulate the various questions which for a long time weighed on the relations of France and England. The first expressions of opinion abroad show the great importance attached to this settlement and that it is considered as a precious further guarantee for general peace. Moreover, the favorable appreciations of which these arrangements are also the subject in England and in France indicate sufficiently that they safeguard fully the essential interests of each, a condition necessary for a durable and fruitful understanding.

Source: *A League of Nations*, Vol. 1 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, April 1918), 227–230.

10. William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” 1910

By no means did all Americans agree with former President Theodore Roosevelt and some of his supporters in glorifying the impact of war. Even pacifists, however, felt that in terms of instilling national unity for a higher cause and giving a sense of purpose, war could be beneficial. In 1910 the influential Harvard philosopher William James published a well-received essay suggesting that Americans needed to find some means of attaining these ends, without subjecting themselves and their country to the horrors of war itself.

At the present day, civilized opinion is a curious mental mixture. The military instincts and ideals are as strong as ever, but are confronted by reflective criticisms which sorely curb their ancient freedom. Innumerable writers are showing up the bestial side of military service. Pure loot and mastery seem no longer morally avowable motives, and pretexts must be found for attributing them solely to the enemy. England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without ceasing, arm solely for “peace,” Germany and Japan it is who are bent on loot and glory. “Peace” in military mouths to-day is a synonym for “war expected.” The word has become a pure provocative, and no government wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that “peace” and “war” mean the same thing, now in posse [in possibility], now in actu [in actuality]. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the “peace” interval.

(1364)

It is plain that on this subject civilized man has developed a sort of double personality. If we take European nations, no legitimate interest of any one of them would seem to justify the tremendous destructions which a war to compass it would necessarily entail. It would seem as though common sense and reason ought to find a way to reach agreement in every conflict of honest interests. I myself think it our bounden duty to believe in such international rationality as possible. But, as things stand, I see how desperately hard it is to bring the peace-party and the war-party together, and I believe that the difficulty is due to certain deficiencies in the program of pacifism which set the militarist imagination strongly, and to a certain extent justifiably, against it. In the whole discussion both sides are on imaginative and sentimental ground. It is but one utopia against another, and everything one says must be abstract and hypothetical. Subject to this criticism and caution, I will try to characterize in

abstract strokes the opposite imaginative forces, and point out what to my own very fallible mind seems the best utopian hypothesis, the most promising line of conciliation. . . .

. . . I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states peacefully organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. A permanent successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. In the more or less socialistic future towards which mankind seems drifting we must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities which answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. We must make new energies and hardships continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built—unless, indeed, we wish for dangerous reactions against commonwealths fit only for contempt, and liable to invite attack whenever a centre of crystallization for military-minded enterprise gets formed anywhere in their neighborhood.

The war-party is assuredly right in affirming and reaffirming that the martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war, are absolute and permanently human goods. Patriotic pride and ambition in their military form are, after all, only specifications of a more general competitive passion. They are its first form, but that is no reason for supposing them to be its last form. Men now are proud of belonging to a conquering nation, and without a murmur they lay down their persons and their wealth, if by so doing they may fend off subjection. But who can be sure that other aspects of one's country may not, with time and education and suggestion enough, come to be regarded with similarly effective feelings of pride and shame?

Why should men not some day feel that it is worth a blood-tax to belong to a collectivity superior in any ideal respect? Why should they not blush with indignant shame if the community that owns them is vile in any way whatsoever? Individuals, daily more numerous, now feel this civic passion. It is only a question of blowing on the spark till the whole population gets incandescent, and on the ruins of the old morals of military honor, a stable system of morals of civic honor builds itself up. What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the individual as in a vise. The war-function has grasped us so far; but constructive interests may someday seem no less imperative, and impose on the individual a hardly lighter burden.

Let me illustrate my idea more concretely. There is nothing to make one indignant in the mere fact that life is hard, that men should toil and suffer pain. The planetary conditions once for all are such, and we can stand it. But that so many men, by mere accidents of birth and opportunity, should have a life of nothing else but pain and hardness and inferiority imposed upon them, should have no vacation, while others natively no more deserving never get any taste of this campaigning life at all,—this is capable of arousing indignation in reflective minds. It may end by seeming shameful to all of us that some of us have nothing but campaigning, and others nothing but unmanly ease. If now—and this is my idea—there were, instead of military conscription a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against Nature, the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous other goods to the commonwealth would follow. The military ideals of the hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature; they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be greater fathers and teachers of the following generation.

Such a conscription, with the state of public opinion that would have required it, and the many moral fruits it would bear, would preserve in the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the military party is so afraid of seeing (1365) disappear in peace. We should get toughness without callousness, authority with as little criminal cruelty as possible, and painful work done cheerily because the duty is temporary, and threatens not, as now, to degrade the whole remainder of one's life. I spoke of the "moral equivalent" of war. So far, war has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war must have its way. But I have no serious doubt that the ordinary prides and shames of social man, once developed to a certain intensity, are capable of organizing such a moral equivalent as I have sketched, or some other just as effective for preserving manliness of type. It is but a question of time, of skilful propagandism, and of opinion-making men seizing historic opportunities.

Source: John J. McDermott, ed., *The Writings of William James* (New York: Random House, 1967), 662–669.

11. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, 13 July 1911

By 1911 Great Britain and Japan agreed that their existing Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance, first concluded in 1902 and revised in 1905, required further modification. Both parties agreed to come to the assistance of the other in the event of an unprovoked attack. Each power deliberately left rather vague the precise nature of its interests and sphere of influence in Asia. The agreement also envisaged frequent military and naval consultations between the two signatories.

Preamble.

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, having agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the same Agreement, namely:

1. (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
2. (b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;
3. (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions:

Article I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement, are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

Article II.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved

in war or defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Article III.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

Article IV.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

Article V.

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Article VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the (1366) High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

Source: *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Franco-Japanese Alliance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), 3–4.

(1367)

MLA

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18. The Pledge Plan: Telegram 174 from the Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, to the German Ambassador at Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, Sent from Berlin, 28 July 1914
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20. The “Willy-Nicky” Telegrams, 29 July–1 August 1914
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22. The German Declaration of War on Russia, 1 August 1914
23. Germany’s Ultimatum: The German Request for Free Passage through Belgium, 2 August 1914
24. Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey, 2 August 1914
25. The Belgian Refusal of Free Passage, 3 August 1914

26. The German Declaration of War on France: Wilhelm von Schoen, German Ambassador in Paris, to French Prime Minister René Viviani, 3 August 1914
27. The “Scrap of Paper”: Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, 4 August 1914
28. “The Lamps Are Going Out”: Sir Edward Grey on the Coming of War
29. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson, 10 August 1914
30. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to J. P. Morgan and Company, 15 August 1914
31. President Woodrow Wilson, “An Appeal to the American People: Message to the United States Congress,” 18 August 1914
32. “The Contemptible Little Army”: Kaiser Wilhelm II, Army Order, 19 August 1914

12. Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary to Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, 2 July 1914

On 5 July 1914 the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, Count Lazlo de Szögyeny-Marich, handed the kaiser a lengthy handwritten letter from Emperor Franz Joseph II. Attached to it was an even longer memorandum (not included here) that the Austrian Foreign Office had drafted shortly before the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Franz Joseph requested German support in dealing with Serbia and in eliminating from the Balkans Russian influence and replacing it with that of Germany and Austria.

(1368)

I honestly regretted that you were compelled to give up your intention of coming to Vienna to the funeral ceremonies. I should have been glad to express to you personally my heartfelt gratitude for your comforting sympathy in my deep sorrow.

You have proved to me again by your warm and sympathetic condolence that I possess in you a faithful and reliable friend, and that I can count on you on every possible occasion.

It would have been very agreeable to me to discuss the political situation with you; but as this was not possible at the present time, I am taking the liberty of sending you the accompanying memorandum prepared by my Minister of Foreign Affairs, which had already been drawn up before the frightful catastrophe at Sarajevo, and which seems especially pertinent since that tragic event.

The perpetration of the assassination of my poor nephew is the direct result of the agitations carried on by the Russian and Serbian Panslavists, the sole object of which is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the destruction of my realm.

According to all the evidence so far brought to light, the Sarajevo affair was not merely the bloody deed of a single individual, but as the result of a well-organized conspiracy, the threads of which can be traced to Belgrade; and even though it will probably prove impossible to get evidence of the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy, directed toward the unification of all the southern Slav countries under the Serbian flag, is responsible for such crimes, and that the continuation of such a state of affairs constitutes an enduring peril for my house and my possessions.

This peril is increased by the fact that Roumania has contracted a close friendship with Serbia, notwithstanding her existing alliance with us, and permits within her own confines an agitation against us just as hateful as is that tolerated by Serbia. . . .

The efforts of my government must in the future be directed toward the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first stage of this journey should be accomplished by the strengthening of the present position of the Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria, whose real interests coincide with our own, may be preserved from a collapse into Russophilism.

When it is recognized in Bucharest that the Triple Alliance is determined not to forego a union with Bulgaria, but would, nevertheless, be willing to persuade Bulgaria to go into partnership with Roumania and guarantee the latter's integrity, perhaps they will retrace there the perilous step to which they have been driven through friendship to Serbia and by the *rapprochement* to Russia.

If this effort should prove successful we might further attempt to reconcile Greece to Bulgaria and to Turkey; thus there would develop under the patronage of the Triple Alliance a new Balkan alliance whose aim would be to put an end to the advance of the Panslavic flood and to assure peace to our countries.

This can, however, only be possible when Serbia, which at present constitutes the pivot of the Panslavic policy, is eliminated as a factor of political power in the Balkans.

You, too, must be convinced, after the recent frightful occurrence in Bosnia, that a reconciliation of the antagonism that now divides Serbia and ourselves is no more to be thought of, and that the continuance of the peace policy of the European monarchs is threatened as long as this hearth of criminal agitation at Belgrade is left unquenched.

Source: Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 68–77. Copyright 1924 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

13. “The Blank Check”: German Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to the German Ambassador at Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, Sent from Berlin, 6 July 1914

Immediately upon receiving Emperor Franz Joseph’s letter requesting German support in any measures it might take against Serbia, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg replied on behalf of Germany. Although Bethmann Hollweg modified the last sentence in the draft originally prepared for him by Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann, this message effectively committed Germany to support Austria in whatever policies it took. German officials clearly perceived the crisis as a test of their own country’s international credibility. The dispatch of this message was later perceived as a key turning point in the escalation of the crisis.

Confidential—For Your Excellency’s personal information and guidance

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador yesterday delivered to the Emperor a confidential personal letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph, which depicts the present situation from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and describes the measures which Vienna has in view. A copy is now being forwarded to Your Excellency.

(1369)

I replied to Count Szögyeny today on behalf of His Majesty that His Majesty sends his thanks to the Emperor Francis Joseph for his letter and would soon answer it personally. In the meantime His Majesty desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation. Even though His Majesty is known to feel no unqualified confidence in Bulgaria and her ruler, and naturally inclines more toward our old ally Rumania and her Hohenzollern prince, yet he quite understands that the Emperor Francis Joseph, in view of the attitude of Rumania and of the danger of a new Balkan alliance aimed directly at the Danube Monarchy, is anxious to bring about an understanding between Bulgaria and the Triple Alliance. His Majesty will, therefore, direct his minister at Sofia to lend the Austro-Hungarian representative such support as he may desire in any action taken to this end. His Majesty will, furthermore, make an effort at Bucharest, according to the wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to influence King Carol to the fulfilment of the duties of his alliance, to the renunciation of Serbia, and to the suppression of the Rumanian agitations directed against Austria-Hungary.

Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will [“under all circumstances” deleted by Bethmann Hollweg from original draft] faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.

Bethmann-Hollweg

Source: Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 78–79. Copyright 1924 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

14. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia, 23 July 1914

On 22 July 1914 the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Leopold Berchtold, instructed Freiherr Vladimir Giesl von Gieslingen, the Austrian minister at Belgrade, to deliver the following ultimatum to Serbia the next day. The demands of the ultimatum were sufficiently uncompromising that Serbian compliance with them would be extremely humiliating to the recipient, and the message was undoubtedly drafted in the expectation that it would provoke war.

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister at the Court of Vienna made, in the name of his Government, the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: Serbia recognizes that her rights were not affected by the state of affairs created in Bosnia, and states that she will accordingly accommodate herself to the decisions to be reached by the Powers in connection with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Serbia, in accepting the advice of the Great Powers, binds herself to desist from the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation since October last, and she furthermore binds herself to alter the tendency of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live on the footing of friendly and neighborly relations with the latter in the future.

Now the history of the past few years, and particularly the painful events of the 28th of June, have proved the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia, whose object it is to separate certain portions of its territory from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which came into being under the very eyes of the Serbian Government, subsequently found expression outside of the territory of the Kingdom in acts of terrorism, in a number of attempts at assassination, and in murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activities of the various unions and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unchecked utterances of the press, the glorification of the authors of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; it has tolerated an unhealthy propaganda in its public instruction; and it has tolerated, finally, every manifestation which could betray the people of Serbia into hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This toleration of which the Royal Serbian Government was guilty, was still in evidence at that moment when the events of the twenty-eighth of June exhibited to the whole world the dreadful consequences of such tolerance.

It is clear from the statements and confessions of the criminal authors of the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived at Belgrade, that the murderers received the weapons and the bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the dispatch of the criminals and of their weapons to Bosnia was arranged and effected under the conduct of Serbian frontier authorities.

The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain the attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward those (1370) agitations which center at Belgrade and are spread thence into the territories of the Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of the Monarchy.

In order to attain this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to demand that the Serbian Government give official assurance that it will condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Monarchy territories that belong to it; and that it will obligate itself to suppress with all the means at its command this criminal and terroristic propaganda. In order to give these assurances a character of solemnity, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26/13, the following declaration:

The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories that belong to it, and it most sincerely regrets the dreadful consequences of these criminal transactions.

The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus have endangered the friendly and neighborly relations, to the cultivation of which the Royal Government had most solemnly pledged itself by its declarations of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repels every idea and every attempt to interfere in the destinies of the population of whatever portion of Austria-Hungary, regards it as its duty most expressly to call attention of the officers, officials, and the whole population of the kingdom to the fact that for the future it will proceed with the utmost rigor against any persons who shall become guilty of any such activities, activities to prevent and to suppress which, the Government will bend every effort.

This declaration shall be brought to the attention of the Royal army simultaneously by an order of the day from His Majesty the King, and by publication in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself:

1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;
2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;
3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;
5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;
6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;

7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;
8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;
9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;
10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points.

(1371)

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government by Saturday, the twenty-fifth instant, at 6 p.m., at the latest.

A reminder of the results of the investigation about Sarajevo, to the extent they relate to the functionaries named in points 7 and 8 [above], is appended to this note.

Appendix:

The criminal investigation undertaken at court in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his comrades on account of the assassination committed on the 28th of June this year, along with the guilt of accomplices, has up until now led to the following conclusions:

1. The plan of murdering Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was concocted in Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a certain Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabesch with the assistance of Major Voijsa Takosic.
2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols along with ammunition—used as tools by the criminals—were procured and given to Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabesch in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovic and Major Voijsa Takosic.

3. The bombs are hand grenades originating from the weapons depot of the Serbian army in Kragujevatz.
4. To guarantee the success of the assassination, Ciganovic instructed Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabesch in the use of the grenades and gave lessons on shooting Browning pistols to Princip and Grabesch in a forest next to the shooting range at Topschider.
5. To make possible Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabesch's passage across the Bosnia-Herzegovina border and the smuggling of their weapons, an entire secretive transportation system was organized by Ciganovic. The entry of the criminals and their weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out by the main border officials of Shabatz (Rade Popovic) and Losnitza as well as by the customs agent Budivoj Grbic of Losnitza, with the complicity of several others.

On the occasion of handing over this note, would Your Excellency please also add orally that—in the event that no unconditionally positive answer of the Royal government might be received in the meantime—after the course of the 48-hour deadline referred to in this note, as measured from the day and hour of your announcing it, you are commissioned to leave the I. and R. Embassy of Belgrade together with your personnel.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/austro-hungarian-ultimatum.html>.

15. Russian Memorandum of Advice to Serbia: Extract from the Special Journal of the Council of Ministers, 24[11] July 1914

Upon receiving Austria's ultimatum, which demanded a reply no later than the evening of 25 July, the Serbian government sought advice from its Russian patron. Members of the Russian government met immediately and agreed to advise Serbia to seek to extend the deadline and try to submit its differences with Austria to international arbitration. Should Austria nonetheless invade Serbian territory, Russia advised Serbia to offer no armed resistance. As a precautionary measure, Russian officials also decided to mobilize their own military immediately, a move that potential antagonists were nonetheless liable to interpret as evidence that Russia had already decided on war.

Subsequent to the declaration made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the most recent measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government against Serbia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Council of Ministers that, according to information received by him and according to the announcement made by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Imperial Court, the Austro-Hungarian Government had turned upon the Serbian Government with demands which appeared, in fact, to be quite unacceptable to the Serbian Government as a sovereign State, and which were drawn up in the form of an ultimatum calling for a reply within a definite time, expiring tomorrow, July 12 [25], at 6 o'clock in the evening.

Therefore, foreseeing that Serbia would turn to us for advice, and perhaps also for aid, there arose a need to prepare an answer which might be given to Serbia.

Having considered the declaration made by [Russian Foreign Minister] Marshal Sazonov in its relation to the information reported by the Ministers of War, Marine, and Finance concerning the political and military situation, the Council of Ministers decreed:

1—To approve the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to get in touch with the Cabinets of the Great Powers in order to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to grant a postponement in the matter of the answer to the ultimatum demands presented by the Austro-Hungarian Government, (1372) so that it might be possible for the Governments of the Great Powers to become acquainted with and to investigate the documents on the Sarajevo crime which are in the hands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and which, according to

the declaration of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, it is willing to communicate to the Russian Government.

2—To approve the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to advise the Serbian Government, in case the situation of Serbia should be such that she could not with her own strength protect herself against the possible armed invasion by Austro-Hungary, not to offer armed resistance to the invasion of Serbian territory, if such all invasion should occur, but to announce that Serbia yields to force and that she entrusts her fate to the judgment of the Great Powers.

3—To authorize the Ministers of War and of Marine, in accordance with the duties of their offices, to beg your Imperial Majesty to consent, according to the progress of events, to order the mobilization of the four military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, and the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.

(Note by the Acting Secretary of the Council: “In the original the word ‘Baltic’ has been added by his Imperial Majesty’s own hand, and the word ‘fleet’ corrected to read ‘fleets.’”)

4—To authorize the War Minister to proceed immediately to gather stores of war material.

5—To authorize the Minister of Finance to take measures instantly to diminish the funds of the Ministry of Finance which may be at present in Germany or Austria.

The Council of Ministers considers it its loyal duty to inform your Imperial Majesty of these decisions which it has made.

Countersigned: President of the Council of Ministers,
STATE SECRETARY GOREMYKIN
[Names of members of the council follow.]

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/russmemo.html>.

16. The Serbian Response to the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum, 25 July 1914

Two days after receiving the Austrian ultimatum, the Serbian government replied. Its answer was largely conciliatory, and in accordance with the advice of the Russian government, Serbia suggested that should Austria still not be entirely satisfied, they should submit their differences to either the International Court at The Hague or to the arbitration of the Great Powers.

The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere have there been renewed protests against the great neighbourly monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in the Skuptchina [Serbian parliament], as well as in the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Serbian declaration of March 31st, 1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different official bodies of the kingdom, nor its officials have made any attempt to alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the Imperial and Royal Government has made no protests in this sense excepting in the case of a textbook, in regard to which the Imperial and Royal Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has given during the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to Serbia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has successfully resolved the greater number thereof, in pursuit of the interests of both countries.

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions that citizens of Serbia had participated in the preparations of the outrage in

Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready, in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive information.

According to the wishes of the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Serbian citizen of whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself particularly to publish the following declaration on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July:

(1373)

The Royal Serbian Government condemns all forms of propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., all and any activities aimed at the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations. . . .

The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations to whose observation the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself under the declaration of 31 March, 1909. . . .

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engages at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.
2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna

Odbrana” and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the “Narodna Odbrana” Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertakes to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnishes them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.
4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and acts of these officers and officials for the purpose of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.
5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.
6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.
7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good as to

supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purpose of the later enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

(1374)

9. The Royal Government is ready to prove explanations of the statements which its officials in Serbia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the Imperial and Royal Government gives detailed information as to detail where those statements were made and succeeds in proving that those statements have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself ensures care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected.
10. The Royal Government will notify the Imperial and Royal Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Serbian Government believes it to be in the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the Imperial and Royal Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at The Hague or by leaving it to the decision of those Great Powers who contributed to the drafting of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on 18/31st March, 1909.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/serbresponse.html>; also Joe H. Kirchberger, ed., *The First World War: An Eyewitness History* (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 340–341.

**17. The Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War on Serbia, 28 July 1914:
Telegram from Count Leopold von Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs**

At 11:10 a.m. on 28 July 1914 the Austrian government in Vienna dispatched the following telegram to the Serbian prime minister. It was received at 12:30 p.m. the same day.

The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

COUNT BERCHTOLD

Source: Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (London: HMSO, 1915), 392.

18. The Pledge Plan: Telegram 174 from the Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, to the German Ambassador at Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, Sent from Berlin, 28 July 1914

Once Austria-Hungary had decided to declare war on Serbia, the German chancellor cynically advised Austrian officials to express public moderation in their demands upon Serbia, so as to place upon Russia the onus for the expansion of the war into a broad European conflict.

The Austro-Hungarian government has distinctly informed Russia that it is not considering any territorial acquisitions in Serbia. This agrees with Your Excellency's report to the effect that neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian statesmen consider the increase of the Slavic element in the monarchy to be desirable. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government has left us in the dark concerning its intentions, despite repeated interrogations. The reply of the Serbian government to the Austrian ultimatum, which has now been received, makes it clear that Serbia has agreed to the Austrian demands to so great an extent that, in case of a completely uncompromising attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government, it will become necessary to reckon upon the gradual defection from its cause of public opinion throughout all Europe.

According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military movement against Serbia will not be possible before the 12th of August. As a result, the Imperial government is placed in the extraordinarily difficult position of being exposed in the meantime to the mediation and conference proposals of the other cabinets and if it continues to maintain its previous aloofness in the face of such proposals, it will incur the odium of having been responsible for a world war, even, finally, among the German people themselves. A successful war on three fronts cannot be commenced and carried on any such basis.

It is imperative that the responsibility for the eventual extension of the war among those nations not originally immediately concerned should, under all circumstances, fall on Russia. At Mr. Sazonoff's last conversation with [Austrian ambassador to Russia] Count Pourtales, the Minister already conceded that Serbia would have to receive her "deserved lesson." At any rate the Minister was no longer so unconditionally opposed to the Austrian point of view as he had been (1375) earlier. From this fact it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the Russian government might even realize that, once the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army had begun, the very honor of its

arms demanded an invasion of Serbia. But it will be all the better able to compromise with this idea if the Vienna Cabinet repeats at Petersburg its distinct declaration that she is far from wishing to make any territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that her military preparations are solely for the purpose of a temporary occupation of Belgrade and certain other localities on Serbian territory in order to force the Serbian government to the complete fulfillment of her demands, and for the creation of guarantees of future good behavior—to which Austria-Hungary has an unquestionable claim after the experiences she has had with Serbia. An occupation like the German occupation of French territory after the Peace of Frankfurt, for the purpose of securing compliance with the demands for war indemnity, is suggested. As soon as the Austrian demands are complied with, evacuation would follow. Should the Russian government fail to recognize the justice of this point of view, it would have against it the public opinion of all Europe, which is now in the process of turning away from Austria. As a further result, the general diplomatic, and probably the military, situation would undergo material alteration in favor of Austria-Hungary and her allies.

Your Excellency will kindly discuss the matter along these lines thoroughly and impressively with [Austrian Foreign Minister] Count Berchtold, and instigate an appropriate move at St. Petersburg. You will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back. The case is solely one of finding a way to realize Austria's desired aim, that of cutting the vital cord of the Greater-Serbia propaganda without at the same time bringing on a world war, and, if the latter cannot be avoided in the end, of improving the conditions under which we shall have to wage it, insofar as is possible.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/pledplan.html>.

19. Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, to Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 29 July 1914

As European war became more likely, Helmuth von Moltke sent the imperial chancellor an analysis of the situation. Moltke was a supporter of the strategy of the plan developed by his predecessor, General Alfred von Schlieffen. The Schlieffen Plan envisaged that in the event of a general European war, Germany would quickly launch an overwhelming flank attack on France through Belgium and Holland while employing smaller forces to keep Russia at bay. By the end of July, Moltke clearly thought war inevitable and was eager to bring this strategy into play.

Summary of the Political Situation

It goes without saying that no nation of Europe would regard the conflict between Austria and Serbia with any interest except that of humanity, if there did not lie within it the danger of general political complications that today already threaten to unchain a world war. For more than five years Serbia has been the cause of a European tension which has been pressing with simply intolerable weight on the political and economic existence of nations. With a patience approaching weakness, Austria has up to the present borne the continuous provocations and the political machinations aimed at the disruption of her own national stability by a people which proceeded from regicide at home to the murder of princes in a neighboring land. It was only after the last despicable crime that she took to extreme measures, in order to burn out with a glowing iron a cancer that has constantly threatened to poison the body of Europe. One would think that all Europe would be grateful to her. All Europe would have drawn a breath of relief if this mischief-maker could have been properly chastised, and peace and order thereby have been restored to the Balkans; but Russia placed herself at the side of this criminal nation. It was only then that the Austro-Serbian affair became the thunder-cloud which may at any moment break over Europe.

Austria has declared to the European cabinets that she intends neither to make any territorial acquisitions at Serbia's expense nor to infringe upon her status as a nation; that she only wants to force her unruly neighbor to accept the conditions that she considers necessary if they are to continue to exist side by side, and which Serbia, as experience has proved, would never live up to, despite solemn assurances, unless compelled by force. The Austro-Serbian affair is a purely private quarrel in which, as has been said, nobody in Europe would have a profound interest and which would in no way threaten the peace

of Europe but, on the contrary, would establish it more firmly, if Russia had not injected herself into it. That was what first gave the matter its menacing aspect.

Austria has only mobilized a portion of her armed forces, eight army corps, against Serbia—just enough with which to be able to put through her punitive expedition. As against this, Russia has made all preparations to enable her to mobilize the army corps of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa and Moscow, twelve army corps in all, within the briefest period, and is providing for similar preparatory measures in the north also, along the German border and the Baltic Sea.

(1376)

She announces that she intends to mobilize when Austria advances into Serbia, as she cannot permit the destruction of Serbia by Austria, though Austria has explained that she intends nothing of the sort.

What must and will the further consequences be? If Austria advances into Serbia she will have to face not only the Serbian army but also the vastly superior strength of Russia; thus she can not enter upon a war with Serbia without securing herself against an attack by Russia. That means that she will be forced to mobilize the other half of her Army, for she cannot possibly surrender at discretion to a Russia all prepared for war. At the moment, however, in which Austria mobilizes her whole Army, the collision between herself and Russia will become inevitable. But that, for Germany, is the *casus foederis*. If Germany is not to be false to her word and permit her ally to suffer annihilation at the hands of Russian superiority, she, too, must mobilize. And that would bring about the mobilization of the rest of Russia's military districts as a result. But then Russia will be able to say: I am being attacked by Germany. She will then assure herself of the support of France, which, according to the compact of alliance, is obliged to take part in the war, should her ally, Russia, be attacked. Thus the Franco-Russian alliance, so often held up to praise as a purely defensive compact, created only in order to meet the aggressive plans of Germany, will become active, and the mutual butchery of the civilized nations of Europe will begin.

It cannot be denied that the affair has been cunningly contrived by Russia. While giving continuous assurances that she was not yet "mobilizing," but only making preparations "for an eventuality," that "up to the present" she had called no reserves to the colors, she has been getting herself so ready for war that when she actually issues her mobilization orders, she will be prepared to

move her armies forward in a very few days. Thus she puts Austria in a desperate position and shifts the responsibility to her, inasmuch as she is forcing Austria to secure herself against a surprise by Russia. She will say: You, Austria, are mobilizing against us, so you want war with us. Russia assures Germany that she wishes to undertake nothing against her; but she knows perfectly well that Germany could not remain inactive in the event of a belligerent collision between her ally and Russia. So Germany, too, will be forced to mobilize, and again Russia will be enabled to say to the world: I did not want war, but Germany brought it about. After this fashion things must and will develop, unless, one might say, a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war which will annihilate for decades the civilization of almost all Europe.

Germany does not want to bring about this frightful war. But the German Government knows that it would be violating in ominous fashion the deep-rooted feelings of fidelity which are among the most beautiful traits of the nation, if it did not come to the assistance of its ally at a moment which was to be decisive of the nation's existence.

According to the information at hand, France, also, appears to be taking measures preparatory to an eventual mobilization. It is apparent that Russia and France are moving hand in hand as far as regards their preparations.

Thus, when the collision between Austria and Russia becomes inevitable, Germany, also, will mobilize, and will be prepared to take up the fight on two fronts.

With relation to the military preparations we have in view, should the case arise, it is of the greatest importance to ascertain as soon as possible whether Russia and France intend to let it come to a war with Germany. The further the preparations of our neighbors are carried, the quicker they will be able to complete their mobilization. Thus the military situation is becoming from day to day more unfavorable for us, and can, if our prospective opponents prepare themselves further, unmolested, lead to fateful consequences.

Source: Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 306–308. Copyright 1924 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

20. The “Willy-Nicky” Telegrams, 29 July–1 August 1914

As war approached, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II (“Willy”) and Tsar Nicholas II (“Nicky”) of Russia exchanged ten telegrams in which, each writing in English, they professed their mutual desire to avoid war. Neither, however, was prepared to make the concessions that might have achieved this objective. When the war ended, both men had lost their thrones and the tsar and his family were dead.

Tsar to Kaiser
29 July 1914, 1 a.m.
Peter’s Court Palais
To: Sa Majesté l’Empereur
Neues Palais

Am glad you are back. In this serious moment, I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure forced upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.

(1377)

Kaiser to Tsar
29 July 1914, 1:45 a.m.
[This and the previous telegraph crossed.]

It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country.

The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which Archduke Francis Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country.

You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics plays no part at all.

On the other hand, I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope that you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin

Willy

Kaiser to Tsar
29 July 1914, 6:30 p.m.
Berlin

I received your telegram and share your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram, I cannot consider Austria's action against Servia an "ignoble" war. Austria knows by experience that Servian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand its action must be judged as trending to get full guarantee that the Servian promises shall become real facts. Thus my reasoning is borne out by the statement of the Austrian cabinet that Austria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Servia.

I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Servian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable, and as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exercises to promote it. Of course military measures on the part of Russia would be looked upon by Austria as a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help.

Willy

Tsar to Kaiser
29 July 1914, 8:20 p.m.
Peter's Court Palace

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented today by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency! It would be right to give

over the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.

Your loving Nicky

Tsar to Kaiser
30 July 1914, 1:20 a.m.
Peter's Court Palais

Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatischev this evening with instructions.

The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria's preparations.

I hope from all my heart that these measures won't in any way interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.

Nicky

Kaiser to Tsar
30 July 1914, 1:20 a.m.
Berlin

Best thanks for telegram. It is quite out of the question that my ambassador[']s language could have been in contradiction with the tenor of my telegram. Count Pourtalès was instructed to draw the attention of your government to the danger & grave consequences involved by a mobilisation; I said the same in my telegram to you. Austria has only mobilised against Servia & only a part of her army. If, as it is now the case, according to the communication by you & your Government, Russia mobilises against Austria, my rôle as mediator you kindly intrusted me with, & which I accepted at you[r] express prayer, will be endangered if not ruined. The (1378) whole weight of the decision lies solely on you[r] shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for Peace or War.

Willy

Kaiser to Tsar
31 July 1914
Berlin

On your appeal to my friendship and your call for assistance began to mediate between your and the [A]ustro-[H]ungarian Government. While this action was proceeding your troops were mobilised against Austro-Hungary, my ally. [T]hereby, as I have already pointed out to you, my mediation has been made almost illusory.

I have nevertheless continued my action.

I now receive authentic news of serious preparations for war on my Eastern frontier. Responsibility for the safety of my empire forces preventive measures of defence upon me. In my endeavours to maintain the peace of the world I have gone to the utmost limit possible. The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it.

Nobody is threatening the honour or power of Russia who can well afford to await the result of my mediation. My friendship for you and your empire, transmitted to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me and I have honestly often backed up Russia when she was in serious trouble especially in her last war.

The peace of Europe may still be maintained by you, if Russia will agree to stop the milit. measures which must threaten Germany and Austro-Hungary.

Willy

Tsar to Kaiser

31 July 1914

Petersburg, Palace

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, Neues Palais

[This and the previous telegram crossed.]

I thank you heartily for your mediation which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully.

It is *technically* impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Servia's account are taking place my troops shall not make any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this. I put all my trust in God[']s mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

Your affectionate

Nicky

Tsar to Kaiser
1 August 1914
Peter's Court, Palace
Sa Majesté l'Empereur
Berlin

I received your telegram. Understand you are obliged to mobilise but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace deal to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship must succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer.

Nicky

Kaiser to Tsar
1 August, 1914
Berlin

Thanks for your telegram. I yesterday pointed out to your government the way by which alone war may be avoided.

Although I requested an answer for noon today, no telegram from my ambassador conveying an answer from your Government has reached me as yet. I therefore have been obliged to mobilise my army.

Immediate affirmative clear and unmistakable answer from your government is the only way to avoid endless misery. Until I have received this answer alas, I am unable to discuss the subject of your telegram. As a matter of fact I must request you to immediatly [*sic*] order your troops on no account to commit the slightest act of trespassing over our frontiers.

Willy

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/willynilly.html>.

21. British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey to Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador to France, 31 July 1914

On the last day of July, Sir Edward Grey had an interview with the French ambassador to Britain, Paul Cambon. Under the terms of its alliance with Russia, France was bound to go to war (1379) with Germany should the latter state declare war on its ally. No such obligations, however, bound Britain. Despite urgent pleas from Cambon that he specify whether or not Britain would intervene in the widening war, Grey remained noncommittal. Even at this juncture, a divided British cabinet had not yet decided what course to take.

Sir, M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral; I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet today, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. The commercial and financial situation was exceedingly serious; there was danger of a complete collapse that would involve us and everyone else in ruin; and it was possible that our standing aside might be the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit, in which we should be involved. This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our attitude.

I went on to say to M. Cambon that though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments

might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon expressed great disappointment at my reply. He repeated his question of whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, so far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilisation of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilisation was being forced by Russia.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870, we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase in German strength; and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

Source: Joe H. Kirchberger, ed., *The First World War: An Eyewitness History* (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 343.

22. The German Declaration of War on Russia, 1 August 1914

On 1 August 1914 the German ambassador in St. Petersburg delivered the following message to the Russian government. Drafted in considerable haste, in two places the final version still included alternative wordings.

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty (1380) the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with [alternative version included in final message: not having considered it necessary to answer] this demand, and having shown by this refusal [alternative version included in final message: this attitude] that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/germandecruss.html>.

23. Germany's Ultimatum: The German Request for Free Passage through Belgium, 2 August 1914

On 28 July 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, impelling Russia to come to its defense, whereupon, on 1 August 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. Calculating that this would inevitably in turn bring France, Russia's ally, into the war, Germany demanded that Belgium—whose neutrality Germany, together with other major European powers, had guaranteed under the 1870 Treaty of London—allow its troops free passage through Belgian territory so that they could invade France. This Belgium refused the following day, whereupon on 4 August Germany declared war on Belgium. On 2 August the British cabinet decided, after lengthy discussion, that should Germany, as occurred one day later, attack France, Britain would declare war on Germany. The latter country's disregard of Belgian neutrality gave Britain additional justification for its 4 August declaration of war on Germany. On 2 August the German ambassador at Brussels, Herr von Below Saleske, handed M. Davignon, Belgium's minister for foreign affairs, the following note, setting in motion the events described above.

Very Confidential

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind them selves, at the

conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/belgium_germanrequest.htm.

24. Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey, 2 August, 1914

On 2 August 1914 Count von Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Constantinople, signed a secret treaty of alliance with Turkey. Although Turkey remained ostensibly (1381) neutral for a further three months, its government clearly favored Germany, allowing German warships to take refuge in Turkish waters. Early in November Russia, Serbia, Britain, and France all declared war on the Ottoman Empire, some of whose territories each of the Allies coveted.

1. The two contracting parties agree to observe strict neutrality in regard to the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
2. In case Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should thus bring about a casus foederis [reason to enter the war due to the existing alliance] for Germany with relation to Austria-Hungary, this casus foederis would also come into existence for Turkey.
3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission.
4. Germany obligates herself, if necessary by force of arms . . . [cipher group lacking] Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened.
5. This agreement which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting both Empires from international complications which may result from the present conflict goes into force as soon as it is signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918.
6. In case it shall not be denounced by one of the high contracting parties six months before the expiration of the term named above, this treaty shall remain in force for a further period of five years. . . .
8. The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public as a result of an agreement arrived at between the two high contracting parties.

Source: The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
<http://www.yale.edu.eproxy.lib.hku.hk/lawweb/avalon/turkgerm.htm>.

25. The Belgian Refusal of Free Passage, 3 August 1914

The morning after he had received the German ultimatum, Belgium's minister for foreign affairs responded by handing the German minister in Brussels the following note. The next morning German forces invaded Belgium.

This note [asking free passage] has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on 1 August, in the name of the French Government. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/belgsayno.html>.

**26. The German Declaration of War on France: Wilhelm von Schoen,
German Ambassador in Paris, to French Prime Minister René Viviani, 3
August 1914**

Once Germany had declared war on Russia, military leaders assumed that under its alliance commitments France would automatically come to the assistance of its ally. German troops therefore prepared to invade France, crossing Belgian territory in the process. On 3 August Germany, disingenuously and untruthfully alleging unprovoked attacks on German soil by French forces, delivered a declaration of war to the French prime minister.

(1382)

The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel; one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release the[m] if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request Your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. . . .

Source: Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 531–532. Copyright 1924 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

27. The “Scrap of Paper”: Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, 4 August 1914

The German Imperial Chancellor Count Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow were both apparently shocked at the British declaration of war. Both had gambled that Britain would refuse to honor the guarantees given to Belgium many decades earlier. In final interviews with the British ambassador in Berlin, both expressed shock and disillusionment over the British decision. In words that represented a major propaganda disaster for Germany, Bethmann Hollweg dismissively referred to Britain's treaty obligations to Belgium as a mere “scrap of paper.”

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant, I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be “No,” as in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. . . .

This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the

circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor [Bethmann Hollweg], as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the steps taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said (1383) that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/paperscrap.html>.

28. “The Lamps Are Going Out”: Sir Edward Grey on the Coming of War

In 1925, seven years after the Great War ended, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey published his memoirs in which he recalled the coming of war, something he profoundly regretted. He reflected upon his own erroneous belief that come what may, war would be avoided, and he discussed what he saw as the consequences of the war for those powers involved.

[D]ominant in my mind in the last week of July 1914 . . . was [the belief] that a great European war would be a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale, and that this would be so obvious to all the Great Powers that, when on the edge of the abyss, they would call a halt and recoil from it. The first half of this impression unfortunately admits of no qualification now. We know the full tale of the loss of life, of the maiming and wounding; we know this, but the amount of grief and suffering caused by it is more than human thought or sympathy can measure.

A friend came to see me on one of the evenings of the last week [before war began]—he thinks it was on Monday, August 3. We were standing at a window of my room in the Foreign Office. It was getting dusk, and the lamps were being lit in the space below on which we were looking. My friend recalls that I remarked on this with the words: “The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time.”

The full extent of the economic disaster of the war is not yet known. Europe is still engaged in grappling with it; we have certainly not yet seen the end of it; it is possible that we have not seen the worst of it. Some of us thought that economic disaster would make itself felt more quickly after the outbreak of war; that it would rapidly become so acute as to bring war to an end. In that we were wrong, but we were wrong only in our estimate of the time and the manner in which economic disaster would make itself felt. It might have been more merciful to Europe as a whole, if this disaster had made itself felt more quickly and imperatively. and so had shortened the war. The longer the war went on the greater the magnitude of the economic disaster was sure to be, and the more prolonged and enduring would be the effects of it. Those who had the worst forebodings of what war would mean, did not over-estimate the human suffering or the economic distress that it has actually caused.

The war has also had a great effect on the old social and political order. In some countries it has destroyed it; in all European countries it has shaken it. The crust of the old order was wearing thin already. I felt that if war came the

new forces pent within must break through. If war came, and proved to be the catastrophe that was anticipated, people would not stop to apportion war guilt, to blame one country or to acquit another; they would take a wholesale view and say that, no matter who was to blame for this war, the system under which such a catastrophe was possible must be changed. This feeling . . . was with me constantly at the time.

How much of this forecast has been verified? Six Great European Powers took part in the war. France is the only one of them of which it can be said that the social and political order has not been changed to an extent and degree that seemed almost impossible or incredible to us in 1914. Russia has had a revolution and is in a condition that seems to baffle description; Germany is a Republic; Italy has had a revolution sufficient to change her whole political system; and Austria-Hungary, as a Great Power, has disappeared. Britain has had a Labour Government, though, according to our precedents, we are making our revolutions lowly and by constitutional methods.

Source: Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years 1892–1916*, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), 2:19–21.

29. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson, 10 August 1914

On 4 August 1914 President Woodrow Wilson of the United States formally proclaimed his country's neutrality toward the conflict. Within a few days, Allied governments inquired of leading New York bankers as to whether the U.S. government would permit Allied governments to borrow money in that country to finance their war purchases. The U.S. secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, passed on this request to the (1384) president, with whom the ultimate decision rested. Bryan, a staunch pacifist, made quite clear his own preference to deny any belligerent government such financing.

I beg to communicate to you an important matter which has come before the Department. Morgan Co. of New York have asked whether there would be any objection to their making a loan to the French Government and also the Rothschilds—I suppose that is intended for the French Government. I have conferred with Mr. Lansing [legal counselor to the Department of State] and he knows of no legal objection to financing this loan, but I have suggested to him the advisability of presenting to you an aspect of the case which is not legal but I believe to be consistent with our attitude in international matters. It is whether it would be advisable for this Government to take the position that it will not approve of any loan to a belligerent nation. The reasons that I would give in support of this proposition are:

First. Money is the worst of all contrabands because it commands everything else. The question of making loans contraband by international agreement has been discussed, but no action has been taken. I know of nothing that would do more to prevent war than an international agreement that neutral nations would not loan to belligerents. While such an agreement would be of great advantage, could we not by our example hasten the reaching of such an agreement? We are the one great nation which is not involved and our refusal to loan to any belligerent would naturally tend to hasten a conclusion of the war. We are responsible for the use of our influence through example and as we can not tell what we can do until we try, the only way of testing our influence is to set the example and observe its effect. This is the fundamental reason in support of the suggestion submitted.

Second. Here is a special and local reason, it seems to me, why this course would be advisable. Mr. Lansing observed in the discussion of the subject that a loan would be taken by those in sympathy with the country in whose behalf the loan was negotiated. If we approved of a loan to France we would not, of

course, object to a loan to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria, or to any other country, and if loans were made to these countries our citizens would be divided into two groups, each group loaning money to the country which it favors and this money could not be furnished without expressions of sympathy. These expressions of sympathy are disturbing enough when they do not rest upon pecuniary interests—they would be still more disturbing if each group was pecuniarily interested in the success of the nation to whom its members had loaned money.

Third. The powerful financial interests which would be connected with these loans would be tempted to use their influence through the newspapers to support the interests of the Government to which they had loaned because the value of the security would be directly affected by the result of the war. We would thus find our newspapers violently arrayed on one side or the other, each paper supporting a financial group and pecuniary interest. All of this influence would make it all the more difficult for us to maintain neutrality, as our action on various questions that would arise would affect one side or the other and powerful financial interests would be thrown into the balance.

I am to talk over the telephone with Mr. Davison of the Morgan Co. at 1 o'clock, but I will have him delay final action until you have time to consider. . . .

P.S.—Mr. Lansing [State Department counselor] calls attention to the fact that an American citizen who goes abroad and voluntarily enlists in the army of a belligerent nation loses the protection of his citizenship while so engaged, and asks why dollars, going abroad and enlisting in war, should be more protected. As we cannot prevent American citizens going abroad at their own risk, so we cannot prevent dollars going abroad at the risk of the owners, but the influence of the Government is used to prevent American citizens from doing this. Would the Government not be justified in using its influence against the enlistment of the Nation's dollars in a foreign war? The Morgans say that the money would be spent here, but the floating of these loans would absorb the loanable funds and might affect our ability to borrow.

Source: U.S. Senate, 74 Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 25:7517–7518.

30. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to J. P. Morgan and Company, 15 August 1914

After consultation with the president, the U.S. secretary of state passed on to the partners of J. P. Morgan and Company, together with other American bankers, the fact that the Wilson administration considered it unneutral for American financiers to make loans to any belligerent government.

Inquiry having been made as to the attitude of this government in case American bankers are asked to make loans to foreign governments during the war in Europe, the following announcement is made:

There is no reason why loans should not be made to the governments of neutral nations, but in the judgment of this Government, loans by American bankers to any foreign (1385) nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.

Source: U.S. Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 25:7505.

31. President Woodrow Wilson, “An Appeal to the American People: Message to the United States Congress,” 18 August 1914

The United States initially sought to remain uninvolved in the war. Only a fortnight after it began, President Woodrow Wilson formally urged all Americans to favor neither side in the conflict but rather remain “impartial.” Even at this early stage, Wilson clearly hoped that the United States would be able to serve as a mediator in the war.

I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during these last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their opinions upon the street.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests—may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action. Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought, as well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another. . . .

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 30, May–September 1914* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 393–394.

32. "The Contemptible Little Army": Kaiser Wilhelm II, Army Order, 19 August 1914

At the beginning of the war, German leaders believed that a swift victory would be easily attainable. One factor underlying their confidence was the knowledge that Britain did not possess a large standing army and that it would take some time to mobilize such forces. The German kaiser's insult to the British army quickly became a badge of pride.

It is my Royal and Imperial command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill and all the valor of my soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army.

Headquarters, Aix-la-Chapelle

Source: Charles F. Horne and Warren F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 2:136.

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Roberts, P. M., S. C. Tucker (2005). World War I Documents (January–August 1914). In *The Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History* (pp.). Retrieved from <http://legacy.abc-clio.com.eproxy.lib.hku.hk/reader.aspx?isbn=9781851094257&id=WW1E.1839>

World War I Documents (September–December 1914)

33. The September Program: Extracts from Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Memorandum, “Provisional Notes on the Direction of Our Policy on the Conclusion of Peace,” 4 September 1914
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38. British Admiralty, Declaration of North Sea War Zone, 3 November 1914
39. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The War and Russian Social Democracy,” November 1914
40. The British Finance Act (Session 2), 27 November 1914
41. German Propaganda: Austro-German Proclamation to Russian Troops, 1914 or Early 1915

33. The September Program: Extracts from Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Memorandum, “Provisional Notes on the Direction of Our Policy on the Conclusion of Peace,” 4 September 1914

*Since the 1960s, when the German historian Fritz Fischer published the magisterial tome **Germany's Aims in the First World War**, controversy has raged over the extent of Germany's war aims during the Great War and whether these were so extensive as to be effectively unacceptable to the Allied Powers. The following document written by Count Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Germany's chancellor, a few weeks after the war began has been taken as evidence that Germany sought complete dominion in Europe. A contemporaneous introduction drafted by German officials stated: “The ‘general aim of the war’ was, for him, ‘security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a Great Power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken.’” Since peace with Russia did not appear likely in the near future, Bethmann Hollweg did not specify precisely what Germany would demand of Russia. Anticipating, however, that victory in the continental west was near, he stated the following “individual war aims” that Germany would require of the Western powers. In practice, German war aims and particularly those of the chancellor, tended to shift according to circumstances at any given time. The September Program undoubtedly reflected Germany's substantial, though incomplete, initial successes.*

1. *France.* The military to decide whether we should demand cession of Belfort and western slopes of the Vosges, razing of fortresses and cession of coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne.

The ore-field of Briey, which is necessary for the supply of ore for our industry, to be ceded in any case.

Further, a war indemnity, to be paid in instalments; it must be high enough to prevent France from spending any considerable sums on armaments in the next 15–20 years.

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Furthermore: a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany, secures the French market for our exports and makes it possible to

exclude British commerce from France. This treaty must secure for us financial and industrial freedom of movement in France in such fashion that German enterprises can no longer receive different treatment from French.

2. *Belgium*. Liège and Verviers to be attached to Prussia, a frontier strip of the province of Luxemburg to Luxemburg.

Question whether Antwerp, with a corridor to Liège, should also be annexed remains open.

At any rate Belgium, even if allowed to continue to exist as a state, must be reduced to a vassal state, must allow us to occupy any militarily important ports, must place her coast at our disposal in military respects, must become economically a German province. Given such a solution, which offers the advantages of annexation without its inescapable domestic political disadvantages, French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, where most of the population is Flemish, can without danger be attached to this unaltered Belgium. The competent quarters will have to judge the military value of this position against England.

3. *Luxemburg*. Will become a German federal state and will receive a strip of the present Belgian province of Luxemburg and perhaps the corner of Longwy.

4. We must create a *central European economic association* through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany's economic dominance over Mitteleuropa.

5. *The question of colonial acquisitions*, where the first aim is the creation of a continuous Central African colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realised *vis-à-vis* Russia.

6. A short provisional formula suitable for a possible preliminary peace will be found for a basis for the economic agreements to be concluded with France and Belgium.

7. *Holland*. It will have to be considered by what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer relationship with the German Empire.

8. In view of the Dutch character, this closer relationship must leave them free of any feeling of compulsion, must alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then, must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an offensive and defensive alliance, to cover the colonies; in any case a close customs association, perhaps the cession of Antwerp to Holland in return for the right to keep a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the mouth of the Scheldt.

Source: Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), 103–105. Copyright © 1961 by Droste Verlag and Druckerel GmbH, Dusseldorf. English translation copyright © 1967 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

34. The First Engagement in Submarine Warfare, 22 September 1914: German and British Perspectives

From early in the war German sailors began to use a new technology, the submarine or U-boat (Unterseeboot). The first major engagement in which a submarine took part was on 22 September 1914, when one submarine was responsible for the sinking of three 12,000-ton British cruisers, each carrying 800 men. Both the triumphant German submarine commander of the U-9, who died soon afterward in another engagement, and a senior officer from a British vessel left personal accounts of the first submarine victory.

Account of German Lieutenant Otto Weddigen

I am 32 years old and have been in the navy for years. For the last five years I have been attached to the submarine flotilla, and have been most interested in that branch of the navy. At the outbreak of the war our undersea boats were rendezvoused at a series of the North Sea.

Each of us felt and hoped that the Fatherland might be benefited by such individual efforts of ours as were possible at a time when our bigger sisters of the fleet were prohibited from activity. So we awaited commands from the Admiralty, ready for any undertaking that promised to do for the imperial navy what our brothers of the army were so gloriously accomplishing.

I was married at the home of my brother in Wilhelmshaven to my boyhood sweetheart, Miss Prete of Hamburg, on August 16th. Before that I had been steadily on duty with my boat, and I had to leave again the next day after my marriage. But both my bride and I wanted the ceremony to take place at the appointed time, and it did, although within twenty-four hours thereafter I had to go away on a venture that gave a good chance of making my new wife a widow. But she was as firm (1389)as I was that my first duty was to answer the call of our country, and she waved me away from the dock with good-luck wishes.

I set out from a North Sea port on one of the arms of the Kiel Canal and set my course in a southwesterly direction. Thus I was soon cruising off the coast of Holland. I had been lying in wait there only a few days before the morning of September 22nd arrived, the day on which I fell in with my quarry.

When I started from home the fact was kept quiet and a heavy sea helped to keep the secret, but when the action began the sun was bright and the water smooth—not the most favorable conditions for submarine work.

I had sighted several ships during my passage, but they were not what I was seeking. English torpedo boats came within my reach, but I felt there was bigger game further and so on I went. I traveled on the surface except when we sighted vessels, and then I submerged, not even showing my periscope, except when it was necessary to take bearings. It was ten minutes after 6 on the morning of last Tuesday when I caught sight of one of the big cruisers of the enemy.

I was then eighteen sea miles northwest of the Hook of Holland. I had then traveled considerably more than 200 miles from my base. My boat was one of an old type, but she had been built on honor, and she was behaving beautifully. I had been going ahead partly submerged, with about five feet of my periscope showing. Almost immediately I caught sight of the first cruiser and two others. I submerged completely and laid my course so as to bring up in the center of the trio, which held a sort of triangular formation. I could see their gray-black sides riding high over the water.

When I first sighted them they were near enough for torpedo work, but I wanted to make my aim sure, so I went down and in on them. I had taken the position of the three ships before submerging, and I succeeded in getting another flash through my periscope before I began action. I soon reached what I regarded as a good shooting point.

Then I loosed one of my torpedoes at the middle ship. I was then about twelve feet under water, and got the shot off in good shape, my men handling the boat as if she had been a skiff. I climbed to the surface to get a sight through my tube of the effect, and discovered that the shot had gone straight and true, striking the ship, which I later learned was the *Aboukir*, under one of her magazines, which in exploding helped the torpedo's work of destruction.

There were a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire, and part of the cruiser rose in the air. Then I heard a roar and felt reverberations sent through the water by the detonation. She had been broken apart, and sank in a few minutes. The *Aboukir* had been stricken in a vital spot and by an unseen force; that made the blow all the greater.

Her crew were brave, and even with death staring them in the face kept to their posts, ready to handle their useless guns, for I submerged at once. But I had stayed on top long enough to see the other cruisers, which I learned were the *Cressy* and the *Hogue*, turn and steam full speed to their dying sister, whose plight they could not understand, unless it had been due to an accident.

The ships came on a mission of inquiry and rescue, for many of the *Aboukir*'s crew were now in the water, the order having been given, "Each man for himself."

But soon the other two English cruisers learned what had brought about the destruction so suddenly.

As I reached my torpedo depth I sent a second charge at the nearest of the oncoming vessels, which was the *Hogue*. The English were playing my game, for I had scarcely to move out of my position, which was a great aid, since it helped to keep me from detection.

On board my little boat the spirit of the German Navy was to be seen in its best form. With enthusiasm every man held himself in check and gave attention to the work in hand.

The attack on the *Hogue* went true. But this time I did not have the advantageous aid of having the torpedo detonate under the magazine, so for twenty minutes the *Hogue* lay wounded and helpless on the surface before she heaved, half turned over and sank.

But this time, the third cruiser knew of course that the enemy was upon her and she sought as best she could to defend herself. She loosed her torpedo defense batteries on boats, starboard and port, and stood her ground as if more anxious to help the many sailors who were in the water than to save herself. In common with the method of defending herself against a submarine attack, she steamed in a zigzag course, and this made it necessary for me to hold my torpedoes until I could lay a true course for them, which also made it necessary for me to get nearer to the *Cressy*. I had come to the surface for a view and saw how wildly the fire was being sent from the ship. Small wonder that was when they did not know where to shoot, although one shot went unpleasantly near us.

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When I got within suitable range I sent away my third attack. This time I sent a second torpedo after the first to make the strike doubly certain. My crew were aiming like sharpshooters and both torpedoes went to their bull's-eye. My luck was with me again, for the enemy was made useless and at once began sinking by her head. Then she careened far over, but all the while her men stayed at the guns looking for their invisible foe. They were brave and true to their country's sea traditions. Then she eventually suffered a boiler explosion and completely

turned turtle. With her keel uppermost she floated until the air got out from under her and then she sank with a loud sound, as if from a creature in pain.

The whole affair had taken less than one hour from the time of shooting off the first torpedo until the *Cressy* went to the bottom. Not one of the three had been able to use any of its big guns. I knew the wireless of the three cruisers had been calling for aid. I was still quite able to defend myself, but I knew that news of the disaster would call many English submarines and torpedo boat destroyers, so, having done my appointed work, I set my course for home. . . .

Report by British Navy Commander Bertram W. L. Nicholson

Sir: I have the honour to submit the following report in connection with the sinking of H.M.S. *Cressy*, in company with H.M.S. *Aboukir* and *Hogue*, on the morning of the 22nd of September, while on patrol duty:

The *Aboukir* was struck at about 6.25 a.m. on the starboard beam. The *Hogue* and *Cressy* closed and took up a position, the *Hogue* ahead of the *Aboukir*, and the *Cressy* about 400 yards on her port beam. As soon as it was seen that the *Aboukir* was in danger of sinking all the boats were sent away from the *Cressy*, and a picket boat was hoisted out with steam up. When cutters full of the *Aboukir*'s men were returning to the *Cressy*, the *Hogue* was struck, apparently under the aft 9.2 magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately. Almost directly after the *Hogue* was hit we observed a periscope on our port bow about 300 yards off.

Fire was immediately opened and the engines were put full speed ahead with the intention of running her down. Our gunner, Mr. Dougherty, positively asserts that he hit the periscope and that the submarine sank. An officer who was standing alongside the gunner thinks that the shell struck only floating timber, of which there was much about, but it was evidently the impression of the men on deck, who cheered and clapped heartily, that the submarine had been hit. This submarine did not fire a torpedo at the *Cressy*.

Capt. Johnson then maneuvered the ship so as to render assistance to the crews of the *Hogue* and *Aboukir*. About five minutes later another periscope was seen on our starboard quarter and fire was opened. The track of the torpedo she fired at a range of 500 to 600 yards was plainly visible and it struck us on the starboard side just before the after-bridge.

The ship listed about 10 degrees to the starboard and remained steady. The time was 7.15 a.m. All the watertight doors, deadlights and scuttles had been

securely closed before the torpedo struck the ship. All the mess stools and table shores, and all available timber below and on deck, had been previously got up and thrown over side for the saving of life.

A second torpedo fired by the same submarine missed and passed about 10 feet astern. About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo had hit, a third torpedo fired from a submarine just before the starboard beam hit us under the No. 5 boiler room. The time was 7.30 a.m. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up, remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank, at 7.55 a.m.

A large number of men were saved by casting adrift on Pattern 3 target. The steam pinnace floated off her clutches, but filled and sank.

The second torpedo which struck the *Cressy* passed over the sinking hull of the *Aboukir*, narrowly missing it. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at the *Cressy*. . . .

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 2:296–303.

35. Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Memorandum of a Conversation with the President at 8:30 This Evening Relative to Loans and Bank Credits to Belligerent Governments, 23 October 1914

Under pressure from leading New York bankers to relax the Wilson administration's attitude on short-term credits to belligerent governments, Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing discussed the matter with President Woodrow Wilson. Without any publicity or formal announcements, he then quietly conveyed the president's endorsement of such financing to Willard D. Straight of J. P. Morgan and Company and Roger D. Farnham of the National City Bank, effectively giving those and other banks a green light to go ahead with such credits.

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From my conversation with the President I gathered the following impressions as to his views concerning bank credits of belligerent governments in contradistinction to a public loan floated in this country.

There is a decided difference between an issue of Government bonds, which are sold in open market to investors, and an arrangement for easy exchange in meeting debts incurred in trade between a government and American merchants.

The sale of bonds draws gold from the American people. The purchasers of bonds are loaning their savings to the belligerent government, and are, in fact, financing the war.

The acceptance of Treasury notes or other evidences of debt in payment for articles purchased in the country is merely a means of facilitating trade by a system of credits which will avoid the clumsy and impractical method of cash payments. As trade with belligerents is legitimate and proper it is desirable that obstacles, such as interference with an arrangement of credits or easy method of exchange, should be removed.

The question of an arrangement of this sort ought not to be submitted to the Government for its opinion, since it has given its views on loans in general, although an arrangement as to credits has to do with a commercial debt rather than with a loan of money.

The above are my individual impressions of the conversations with the President, who authorized me to give them to such persons as were entitled to

hear them, upon the express understanding that they were my own impressions and that I had no authority to speak for the President or the Government.

On the bottom of this document Lansing noted:

Substance of above conveyed to Willard Straight at Metropolitan Club, 8:30 p.m., October 24, 1914. Substance of above conveyed to R. L. Farnham at the Department, 10:30 a.m., October 26, 1914.

Source: U.S. Senate, 74 Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 25:7518–7519.

36. Turkey Declares War on the Allies: Proclamation by Sultan Mehmed, 29 October 1914

After almost three months of wavering and an initial halfhearted attempt at neutrality, in late October 1914 Turkey finally opted war as an ally of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary. This decision did not surprise the Allies, but it meant that they now felt free to reach agreements among themselves as to the future disposition of various Turkish-ruled territories in the Near and Middle East and Europe.

To my army! To my navy!

Immediately after the war between the Great Powers began, I called you to arms in order to be able in case of trouble to protect the existence of empire and country from any assault on the part of our enemies, who are only awaiting the chance to attack us suddenly and unexpectedly as they have always done.

While we were thus in a state of armed neutrality, a part of the Russian fleet, which was going to lay mines at the entrance of the straits of the Black Sea, suddenly opened fire against a squadron of our own fleet at the time engaged in maneuvers.

While we were expecting reparation from Russia for this unjustified attack, contrary to international law, the empire just named, as well as its allies, recalled their ambassadors and severed diplomatic relations with our country.

The fleets of England and France have bombarded the straits of the Dardanelles, and the British fleet has shelled the harbor of Akbah on the Red Sea. In the face of such successive proofs of wanton hostility we have been forced to abandon the peaceful attitude for which we always strove, and now in common with our allies, Germany and Austria, we turn to arms in order to safeguard our lawful interests.

The Russian Empire during the last three hundred years has caused our country to suffer many losses in territory, and when we finally arose to that sentiment of awakening and regeneration which would increase our national welfare and our power, the Russian Empire made every effort to destroy our attempts, either with war or with numerous machinations and intrigues. Russia, England, and France never for a moment ceased harboring ill-will against our Caliphate, to which millions of Mussulmans, suffering under the tyranny of foreign

dominations, are religiously and wholeheartedly devoted, and it was always these powers that started every misfortune that came upon us.

Therefore, in this mighty struggle which now we are undertaking, we once for all will put an end to the attacks made from one side against the Caliphate, and from the other against the existence of our country.

The wounds inflicted, with the help of the Almighty, by my fleet in the Black Sea, and by my army in the Dardanelles, in (1392) Akbah, and on the Caucasian frontiers against our enemies, have strengthened in us the conviction that our sacred struggle for a right cause will triumph. The fact, moreover, that to-day the countries and armies of our enemies are being crushed under the heels of our allies is a good sign, making our conviction as regards final success still stronger.

My heroes! My soldiers! In this sacred war and struggle, which we began against the enemies who have undermined our religion and our holy fatherland, never for a single moment cease from strenuous effort and from self-abnegation.

Throw yourselves against the enemy as lions, bearing in mind that the very existence of our empire, and of 300,000,000 Moslems whom I have summoned by sacred Fetva to a supreme struggle, depend on your victory.

The hearty wishes and prayers of 300,000,000 innocent and tortured faithful, whose faces are turned in ecstasy and devotion to the Lord of the universe in the mosques and the shrine of the Kasbah, are with you.

My children! My soldiers! No army in the history of the world was ever honored with a duty as sacred and as great as is yours. By fulfilling it, show that you are the worthy descendants of the Ottoman Armies that in the past made the world tremble, and make it impossible for any foe of our faith and country to tread on our ground, and disturb the peace of the sacred soil of Yemen, where the inspiring tomb of our prophet lies. Prove beyond doubt to the enemies of the country that there exist an Ottoman army and navy which know how to defend their faith, their country and their military honor, and how to defy death for their sovereign!

Right and loyalty are on our side, and hatred and tyranny on the side of our enemies, and therefore there is no doubt that the Divine help and assistance of the just God and the moral support of our glorious Prophet will be on our side

to encourage us. I feel convinced that from this struggle we shall emerge as an empire that has made good the losses of the past and is once more glorious and powerful.

Do not forget that you are brothers in arms of the strongest and bravest armies of the world, with whom we now are fighting shoulder to shoulder. Let those of you who are to die a martyr's death be messengers of victory to those who have gone before us, and let the victory be sacred and the sword be sharp of those of you who are to remain in life.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 2:382–384.

37. Turkey, Official Rejection of Treaties of Dependence, 29 October 1914

Simultaneously with her declaration of war, Turkey repudiated treaties she had previously signed with the Western powers on the grounds that these were unjust to Turkey and that the Western powers had, in any case, never observed those provisions favorable to Turkey. Turkey's action set a precedent for many similar unilateral abrogations of treaties by once-weak nations during the twentieth century on the grounds that these were unjust, unequal, and quasi-colonial in nature. Turkey initially sent a copy of this declaration to Germany and later to the various neutral nations, including the United States.

The Imperial Ottoman Government had occasion in the course of the second half of the last century to sign, under various circumstances, two important treaties, of Paris of March 10, 1856, and the one of Berlin of August 3, 1878.

The first established a state of affairs, an equilibrium, which the second treaty destroyed to a great extent, but both were violated by the signatory powers themselves, who violated their promises, either openly or secretly, so that after having obtained the application of the clauses which were to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire, they did not trouble themselves about those which were in its favor, and they even opposed them constantly.

The Treaty of Paris contained a stipulation "to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire," and to guarantee jointly "the strict observation of this agreement." It further excluded all interference in the relations of the Imperial Government "with its subjects and with the internal administration of the empire."

This did not prevent the French Government from exercising in the Ottoman Empire an intervention supported by armed force, and to exact the establishment of a new administration. The other signatory powers were then obliged to associate themselves diplomatically with this act so as not to leave France free in her designs, which were contrary to the above-mentioned stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and gave rise to fears of aims of annexation.

On the other hand, the Russian Government embarked upon a similar line of conduct by preventing the Sublime Porte in an ultimatum from taking action against the principalities of Serbia and Montenegro which Russia had aroused, and to whom it did not fail to furnish arms, subsidies, officers, and even soldiers, and finally to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, after having demanded that a new internal administration be established in certain Ottoman

provinces, and that (1393) foreign interference enter into the conduct of their public affairs.

Moreover, the above-mentioned clauses of the Treaty of Paris did not hinder the French Government from occupying Tunis and establishing a protectorate over this dependence of the empire; nor did it prevent the British Government from occupying Egypt and establishing effective domination, nor from making a series of encroachments of Ottoman sovereignty south of Yemen at Nedjid, at Koweit, at El Katr, as well as in the Persian Gulf; nor did these provisions inconvenience the four Governments who are now at war with Turkey in modifying by force the status of the Island of Crete and in creating there a new situation in flagrant contradiction with the integrity which they had undertaken to respect.

Finally, Italy had no scruples in declaring war on the Ottoman Empire without any serious reason, simply with the object of conquest and to obtain compensations as a result of the new political situation in North Africa, and it did not even trouble to comply with its promise that it would “before using force enable the contracting parties to prevent such extreme measures by mediation.”

The above makes it unnecessary to enumerate still more circumstances when intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire took place.

The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed as a result of the events of 1877–1878, modified considerably the Treaty of Paris by creating new situations in European Turkey; these situations were afterward changed by further conventions, which annulled the stipulations of the international convention referred to.

But not long after the conclusion of this treaty the Russian Government showed the degree of its respect for its own promises. Not having conquered Batoum, it had only been able to annex this fortress by declaring in a solemn international clause its intention to transform it into an essentially commercial free port. The British Government had on this basis consented to renew certain arrangements.

However, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, after having realized its intentions, simply repudiated this article of the treaty, and made of said city a fortified place. The British Government did not take a single one of the measures which it had promised, thus showing how little importance it attached to the system established by the Treaty of Berlin.

The Imperial Ottoman Government carried out very scrupulously the onerous clauses of the treaty, but the few provisions inserted therein in its favor have remained a dead letter, in spite of its insistence and that of its creditors, owing to the interest which a certain power had in preventing all improvement in the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

The developments set forth show that the Treaties of Paris and Berlin were constantly being violated in their essential and general clauses by certain States which had signed them. But it cannot be conceived that the same international convention should be violated as regards the duties of one of the contracting parties when all provisions of the latter are invariably disregarded. This fact alone renders it already null and void for said party.

Moreover, the situation in which the two above-mentioned treaties were signed has completely changed. The Imperial Ottoman Government is at war with four of the signatory powers, the powers on whose initiative and assistance, and in whose interest said conventions were concluded, a fact which annuls them absolutely as regards the relations between Turkey and those powers.

Furthermore, the Imperial Government has allied itself with two of these powers on a footing of entire equality.

Hence the Ottoman Empire has definitely abandoned its somewhat subordinate position under the collective guardianship of the great powers which some of the latter were interested in maintaining. It therefore enters the group of European powers with all the rights and prerogatives of an entirely independent Government. This new situation also removes all *raison d'être* for the above-mentioned treaties.

All these different considerations render the said conventions null and void without any contractual value. Nevertheless, in order not to allow any doubts on this point in the minds of those contracting States who have changed their relationship of friendship into an alliance, the Imperial Government has the honor to inform the Imperial Government of Germany and the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary that it denounces said treaties of 1856 and 1878.

It deems it useful, however, to declare that it will not fail to appeal to the principles of international law in order to have these rights respected which had been stipulated in its favor by the above-mentioned treaties and which until now have been disregarded.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 2:384–388.

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38. British Admiralty, Declaration of North Sea War Zone, 3 November 1914

As commercial warfare intensified, the British government notified the governments of other states that it intended to declare the entire North Sea a war zone. The stated rationale for instituting this policy was indiscriminate mining by purportedly neutral merchantmen, vessels the British suspected were surreptitiously following German orders and thereby endangering other merchant and military shipping in the North Sea. Britain insisted that in future all shipping use channels by Britain, a measure that also made it far easier for Britain to police such shipping and intercept cargoes bound for Germany. By implication, British vessels were liable to treat any ship that ignored these guidelines as an enemy.

During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on main trade route from America to Liverpool via north of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up with loss of life by this agency. The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck and but for warnings given by British cruisers other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed.

These mines can not have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessels flying neutral flag which have come along the trade route as if for purposes of peaceful commerce and while profiting to the full by immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships have wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

Mine laying under neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare.

In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British Navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on high seas, and to the maintenance within limits of international law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this kind of war is being waged.

They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft.

All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from the 5th of November onwards the Admiralty announces that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely so far as Great Britain is concerned up the east coast of England to Farn Island, whence safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lightship. From this point they should turn north or south according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. Converse applies to vessels outward bound.

By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying even for a few miles from the course thus indicated may be followed by serious consequences.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914: Supplement, the World War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 464.

39. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The War and Russian Social Democracy,” November 1914

When European war began in August 1914, many socialists rallied to the support of their respective nations. The radical Russian socialist Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, by contrast, perceived the war as one between capitalist and imperialist nations. He openly hoped for the defeat of Russia, which he anticipated would bring the violent overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a revolutionary regime.

The European war, for which the governments and the bourgeois parties of all countries have been preparing for decades, has broken out. The growth of armaments, the extreme intensification of the struggle for markets in the epoch of the latest, the imperialist stage of capitalist development in the advanced countries, and the dynastic interests of the most backward East European monarchies were inevitably bound to lead, and have led, to this war. Seizure of territory and subjugation of foreign nations, ruin of a competing nation and plunder of its wealth, diverting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, (1395) England and other countries, disuniting and nationalist doping of the workers of the extermination of their vanguard with the object of weakening the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—such is the only real meaning, substance and significance of the present war.

On Social-Democracy, primarily, rests the duty of disclosing the true meaning of the war and of ruthlessly exposing the falsehood, sophistry and “patriotic” phrasemongering spread by the ruling classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, in defence of the war. . . .

Under present conditions, it is impossible to determine, from the standpoint of the international proletariat, the defeat of which of the two groups of belligerent nations would be the lesser evil for Socialism. But for us, the Russian Social-Democrats, there cannot be the slightest doubt that from the standpoint of the working class and of the labouring masses of all the nations of Russia, the lesser evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy, the most reactionary and barbarous of governments, which is oppressing the greatest number of nations and the largest mass of the populations of Europe and Asia.

The immediate political slogan of the Social-Democrats of Europe must be the formation of a republican United States of Europe, but in contrast to the bourgeoisie, which is ready to “promise” anything in order to draw the

proletariat into the general current of chauvinism, the Social-Democrats will explain that this slogan is utterly false and senseless without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.

In Russia, in view of the fact that this country is the most backward and has not yet completed its bourgeois revolution, the task of the Social-Democrats is, as heretofore, to achieve the three fundamental conditions for consistent democratic reform, viz., a democratic republic (with complete equality and self-determination for all nations), confiscation of the landed estates, and an 8-hour day. But in all the advanced countries the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, and this slogan becomes the more urgent, the more the burdens of war press upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its role must become in the restoration of Europe after the horrors of the present “patriotic” barbarism amidst the gigantic technical progress of big capitalism. . . .

The transformation of the present imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan; it was indicated by the experience of the [1870 Paris] Commune and outlined by the Basle resolution [of the Socialist International] (1912), and it logically follows from all the conditions of an imperialist war among highly developed bourgeois countries. However difficult such a transformation may appear at any given moment, Socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction once war has become a fact.

Only in this way can the proletariat shake off its dependence on the chauvinist bourgeoisie, and, in one form or another, more or less rapidly, take decisive steps towards the real freedom of nations and towards Socialism.

Long live the international fraternity of the workers against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries!

Long live a proletarian International, freed from opportunism!

Source: Robert V. Daniels, Vol. 1, *A Documentary History of Communism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 135–139.

40. The British Finance Act (Session 2), 27 November 1914

For every belligerent, war was an enormously expensive undertaking that threatened to exhaust the resources available to every state. By mid-1916 the British government was spending £5 million per day on the war. Although some of this was raised through the sale of (often tax-exempt) war bonds to the British public, much came from drastic increases in the taxation of incomes and profits, which in turn had a heavily redistributive and egalitarian effect on incomes. The successive Finance Acts that the British government passed during the war imposed steadily escalating demands on the relatively well-to-do, which soon made the initial increases in the November 1914 Finance Act seem modest.

12.—(1) In order, as far as may be, to provide for the collection of income-tax (including super-tax) for the last four months of the current income-tax year at double the rates at which it is charged under the Finance Act, 1914, the following provisions shall have effect:

1. (a) The amount payable in respect of any assessment already made of income-tax already chargeable otherwise than by way of deduction, or of super-tax, shall be treated as increased by one-third, and any authority to collect the tax, and remedy for non-payment of the tax, shall apply accordingly; and
2. (b) An assessment of any such income-tax or super-tax not already made shall be for an amount one-third more than that for which it would have been made if this Act had not passed; and

(1396)

3. Such deductions shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue in the case of dividends, interest, or other annual sums (including rent) due or payable after the fifth day of December nineteen hundred and fourteen as will make the total amount deducted in respect of income-tax for the year equal to that which would have been deducted if income-tax for the year had been at the rate of one shilling and eightpence; and
4. (d) Subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Revenue Act, 1911, shall apply, in cases where both the half-yearly payments referred to therein have been paid before the passing of this Act, as if this Act were the Act imposing income-tax for the year, and as if one shilling and eightpence were the rate ultimately charged for the year; and

5. (e) Where the amount of any exemption, relief, or abatement under the Income Tax Acts is to be determined by reference to the amount of income-tax on any sum, the amount of the tax shall be calculated at one shilling and eightpence, with a proportionate reduction where relief is granted under Section 6 of the Finance Act, 1914; and where income-tax is payable in respect of a part only of a year, the tax shall be deemed to be at the rate of one shilling and eightpence.
6. (2) For the purpose of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1913, or of continuing income-tax for any future income-tax year, the rate of income-tax for the current year shall be deemed to be two shillings and sixpence.

Source: The Income Tax Expert of the Accountant, *The War Finance Acts of 1914 to 1917* (London: Gee and Company, 1918), 17–19.

41. German Propaganda: Austro-German Proclamation to Russian Troops, 1914 or Early 1915

Creative propaganda was quite widespread in World War I. Soon after the war began, German and Austrian troops fighting Russian forces devised a fake proclamation, supposedly written by Tsar Nicholas II, telling his soldiers that he was effectively a captive of the Russian commander and his allies, who had launched the war against his wishes, and ordering the Russian combatants to lay down their arms.

SOLDIERS:

At the most difficult moment of his life, your Tsar is addressing you, soldiers.

This unfortunate war began contrary to my own will: It was provoked by the intrigues of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich and his adherents, who want to remove me, so that he himself may occupy the throne. Under no condition whatever would I have agreed to the declaration of this war, knowing beforehand its sad issue for Mother Russia; but my cunning relative and treacherous generals prevent me from using the power given to me by God, and, fearing for my life, I am forced to do everything they demand of me.

Soldiers! Refuse to obey your treacherous generals; turn your weapons against all who threaten the life and the liberty of your Tsar, the safety and security of your dear country.

Your unfortunate Tsar,

NICHOLAS

Source: Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 40–41.

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World War I Documents (1915)

42. Agreement between the British Government and J. P. Morgan and Company, 15 January 1915
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45. Russian War Aims: Memorandum from the British Embassy at Petrograd to the Russian Government, 12 March [27 February] 1915
46. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at London, Count Aleksandr de Benckendorff, 7 [20] March 1915
47. United States: Platform for "League of Peace" Adopted at the Century Club, 9 April 1915, as Revised by William Howard Taft the Following Morning
48. The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915
49. German Use of Gas, April 1915: Report of British Field Marshal Sir John French on the Second Battle of Ypres, 15 June 1915
50. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Junius Pamphlet*, Written April 1915, Published in Zurich in February 1916, and Illegally Distributed in Germany
51. "Too Proud to Fight": President Woodrow Wilson, Address in Philadelphia to Newly Naturalized Citizens, 10 May 1915
52. The First *Lusitania* Note Sent by the U.S. Government to the Imperial German Government, 13 May 1915
53. German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow, Reply to the First *Lusitania* Note, 28 May 1915
54. The Gallipoli Campaign, May–August 1915: Accounts of Captain Guy Warneford Nightingale, Royal Munster Fusiliers
55. The Second *Lusitania* Note: The U.S. Government to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow, 9 June 1915

56. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to President Woodrow Wilson, 6 September 1915
57. President Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 8 September 1915
58. The *Arabic* Crisis: The German Ambassador to Washington, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 5 October 1915
59. Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, to Husayn ibn 'Al, Sharif of Mecca, 24 October 1915
60. Jane Addams to President Woodrow Wilson, 29 October 1915
61. Colonel Edward M. House to President Woodrow Wilson, 10 November 1915, and Wilson Cable to House, 11 November 1915
62. President Woodrow Wilson, Annual State of the Union Message, 7 December 1915

42. Agreement between the British Government and J. P. Morgan and Company, 15 January 1915

At the beginning of the war, competing British—and French and Russian—government agencies sought to purchase supplies in the United States, driving up the prices of all such commodities. In late 1914 Henry P. Davison, a partner in the leading pro-Allied American private bank, J. P. Morgan and Company, spent several weeks in London negotiating an agreement (1398) whereby his firm would handle all U.S. purchases on behalf of the British government. Highly lucrative for the Morgan firm, this contract allowed the British to coordinate their American purchasing, eliminating waste and duplication of orders and negotiating better prices. Shortly afterward the French reached a similar arrangement with Morgans.

An agreement made the fifteenth day of January one thousand nine hundred and fifteen between His Majesty's Army Council and the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (hereinafter called "His Majesty's Government"), on behalf of His Majesty on the one part and Messieurs J. P. Morgan and Company of 23 Wall Street in the city and State of New York, U.S.A. (hereinafter called "the commercial agents") of the other part.

1. The commercial agents will as from the date of this agreement place their services at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for the purchase of such goods and supplies as they may be instructed to buy in the United States of America.
2. The commercial agents undertake in respect of the said purchase of goods and supplies to use their best endeavours to secure for His Majesty's Government the most favourable terms as to quality, price, delivery, discounts, and rebates, and also to aid and stimulate by all the means at their disposal sources of supply for the articles required.
3. The relation between His Majesty's Government and the commercial agents shall be that of principal and agent, respectively.
4. The commercial agents are not to have any liability for delivery, quality, or prices of purchases, but are to be responsible solely as agents for their good faith and best endeavour.
5. Full specifications will be supplied by His Majesty's Government through their duly accredited representatives either directly or through Messieurs Morgan Grenfell & Co., who will at all times have authority to act in London on behalf of the commercial agents. The responsibility of inspection to rest with His Majesty's Government who will, if they

- think desirable, appoint representatives to inspect it in the United States of America and accept on their behalf goods for shipment. The commercial agents shall co-operate fully at all times with the accredited representatives.
6. The commercial agents will use their discretion in employing such buying corporations or experienced brokers to effect purchases as may seem to them to be in the best interests of His Majesty's Government, having due regard to deliveries, quality, and price.
 7. His Majesty's Government will repay to the commercial agents all commission, if any, paid to such buying corporations or brokers as may be employed; and His Majesty's Government shall receive all rebates, discounts, etc., which the commercial agents may be able to obtain.
 8. The commercial agents shall have general supervision over and will in every way facilitate prompt shipment of goods, making all necessary arrangements within their power up to and including the actual shipment.
 9. His Majesty's Government shall furnish the commercial agents with a list of all buyers of goods and supplies for the War Department now and from time to time acting for the said Army Council in the United States of America with full information regarding contracts already executed, orders now being filled and negotiations pending. All such buyers will be instructed to place themselves in touch with the commercial agents and to place no further orders (unless expressly instructed by His Majesty's Government to do so in particular cases) except through the commercial agents.
 10. The commercial agents shall, if required, facilitate the completion and shipment of orders now being filled and shall, if required, assist in the completion of contracts now being negotiated, but no commission shall be payable for these services unless His Majesty's Government expressly state that they will pay commission thereon in respect of any particular negotiation.
 11. His Majesty's Government shall pay to the commercial agents in compensation for their services a commission of two percent upon the net price of goods and supplies purchased through them under this agreement until such net price shall amount in the aggregate to a sum of ten million pounds and thereafter a commission of one per cent upon any excess beyond such aggregate amount of ten million pounds. His Majesty's Government shall pay at the outset this sum of ten thousand pounds for outlays and as a retaining fee, which sum shall be credited against and absorbed by commissions as they accrue. The commercial agents will, as far as possible, purchase all goods direct from the manufacturers, and their commission before mentioned will be payable

- upon the net price of the goods delivered at the factory, less all rebates and discounts and exclusive of all commissions, freight, and other out-of-pocket expenses. In the case of goods which it is found necessary to purchase either from manufacturers or from merchants, agents, or otherwise on terms of delivery at some place other than the (1399) factory the net price for the purpose of calculating commission shall be deemed to be the invoice price at the place of delivery, less all rebates and discounts and exclusive of all commissions, freight, and other out-of-pocket expenses, provided that sea freight and all other expenses of or connected with shipment or transit by sea will, in every case, be excluded from the net price on which the commission or the commercial agents is payable.
12. The Commercial agents shall keep special books for the recording of all transactions connected with this agreement and such books shall be open to the inspection of any officer or accountant appointed by His Majesty's Government for the purpose. Such extracts of these accounts as may be required shall be forwarded to London for inspection.
 13. Subject as hereinafter mentioned, it is the intention of the said army council that orders on behalf of the War Department shall be placed through the commercial agents for the purchase of any goods or supplies which it may be desired to purchase in the United States of America during the currency of this agreement except purchases effected by or through the remount commission or their agents. It is also the intention of the Admiralty with a view to secure coordination between the purchasing of Admiralty and War Department supplies of the same general character to place their orders through the commercial agents upon the terms of this agreement so far as in their opinion they are able conveniently to do so without undue interference with their established channels of purchasing their requirements in the United States of America.
 14. The expressions of intention set forth in the last paragraph shall not in any way, however, be binding on His Majesty's Government who expressly reserve the right to make purchases otherwise than through the commercial agents if in the opinion of the said Army Council or the Admiralty as the case may be there is good and sufficient reason for doing so. Inasmuch as they may find practicable and in order to avoid complications His Majesty's Government will keep the commercial agents fully posted as to purchases, if any, made otherwise than through them.
 15. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of the two last foregoing clauses, in cases where contracts providing for the delivery of

- specific goods at stated times and in agreed quantities have already been entered into, a further order for additional supplies, under an extension of such already existing contracts, involving no negotiations, may be excluded from the operation of this agreement.
16. It is understood that the commercial agents will not make any undisclosed profit directly or indirectly out of purchases made through their agency and in the event of the commercial agents' being financially interested in the profits of any companies or firms from whom purchases may be made, a note will be attached to the record of the purchase for the information of His Majesty's Government, giving particulars of the interest of the commercial agents in such companies or firms.
17. This agreement may be terminated at any time by either party or by notice transmitted by post or cable to the other, the notice to take effect as from the time when in ordinary course of post or cable delivery the same ought to reach the other. Notwithstanding such notice the commercial agents shall facilitate the carrying out, completion, and shipments of all outstanding orders placed through them.

Source: U.S. Senate, 74 Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 25:7675–7677.

43. The Japanese Government's "Twenty-One Demands" on China, 18 January 1915

Having taken the Chinese city of Tsingtao from Germany in late 1914, Japan sought to make permanent its takeover of Germany's territorial concession in Shandong and also to win a special status in China. In the "Twenty-One Demands" presented to China in mid-January 1915, the Japanese government sought special rights in both Shandong and Manchuria and, if possible, the ending of leases of Chinese territory to other foreign powers. With support from Great Britain and the United States, in April 1915 China prevailed upon Japan to make these demands slightly more moderate but on 8 May 1915 reluctantly acceded to the remainder, which, if implemented, would in practice have effectively enabled Japan to control many of China's dealings with other powers.

Text of the Twenty-One Demands

Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

Article 1

The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with (1400) the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.

Article 2

The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.

Article 3

The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochow Tsinanfu Railway.

Article 4

The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1

The two contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.

Article 2

The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.

Article 3

The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside, and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds commercial, industrial, and otherwise.

Article 4

The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Article 5

The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance:

(1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Article 6

The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.

Article 7

The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.

Group III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.

Article 2

The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said

Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

Group IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of (1401) China, agree to the following article: The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along the coast of China.

Group V

Article 1

The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers;

Article 2

The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China the right to own land;

Article 3

In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance the police in localities (in China), where such arrangements: are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service;

Article 4

China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan;

Article 5

In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the

negotiations which have been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou;

Article 6

In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien;

Article 7

China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm>.

44. German Admiralty Declaration, 4 February 1915

Early in 1915 the German admiralty decided to exploit to the full its new weapon, the submarine. A flimsy craft when above water, the submarine's torpedoes could nonetheless sink a battleship. They were equally effective against the merchant vessels that, by early 1915, were bearing ever increasing quantities of vital war supplies from North America to Britain and France. Despite the risk that attacks on neutral vessels or on ships carrying neutral citizens might bring the United States into the war, German naval and military officers chose to declare the existence of an exclusionary war zone around the British Isles, warning that they would feel free to attack any shipping within its limits. The U.S. government promptly issued a formal protest against this declaration.

All the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are hereby declared to be a war zone. From February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel found within this war zone will be destroyed without it always being possible to avoid danger to the crews and passengers.

Neutral ships will also be exposed to danger in the war zone, as, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government, and owing to unforeseen incidents to which naval warfare is liable, it is impossible to avoid attacks being made on neutral ships in mistake for those of the enemy.

Navigation to the north of the Shetlands, in the eastern parts of the North Sea and through a zone at least thirty nautical miles wide along the Dutch coast is not exposed to danger.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 94.

45. Russian War Aims: Memorandum from the British Embassy at Petrograd to the Russian Government, 12 March [27 February] 1915

The Allies made their original decision to go to war in August 1914 so swiftly that they had not agreed as to the objectives for which they would fight. At the beginning of 1915 Russia sought pledges from France and Britain as to the territorial gains it could expect at the end of the war. The agreements reached among the Allies were the first of the Allied secret treaties as to the future disposition of territories they expected to capture from their opponents; to induce them to join the Allies, Italy and Romania would subsequently be promised comparable (1402) territorial gains at the expense of the Central Powers. At the beginning of 1915 Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador in Petrograd, presented a memorandum on the subject to the Russian Foreign Office, specifically promising Russia Constantinople and control of the Dardanelles Straits but requesting that these agreements be kept secret.

His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the following observations with reference to the Aide-Mémoire which this Embassy had the honor of addressing to the Imperial Government on February 27–March 12, 1915.

The claim made by the Imperial Government in their Aide-Mémoire of February 19–March 4, 1915 considerably exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by [Russian Foreign Minister] M. Sasonow as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war. [British Foreign Secretary] Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that M. Sasonow will realize that it is not in the power of His Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned Aide-Mémoire. That Document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiment at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward Grey therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognize that the recent general assurances given to M. Sasonow have been most loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the Aide-Mémoire now, His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the proposed settlement is realized.

From the British Aide-Mémoire it follows that the desiderata of His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condition which could impair Russia's control over the territories described in the Russian Aide-Mémoire of February 19–March 4, 1915.

In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade entrepôt for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government will ask that Russia shall, when she comes in the position of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant ships passing through the Straits, as M. Sasonow has already promised.

Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that this operation, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will, if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations. Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on reasonable terms, offer to coöperate with the Allies. The only Power likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece. Admiral Carden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroyers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla, if it could have been secured, would thus have been of inestimable value to His Majesty's Government.

To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the apprehensions of Bulgaria and Rumania as to Russia's possession of the Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power to render the cooperation of these two States an attractive prospect to them.

Sir E. Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to take into consideration the whole question of the future interests of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey; and, in formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the Russian Government. As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E.

Grey will wish to state that, throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.

Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definitive proposal on any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, so as to recognize the present neutral sphere as a British sphere.

Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States, and especially to Bulgaria and Rumania, some satisfactory assurance as to their prospects and general position with regard to the territories contiguous to their frontiers, to the possession of which they are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agreement as to the French and British desiderata in the final peace terms is reached, Sir E. (1403) Grey points out that it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and British Governments should remain secret.

Source: Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 60–62.

46. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at London, Count Aleksandr de Benckendorff, 7 [20] March 1915

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov responded enthusiastically and swiftly to the British offer of Constantinople, whose annexation was a time-honored goal of Russian foreign policy. Within a week the Russian foreign minister sent a cable to his ambassador in London, detailing precisely what Russia expected from the British—and French—governments, and what the Allies could expect in return.

1265. Referring to the memorandum of the British Embassy of March 12, please express to Grey the profound appreciation by the Imperial Government of England's full and final agreement to solve the question of the Straits and Constantinople conformably to Russia's wishes. The Imperial Government fully appreciates the sentiments of the British Government and feels assured that the unreserved recognition of their mutual interests will forever secure the friendship between Russia and Great Britain.

Having already granted the conditions regarding commerce in the Straits and Constantinople, the Imperial Government sees no objection to the confirmation of its agreement to establish: (1) free transit through Constantinople for goods neither proceeding from Russia nor destined to Russia; and also (2) free passage of commercial vessels through the Straits.

In order to facilitate the operation of breaking through the Dardanelles which the Allies have undertaken, the Russian Government is disposed to assist in attracting to this undertaking the states of which the cooperation appears useful to Great Britain and France.

The Imperial Government shares the opinion of the British Government that the Holy Places of Islam must in the future also remain under independent Moslem rule. It is desirable to ascertain whether it is planned to leave these places under the rule of Turkey, the Sultan of Turkey retaining the title of calif, or whether it is proposed to create new independent states, since the Imperial Government would only be able to formulate its desires in accordance with one or other of these assumptions. On its part the Imperial Government would consider most desirable the separation of the califate from Turkey. The liberty of pilgrimages must assuredly be guaranteed.

The Imperial Government confirms its agreement to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia in the British sphere of influence. It considers just, however, to

reserve that the regions of the towns of Ispahan and Yezd forming with them one inseparable whole should be assigned to Russia in view of the Russian interests existing there.

The neutral zone now penetrates as a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers and reaches the Russian frontier at Zulfikar. It is therefore necessary to incorporate a part of this wedge in the Russian sphere of influence.

Essential importance is attached to the question of the building of a railway in the neutral zone. This matter will require a further friendly examination.

The Imperial Government counts on the recognition of its liberty of action in its own sphere of influence, covering particularly the right of privileged development in this sphere of its financial and economic enterprises.

Finally, the Imperial Government considers desirable the simultaneous settlement also of the questions in northern Afghanistan, contiguous with Russia, in the sense of the wishes expressed by the Imperial Ministry in the preceding negotiations last year.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: Supplement 2, Pt. 1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 496–497.

47. United States: Platform for “League of Peace” Adopted at the Century Club, 9 April 1915, as Revised by William Howard Taft the Following Morning

Within a few months of the outbreak of war, private groups in both Great Britain and the United States were organizing in support of the establishment of a postwar international organization that would attempt to prevent future wars. In many, though not all, cases, members of such groups thought an Allied victory the essential prerequisite of their plans. Most had ties with the prewar international arbitration and peace movement. In the United States, the most prominent of such private groups was the League to Enforce Peace, founded in spring 1915 with the support of Republican lawyer and ex-President William Howard Taft. In June 1915 the newly formed League to Enforce Peace, meeting in Philadelphia, formally adopted the following draft as its platform.

(1404)

It is desirable for the United States to join a League of the great nations binding the signatories to the following:

First, all justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second, all non-justiciable questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiations, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third, the signatory powers shall jointly use their military forces to prevent any one of their number from going to war or committing acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the following.

Fourth, that conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in article one.

Source: League to Enforce Peace: American Branch, *Independence Hall Conference Held in the City of Philadelphia* (New York: League to Enforce Peace, 1915), 94.

48. The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915

After due consideration, Italy decided that its interests would best be served by joining the Allies. Toward the end of April 1915, therefore, representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy met in London, where they signed a treaty. Under this agreement's provisions the Allies secretly promised to Italy those territorial gains she sought. The signatories also agreed that none would make a separate peace with the enemy.

Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915

By Order of his Government the Marquis Imperiali, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy, has the honour to communicate to the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to their Excellencies M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic, and to Count de Benckendorff, Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the following memorandum:

Memorandum

Article 1. A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. This convention shall settle the minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in order to prevent that Power from concentrating all its strength against Italy, in the event of Russia deciding to direct her principal effort against Germany.

This military convention shall settle questions of armistices, which necessarily comes within the scope of the Commanders-in-chief of the Armies.

Article 2. On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and Russia against their enemies.

Article 3. The French and British fleets shall render active and permanent assistance to Italy until such time as the Austro-Hungarian fleet shall have been destroyed or until peace shall have been concluded.

A naval convention shall be immediately concluded to this effect between France, Great Britain and Italy.

Article 4. Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural frontier (the Brenner frontier), as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, as well as the small islands of Plavnik, Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, and the neighbouring islets. . . .

Article 5. Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present administrative boundaries. . . . She shall also obtain all the islands situate[d] to the north and west of Dalmatia. . . .

To be neutralised:

(1) The entire coast from Cape Planka on the north to the southern base of the peninsula of Sabbioncello in the south, so as to include the whole of that peninsula; (2) the portion of the coast which begins in the north at a point situated 10 kilometres south of the headland of Ragusa Vecchia extending southward as far as the River Voïussa, in such a way as to include the gulf and ports of Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, St. Jean de Medua and Durazzo, without prejudice to the rights of Montenegro consequent on the declarations exchanged between the Powers in April and May 1909. As these rights (1405) only apply to the present Montenegrin territory, they cannot be extended to any territory or ports which may be assigned to Montenegro. Consequently neutralisation shall not apply to any part of the coast now belonging to Montenegro. There shall be maintained all restrictions concerning the port of Antivari which were accepted by Montenegro in 1909; (3) finally, all the islands not given to Italy.

Note: The following Adriatic territory shall be assigned by the four Allied Powers to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: In the Upper Adriatic, the whole coast from the bay of Volosca on the borders of Istria as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the coast which is at present Hungarian, and all the coast of Croatia, with the port of Fiume and the small ports of Novi and Carlopago, as well as the islands of Veglia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. And, in the Lower Adriatic (in the region interesting Serbia and Montenegro) the whole coast from Cape Planka as far as the River Drin, with the important harbours of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and St. Jean de Medua and the islands of Greater and Lesser Zirona, Bua, Solta, Brazza, Jaclian and Calamotta. The port of Durazzo to be assigned to the independent Moslem State of Albania.

Article 6. Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno and surrounding territory of sufficient extent to assure defence of these points (from the Voïussa to the north and east, approximately to the northern boundary of the district of Chimara on the south).

Article 7. Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (see Article 6) up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralized.

Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers.

Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida.

Article 8. Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is at present occupying.

Article 9. Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognise that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that, in the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention. The zone which shall eventually be allotted to Italy shall be delimited, at the proper time, due account being taken of the existing interests of France and Great Britain.

The interests of Italy shall also be taken into consideration in the event of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained and of alterations being made in the zones of interest of the Powers.

If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the Province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it.

Article 10. All rights and privileges in Libya at present belonging to the Sultan by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne are transferred to Italy.

Article 11. Italy shall receive a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to her efforts and her sacrifices.

Article 12. Italy declares that she associates herself in the declaration made by France, Great Britain and Russia to the effect that Arabia and the Moslem Holy Places in Arabia shall be left under the authority of an independent Moslem Power.

Article 13. In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relating to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

Article 14. Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under equitable conditions, of a loan of at least £50,000,000 to be issued on the London market.

Article 15. France, Great Britain and Russia shall support such opposition as Italy may make to any proposal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy See in any peace negotiations or negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the present war.

(1406)

Article 16. The present arrangement shall be held secret. The adherence of Italy to the Declaration of the 5th September, 1914, shall alone be made public, immediately upon declaration of war by or against Italy.

After having taken act of the foregoing memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, duly authorised to that effect, have concluded the following agreement with the representative of Italy, also duly authorised by his Government:

France, Great Britain and Russia give their full assent to the memorandum presented by the Italian Government.

With reference to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the memorandum, which provide for military and naval co-operation between the four Powers, Italy declares that she will take the field at the earliest possible date and within a period not exceeding one month from the signature of these presents.

Source: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 334–339.

49. German Use of Gas, April 1915: Report of British Field Marshal Sir John French on the Second Battle of Ypres, 15 June 1915

Although French forces probably used small quantities of stupefying gas early in 1915, German troops were the first to use large-scale weapons of chemical warfare, employing massive amounts of poisonous chlorine gas at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915. On 22 April a cloud of gas was released simultaneously over 4 miles of the front, where it quickly affected 10,000 Allied troops, 5,000 of whom died within ten minutes of their first exposure to gas. The Germans themselves had not anticipated how successful their new weapons would be and thus failed to fully exploit the breakthrough this created. Two days later gas was used again, this time against Canadian troops, and it was repeatedly employed from then until the battle ended in late May. The Allies ceded substantial ground to German forces, appreciably reducing the size of their salient around Ypres, though inadequate supplies and manpower eventually forced German commanders to end the assault. From then onward during the war, all belligerent nations used gas extensively.

I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralyzed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favorable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighborhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theater, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been

demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harbored these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an Army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of April 22nd that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:

From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division. Thence, in a southeasterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Beclaere Road, the Canadian Division. Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line southeast to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion of Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlemernighe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for (1407) the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been used.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns. . . .

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 3:139–144.

50. Rosa Luxemburg, The Junius Pamphlet, Written April 1915, Published in Zurich in February 1916, and Illegally Distributed in Germany

The left-wing Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), a Polish Jew who was imprisoned for her outspoken opposition to Germany's decision to enter World War I, wrote The Junius Pamphlet while in captivity. Smuggled out of prison and published abroad, it soon became the guiding statement of the International Group, which evolved into first the Spartacus League and eventually, on 1 January 1919, the Communist Party of Germany.

The scene has changed fundamentally. The six weeks' march to Paris [envisaged in the Schlieffen Plan, the original German war strategy] has grown into a world drama. Mass slaughter has become the tiresome and monotonous business of the day and the end is no closer. Bourgeois statecraft is held fast in its own vise. The spirits summoned up can no longer be exorcised.

Gone is the euphoria. Gone the patriotic noise in the streets, the chase after the gold-colored automobile, one false telegram after another, the wells poisoned by cholera, the Russian students heaving bombs over every railway bridge in Berlin, the French airplanes over Nuremberg, the spy hunting public running amok in the streets, the swaying crowds in the coffee shops with ear-deafening patriotic songs surging ever higher, whole city neighborhoods transformed into mobs ready to denounce, to mistreat women, to shout hurrah and to induce delirium in themselves by means of wild rumors. Gone, too, is the atmosphere of ritual murder, the Kishinev [pogrom] air where the crossing guard is the only remaining representative of human dignity.

The spectacle is over. German scholars, those "stumbling lemurs," have been whistled off the stage long ago. The trains full of reservists are no longer accompanied by virgins fainting from pure jubilation. They no longer greet the people from the windows of the train with joyous smiles. Carrying their packs, they quietly trot along the streets where the public goes about its daily business with aggrieved visages.

In the prosaic atmosphere of pale day there sounds a different chorus—the hoarse cries of the vulture and the hyenas of the battlefield. Ten thousand tarpaulins guaranteed up to regulations! A hundred thousand kilos of bacon, cocoa powder, coffee-substitute—c.o.d., immediate delivery! Hand grenades, lathes, cartridge pouches, marriage bureaus for widows of the fallen, leather belts, jobbers for war orders—serious offers only! The cannon fodder loaded onto trains in August and September is moldering in the killing fields of

Belgium, the Vosges, and Masurian Lakes where the profits are springing up like weeds. It's a question of getting the harvest into the barn quickly. Across the ocean stretch thousands of greedy hands to snatch it up.

Business thrives in the ruins. Cities become piles of ruins; villages become cemeteries; countries, deserts; populations are beggared; churches, horse stalls. International law, treaties and alliances, the most sacred words and the highest authority have been torn in shreds. Every sovereign "by the grace of God" is called a rogue and lying scoundrel by his cousin on the other side. Every diplomat is a cunning rascal to his colleagues in the other party. Every government sees every other as dooming its own people and worthy only of universal contempt. There are food riots in Venice, in Lisbon, Moscow, Singapore. There is plague in Russia, and misery and despair everywhere.

Violated, dishonored, wading in blood, dripping filth—there stands bourgeois society. This is it [in reality]. Not all spic and span and moral, with pretense to culture, philosophy, ethics, order, peace, and the rule of law—but the ravening beast, the witches' sabbath of anarchy, a plague to culture and humanity. Thus it reveals itself in its true, its naked form.

In the midst of this witches' sabbath a catastrophe of world-historical proportions has happened: International Social Democracy has capitulated. To deceive ourselves about it, to cover it up, would be the most foolish, the most fatal thing the proletariat could do. . . . The fall of the socialist proletariat in the present world war is unprecedented. It is a misfortune for (1408) humanity. But socialism will be lost only if the international proletariat fails to measure the depth of this fall, if it refuses to learn from it.

The last forty-five-year period in the development of the modern labor movement now stands in doubt. What we are experiencing in this critique is a closing of accounts for what will soon be half a century of work at our posts. The grave of the Paris Commune ended the first phase of the European labor movement as well as the First International. Since then there began a new phase. In place of spontaneous revolutions, risings, and barricades, after which the proletariat each time fell back into passivity, there began the systematic daily struggle, the exploitation of bourgeois parliamentarianism, mass organizations, the marriage of the economic with the political struggle, and that of socialist ideals with stubborn defense of immediate daily interests. For the first time the polestar of strict scientific teachings lit the way for the proletariat and for its emancipation. Instead of sects, schools, utopias, and isolated experiments in various countries, there arose a uniform, international

theoretical basis which bound countries together like the strands of a rope. Marxist knowledge gave the working class of the entire world a compass by which it can make sense of the welter of daily events and by which it can always plot the right course to take to the fixed and final goal.

She who bore, championed, and protected this new method was German Social Democracy. . . . German Social Democracy was considered the purest embodiment of Marxist socialism. She had laid claim to a special place in the Second International—its instructress and leader. . . .

. . . Especially in the questions of the struggle against militarism and war, German Social Democracy always took the lead. “For us Germans that is unacceptable” regularly sufficed to decide the orientation of the Second International, which blindly bestowed its confidence upon the admired leadership of the mighty German Social Democracy: the pride of every socialist and the terror of the ruling classes everywhere.

And what did we in Germany experience when the great historical test came? The most precipitous fall, the most violent collapse. Nowhere has the organization of the proletariat been yoked so completely to the service of imperialism. Nowhere is the state of siege borne so docilely. Nowhere is the press so hobbled, public opinion so stifled, the economic and political class struggle of the working class so totally surrendered as in Germany. . . .

One thing is certain. The world war is a turning point. It is foolish and mad to imagine that we need only survive the war, like a rabbit waiting out the storm under a bush, in order to fall happily back into the old routine once it is over. The world war has altered the conditions of our struggle and, most of all, it has changed us. Not that the basic law of capitalist development, the life-and-death war between capital and labor, will experience any amelioration. But now, in the midst of the war, the masks are falling and the old familiar visages smirk at us. The tempo of development has received a mighty jolt from the eruption of the volcano of imperialism. The violence of the conflicts in the bosom of society, the enormousness of the tasks that tower up before the socialist proletariat—these make everything that has transpired in the history of the workers’ movement seem a pleasant idyll.

Historically, this war was ordained to thrust forward the cause of the proletariat. . . . It was ordained to drive the German proletariat to the pinnacle of the nation and thereby begin to organize the international and universal conflict between capital and labor for political power within the state. . . .

. . . The future of civilization and humanity depends on whether or not the proletariat resolves manfully to throw its revolutionary broadsword into the scales. In this war imperialism has won. Its bloody sword of genocide has brutally tilted the scale toward the abyss of misery. The only compensation for all the misery and all the shame would be if we learn from the war how the proletariat can seize mastery of its own destiny and escape the role of the lackey to the ruling classes. . . .

In spite of the military dictatorship and censorship of the press, in spite of the abdication of the Social Democrats, in spite of the fratricidal war, the class struggle rises with elemental force from out of the Burgfrieden; and the international solidarity of labor from out of the bloody mists of the battlefield. Not in the weak and artificial attempts to galvanize the old International, not in pledges renewed here and there to stand together again after the war. No! Now in and from the war the fact emerges with a wholly new power and energy that the proletarians of all lands have one and the same interests. The war itself dispels the illusion it has created.

Victory or defeat? Thus sounds the slogan of the ruling militarism in all the warring countries, and, like an echo, the Social Democratic leaders have taken it up. Supposedly, victory or defeat on the battlefield should be for the proletarians of Germany, France, England, or Russia exactly the same as for the ruling classes of these countries. As soon as the cannons thunder, every proletarian should be interested in the victory of his own country and, therefore, in the defeat of the other countries. Let us see what such a victory can bring to the proletariat.

(1409)

According to official version, adopted uncritically by the Social Democratic leaders, German victory holds the prospect of unlimited economic growth, while defeat means economic ruin. This conception rests upon the pattern of the war of 1870. . . .

But today matters are quite different in the belligerent states. Today war does not function as a dynamic method of procuring for rising young capitalism the preconditions of its “national” development. War has this character only in the isolated and fragmentary case of Serbia. Reduced to its historically objective essence, today’s world war is entirely a competitive struggle amongst fully mature capitalisms for world domination, for the exploitation of the remaining zones of the world not yet capitalistic. That is why this war is totally different

in character and effects. The high degree of economic development in the capitalist world is expressed in the extraordinarily advanced technology, that is, in the destructive power of the weaponry which approaches the same level in all the warring nations. The international organization of the murder industry is reflected now in the military balance, the scales of which always right themselves after partial decisions and momentary changes; a general decision is always and again pushed into the future. The indecisiveness of military results leads to ever new reserves from the population masses of warring and hitherto neutral nations being sent into fire. The war finds abundant material to feed imperialist appetites and contradictions, creates its own supplies of these, and spreads like wildfire. But the mightier the masses and the more numerous the nations dragged into the war on all sides, the more drawn out its existence will be.

Considered all together, and before any decision regarding military victory or defeat has been taken, the effect of the war will be unlike any phenomenon of earlier wars in the modern age: the economic ruin of all belligerents and to an increasing degree that of the formally neutral as well. Every additional month of the war affirms and extends this result and postpones the expected fruits of military success for decades. In the last analysis, neither victory nor defeat can change any of this. On the contrary, it makes a purely military decision extremely unlikely and leads one to conclude the greater probability that the war will end finally with the most general and mutual exhaustion. . . .

Thus proletarian policy is locked in a dilemma when trying to decide on which side it ought to intervene, which side represents progress and democracy in this war. In these circumstances, and from the perspective of international politics as a whole, victory or defeat, in political as well as economic terms, comes down to a hopeless choice between two kinds of beatings for the European working classes. Therefore, it is nothing but fatal madness when the French socialists imagine that the military defeat of Germany will strike a blow at the head of militarism and imperialism and thereby pave the way for peaceful democracy in the world. Imperialism and its servant, militarism, will calculate their profits from every victory and every defeat in this war—except in one case: if the international proletariat intervenes in a revolutionary way and puts an end to such calculations. . . .

It is war as such, no matter how it ends militarily, that signifies the greatest defeat for Europe's proletariat. It is only the overcoming of war and the speediest possible enforcement of peace by the international militancy of the proletariat that can bring victory to the workers' cause. . . .

Proletarian policy knows no retreat; it can only struggle forward. It must always go beyond the existing and the newly created. In this sense alone, it is legitimate for the proletariat to confront both camps of imperialists in the world war with a policy of its own.

But this policy can not consist of social democratic parties holding international conferences where they individually or collectively compete to discover ingenious recipes with which bourgeois diplomats ought to make the peace and ensure the further peaceful development of democracy. All demands for complete or partial “disarmament,” for the dismantling of secret diplomacy, for the partition of all multinational great states into small national ones, and so forth are part and parcel utopian as long as capitalist class domination holds the reins. [Capitalism] cannot, under its current imperialist course, dispense with present-day militarism, secret diplomacy, or the centralized multinational state. In fact, it would be more pertinent for the realization of these postulates to make just one simple “demand”: abolition of the capitalist class state. . . .

Imperialism and all its political brutality, the chain of incessant social catastrophes that it has let loose, is undoubtedly an historical necessity for the ruling classes of the contemporary capitalist world. Nothing would be more fatal for the proletariat than to delude itself into believing that it were possible after this war to rescue the idyllic and peaceful continuation of capitalism. However, the conclusion to be drawn by proletarian policy from the historical necessity of imperialism is that surrender to imperialism will mean living forever in its victorious shadow and eating from its leftovers. . . .

The expansionist imperialism of capitalism, the expression of its highest stage of development and its last phase of existence, produces the [following] economic tendencies: it transforms the entire world into the capitalist mode of production; all outmoded, pre-capitalist forms of production (1410) and society are swept away; it converts all the world’s riches and means of production into capital, the working masses of all zones into wage slaves. In Africa and Asia, from the northernmost shores to the tip of South America and the South Seas, the remnant of ancient primitive communist associations, feudal systems of domination, patriarchal peasant economies, traditional forms of craftsmanship are annihilated, crushed by capital; whole peoples are destroyed and ancient cultures flattened. All are supplanted by profit mongering in its most modern form.

This brutal victory parade of capital through the world, its way prepared by every means of violence, robbery, and infamy, has its light side. It creates the

preconditions for its own final destruction. It put into place the capitalist system of world domination, the indispensable precondition for the socialist world revolution. . . . And in this sense imperialism ultimately works for us.

The world war is a turning point. For the first time, the ravening beasts set loose upon all quarters of the globe by capitalist Europe have broken into Europe itself. . . . Only today has this “civilized world” become aware that the bite of the imperialist beast brings death, that its very breath is infamy. Only now has [the civilized world] recognized this, after the beast’s ripping talons have clawed its own mother’s lap, the bourgeois civilization of Europe itself. And even this knowledge is grappled with in the distorted form of bourgeois hypocrisy. Every people recognizes the infamy only in the national uniform of the enemy. . . .

None the less, the imperialist bestiality raging in Europe’s fields has one effect about which the “civilized world” is not horrified and for which it has no breaking heart: that is the mass destruction of the European proletariat. Never before on this scale has a war exterminated whole strata of the population; not for a century have all the great and ancient cultural nations of Europe been attacked. Millions of human lives have been destroyed in the Vosges, the Ardennes, in Belgium, Poland, in the Carpathians, on the Save. Millions have been crippled. But of these millions, nine out of ten are working people from the city and the countryside.

It is our strength, our hope, that is mown down day after day like grass under the sickle. The best, most intelligent, most educated forces of international socialism, the bearers of the holiest traditions and the boldest heroes of the modern workers’ movement, the vanguard of the entire world proletariat, the workers of England, France, Belgium, Germany, Russia—these are the ones now being hamstrung and led to the slaughter. These workers of the leading capitalist countries of Europe are exactly the ones who have the historical mission of carrying out the socialist transformation. Only from out of Europe, only from out of the oldest capitalist countries will the signal be given when the hour is ripe for the liberating social revolution. Only the English, French, Belgian, German, Russian, Italian workers together can lead the army of the exploited and enslaved of the five continents. When the time comes, only they can settle accounts with capitalism’s work of global destruction, with its centuries of crime committed against primitive peoples.

But to push ahead to the victory of socialism we need a strong, activist, educated proletariat, and masses whose power lies in intellectual culture as well

as numbers. These masses are being decimated by the world war. The flower of our mature and youthful strength, hundreds of thousands of whom were socialistically schooled in England, France, Belgium, Germany, and Russia, the product of decades of educational and agitational training, and other hundreds of thousands who could be won for socialism tomorrow, fall and molder on the miserable battlefields. The fruits of decades of sacrifice and the efforts of generations are destroyed in a few weeks. The key troops of the international proletariat are torn up by the roots. . . .

The world war today is demonstrably not only murder on a grand scale; it is also suicide of the working classes of Europe. The soldiers of socialism, the proletarians of England, France, Germany, Russia, and Belgium have for months been killing one another at the behest of capital. They are driving the cold steel of murder into each other's hearts. Locked in the embrace of death, they tumble into a common grave. . . .

The madness will cease and the bloody demons of hell will vanish only when workers in Germany and France, England and Russia finally awake from their stupor, extend to each other a brotherly hand, and drown out the bestial chorus of imperialist war-mongers and the shrill cry of capitalist hyenas with labor's old and mighty battle cry: "Proletarians of all lands, unite!"

Source: Marxists.org Internet Archive,
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxembur/works/1915/04.htm>, published in Rosa Luxemburg, *Politische Schriften*, 229–243, 357–372, and translated by Dave Hollis.

51. “Too Proud to Fight”: President Woodrow Wilson, Address in Philadelphia to Newly Naturalized Citizens, 10 May 1915

The outbreak of war in Europe left President Wilson apprehensive that the varied ethnic background of Americans would stoke internal discord within the United States. Speaking to a (1411) group of recent immigrants who had just won their citizenship, he urged that their first loyalty must be to their new country, not their old. He also suggested that the United States possessed a higher national mission than did other countries.

. . . [I]t is not of myself that I wish to think tonight, but of those who have just become citizens of the United States.

This is the only country in the world which experiences this constant and repeated rebirth. Other countries depend upon the multiplication of their own native people. This country is constantly drawing strength out of new sources by the voluntary association with it of great bodies of strong men and forward-looking women out of other lands. And so, by the gift of the free will of independent people, it is being constantly renewed from generation to generation by the same process by which it was originally created. It is as if humanity had determined to see to it that this great nation, founded for the benefit of humanity, should not lack for the allegiance of the people of the world.

You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Of allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one, unless it be God—certainly not of allegiance to those who temporarily represent this great government. You have taken an oath of allegiance to a great ideal, to a great body of principles, to a great hope of the human race. You have said, “We are going to America, not only to earn a living, not only to seek the things which it was more difficult to obtain where we were born, but to help forward the great enterprises of the human spirit—to let men know that everywhere in the world there are men who will cross strange oceans and go where a speech is spoken which is alien to them, if they can but satisfy their quest for what their spirits crave; knowing that, whatever the speech, there is but one longing and utterance of the human heart, and that is for liberty and justice.” And, while you bring all countries with you, you come with a purpose of leaving all other countries behind you—bringing what is best of their spirit, but not looking over your shoulders and seeking to perpetuate what you intended to leave behind in them. I certainly would not be one even to suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth and the nation of his origin—these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of

our hearts. But it is one thing to love the place where you were born, and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go. You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes.

My urgent advice to you would be, not only always to think first of America, but always, also, to think first of humanity. You do not love humanity if you seek to divide humanity into jealous camps. Humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, by justice—not by jealousy and hatred. I am sorry for the man who seeks to make personal capital out of the passions of his fellow men. He has lost the touch and ideal of America, for America was created to unite mankind by those passions which lift, and not by the passions which separate and debase. We came to America, either ourselves or in the persons of our ancestors, to better the ideals of men, to make them see finer things than they had seen before, to get rid of the things that divide, and to make sure of the things that unite. It was but an historical accident, no doubt, that this great country was called the “United States”; and yet I am very thankful that it has that word “united” in its title, and the man who seeks to divide man from man, group from group, interest from interest in the United States is striking at its very heart.

See, my friends, what that means. It means that Americans must have a consciousness different from the consciousness of every other nation in the world. I am not saying this with even the slightest thought of criticism of other nations. You know how it is with a family. A family gets centered on itself if it is not careful and is less interested in the neighbors than it is in its own members. So a nation that is not constantly renewed out of new sources is apt to have the narrowness and prejudice of a family, whereas America must have this consciousness—that on all sides it touches elbows and touches hearts with all the nations of mankind. The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example, not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 33, April 17–July 21, 1915* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 147–149.

52. The First Lusitania Note Sent by the U.S. Government to the Imperial German Government, 13 May 1915

*After Germany's February 1915 declaration that it intended to use submarines against Allied shipping, in two separate incidents American passengers on British ships lost their lives due to German submarine attacks. A far more serious such episode (1412) occurred on 7 May 1915 when a German torpedo sank the British passenger liner the **Lusitania** off the coast of Ireland. Over 1,100 passengers and crew died, including 124 Americans. President Woodrow Wilson responded by sending the following note, which his ambassador in Berlin delivered to the German minister of foreign affairs.*

In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted. . . .

Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of human action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to believe—it cannot now bring itself to believe—that these acts, so absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or sanction of that great Government. It feels it to be its duty, therefore, to address the Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness and in the earnest hope that it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial German Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which have been created and vindicate once more the position of that Government with regard to the sacred freedom of the seas.

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in

the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. . . . Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights. . . .

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States can not believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least within the practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even

of submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives of non-combatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation as far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate (1413) steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. . . .

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 393–396.

53. German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow, Reply to the First *Lusitania* Note, 28 May 1915

At the end of May the German Foreign Office sent a rather combative reply to the United States. Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow apologized for German sinkings of American vessels and promised full compensation, but he justified attacks on British ships bearing American passengers on the grounds that the latter frequently also carried Allied troops and munitions.

The undersigned has the honor to make the following reply to the note . . . on the subject of the impairment of many American interests by the German submarine war.

The Imperial Government has subjected the statements of the Government of the United States to a careful examination and has the lively wish on its part to contribute in a convincing and friendly manner to clear up any misunderstandings which may have entered into the relations of the two Governments through the events mentioned by the American Government. . . .

With regard to the loss of life when the British passenger steamer *Lusitania* was sunk, the German Government has already expressed its deep regret to the neutral Governments concerned that nationals of those countries lost their lives on that occasion. The Imperial Government must state for the rest the impression that certain important facts most directly connected with the sinking of the *Lusitania* may have escaped the attention of the Government of the United States. It therefore considers it necessary in the interest of the clear and full understanding aimed at by either Government primarily to convince itself that the reports of the facts which are before the two Governments are complete and in agreement.

The Government of the United States proceeds on the assumption that the *Lusitania* is to be considered as an ordinary unarmed merchant vessel. The Imperial Government begs in this connection to point out that the *Lusitania* was one of the largest and fastest English commerce steamers, constructed with Government funds as auxiliary cruisers, and is expressly included in the navy lists published by British Admiralty. It is moreover known to the Imperial Government from reliable information furnished by its officials and neutral passengers that for some time practically all the more valuable English merchant vessels have been provided with guns, ammunition, and other weapons, and reinforced with a crew specially practiced in manning guns.

According to reports at hand here, the *Lusitania* when she left New York undoubtedly had guns on board which were mounted under decks and masked.

The Imperial Government furthermore has the honor to direct the particular attention of the American Government to the fact that the British Admiralty by a secret instruction of February this year advised the British merchant marine not only to seek protection behind neutral flags and markings, but even when so disguised to attack German submarines by ramming them. High rewards have been offered by the British Government as a special incentive for the destruction of the submarines by merchant vessels, and such rewards have already been paid out. In view of these facts, which are satisfactorily known to it, the Imperial Government is unable to consider English merchant vessels any longer as “undefended territory” in the zone of maritime war designated by the Admiralty Staff of the Imperial German Navy, the German commanders are consequently no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual and with which they invariably complied before this. Lastly, the Imperial Government must specially point out that on her last trip the *Lusitania*, as on other occasions, had Canadian troops and munitions on board, including no less than 5,400 cases of ammunition destined for the destruction of brave German soldiers who are fulfilling with self-sacrifice and devotion their duty in the service of the Fatherland. The German Government believes that it acts in just self-defense when it seeks to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition destined for the enemy with the means of war at its command. The English steamship company must have been aware of the dangers to which the passengers on board the *Lusitania* were exposed under the circumstances. In taking them on board in spite of this the company quite deliberately tried to use the (1414) lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition carried, and violated the clear provisions of American laws which expressly prohibit, and provide punishment for, the carrying of passengers on ships which have explosives on board. The company thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers. According to the express report of the submarine commander concerned, which is further confirmed by all other reports, there can be no doubt that the rapid sinking of the *Lusitania* was primarily due to the explosion of the cargo of ammunition caused by the torpedo. Otherwise, in all human probability, the passengers of the *Lusitania* would have been saved.

The Imperial Government holds the facts recited above to be of sufficient importance to recommend them to a careful examination by the American Government. The Imperial Government begs to reserve a final statement of its position with regard to the demands made in connection with the sinking of the *Lusitania* until a reply is received from the American Government, and believes

that it should recall here that it took note with satisfaction of the proposals of good offices submitted by the American Government in Berlin and London with a view to paving the way for a modus vivendi for the conduct of maritime war between Germany and Great Britain. The Imperial Government furnished at that time ample evidence of its good will by its willingness to consider these proposals. The realization of these proposals failed, as is known, on account of their rejection by the Government of Great Britain.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 419–421.

54. The Gallipoli Campaign, May—August 1915: Accounts of Captain Guy Warneford Nightingale, Royal Munster Fusiliers

The 1915 Gallipoli campaign, when Great Britain unsuccessfully attempted to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula and use it as a springboard to take the Turkish-owned Dardanelles Straits, which controlled access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and ultimately the Turkish capital of Constantinople, was one of the Allies' worst early disasters. Poor coordination and planning characterized Allied efforts. British, Australian, New Zealand, and French troops took part in several landings around the Gallipoli Peninsula but encountered heroic resistance from Turkish forces, whose officers included the young Colonel Mustafa Kemal. Both Allied and Turkish forces suffered enormous losses, 250,000 casualties out of 480,000 Allied troops, with the numbers probably even worse among the Turks. In late autumn 1915 the Allied commanders, facing superior and well-entrenched Turkish forces, decided to withdraw. Winston Churchill, Britain's first lord of the Admiralty, originated the Gallipoli campaign, and the defeat forced him out office.

Captain Guy Warneford Nightingale, a career officer with the Royal Munster Fusiliers, took part in the landing of 1 May 1915, of which he sent his family vivid accounts. For his efforts at Gallipoli he was twice mentioned in dispatches.

Nightingale to His Mother and His Sister, Margaret Warneford Hesketh-Williams, 1 May 1915

This is the first opportunity I have had of writing to you since we left the boat. You will have seen the papers by now, that we have forced a landing, but ourselves and the Dublins got most awfully mauled in doing so. We left Lemnos for Tenedos one day, and from there we got a collier called the River Clyde, which had been fitted up for the purpose of beaching. We anchored at midnight about two miles from the mouth of the Dardanelles, and at dawn the whole Fleet began a bombardment of the end of the peninsula where we were going to land.

At 7.30 am the Dublins set off in open boats to their landing place which was the same as ours. As each boat got near the shore, snipers shot down the oarsmen. The boats began to drift, and machine-gun fire was turned on to them. You could see the men dropping everywhere, and of the first boatload of 40 men only 3 reached the shore, all wounded. At the same time we ran the old collier on to the shore but the water was shallower than they thought and she

stuck about 80 yards out. Some lighters were put to connect with the shore and we began running along them to get down to the beach. I can't tell you how many were killed or drowned but the place was a regular death-trap.

I ran down to the lighters but was sent back by Jarrett as there was no room on them. Then the wounded began crawling back, the Turks sniping at them the whole time. The men who had managed to reach the shore were all crouching under a bank about 10 feet high, among them Jarrett. At 2 pm the Colonel told me to go down on to the barge, collect as many men as I could and join the force on shore. We jumped into the sea and got ashore somehow with a rain of bullets all round us. I found Jarrett and a lot of men but very few not hit. We waited till dusk and then crept up into a sort of position a few yards up. We took up an outpost line and I had just put up my sentry groups and [J]arrett came up to have a look, when he was shot through the throat by my side. He died very soon and that left me the Senior Officer on shore.

We dug ourselves in, the Turks sniping at us from every corner and I've never spent such a rotten night. It was pouring (1415) with rain too. During the night all the rest of the regt landed and by the morning we had what remained of us, one company of the Dublins and one company of the Hants under Major Beckwith. We were told to take an old ruined castle, full of Turks, then a village and finally storm a hill with a redoubt at the top. The castle was rushed at the point of the bayonet and we lost only a few. The village was an awful snag. Every house and corner was full of snipers and you only had to show yourself in the streets to have a bullet at your head. We spent from 9 am to 2.30 before we finally cleared them all out, we lost a lot of men and officers in it. I got one swine of a Turk with my revolver when searching a house for snipers but he nearly had me first.

By 3 we held a line at the far end of the village and the hill we had to take was immediately above us. The *Queen Elizabeth* and 4 other Men-of-War then shelled the hill and at 4.30 we were ordered to fix bayonets and take the hill. My company led the attack with the Dubliners and we had a great time. We saw the enemy, which was the chief thing, and the men all shouted and enjoyed it tremendously. It was a relief after all that appalling sniping. We rushed straight to the top and turned 2,000 Turks off the redoubt and poured lead into them at about 10 yards range. . . . It was 6 by the time we finished firing on the Turks and we dug ourselves in in an outpost position.

On the night of the first of May we had a tremendous attack. They crept up in the dark and were in our trenches and bayonetting our men before we knew the

attack had begun. We lost some trenches but recovered them all in half an hour. . . . The attack went on from 10.30 pm till dawn. The Turks attacked again and again shouting "Allah! Allah!" It was most exciting hearing them collecting in a dip in the hill about 40 yards away waiting for their next charge. We mowed them down and only once did they get so close that we were able to bayonet them. When dawn broke, we saw them in hundreds retiring and simply mowed them down. We took 300 prisoners and could have taken 3,000, but we preferred shooting them. All the streams were simply running blood and the heaps of dead were a grand sight. . . .

The next day we were moved up and dug ourselves in again while two other brigades advanced a mile. The next morning we were told to move up to the advanced line and dug ourselves in again while two other brigades advanced a mile. The next morning we were told to move up to the advanced line and act in reserve, but by the time we got up to it the firing line was so hard pressed that we had to go straight up into it. We had a very heavy day's fighting being under fire continuously from 8 am till dark. The next morning we advanced about 100 yards in and the whole Division dug itself in in a long line across the peninsula from sea to sea. We are still holding this line and have got three and a half miles of the peninsula now. We get shelled all day, and sniped at and attacked all night, but are very cheery. We have plenty of food now and water and have dug ourselves into the ground like in France. . . .

The German officers whom we have taken prisoner say it is absolutely beyond them how we ever effected a landing at all. If there was one place in the whole world that was impregnable it was this peninsula and they say no army in the world except ours could have seen half its numbers mown down and still come on and make good a landing. It has certainly been a tough job. . . .

Nightingale to His Mother, 10 May 1915

Here we are, back again after 15 days continuous fighting. . . .

We had a bad time the day before yesterday. Just at 5 in the evening we were ordered to advance 800 yards and dig in. We were in the most advanced line. Williams and I were leading our co[mpan]y and Waldegrave came in with half of his, while the remainder were in support. We only got 200 yards and in that distance in a couple of minutes my coy lost 7 killed and 23 wounded. Poor Waldegrave was badly hit next to me. He was hit practically through the heart and then through both lungs. We had to dig in then and there under heavy fire and only 400 yards from a Turkish redoubt which was sweeping the whole

ground with machine-gun fire. We made some sort of a line and hung on all night expecting to be attacked, but the Turks got such a bad knock in the last night attack they think twice now. . . .

The next day we were supported by some Australians and New Zealanders. We hung on all day and were then relieved by the Worcesters. We were ordered back two miles to the left in the firing-line and with two coys of the KOS [King's Own Scottish] Borderers were ordered to make a night attack and entrench in a position 500 yards in front. Two regiments had already been wiped out trying to do it in daylight. We advanced 300 strong and 3 officers at 1 am. When we reached the place we were heard by the Turks and they opened up a heavy fire on us. It was pitch dark. A fortnight before two regiments had attempted to force a landing there and after fighting for 16 hours had to re-embark, leaving about 700 of their own dead and about 1,500 Turks. These bodies were still lying there highly decomposed and the stench was awful. In the dark we kept tumbling over the bodies and treading on them. When it was light I found that I had dug in next to the remains of an officer in the KOSB whom I had last seen at the opera in Malta and had spent a most jolly evening with. There were ten KOSBs and seven South Wales Borderers lying there but I only recognised a few.

(1416)

We found we could not hold on as we were enfiladed so had to retire back to the entrenchments. In the morning a subaltern in the Dublins and myself went to do a recce. We crept half a mile round the cliff and got to within a few yards of some Turkish trenches. We could hear them talking and saw them cooking. It was most tantalising not being able to shoot. There were about 7,000 of them. We went back, after sketching the position, to bring up the regiment. I led up the Dublins and just as we got up there the Turks opened a cross-fire on us from two machine-guns. They had had them the whole time and we must have got very close to them when we crept up to sketch the position. Out of the first six men up there I was the only one not hit. It was no good stopping there. If the men had been fresh and not absolutely exhausted we might have rushed the machine-gun with the bayonet but it was quite out of the question. . . .

This is now degenerating into a kind of trench warfare. We can't possibly advance, nor can the Turks. If we had only had enough troops in the beginning to keep them on the run we would have the whole peninsula by now.

Nightingale to His Father, 14 May 1915

. . . I see they are breaking our casualties gently to you at home. Out of the 14 officers of ours hit on Sunday April 25 the *Times* of the 2nd May gives only Major Jarrett killed and five wounded. A lot of the regiments like the Lancs Fusiliers who lost 20 officers the first day are not mentioned at all! I think the Dublins are the only complete list. I suppose they'll try and make out it's been nothing at all out here, just a scrap with the Turks, whereas it's been hell and frightfully mismanaged. There are any number of officers and men here who have had five or six months in France and were right through Mons and they say it was nothing, a mere picnic, compared to the landing and subsequent 14 days of this show. We expect to get back to the firing-line tomorrow.

Nightingale to His Mother, 9 June 1915

The dust is becoming unbearable here, for there is always a hot wind blowing day and night. We go up to relieve the firing trenches in 2 or 3 days time but I don't think there will be any more advancing for some time. Our losses were appalling the last time we attempted to advance and the poor old Fusilier Brigade is in a very bad way.

Nightingale to His Mother, 13 June 1915

We have been in the trenches two days now and have four more to do. The trenches are awful—very badly made, narrow, not bullet proof and smell absolutely revolting from dead bodies. We are occupying Turkish trenches which we captured but there is an absolute maze of trenches. We are all round the Turks and they are all round us too. The Dublins have their backs to Achi Baba and face our Base, the Turks being between them and us! We share several trenches with the Turks, with a barricade between and throw bombs at each other over the top!

The whole place is up and down hill, not in the slightest like the trenches in France. To get to our trenches we go four miles up a deep nullah with sides 200 feet high. There is a great barricade right up across the nullah at the furthest point we hold. To get into our trenches we go up a zig-zag track and enter a hole in the cliff which leads into our support trenches and from there are innumerable communication trenches leading into the firing-line. Of course you can't show your head above the trench for a second but have to look through periscopes or through peepholes. Between the trenches are any amount of dead and decomposing bodies of our men and Turks lying on the heather. The smell

is awful, though we throw down quantities of Chloride of Lime and creosote. . . .

Two months later, on 21 August 1915, Nightingale took part in the last and largest battle of the campaign as the Allies attempted to take Scimitar Hill and Hill 60, whose heights dominated Suvla Plain, in the northern portion of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Exhausted British troops, who had spent the previous thirty-six hours on sea transports, under shell fire, and on a night-march to the trenches opposite Scimitar Hill, suffered 5,000 casualties in the near-suicidal assault. Shell fire set alight the desiccated scrub and gorse covering the plain and hills.

Nightingale to His Mother, 25 August 1915

Our battalion was the assaulting one of the brigades, and we had to take a hill about half a mile ahead. Everyone was cooked with the heat and almost too weary to stand, with no sleep for 3 nights. At 3 pm the battalion shoved off, 700 strong. The furthest any got was 500 yards and none came back from there. They all got mown down by machine-gun fire. We lost 9 officers and nearly 400 men. The Turks shelled us very heavily and the whole country which is covered with gorse caught fire. This split up the attack and parties got cut up. Many of our wounded were burnt alive and it was as nasty a sight as ever I want to see.

. . . Finally about 7.30 pm the survivors came in under orders from the division and all night wounded men came straggling back, all with tales of our men still lying out there.

How any of us escaped I don't know. Our headquarters was very heavily shelled and then the fire surrounded the place and we all thought we were going to be burnt alive. Where the telephone was, the heat was appalling. The roar of the flames drowned the noise of the shrapnel, and we had to lie flat at the (1417) bottom of the trench while the flames swept over the top. Luckily both sides didn't catch simultaneously, or I don't know what would have happened. After the gorse was burnt, the smoke nearly asphyxiated us! All this time our battalion was being cut up in the open and it really was very unpleasant trying to send calm messages down to the brigade HQ, while you were lying at the bottom of the trench like an oven, expecting to be burnt every minute, and knowing that your battalion was getting hell a hundred yards away! The telephone wires finally fused from the heat.

The whole attack was a ghastly failure. They generally are now. . . . We were really played out and so was the whole division and ought never to have been made to do anything. The 29th Division will never be any more good, but the people in authority seem to think we are still the same troops that did the landing.

Nightingale to His Mother, 26 August 1915

There is no doubt about it, we have played all our cards on this new landing and failed, the opportunity that has been lost and if there had been any troops other than only those who took part in it I think they would have done it. . . . [T]hey shell us all day here, much more so than at Camp Helles, and as I write they are shelling a battery 400 yards immediately behind us and the shells are screaming over my dugout. I am sure everybody's opinion is live and let live, and Turkey for the Turks!

For the rest of 1915, Nightingale's unit remained on the peninsula, tormented first by heat, flies, and dysentery, then as winter approached by floods, gales, and intense cold. Nightingale's battalion of the Royal Munster Fusiliers was one of the last evacuated, in January 1916.

Source: Imperial War Museum, in *A Place Called Armageddon: Letters from the Great War*, ed. Michael Moynihan, 83–101 (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1975). Courtesy of the Nightingale family, with the assistance of the Imperial War Museum.

55. The Second *Lusitania* Note: The U.S. Government to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow, 9 June 1915

*President Woodrow Wilson and the majority of his administration thought the German reply to the first **Lusitania** note inadequately conciliatory. A second note was therefore drafted, demanding that German submarines cease making attacks without warning upon any civilian passenger ships. Fearing that if Germany rejected these demands the United States would be forced to declare war, the pacifist secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, disagreed with this note's emphasis and before it was sent therefore resigned from the administration. His interim replacement, Robert Lansing, instructed Ambassador James W. Gerard in Berlin to deliver the following message to the German foreign minister.*

In compliance with your excellency's request I did not fail to transmit to my Government immediately upon their receipt your note of May 28 in reply to my note of May 15 [13], and your supplementary note of June 1, setting forth the conclusions so far reached by the Imperial German Government concerning the attacks on the American steamers *Cushing* and *Gulflight*. I am now instructed by my Government to communicate the following in reply: . . .

Your excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of the steamship *Lusitania*, adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and your excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that the *Lusitania* was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted, under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. Fortunately, these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in your excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the *Lusitania* was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with

scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness, the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the *Lusitania* or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this (1418) Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance of passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no lot or part in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial

German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.

The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its services in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.

In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

The Government of the United States can not admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation

to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 436–438.

(1419)

56. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to President Woodrow Wilson, 6 September 1915

Despite the availability of American commercial credits, by summer 1915 the vast purchases of U.S. war supplies undertaken by the British and French governments were an increasing strain on Allied finances. American bankers and Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo urged their government to reverse its policy banning loans to belligerent governments. J. P. Morgan and Company and other leading pro-Allied bankers in New York were planning a major offering on behalf of the British and French governments that eventually became the \$100 million Anglo-French loan of autumn 1915. The sympathetic Robert Lansing, the new secretary of state, pleaded their case to President Woodrow Wilson.

Doubtless Secretary McAdoo has discussed with you the necessity of floating government loans for the belligerent nations, which are purchasing such great quantities of goods in this country, in order to avoid a serious financial situation which will not only affect them but this country as well.

Briefly, the situation, as I understand it, is this: Since December 1st, 1914, to June 30, 1915, our exports have exceeded our imports by nearly a billion dollars, and it is estimated that the excess will be from July 1st to December 1, 1915, a billion and three quarters. Thus for the year 1915 the excess will be approximately two and [a] half billions of dollars.

It is estimated that the European banks have about three and [a] half billions of dollars in gold in their vaults. To withdraw any considerable amount would disastrously affect the credit of the European nations, and the consequence would be a general state of bankruptcy.

If the European countries cannot find means to pay for the excess of goods sold to them over those purchased from them, they will have to stop buying and our present export trade will shrink proportionately. The result would be restriction of outputs, industrial depression, idle capital and idle labor, numerous failures, financial demoralization, and general unrest and suffering among the laboring classes.

Probably a billion and three quarters of the excess of European purchases can be taken care of by the sale of American securities held in Europe and by the

transfer of trade balances of oriental countries, but that will leave three quarters of a billion to be met in some other way. Furthermore even if that is arranged, we will have to face a more serious situation in January, 1916, as the American securities held abroad will have been exhausted.

I believe that Secretary McAdoo is convinced and I agree with him that there is only one means of avoiding this situation which would so seriously affect economic conditions in the country, and that is the flotation of large bond issues by the belligerent governments. Our financial institutions have the money to loan and wish to do so. On account of the great balance of trade in our favor the proceeds of these loans would be expended here. The result would be a maintenance of the credit of the borrowing nations based on their gold reserve, a continuance of our commerce at its present volume and industrial activity with the consequent employment of capital and labor and national prosperity.

The difficulty is—and this is what Secretary McAdoo came to see me about—that the Government early in the war announced that it considered “war loans” to be contrary to “the true spirit of neutrality.” A declaration to this effect was given to the press about August 15, 1914, by Secretary Bryan. The language is as follows: “In the judgment of this Government loans by American bankers to any foreign nation at war is inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.”

In October, 1914, after a conference with you, I gave my “impressions” to certain New York bankers in reference to “credit loans,” but the general statement remained unaffected. . . .

Manifestly the Government has committed itself to the policy of discouraging general loans to belligerent governments. The practical reasons for the policy at the time we adopted it were sound, but basing it on the ground that loans are “inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality” is now a source of embarrassment. This latter ground is as strong today as it was a year ago, while the practical reasons for discouraging loans have largely disappeared. We have more money than we can use. Popular sympathy has become crystallized in favor of one or another of the belligerents to such an extent that the purchase of bonds would in no way increase the bitterness of partisanship or cause a possibly serious situation.

Now, on the other hand, we are face to face with what appears to be a critical economic situation, which can only be relieved apparently by the investment of

American capital in foreign loans to be used in liquidating the enormous balance of trade in favor of the United States.

Can we afford to let a declaration as to our conception of “the true spirit of neutrality” made in the first days of the war stand in the way of our national interests which seem to be seriously threatened?

If we cannot afford to do this, how are we to explain away the declaration and maintain a semblance of consistency?

(1420)

My opinion is that we ought to allow the loans to be made for our own good, and I have been seeking some means of harmonizing our policy, so unconditionally announced, with the flotation of general loans. As yet I have found no solution to the problem.

Secretary McAdoo considers that the situation is becoming acute and that something should be done at once to avoid the disastrous results which will follow a continuance of the present policy.

Source: U.S. Senate, 74 Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 26: 7883.

57. President Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 8 September 1915

*President Woodrow Wilson acquiesced in Robert Lansing's arguments that the U.S. government should permit American bankers to extend loans as well as credits to the Allies. Given the ongoing **Lusitania** crisis with Germany and German charges that the U.S. neutrality effectively favored the Allies, the president was nonetheless reluctant to draw attention to this decision by issuing a formal public statement endorsing such loans. After discussing the matter with Lansing, he sent the latter a very brief reply.*

I have no doubt that our oral discussion of the matter yesterday suffices. If it does not, will you let me know that you would like a written reply?

Source: U.S. Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, 40 pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–1936), 26:7884.

58. The *Arabic* Crisis: The German Ambassador to Washington, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 5 October 1915

*On 19 August 1915, while the United States was still demanding satisfaction over the **Lusitania**, another passenger ship, the **Arabic**, fell victim to a German submarine off the Irish coast. Fearing that if left unaddressed this incident might easily escalate into a crisis that would bring the United States into the war, German officials took a conciliatory line, disavowing the submarine commander's action and offering full compensation for the five dead American passengers.*

Prompted by the desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with regard to the *Arabic* incident, my Government has given me the following instructions:

The orders issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German submarines—of which I notified you on a previous occasion—have been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the *Arabic* case is considered out of the question.

According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine that sank the *Arabic*, and his affidavit as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the *Arabic* intended to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavits of the British officers of the *Arabic*, according to which the *Arabic* did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine, therefore, was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly.

Under these circumstances my Government is prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the *Arabic*. I am authorized to negotiate with you about the amount of this indemnity.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915: Supplement, the World War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 560.

59. Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, to Husayn ibn 'Al, Sharif of Mecca, 24 October 1915

As the Turkish sultanate lost its hold upon the territories of the Ottoman Empire and exacerbated Muslim sensibilities by allying itself with Christian Germany in the war, Husayn ibn 'Al, the high priest or sharif of the Islamic territory of the Hejaz, which contains the holy cities of Medina and Mecca, moved more aggressively toward independence. He was encouraged by British officials, including Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt, who promised him recognition and financial and military assistance.

I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and your expression of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but (1421) it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.—

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

1. (1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

2. (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.
3. (3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government for those various territories.
4. (4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.
5. (5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom of all peoples.

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed ibn Arif ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

(Compliments).

(Signed): A. HENRY MCMAHON.

Source: Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, 6th rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 2001), 11–12.

60. Jane Addams to President Woodrow Wilson, 29 October 1915

Many Americans strongly opposed any intervention in the war by their country. Since German submarine warfare made it likely that if the United States did join the fighting it would be against Germany, Americans of German extraction were generally antiwar, as were the largely anti-British Irish Americans. Socialists and progressives also tended to oppose the war. Prominent among the latter was Jane Addams, a leading American social reformer, feminist, and founder of the Chicago settlement Hull House; she was also chairperson of the Woman's Peace Party. She visited Europe in spring 1915, attending a Women's Conference at The Hague as a representative of neutral women, after which she and other women pacifists personally attempted to persuade political leaders in Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, and Austria of the desirability of peace. In fall 1915 Addams questioned President Wilson's recent upgrading of U.S. defenses, which included increases in armament production and the doubling of the army.

Feeling sure that you wish to get from all sources the sense of the American people in regard to great national questions, officers (1422) of the Women's Peace Party venture to call to your attention certain views which they have reason to believe are widespread, although finding no adequate expression in the press.

We believe in real defense against real dangers, but not in a preposterous "preparedness" against hypothetical dangers.

If an exhausted Europe could be an increased menace to our rich, resourceful republic, protected by two oceans, it must be a still greater menace to every other nation.

Whatever increase of war preparedness we may make would compel poorer nations to imitate us. These preparations would create rivalry, suspicion and taxation in every country.

At this crisis of the world, to establish a "citizen soldiery" and enormously to increase our fighting equipment would inevitably make all other nations fear instead of trust us.

It has been the proud hope of American citizens who love their kind, a hope nobly expressed in several of your own messages, that to the United States might be granted the unique privilege not only of helping the war-worn world

to a lasting peace, but of aiding toward a gradual and proportional lessening of that vast burden of armament which has crushed to poverty the peoples of the old world.

Most important of all, it is obvious that increased war preparations in the United States would tend to disqualify our National Executive from rendering the epochal service which this world crisis offers for the establishment of permanent peace.

Source: The Jane Addams Papers, 1860–1935 (Bell & Howell Information and Learning, 1985; Ann Arbor, MI), Reel 9, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section reprinted in Andrew Carroll, ed., *War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 125–126. Used by permission of Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

61. Colonel Edward M. House to President Woodrow Wilson, 10 November 1915, and Wilson Cable to House, 11 November 1915

By autumn 1915 many influential individuals in both Great Britain and the United States already contemplated the creation of a postwar international organization to prevent future wars. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had already begun to discuss with Colonel Edward M. House, President Woodrow Wilson's confidential advisor, the possibility that the United States might not only join and assist in creating such a body but also might help mediate an end to the war on terms favorable to the Allies. Grey himself considered U.S. membership essential to any such organization's success. From September onward House and Grey discussed these proposals at some length and also exchanged secret coded messages that were passed on to Wilson. In November, House in New York sent the president in Washington a letter enclosing a cable and part of a letter from Grey, together with a suggested draft reply. Clearly, the president already envisaged that in the future his country would take a far greater international role than in the past.

I am enclosing you a copy of a cable which came from Sir Edward Grey yesterday in the code we have between us. I also enclose copy of paragraph four of his letter to which he refers fearing lest you may not have it convenient.

With your approval, I shall send him in cipher this answer:

"Yes, the proposal contemplated is, broadly speaking, along the lines mentioned in fourth paragraph of your letter to me of September 22nd."

It seems to me that we must throw the influence of this nation in behalf of a plan by which international obligation must be kept, and in behalf of some plan by which the peace of the world may be maintained. We should do this not only for the sake of civilization, but for our own welfare, for who may say when we may be involved in such a holocaust as is now devastating Europe.

Must we not be a party to the making of new and more humane rules of warfare, and must we not lend our influence towards the freedom of both the land and sea? This is the part I think you are destined to play in the world tragedy, and it is the noblest part that has ever come to a son of man. This country will follow you along such a path, no matter what the cost may be.

Enclosed Memorandum

On an enclosed piece of paper, House gave Wilson the text of a telegram from Grey received the day before, his suggestion for a proposed answer, and an excerpt from an earlier letter Grey had sent to House.

November 9th, 1915.

Split letter received. What is the proposal of the elimination of militarism and navalism that you contemplate? Is it that suggested in fourth paragraph of letter to you of September 22nd?

I am writing more fully in reply. E. Grey.

(1423)

Proposed Answer to the Above Cable

Yes, the proposal contemplated is broadly speaking along the lines mentioned in fourth paragraph of your letter to me of September 22nd.

Paragraph four of Sir Edward Grey's letter of September 22nd.

"To me, the great object of securing the elimination of militarism and navalism is to get security for the future against aggressive war. How much are the United States prepared to do in this direction? Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations binding themselves to side against any Power which broke a Treaty; which broke certain rules of warfare on sea or land (such rules would of course have to be drawn up after this war); or which refused, in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war? Only in some such agreement do I see a prospect of diminishing militarism in future, so that no nation will build up armies or navies for aggressive purposes."

President Woodrow Wilson, Telegram to Colonel Edward M. House, 11 November 1915

The president sent House a telegram effectively endorsing his suggestion.

Message approved you might even omit words broadly speaking and say merely along the lines of Woodrow Wilson.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 35, 1915–1916* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 186–187.

62. President Woodrow Wilson, Annual State of the Union Message, 7 December 1915

By late 1915, recurrent crises with both Germany and the Allies, as well as continuing U.S.-Mexican border disputes, had convinced President Woodrow Wilson that as a matter of prudence, the United States must enhance its defenses. In his annual State of the Union address to the Congress, he therefore called for a program of military "preparedness," a moderate U.S. buildup of military and naval forces designed to enable the country to deter any potential threats. The president anticipated that increased taxation would finance these measures and that improved industrial mobilization would be a concomitant. He called for the creation of a U.S. merchant marine to render American commerce independent of foreign shipping. After several instances of German and Austrian sabotage of American defense plants producing for the Allies, he also warned sternly against potential disloyalty.

Gentlemen of the Congress: Since I last had the privilege of addressing you on the state of the Union the war of nations on the other side of the sea, which had then only begun to disclose its portentous proportions, has extended its threatening and sinister scope until it has swept within its flame some portion of every quarter of the globe, not excepting our own hemisphere, has altered the whole face of international affairs, and now presents a prospect of reorganization and reconstruction such as statesmen and peoples have never been called upon to attempt before.

We have stood apart, studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so. Not only did we have no part or interest in the policies which seem to have brought the conflict on; it was necessary, if a universal catastrophe was to be avoided, that a limit should be set to the sweep of destructive war and that some part of the great family of nations should keep the processes of peace alive, if only to prevent collective economic ruin and the breakdown throughout the world of the industries by which its populations are fed and sustained. It was manifestly the duty of the self-governed nations of this hemisphere to redress, if possible, the balance of economic loss and confusion in the other, if they could do nothing more. In the day of readjustment and recuperation we earnestly hope and believe that they can be of infinite service. . . .

. . . I am interested to fix your attention on this prospect now because unless you take it within your view and permit the full significance of it to command your thought I cannot find the right light in which to set forth the particular

matter that lies at the very front of my whole thought as I address you today, I mean national defense.

No one who really comprehends the spirit of the great people for whom we are appointed to speak can fail to perceive that their passion is for peace, their genius best displayed in the practice of the arts of peace. Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war. Their thought is of individual liberty and of the free labour that supports life and the uncensored thought that quickens it. Conquest and dominion are not in our reckoning, or agreeable to our principles. But just because we demand unmolested development and the undisturbed government of our own lives upon our own principles of right and liberty, we resent, from whatever quarter it may come, the aggression we ourselves will not practice. We insist upon security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right. From the (1424) first we have made a common cause with all partisans of liberty on this side [of] the sea, and have deemed it as important that our neighbours should be free from all outside domination as that we ourselves should be; have set America aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political freemen.

Out of such thought grow all our policies. We regard war merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression. And we are as fiercely jealous of coercive or dictatorial power within our own nation as of aggression from without. We will not maintain a standing army except for uses which are as necessary in times of peace as in times of war; and we shall always see to it that our military peace establishment is no larger than is actually and continuously needed for the uses of days in which no enemies move against us. But we do believe in a body of free citizens ready and sufficient to take care of themselves and of the governments which they have set up to serve them. In our constitutions themselves we have commanded that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” and our confidence has been that our safety in times of danger would lie in the rising of the nation to take care of itself, as the farmers rose at Lexington.

But war has never been a mere matter of men and guns. It is a thing of disciplined might. If our citizens are ever to fight effectively upon a sudden summons, they must know how modern fighting is done, and what to do when the summons comes to render themselves immediately available and

immediately effective. And the government must be their servant in this matter, must supply them with the training they need to take care of themselves and of it. The military arm of their government, which they will not allow to direct them, they may properly use to serve them and make their independence secure,—and not their own independence merely but the rights also of those with whom they have made common cause, should they also be put in jeopardy. They must be fitted to play the great role in the world, and particularly in this hemisphere, for which they are qualified by principle and by chastened ambition to play.

It is with these ideals in mind that the plans of the Department of War for more adequate national defense were conceived which will be laid before you, and which I urge you to sanction and put into effect as soon as they can be properly scrutinized and discussed. They seem to me the essential first steps, and they seem to me for the present sufficient.

They contemplate an increase of the standing force of the regular army from its present strength of five thousand and twenty-three officers and one hundred and two thousand nine hundred and eighty-five enlisted men of all services to a strength of seven thousand one hundred and thirty-six officers and seven enlisted men, or 141,483, all told, all services, rank and file, by the addition of fifty-two companies of coast artillery, fifteen companies of engineers, ten regiments of infantry, four regiments of field artillery, and four aero squadrons, besides seven hundred and fifty officers required for a great variety of extra service, especially the all important duty of training the citizen force of which I shall presently speak, seven hundred and ninety-two non-commissioned officers for service in drill recruiting and the like, and the necessary quota of enlisted men for the Quartermaster Corps, the Hospital Corps, the Ordnance Department, and other similar auxiliary services. These are the additions necessary to render the army adequate for its present duties, duties which it has to perform not only upon our own continental coasts and borders and at our interior army posts, but also in the Philippines, in the Hawaiian Islands, at the Isthmus, and in Porto Rico.

By way of making the country ready to assert some part of its real power promptly and upon a larger scale, should occasion arise, the plan also contemplates supplementing the army by a force of four hundred thousand disciplined citizens, raised in increments of one hundred and thirty-three thousand a year throughout a period of three years. This it is proposed to do by a process of enlistment under which the serviceable men of the country would be asked to bind themselves to serve with the colors for purposes of training for

short periods throughout three years, and to come to the colors at call at any time throughout an additional “furlough” period of three years. This force of four hundred thousand men would be provided with personal accoutrements as fast as enlisted and their equipment for the field made ready to be supplied at any time. They would be assembled for training at stated intervals at convenient places in association with suitable units of the regular army. Their period of annual training would not necessarily exceed two months in the year.

It would depend upon the patriotic feeling of the younger men of the country whether they responded to such a call to service or not. It would depend upon the patriotic spirit of the employers of the country whether they made it possible for the younger men in their employ to respond under favorable conditions or not. I, for one, do not doubt the patriotic devotion either of our young men or of those who give them employment,—those for whose benefit and protection they would in fact enlist. I would look forward to the success of such an experiment with entire confidence.

At least so much by way of preparation for defense seems to me to be absolutely imperative now. We cannot do less.

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The programme which will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Navy is similarly conceived. It involves only a shortening of the time within which plans long matured shall be carried out; but it does make definite and explicit a programme which has heretofore been only implicit, held in the minds of the Committees on Naval Affairs and disclosed in the debates of the two Houses but nowhere formulated or formally adopted. It seems to me very clear that it will be to the advantage of the country for the Congress to adopt a comprehensive plan for putting the navy upon a final footing of strength and efficiency and to press that plan to completion within the next five years. We have always looked to the navy of the country as our first and chief line of defense; we have always seen it to be our manifest course of prudence to be strong on the seas. Year by year we have been creating a navy which now ranks very high indeed among the navies of the maritime nations. We should now definitely determine how we shall complete what we have begun, and how soon.

The programme to be laid before you contemplates the construction within five years of ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifteen fleet submarines, eighty-five coast submarines, four gunboats, one

hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil ships, and one repair ship. It is proposed that of this number we shall the first year provide for the construction of two battle ships, two battle cruisers, three scout cruisers, fifteen destroyers, five fleet submarines, twenty-five coast submarines, two gunboats, and one hospital ship; the second year, two battleships, one scout cruiser, ten destroyers, four fleet submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one gun boat, and one fuel oil ship; the third year, two battle ships, one battle cruiser, two scout cruisers, five destroyers, two fleet submarines, and fifteen coast submarines; the fourth year, two battle ships, two battle cruisers, two scout cruisers, ten destroyers, two fleet submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one ammunition ship, and one fuel oil ship; and the fifth year, two battle ships, one battle cruiser, two scout cruisers, ten destroyers, two fleet submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one gunboat, one ammunition ship, and one repair ship.

The Secretary of the Navy is asking also for the immediate addition to the personnel of the navy of seven thousand five hundred sailors, twenty-five hundred apprentice seamen, and fifteen hundred marines. This increase would be sufficient to care for the ships which are to be completed within the fiscal year 1917 and also for the number of men which must be put in training to man the ships which will be completed early in 1918. It is also necessary that the number of midshipmen at the Naval academy at Annapolis should be increased by at least three hundred in order that the force of officers should be more rapidly added to; and authority is asked to appoint, for engineering duties only, approved graduates of engineering colleges, and for service in the aviation corps a certain number of men taken from civil life.

If this full programme should be carried out we should have built or building in 1921, according to the estimates of survival and standards of classification followed by the General Board of the Department, an effective navy consisting of twenty-seven battleships, of the first line, six battle cruisers, twenty-five battleships of the second line, ten armored cruisers, thirteen scout cruisers, five first class cruisers, three second class cruisers, ten third class cruisers, one hundred and eight destroyers, eighteen fleet submarines, one hundred and fifty-seven coast submarines, six monitors, twenty gunboats, four supply ships, fifteen fuel ships, four transports, three tenders to torpedo vessels, eight vessels of special types, and two ammunition ships. This would be a navy fitted to our needs and worthy of our traditions.

But armies and instruments of war are only part of what has to be considered if we are to consider the supreme matter of national self-sufficiency and security in all its aspects. There are other great matters which will be thrust upon our

attention whether we will or not. There is, for example, a very pressing question of trade and shipping involved in this great problem of national adequacy. It is necessary for many weighty reasons of national efficiency and development that we should have a great merchant marine. The great merchant fleet we once used to make us rich, that great body of sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag into every sea, and who were the pride and often the bulwark of the nation, we have almost driven out of existence by inexcusable neglect and indifference and by a hopelessly blind and provincial policy of so-called economic protection. It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our commercial independence.

For it is a question of independence. If other nations go to war or seek to hamper each other's commerce, our merchants, it seems, are at their mercy, to do with as they please. We must use their ships, and use them as they determine. We have not ships enough of our own. We cannot handle our own commerce on the seas. Our independence is provincial, and is only on land and within our own borders. We are not likely to be permitted to use even the ships of other nations in rivalry of their own trade, and are without means to extend our commerce even where the doors are wide open and our goods desired. Such a situation is not to be endured. It is of capital importance not only that the United States should be its own carrier on the seas and enjoy the economic independence which only an adequate merchant marine would give it, but also that the American hemisphere as a whole should enjoy a like independence and self-sufficiency, if it is (1426) not to be drawn into the tangle of European affairs. Without such independence the whole question of our political unity and self-determination is very seriously clouded and complicated indeed.

Moreover, we can develop no true or effective American policy without ships of our own,—not ships of war, but ships of peace, carrying goods and carrying much more: creating friendships and rendering indispensable services to all interests on this side the water. They must move constantly back and forth between the Americas. They are the only shuttles that can weave the delicate fabric of sympathy, comprehension, confidence, and mutual dependence in which we wish to clothe our policy of America for Americans.

The task of building up an adequate merchant marine for America private capital must ultimately undertake and achieve, as it has undertaken and achieved every other like task amongst us in the past, with admirable enterprise, intelligence, and vigor; and it seems to me a manifest dictate of wisdom that we should promptly remove every legal obstacle that may stand in the way of this much to be desired revival of our old independence and should

facilitate in every possible way the building, purchase, and American registration of ships. . . . Our goods must not lie piled up at our ports and stored upon side tracks in freight cars which are daily needed on the road; must not be left without means of transport to any foreign quarter. We must not await the permission of foreign ship-owners and foreign governments to send them where we will.

With a view to meeting these pressing necessities of our commerce and availing ourselves at the earliest possible moment of the present unparalleled opportunity of linking the two Americas together in bonds of mutual interest and service, an opportunity which may never return again if we miss it now, proposals will be made to the present Congress for the purchase of construction of ships to be owned and directed by the government similar to those made to the last Congress, but modified in some essential particulars. I recommend these proposals to you for your prompt acceptance with the more confidence because every month that has elapsed since the former proposals were made has made the necessity for such action more and more manifestly imperative. That need was then foreseen; it is now acutely felt and everywhere realized by those for whom trade is waiting but who can find no conveyance for their goods. . . .

The plans for the armed forces of the nation which I have outlined, and for the general policy of adequate preparation for mobilization and defense, involve of course very large additional expenditures of money,—expenditures which will considerably exceed the estimated revenues of the government. It is made my duty by law, whenever the estimates of expenditure exceed the estimates of revenue, to call the attention of the Congress to the fact and suggest any means of meeting the deficiency that it may be wise or possible for me to suggest. I am ready to believe that it would be my duty to do so in any case; and I feel particularly bound to speak of the matter when it appears that the deficiency will arise directly out of the adoption by the Congress of measures which I myself urge it to adopt. Allow me, therefore, to speak briefly of the present state of the Treasury and of the fiscal problems which the next year will probably disclose. . . .

The additional revenues required to carry out the programme of military and naval preparedness of which I have spoken, would, as at present estimated, be for the fiscal year 1917, \$93,800,000. . . .

. . . Borrowing money is short-sighted finance. It can be justified only when permanent things are to be accomplished which many generations will certainly

benefit by and which it seems hardly fair that a single generation should pay for. The objects we are now proposing to spend money for cannot be so classified, except in the sense that everything wisely done may be said to be done in the interest of prudent statesmanship and frank finance that in what we are now, I hope, about to undertake we should pay as we go. The people of the country are entitled to know just what burdens of taxation they are about to carry, and to know from the outset, now. The new bills should be paid by internal taxation. . . .

I have spoken to you to-day, Gentlemen, upon a single theme, the thorough preparation of the nation to care for its own security and to make sure of entire freedom to play the impartial role in this hemisphere and in the world which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to it.

I have had in my mind no thought of any immediate or particular danger arising out of our relations with other nations. We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is reason to hope that no question in controversy between this and other Governments will lead to any serious breach of amicable relations, grave as some differences of attitude and policy have been and may yet turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries (1427) wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not great as compared with the whole number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of virile foreign stocks; but it is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers. America never witnessed anything like this before. It never dreamed it possible that men sworn into its own citizenship, men drawn out of great free stocks such as supplied some of the best and strongest elements of that little, but how heroic, nation that in a high day of old staked its very life to free itself from every entanglement that had darkened the fortunes of the older nations and set up a new standard here,—that men of such origins and such free choices of allegiance would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek to make this proud country once more a hotbed of European passion. A

little while ago such a thing would have seemed incredible. Because it was incredible we made no preparation for it. We would have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as if we were suspicious of ourselves, our own comrades and neighbors! But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. It is possible to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the terms in which they may be dealt with. . . .

While we speak of the preparation of the nation to make sure of her security and her effective power, we must not fall into the patent error of supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards of written law. It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings, their free opportunity to use the natural resources of our great home land and of the lands outside our continental borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their development; from the organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life. The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are more vital to the nation in this time of test than at any other time. We cannot adequately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct the force of our laws into these all-important fields of domestic action. A matter which it seems to me we should have very much at heart is the creation of the right instrumentalities by which to mobilize our economic resources in any time of national necessity. I take it for granted that I do not need your authority to call into systematic consultation with the directing officers of the army and navy men of recognized leadership and ability from among our citizens who are thoroughly familiar, for example, with the transportation facilities of the country and therefore competent to advise how they may be coordinated when the need arises, those who can suggest the best way in which to bring about prompt cooperation among the manufacturers of the country, should it be necessary, and those who could assist to bring the technical skill of the country to the aid of the Government in the solution of particular problems of defense. I only hope that if I should find it feasible to constitute such an advisory body the Congress would be willing to vote the small sum of money that would be

needed to defray the expenses that would probably be necessary to give it the clerical and administrative machinery with which to do serviceable work.

What is more important is, that the industries and resources of the country should be available and ready for mobilization. It is the more imperatively necessary, therefore, that we should promptly devise means for doing what we have not yet done: that we should give intelligent federal aid and stimulation to industrial and vocational education, as we have long done in the large field of our agricultural industry; that, at the same time that we safeguard and conserve the natural resources of the country we should put them at the disposal of those who will use them promptly and intelligently. . . .

For what we are seeking now, what in my mind is the single thought of this message, is national efficiency and security. We serve a great nation. We should serve it in the spirit of its peculiar genius. It is the genius of common men for self-government, industry, justice, liberty and peace. We should see to it that it lacks no instrument, no facility or vigor of law, to make it sufficient to play its part with energy, safety, and assured success. In this we are no partisans but heralds and prophets of a new age.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 35, 1915–1916* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 293–310.

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67. The Gore Resolution: Senate Concurrent Resolution 14, 17 February 1916
68. The Battle of Verdun, February–December 1916: General Erich von Falkenhayn, Account of the Beginning of Verdun, February–May 1916
69. The House-Grey Memorandum: Confidential Memorandum of Sir Edward Grey, 22 February 1916
70. The German Ministry of War, Instruction XXI to the Press, J.-Nr.123/16.IV/M, 25 February 1916
71. Edward T. Devine, "Social Preparedness," *The Survey*, 18 March 1916
72. Beatrice Webb on Pacifism: Diary Entry, 8 April 1916
73. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to James W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador in Germany, Transmitting the *Sussex* Note to the German Government, 18 April 1916
74. The Sinn Féin Uprising, Easter 1916: Proclamation Issued in Dublin 24 April 1916, Signed by Padraic Pearse and Six Others
75. "The *Sussex* Pledge": German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow, Note for the U.S. Government, 4 May 1916
76. The Sykes-Picot Agreement: Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15–16 May 1916
77. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, DC, 27 May 1916

78. King Husayn, Sharif of the Hejaz, Proclamation Published in Mecca, 27 June 1916
79. Sir Douglas Haig, Second Dispatch on the Somme Campaign of July–November 1916, 23 December 1916
80. The War Spirit: Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador in London, to President Woodrow Wilson, 21 July 1916
81. Romania Joins the Allies: The Treaty of Bucharest and Associated Military Convention, 4 [17] August 1916
82. John Maynard Keynes, “The Financial Dependence of the United Kingdom on the United States of America,” 10 October 1916
83. British Appeals to Control Venereal Disease: Women Social Workers’ Appeal, *The Times*, 23 October 1916
84. The Federal Reserve Board Restricts Foreign Borrowing in the United States, 26–27 November 1916
85. The German Civilian Service Bill, 5 December 1916
86. The German Peace Note, 12 December 1916
87. President Woodrow Wilson, An Appeal for a Statement of War Aims, 18 December 1916
88. Tsar Nicholas II, Special Order of the Day, 25 December 1916
89. The Reply of the Entente Governments to the German Peace Proposals, 29 December 1916

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63. Antiwar American Labor Activists: The Industrial Workers of the World

Both before and after U.S. intervention in World War I, the radical labor union the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), founded in 1905, was staunchly antiwar. Known for their love of music, in 1916 IWW members included several pacifist poems in the latest edition of their official songbook.

John F. Kendrick, "Christians at War," 1916

Onward, Christian soldiers! Duty's way is plain;
Slay your Christian neighbors, or by them be slain,
Pulpiteers are spouting effervescent swill,
God above is calling you to rob and rape and kill,
All your acts are sanctified by the Lamb on high;
If you love the Holy Ghost, go murder, pray and die.

Onward, Christian soldiers! Rip and tear and smite!
Let the gentle Jesus bless your dynamite.
Splinter skulls with shrapnel, fertilize the sod;
Folks who do not speak your tongue deserve the curse of God.
Smash the doors of every home, pretty maidens seize;
Use your might and sacred right to treat them as you please.

Onward, Christian soldiers! Eat and drink your fill;

Rob with bloody fingers, Christ okays the bill,
Steal the farmers' savings, take their grain and meat;
Even though the children starve, the Savior's bums must eat,
Burn the peasants' cottages, orphans leave bereft;
In Jehovah's holy name, wreak ruin right and left.

Onward, Christian soldiers! Drench the land with gore;
Mercy is a weakness all the gods abhor.
Bayonet the babies, jab the mothers, too;
Hoist the cross of Calvary to hallow all you do.
File your bullets' noses flat, poison every well;
God decrees your enemies must all go plumb to hell.

Onward, Christian soldiers! Blight all that you meet;
Trample human freedom under pious feet.
Praise the Lord whose dollar sign dupes his favored race!
Make the foreign trash respect your bullion brand of grace.
Trust in mock salvation, serve as tyrant's tools;
History will say of you: "That pack of G.. d.. fools."

Source: History in Song,
<http://www.fortunecity.com/tinpan/parton/2/christia.html>; first published in
Industrial Workers of the World, Little Red Songbook, 9th ed. (Joe Hill
Memorial Edition), March 1916.

**64. Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden to Sir George Perley,
Canada's Acting High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, 4 January
1916**

The British government asked its Dominions to contribute to the war effort both in men and financially to the limits of their capacity. In response, the Dominions expected greater consultation and autonomy than had been the case in the past, demands that caused the holding of an Imperial War Conference in London in April 1917 and the creation of an Imperial War Cabinet on which the Dominions were represented. After the war these pressures eventually resulted in the 1930 Statute of Westminster, which gave the British Dominions (Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Ireland) formal independence from the British government and control of their own domestic and foreign policies. Although staunchly pro-Allied, Sir Robert Borden, Canada's wartime prime minister, expressed some of these frustrations in private correspondence to his high commissioner in London and more publicly at the Westminster Imperial Conference of spring 1917. Borden perhaps wrote this letter in the exasperation of the moment, since a few days later he dispatched a cable to Perley instructing him to take no action upon this letter. The concerns, however, remained valid, and he took them up later.

I beg to acknowledge your letter of the 5th November enclosing copy of correspondence with the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies [Bonar Law] touching my message as to information and consultation during the war.

Mr. Bonar Law's letter is not especially illuminating and leaves the matter precisely where it was before my letter was sent.

During the past four months since my return from Great Britain, the Canadian Government (except for an occasional telegram from you or Sir Max Aitken) have had just what information could be gleaned from the daily press and no more. As to consultation, plans of campaign have been made and unmade, measures adopted and apparently abandoned and generally speaking steps of the most important and even vital character have been taken, postponed or rejected without the slightest consultation with the authorities of this Dominion.

It can hardly be expected that we shall put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no more voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy automata. Any person cherishing such an expectation harbours an unfortunate and even dangerous delusion. Is this

war being waged by the United Kingdom alone or is it (1431) a war waged by the whole Empire? If I am correct in supposing that the second hypothesis must be accepted then why do the statesmen of the British Isles arrogate to themselves solely the methods by which it shall be carried on in the various spheres of warlike activity and the steps which shall be taken to assure victory and a lasting peace?

It is for them to suggest the method and not for us. If there is no available method and if we are expected to continue in the role of automata the whole situation must be reconsidered.

Procrastination, indecision, inertia, doubt, hesitation and many other undesirable qualities have made themselves entirely too conspicuous in this war. During my recent visit to England a very prominent Cabinet Minister in speaking of the officers of another Department said that he did not call them traitors but he asserted that they could not have acted differently if they had been traitors. They are still doing duty and five months have elapsed. Another very able Cabinet Minister spoke of the shortage of guns, rifles, munitions, etc., but declared that the chief shortage was of brains.

Source: Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 1, 1909–1918* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1967), 104.

65. The British Military Service Act, 27 January 1916

Although Great Britain initially relied on volunteers and moral suasion to raise its armies, after sixteen months of war such measures no longer sufficed to provide the millions of men that the conflict required. Despite concerns over civil liberties, in January 1916 the British parliament therefore passed legislation making all single men between the ages of 18 and 40 liable for military service. As the war continued and manpower was in ever shorter supply, subsequent acts drastically expanded the catchment.

An Act to Make Provision with Respect to Military Service in Connexion with the Present War

1.—(1) Every male British subject who—

1. (a) on the fifteenth day of August nineteen hundred and fifteen was ordinarily resident in Great Britain, and had attained the age of eighteen years and had not attained the age of forty-one years; and
2. (b) on the second day of November nineteen hundred and fifteen was unmarried or was a widower without any child dependent on him;

shall, unless he is either within the exceptions set out in the First Schedule to this Act, or has attained the age of forty-one years before the appointed date, be deemed as from the appointed date to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's regular forces for general service with the colours or in the reserve for the period of the war, and to have been forthwith transferred to the reserve. . . .

2.—(1) An application may be made at any time before the appointed date to the Local Tribunal established under this Act by or in respect of any man for the issue to him of a certificate of exemption from the provisions of this Act—

1. (a) on the ground that it is expedient in the national interests that he should instead of being employed in military service, be engaged in other work in which he is habitually engaged or in which he wishes to be engaged or, if he is being educated or trained for any work, that he should continue to be so educated or trained; or
2. (b) on the ground that serious hardship would ensue, if the man were called up for army service, owing to his exceptional financial or business obligations or domestic position; or
3. (c) on the grounds of ill-health or infirmity; or
4. (d) on the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service;

and the Local Tribunal, if they consider the grounds of the application established, shall grant such a certificate. . . .

Schedule of Exceptions to Section 1(1)

1. Men ordinarily resident in His Majesty's Dominions abroad, or resident in Great Britain for the purpose only of their education or for some other special purpose.
2. Members of His Majesty's regular or reserve forces, or of the forces raised by the Governments of His Majesty's Dominions, and members of the Territorial Force who are liable for foreign service or who are, in the opinion of the Army Council, not suited for foreign service.
3. Men serving in the Navy, or the Royal Marines, or who, though not serving in the Navy or Royal Marines, are recommended for exception by the Admiralty.
4. Men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious denomination.
5. Men who have left or been discharged from the naval or military service of the Crown in consequence of disablement or ill-health (including officers who have ceased to hold a commission in consequence of disablement or ill-health), and, subject to any provision (1432) which may hereafter be made by Parliament, men who have been discharged from the naval or military service of the Crown on the termination of their period of service.
6. Men who hold a certificate of exemption under this Act for the time being in force (other than a certificate of exemption from combatant service only), or who have offered themselves for enlistment and been rejected since the fourteenth day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen.

Source: U.S. Senate, 65 Cong., 1st Sess., *The Military Service Acts of Great Britain, 1916* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 3–8.

66. Eugene V. Debs, "The Prospect for Peace," American Socialist, 19 February 1916

Like the left in belligerent states, American socialists and others split over the war. Eugene V. Debs, who ran five times as a Socialist presidential candidate, saw little difference between either side in the war and supported the 1915 Zimmerwald Conference's appeal for peace negotiations. He hoped that such a peace would bring about disarmament and that the peoples of conquered territories would be allowed to determine their own form of government.

There is no doubt that the belligerent nations of Europe are all heartily sick of war and that they would all welcome peace even if they could not dictate all its terms.

But it should not be overlooked that this frightful upheaval is but a symptom of the international readjustment which the underlying economic forces are bringing about, as well as the fundamental changes which are being wrought in our industrial and political institutions. Still, every war must end and so must this. The destruction of both life and property has been so appalling during the eighteen months that the war has been waged that we may well conclude that the fury of the conflict is largely spent and that, with bankruptcy and ruin such as the world never beheld staring them in the face, the lords of capitalist misrule are about ready to sue for peace.

From the point of view of the working class, the chief sufferers in this as in every war, the most promising indication of peace is the international conference recently held in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, attended by representatives of all European neutral nations and some of the belligerent powers. This conference, consisting wholly of representatives of the working class issued a ringing manifesto in favor of the international re-organization on a permanent and uncompromising anti-war basis and of putting forth all possible efforts to end the bloody conflict which for a year and a half has shocked Christendom and outraged the civilization of the world.

The manifesto above referred to has been received with enthusiasm by the workers of all of the belligerent nations and the sentiment in favor of its acceptance and of the program of procedure it lays down is spreading rapidly in labor circles in the nations at war as well as in those at peace.

It would no doubt do much to clear the situation and expedite peace overtures if a decisive battle were fought and the indications are that such a battle, or series

of battles, will be fought between now and spring. But the opportune moment for pressing peace negotiations can be determined only by the logic of events and when this comes the people of the United States should be ready to help in every way in their power to terminate this unholy massacre and bring peace to the world.

As to the terms upon which peace is to be restored these will no doubt be determined mainly by the status of the several belligerent powers when the war is ended. A program of disarmament looking to the prevention of another such catastrophe would seem to be suggested by the present heart-breaking situation but as experience has demonstrated that capitalist nations have no honor and that the most solemn treaty is but a “scrap of paper” in their mad rivalry for conquest and plunder, such a program, even if adopted, might prove abortive and barren of results.

The matter of the conquered provinces will no doubt figure largely in the peace negotiations and the only way to settle that in accordance with the higher principles of civilized nations is to allow the people of each province in dispute to decide for themselves by popular vote what nation they desire to be annexed to, or to remain, if they prefer, independent sovereignties.

Permanent peace, however, peace based upon social justice, will never prevail until national industrial despotism has been supplanted by international industrial democracy. The end of profit and plunder among nations will also mean the end of war and the dawning of the era of “Peace on Earth and Good Will among Men.”

Source: Marxists.org Internet Archive,
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/debs/works/1916/peace.htm>.

67. The Gore Resolution: Senate Concurrent Resolution 14, 17 February 1916

By early 1916, a number of prominent U.S. politicians feared that clashes over travel by Americans on belligerent ships (1433) and war trade with the Allies would drag the United States into war. Various congressional resolutions were introduced with the intention of minimizing this risk. Some, including one sponsored by the Texas politicians Senator Thomas P. Gore and Congressman Jeff McLemore, would have banned travel by Americans on belligerent ships. With support from President Woodrow Wilson, in March both Congress and the Senate tabled this resolution, which meant that it would fail to pass.

Whereas a number of leading powers of the world are now engaged in a war of unexampled proportions; and

Whereas the United States is happily at peace with all of the belligerent nations; and

Whereas it is equally the desire and the interest of the American people to remain at peace with all nations; and

Whereas the President has recently afforded fresh and signal proofs of the superiority of diplomacy to butchery as a method of settling international disputes; and

Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent vessels rather than upon unarmed vessels is essential neither to their life, liberty, or safety, nor to the independence, dignity, or security of the United States; and

Whereas Congress alone has been vested with the power to declare war, which involves the obligations to prevent war by all proper means consistent with the honor and vital interest of the Nation:

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should, in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States, forbear to exercise the right to travel as passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel is armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by

the Secretary of State or by anyone acting under him to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power.

Source: U.S. Senate, 64 Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (25 February 1916), 3120.

68. The Battle of Verdun, February—December 1916: General Erich von Falkenhayn, Account of the Beginning of Verdun, February—May 1916

In February 1916 German troops began a major assault on the French stronghold of Verdun, which commands the Meuse River. The campaign, which lasted almost a year, caused a total of 700,000 casualties on a battlefield of less than 10 square kilometers. The assault was launched by General Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff and commander-in-chief, in the hope that this would become the turning point in the war, setting German forces on the road to victory. Working on the assumption that France would never abandon Verdun, he hoped to use superior German firepower and battle tactics to hollow out opposing French forces. According to one eyewitness:

Over the roads leading towards Verdun artillery and ammunition were brought up in such quantities as the history of war has never seen on such a small space. The country was covered with guns. We could hardly believe what we saw round Verdun. Long rows of guns as in old battle pictures, set up in open fields with gunners standing about them, and on the hill-tops observation-posts with their great telescopes uncovered. When I shut my eyes I still see before me those curved lines, row upon row in endless array, with gunners moving about them in the open battlefield.

Although German troops made substantial early gains of ground, within a week their opponents had rallied, and the campaign settled into a lengthy stalemate. Falkenhayn, who lost his position as military chief of staff when the Verdun campaign bogged down, gave his own account, undoubtedly self-justifying, of the early part of the operation, which provides considerable insight into the mind-set of top German military leaders.

For the assault on Verdun the supply of ammunition considerably exceeded the quantity which all previous experience suggested as likely to be needed. Similarly, every demand for labor and equipment was complied with.

In order to divert the attention of the enemy from all these preparations, the other armies in the West were charged with the task of keeping him busy by small enterprises on their sectors. In this they acquitted themselves in exemplary fashion. . . . Everywhere the appointed objectives were reached, and the enemy suffered heavy losses.

The relatively slight German losses sustained on these occasions were justified, for it is highly probable that these operations materially contributed to mask our

plans. In return, it was only in the nature of things that larger operations (1434) other than the main attack already planned should be discountenanced. . . .

On the day appointed for the opening of the attack the condition of the ground in the Meuse district, soaked with continuous rain, prevented any movement of the troops, while the poor visibility in the cloud-laden sky made artillery work impossible. Not till the middle of the month did the weather improve sufficiently to admit of the bombardment starting on the 21st of February.

The successful infantry attack on the following day was carried out with an irresistible impetus, and the enemy's first lines were simply overrun. Nor could the advanced fortifications, constructed in peace, stop the brave attackers, although these works were not much damaged by our artillery. On February 25th the 24th (Brandenburg) Infantry Regiment stormed the Fort Douaumont, the strong and reputedly impregnable north-eastern pillar of the Verdun defence system. Simultaneously the enemy gave way in the Orne valley as far as south of the Metz-Verdun road, so that the German front here also moved forward to the foot of the Heights of the Meuse. From many signs it was clear that this powerful German thrust had not only shaken the whole enemy front in the West very severely, but that its effects had not been lost on the peoples and the Governments of the Entente.

However the Headquarters Staffs of the Army Groups considered it necessary to stay the forward movement against the Heights. Violent—one may say desperate—counter-attacks by troops collected in extreme haste from all parts of the front had begun. They were repulsed everywhere with very heavy loss to the enemy. The situation might have changed, however, had we not brought up our artillery, which had been unable to follow fast enough over the still barely passable roads, and assured the supply of ammunition and food.

Meanwhile the enemy had with astonishing rapidity brought a number of powerful batteries of artillery into position behind the Marre ridge, on the western bank of the river. Their half-flanking effect made itself severely felt on our assault troops. The discomfort caused by these guns had to be stopped. This could not possibly be effected from the right bank of the Meuse, for here we had our hands full in dealing with the enemy forces immediate confronting us. The only means available—as had been foreseen and prepared for—was to push forward the German front on the left bank so far that its artillery could deal with the Franco-British guns on the Marre ridge more effectively than before. We now had troops available to carry out the necessary movement.

Apart from a weak attempt in Champagne, there had been no relief attacks by the enemy in any other sectors, and our observations showed that no preparations for any immediate attack of this sort were in hand. Indeed, it had become highly improbable. The French had nearly got together the whole of their reserves from the rest of their front, and had quickly handed over to the English the sector near Arras, formerly held by them, in order to provide the wherewithal to hold their positions in the Meuse sector. The English had been compelled, by taking over the Arras sector, to extend their line so much, that nothing on a big scale from this direction was to be apprehended. To be sure, the formation of Kitchener's conscript armies in England was proceeding vigorously. Thus it [w]as to be anticipated that the forty to forty-two English divisions, whose presence on the Continent had been established, would be nearly doubled at no very distant date. Whether, and when, these new troops would become fit for use in an offensive was still, however, a matter of uncertainty.

In these circumstances the question that had to be considered by G.H.Q. [Great Headquarters] was whether to intimate that the continuance of the operation on the Meuse would be abandoned, and a new enterprise started on another front. This measure would have meant a complete departure from the views on which the attack north of Verdun was based. Nor was there any reason for doing so. We had hitherto achieved what we had set out to achieve, and there was every reason to hope we should do so again in the future. As a matter of fact, that is what actually happened. No offensive elsewhere had particularly good prospects. The enemy still held their line in great strength. The English, for example, had from seven to eight men every yard of their front. Success was to be gained against positions so strongly held as these only by employing the artillery we had concentrated on the Meuse. Further, it would have meant a great loss of time, and the enemy would assuredly have taken advantage of this to transfer his reserves likewise. It was therefore decided to renounce the idea of changing the scene of operations.

The attack carried out on the 6th of March and in the succeeding weeks on the west bank succeeded to this extent, that the French were thrown out of their foremost lines with heavy casualties every time. Owing to the peculiar conformation of the country we could not use these successes to bring our artillery far enough forward, and consequently the preparatory work here had to be continued. Intense fighting lasted for the whole month of April on the western bank. Not till our occupation of the main portion of Hill 304, on the 7th of May, was there any momentary pause in our attack in this sector. . . .

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As already stated, there had been a temporary cessation of our attack in the western sector; but it must not be assumed from this that things had become absolutely quiet there. Here, as on the eastern bank, the fighting raged continuously and more fiercely than ever. The French saw to that with their practically incessant counter-attacks. The artillery battle never stopped. The raids of the defenders were generally relieved by big thrusts carried out by forces far superior to those of the attackers. For example, a particularly resolute thrust was made on the 22nd and 23rd of May, in the region of Douaumont, and for a time our hold on the armored fort was in danger.

For our part, we usually confined ourselves to sending our opponents home with bloody pates, recovering from him such small patches of ground as we might have gained here and there, and, where necessary, effecting slight improvements in our positions. Nevertheless, this fighting without visible or—for the man at the front—tangible result afforded the sternest test imaginable of the capabilities of the troops. With very few exceptions they stood the test most brilliantly. The enemy nowhere secured any permanent advantages; nowhere could he free himself from the German pressure. On the other hand, the losses he sustained were very severe. They were carefully noted and compared with our own which, unhappily, were not light. The result was that the comparison worked out at something like two and a half to one: that is to say, for two Germans put out of action five Frenchmen had to shed their blood. But deplorable as were the German sacrifices, they were certainly made in a most promising cause.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 4:46–50.

69. The House-Grey Memorandum: Confidential Memorandum of Sir Edward Grey, 22 February 1916

On trips to Europe in autumn 1915 and early 1916, Colonel Edward M. House, President Woodrow Wilson's pro-Allied confidential advisor, met with Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary. Throughout the period of American neutrality, the United States president was eager to mediate a negotiated settlement to the war. Building on this presidential proclivity, House and Grey developed a proposal whereby the United States would call a peace convention and invite Germany to attend; should Germany decline, the United States would enter the war against Germany. Grey wrote the following account for the British cabinet, which ultimately rejected the proposal. It was in any case most unlikely that the United States would, without further strong German provocation, have honored any such agreement. On 6 March, after House had returned to the United States, the president discussed the memorandum with him and weakened its force substantially by inserting the word "probably" before the word "leave." The episode did, however, reveal the staunch pro-Allied outlook of some of Wilson's closest associates.

Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Conference should be summoned to put an end to the war.

Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that, if such a Conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable to the Allies; and, if it failed to secure peace, the United States would leave the Conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable.

Colonel House expressed an opinion decidedly favourable to the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet to the sea, though he thought that the loss of territory incurred by Germany in one place would have to be compensated to her by concessions to her in other places outside Europe.

If the Allies delayed accepting the offer of President Wilson, and if, later on, the course of the war was so unfavourable to them that the intervention of the United States would not be effective, the United States would probably

disinterest themselves in Europe and look to their own protection in their own way.

I said that I felt the statement, coming from the President of the United States, to be a matter of such importance that I must inform the Prime Minister and my colleagues; but that I could say nothing until it had received their consideration.

The British Government could, under no circumstances accept or make any proposal except in consultation and agreement with the Allies . . .

E.G. [Edward Grey]
Foreign Office

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/housegreymemorandum.htm>.

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70. The German Ministry of War, Instruction XXI to the Press, J.-Nr.123/16.IV/M, 25 February 1916

Conscious of the importance of maintaining good relations with the United States, early in 1916 the German Ministry of War issued very detailed and specific instructions to the press as to how to treat German dealings with that country. In particular, the press should neither urge policies nor make statements that the United States might consider provocative or attack President Woodrow Wilson or Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

All reports and discussions referring to our relations with America are to be submitted for examination to the General Command of this district.

There is reason to assume that all controversial questions at present pending between us and America will be settled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. The negotiations carried on to bring this about must not be disturbed by inopportune press discussions. Firm determination is required and everything must be avoided that might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. But the press must not assume a provocative attitude. In discussing the stricter blockade [*Blokadeverschärfung*] planned by England and the so-called "Lansing Demands," the press may touch upon the U-boat question as it had direct bearing on these matters. Stress may be laid on the fact that in the U-boats we possess a very effective weapon and that we shall always be able to make such energetic use of them as circumstances demand. But it is not advisable to make detailed proposals or demands. At the present time, it is not in the German interest to question the conciliatory attitude of the American Government or to accuse it of conscious partisanship in favor of our enemies. By so doing the press would only aid the English effort to induce America to join her side or to use America's help for her own benefit. Personal attacks upon Wilson or Lansing must also be avoided. Political as well as military considerations demand the strictest objectivity in tone and content. Such an attitude is quite in accordance with that proud self-confidence to which we are entitled by our military and naval strength.

These instructions must be strictly obeyed.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, *Fall of the German Empire 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:192–193.

71. Edward T. Devine, "Social Preparedness," The Survey, 18 March 1916

Even if they were opposed to U.S. intervention, many American progressives and liberals hoped that their country would emulate the war-driven social policies of the belligerent nations. Reformers argued that national preparedness for a potential war must encompass a wide array of measures to promote social justice at home. The following article, published in The Survey a year before the United States entered the war, was typical.

The nation is not ready either for war or for the competitions and strains of peace. But how shall we prepare? Precisely by pushing forward with ever-increasing vigor the very measures which are included in the demand for social and industrial justice. They are not unfamiliar subjects of discussion here: infant and child protection, a reduction of the death-rate; a longer and more efficient working life, safety from industrial accidents and occupational disease, provision for the economic burdens of sickness by social insurance or otherwise; rigid food inspection; the segregation and humane care of the mentally defective; prison administration on humane and reformatory lines; town planning and abolition of overcrowding, of dangerous privies and cess pools, of insanitary alleys and dark tenements; constant repressive action against commercialized vice; a campaign against alcoholism; and, above all, educational reform in the light of our new knowledge as to the conditions of successful agriculture, industry and commerce.

The program of social work was formerly timid, apologetic, pretending at best to urge a liberal investment of surplus revenues for its humanitarian ends. We listened respectfully while philanthropists and appropriation committees measured out the doles which they could afford to give away for what they considered luxuries. . . .

The social welfare departments of the modern city or state or nation, and the voluntary agency for the prevention of poverty or disease or crime, can take no such attitude. They are engaged in serious undertakings. They have assumed definite responsibilities. They adopt carefully considered budgets. They require ample resources. Their expenditures are investments. Their returns are in terms of life, vigor, efficiency, power of creation, and capacity for enjoyment.

It is no fanciful analogy that education, hygiene, industrial justice, improved standards of living, belong conspicuously in any program of national preparedness. The national idea is a part of patriotism. The social idea is

another, and equally essential part. The good citizen is one in whose mind the two ideas are joined in an inseparable union.

In America, above all other nations, there is a continuing necessity for this reconciliation of the social and the national ideals. Our distances are great. Our people are of mingled (1437) races, languages and customs. The task of social integration is imperative. To hold up a national idea in terms of salutes to the flag is an empty performance unless it is reinforced by evidence of social ideals cherished by all who own allegiance to the flag. . . .

All Europe has moved strangely nearer to us as we have looked with ever-increasing fascination on her agonizing struggles—not yet knowing whether it may not be literally a death struggle for the life from which our life has been drawn. It will not be so—not for long will the nations hate and kill and destroy what they have built. A better England, a more civilized Germany, a fairer France, a greater Russia, will rise from devastated Europe. Where the boundaries will lie, what political systems will prevail, cannot be told; but humanity itself, enriched by the peculiar gifts of the nations we have known, must survive. It is of deep concern to us that it should be so. . . .

There can be neutrality still, a red-blooded, virile American neutrality, not for commercial profit, nor from craven fear of war, but patriotic, persistently seeking the kindred aspects of each people, remembering our friendships, reasoning patiently if firmly about our wrongs if we have them, yielding no particle of the responsibility which we hold, with other neutrals, in trust for the future of mankind.

In the name of this neutrality, for the sake of humanity itself, we must put our house in order. There is no national policy, worthy the name of America, which does not embrace the most progressive, enlightened, sane, and radical social policy. There is no preparedness worthy of consideration which does not embrace social and industrial justice.

Source: Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., *America at War: A Handbook of Patriotic Education References* (New York: George H. Doran, 1918), 306–307.

72. Beatrice Webb on Pacifism: Diary Entry, 8 April 1916

In spring 1916 the Fabian socialist Beatrice Webb attended a meeting of the No-Conscription Fellowship (NCF) in London, which she later described in her diary. Mrs. Webb was a prowar socialist and a believer in a strong state, attitudes that led her to caustic characterizations of the NCF and to a staunch statement of the antipacifist position.

The Friends Meeting House in Devonshire House Hotel, a large ugly circular hall with a big gallery running round it, was packed with some 2,000 young men—the National Convention of the No-Conscription Fellowship. . . . Among the 2,000 were many diverse types. The intellectual pietist, slender in figure, delicate in feature and complexion, benevolent in expression, was the dominant type. These youths were saliently conscious of their own righteousness. That they are superior alike in heart and intelligence to the “average sensual man” is an undoubted fact: ought one to quarrel with them for being aware of it? And yet the constant expression, in word and manner, of the sentiment avowed by one of them: “We are the people whose eyes are open,” was unpleasing. There were not a few professional rebels, out to smash the Military Service Act, because it was the latest and biggest embodiment of authority hostile to the conduct of their own lives according to their own desires. Here and there were misguided youths who had been swept into the movement because “conscientious objection” had served to excuse their refusal to enlist and possibly might save them from the terrors and discomforts of fighting—pasty-faced furtive boys, who looked dazed at the amount of heroism that was being expected from them. They were obviously scared by the unanimity with which it was decided “to refuse alternative service,” and they will cer[t]ainly take advantage of the resolution declaring that every member of the Fellowship must follow his own conscience in this matter. On the platform were the sympathizers with the movement—exactly the persons you would expect to find at such a meeting, older pacifists and older rebels—Bertrand Russell, Robert Trevelyan, George Lansbury, Olive Schreiner, Lupton, Stephen and Rosa Hobhouse, Dr Clifford, C. H. Norman, Miss Llewelyn Davies and the Snowdens: the pacifist predominating over the rebel element. . . .

The muddled mixture of motives—the claim to be exempt from a given legal obligation, and the use of this privilege as a weapon against the carrying out of the will of the majority—marred the persuasive effect of this demonstration of the No-Conscription Fellowship. The first argument advanced by all the speakers was: “I believe war to be an evil thing: killing our fellow men is expressly forbidden by my religion, and by the religion, the law established, of

my country. Under the Military Service Act *bona fide* conscientious objectors are granted unconditional exemption: I claim this exemption.”

But this plea did not satisfy the militant majority. They declared their intention to defy the Act, so that the Act should become inoperative, even if all the conscientious objectors, on religious grounds, should be relieved from service. They *want* to be martyrs, so as to bring about a revulsion of feeling against any prosecution of the war. They are as hostile to voluntary recruiting as they are to conscription. If the government decided to rely on the recruiting sergeant, they would send a missionary down to oppose him. These men are not so much conscientious objectors as a militant minority of elects, intent on thwarting the will of the majority of ordinary citizens expressed in a national policy.

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Now it seems clear that organized society could not continue to be organized, if every citizen had the right to be a conscientious objector to some part of our social order and insisted that he should be permitted not only to break the law himself but to persuade other citizens to break it. Moreover, when the conscientious objection is to carrying out an unpleasant social obligation like defending your country or paying your taxes, conscience may become the cover for cowardice, greed or any other form of selfishness. Hence the state, in defence, must make the alternative to fulfilling the common obligation sufficiently irksome to test the conscience of the objectors. . . . The social salvation of the twentieth century is not coming by the dissidence of dissent. Democracy means either discipline or anarchy.

Source: Beatrice Webb, *The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Vol. 3, 1905–1924: “The Power to Alter Things,”* Norman and Jean McKenzie, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1984), 252–253. Used by permission, LSE Archives Passfield Papers 1/1/33, 8 April 1916.

73. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to James W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador in Germany, Transmitting the Sussex Note to the German Government, 18 April 1916

By mid-April 1916 the Wilson administration was certain that a German submarine had been responsible for the March attacks upon the Sussex, a British channel steamer, in which several Americans died. Wilson and Lansing drafted an extremely stiff and uncompromising note to the German government demanding that it cease all such attacks on ships carrying American passengers or risk outright war with the United States. In writing this message, the president was apparently torn between his profound wish to avoid war and his strong desire to maintain American rights. On 18 April Lansing cabled this message to Ambassador James W. Gerard in Berlin, with instructions to deliver it immediately to German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow.

Information now in the possession of the Government of the United States established the facts in the case of the *Sussex*, and the inferences which my Government has drawn from that information it regards as confirmed by the circumstances set forth in your excellency's note of the 10th instant. On the 24th of March 1916, at about 2.50 o'clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer *Sussex*, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The *Sussex* had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel; and was not following the route taken by troopships or supply ships. About 80 of her passengers, non-combatants of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were killed or injured.

A careful, detailed, and scrupulous impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the *Sussex* was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. In the view of the Government of the United States these facts from the first made the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a German submarine unavoidable. It now considers that conclusion substantiated by the statements of your excellency's note. A full statement of the facts upon which the Government of the United States has based its conclusions is enclosed.

The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements and proposals contained in that

note is that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the *Sussex*, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the last twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the *Sussex* had been an isolated case, the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had willfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the *Sussex* was manifestly indefensible and caused a terrible loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.

On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German underseas vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding (1439) Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of the waters thus proscribed or to enter them at their peril, the Government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of non-combatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks; and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the United States based that protest, is

not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations.

The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy announced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the commanders of its submarines, and assuring the Government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of non-combatants.

In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation its submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* and mere passenger boats like the *Sussex* have even been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy and the lives of non-combatants, passengers, and crew have been

destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States can not but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has in fact been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll had mounted into the hundreds.

The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as, of course, given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods (1440) of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunity of non-combatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest

reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 232–234.

74. The Sinn Féin Uprising, Easter 1916: Proclamation Issued in Dublin 24 April 1916, Signed by Padraic Pearse and Six Others

With German encouragement, in April 1916 Irish separatists in Dublin rebelled against continuing British rule, a movement triggered in part by the passage of conscription legislation. British troops suppressed the uprising and ruthlessly executed many of the ringleaders. The leaders of the rebellion issued the following proclamation demanding Irish self-government, which the British government effectively granted shortly after the war.

The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the people of Ireland:

Irishmen and Irishwomen, in the name of God and of the dead generations from which you received the old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom, having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organization, the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish citizen army.

Having patiently perfected their discipline and resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and supported by her exiled children in America, and by her gallant allies in Europe, by relying on her own strength, she strikes, in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasible. Long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and Government has not extinguished that right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.

In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty. Six times during the past 300 years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right, and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a sovereign, independent State and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, its welfare, and its exaltation among nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to

pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation, and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences, carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided the minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrage of all her men and women, the Provisional Government hereby constituted will administer the civil and military affairs of the republic, in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonor it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish Nation must, by its valor and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 4:115–116.

(1441)

75. “The Sussex Pledge”: German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow, Note for the U.S. Government, 4 May 1916

Two weeks after receiving the U.S. government's ultimatum on submarine warfare, the German foreign minister handed a reply to Ambassador James W. Gerard. The German government pledged itself to observe the standards of conduct that the Wilson administration had demanded. Ominously, however, Germany sought to make this compliance conditional on the United States prevailing upon the Allies to modify their own practices of maritime warfare to make them acceptable—that is, innocuous—to Germany.

The undersigned, on behalf of the Imperial Government, has the honor to present to his excellency the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. James W. Gerard, the following reply to the note of the April 20 regarding the conduct of German submarine warfare:

The German Government has handed over to the proper naval authorities for further investigation the evidence concerning the *Sussex*, as communicated by the Government of the United States. Judging by results that this investigation has hitherto yielded, the German Government is alive to the possibility that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10 as torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the *Sussex*. The German Government begs to reserve further communications on the matter until certain points are ascertained which are of decisive importance for establishing the facts of the case. Should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to draw the consequences resulting therefrom.

In connection with the case of the *Sussex*, the Government of the United States has made a series of statements, [the] gist of which is the assertion that this incident is to be considered as one instance of the deliberate method of indiscriminate destruction of vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations by German submarine commanders. The German Government must emphatically repudiate this assertion. The German Government, however, thinks it of little avail to enter into details in the present stage of affairs, more particularly as the Government of the United States has omitted to substantiate this assertion by reference to concrete facts. The German Government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon solely in consideration of the interests of neutrals, in spite of the fact

that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies; no such consideration has ever been shown to the neutrals by Great Britain and her allies. . . .

As the German Government has repeatedly declared, it can not dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German Government, however, has now decided to make a further concession in adopting the methods of submarine warfare to the interests of the neutrals; in reaching this decision the German Government has been actuated by considerations which are above the level of the disputed question.

The German Government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the Government of the United States. Again, it fully takes into account that both Governments have for many years cooperated in developing international law in conformity with these principles, the ultimate object of which has been always to confine warfare on sea and on land to the armed forces of the belligerents and to safeguard, as far as possible, non-combatants against the horrors of war.

But, although these considerations are of great weight, they alone would not, under the present circumstances, have determined the attitude of the German Government.

For, in answer to the appeal made by the United States Government on behalf of the sacred principles of humanity and international law, the German Government must repeat once more with all emphasis that it was not the German but the British Government which, ignoring all the accepted rules of international law, has extended this terrible war to the lives and property of non-combatants, having no regard whatever for the interests and rights of the neutrals and non-combatants that through this method of warfare have been severely injured. . . .

The German people knows that the Government of the United States has the power to confine this war to the armed forces of the belligerent countries in the interest of humanity and the maintenance of international law. The Government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist against Great Britain on its incontestable rights to the freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for her existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon, and while making the compliance with these demands a condition for

the maintenance of (1442) relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against the illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people knows to what a considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.

It will therefore be understood that the appeal made by the Government of the United States to the sentiments of humanity and to the principles of international law can not, under the circumstances, meet with the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal is otherwise always certain to find here. If the German Government, nevertheless, has resolved to go to the utmost limit of concessions, it has not alone been guided by the friendship connecting the two great nations for over a hundred years, but it also has thought of the great doom which threatens the entire civilized world should this cruel and sanguinary war be extended and prolonged. . . .

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international war. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.

Accordingly, the German Government is confident that, in consequence of the new orders issued to its naval forces, the Government of the United States will now also consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual cooperation towards the restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July 23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as they are laid down in the notes

presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government on December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. Should the steps taken by the Government not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision. . . .

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 257–260.

76. The Sykes-Picot Agreement: Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15–16 May 1916

As Turkish power crumbled in the Middle East, British and French officials reached a tentative agreement as to how to divide influence within that region between their two nations. On 9 May 1916 Paul Cambon, the French foreign minister, wrote to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey formally proposing a disposition of the Middle East between France and Britain, along lines already agreed by junior French and British diplomats in the area. Sir Edward Grey replied, first briefly, then at greater length.

Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15 May 1916

I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your Excellency could assure me that in those regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become entirely French, or in which French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of navigation or development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions will be maintained.

His Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in regard to the British area.

Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 16 May 1916

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto,

such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve (1443) the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments—

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.
4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.
5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate

in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

6. That in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.
7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Baniyas-Keis Marib-Salkhab Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two Powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States without the previous agreement of His

- Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.
10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third (1444) Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.
 11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.
 12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.

I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged.

I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies.

His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangement now concluded.

Source: *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; Series H: The First World War, 1914–1918*, Vol. 2 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 326–327.

77. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, DC, 27 May 1916

Support for the creation of an international organization to prevent future wars grew dramatically in both Great Britain and the United States after the outbreak of war in August 1914. The most prominent American group was the League to Enforce Peace, created in late 1914, that had won the support of many leading politicians and international lawyers, including former Republican President William Howard Taft and President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard University. In May 1916 President Woodrow Wilson addressed the body, pledging broad American support—albeit in very general terms—for the principle of the creation of “an universal association of the nations.” He did not, however, commit himself to any specific model, neither that suggested by the League to Enforce Peace nor any other.

. . . This great war that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, and which has swept within its flame so great a part of the civilized world, has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects.

With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. But so great a flood, spread far and wide to every quarter of the globe, has of necessity engulfed many a fair province of right that lies very near to us. Our own rights as a nation, the liberties, the privileges, and the property of our people have been profoundly affected. We are not mere disconnected lookers-on. The longer the war lasts, the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again. And when it does come to an end, we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence, give promise of days from which the anxiety of uncertainty shall be lifted, bring some assurance that peace and war shall always hereafter be reckoned part of the common interest of mankind. We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the future, as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war could have come only as it did, suddenly

and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest. It is probable that, if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force. If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been considered worth weighing and regarding.

(1445)

And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals.

We must, indeed, in the very same breath with which we avow this conviction admit that we have ourselves upon occasion in the past been offenders against the law of diplomacy which we thus forecast; but our conviction is not the less clear, but rather the more clear, on that account. If this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesman of the world by a whole age. Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this—that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind. The nations of the

world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other. In order that they may understand each other, it is imperative that they should agree to cooperate in a common cause, and that they should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall be evenhanded and impartial justice.

This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another, arbitrary force must be rejected and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit ourselves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their government to move along these lines: First, such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our

interest is only in peace and its future guarantees. Second, an universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a program. I came only to avow a creed and to give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and cooperation may be near at hand!

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 37, May 9–August 7, 1916* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 113–116.

(1446)

78. King Husayn, Sharif of the Hejaz, Proclamation Published in Mecca, 27 June 1916

In June 1916 the long-contemplated Arab Revolt finally broke out, under the leadership of Sharif Husayn ibn 'Al of Mecca and his three sons. The sharif published a lengthy proclamation, accusing the Ottoman overlords of having jettisoned Islamic principles by installing a secular government in Constantinople. This document was widely circulated around the Arab world.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

This is our general proclamation to all our Moslem brothers. O God, judge between us and our people in truth: Thou art the Judge.

The world knoweth that the first of all Moslem princes and rulers to acknowledge the Turkish Government were the Emirs of Mecca the Blessed. This they did to bind together and make strong the congregation of Islam, as they saw the Sultans of the House of Osman (may the dust of their tombs be blessed, and may they dwell in Paradise), how they were upright, and how they fulfilled all the commandments and ordinances of the faith and of the Prophet (prayers be upon him) perfectly. Therefore they were obedient to them at all times.

For a token of this, remember how in 1327 I, with my Arabs, helped them against the Arabs, to save Ebhah from those who were besieging it, and to preserve the name of the Government in honour; and remember how again in the next year I helped them with my armies, which I entrusted to one of my sons; for indeed we were one with the Government until the Committee of Union and Progress rose up and strengthened itself and laid its hands on power. Consider how since then ruin has overtaken the State, and its possessions have been torn from it, and its place in the world has been lost, until now it has been drawn into this last and most fatal war.

All this they have done, being led away by shameful appetites, which are not for me to set forth, but which are open and a great cause for sorrow to the Moslems of the whole world, who have seen this greatest and most noble Moslem Power broken in pieces and led down to ruin and utter destruction. Our lament is also for so many of its subjects, Moslems and other alike, whose lives have been sacrificed without fault on their part. Some have been treacherously

put to death, others cruelly driven from their homes, as though the calamities of war were not enough. Of these calamities the heaviest share has fallen upon the Holy Land. The poor, and even the families of substance, have been made to sell their doors and windows, yea, even the wooden frames of their houses, for bread, after they had lost their furniture and all their goods.

Not even so was the lust of the Union and Progress fulfilled. They laid bare all the measure of their wicked design and broke the only bond that endured between them and the true followers of Islam. They departed from their obedience to the precepts of the Book.

With the countenance of the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Ulema, the Ministers and the notables, one of their papers called the "Ijtihad" published in Constantinople unworthy things about the Prophet (the Prayer and Peace of God be upon him) and spoke evil of him (God forbid). Then the Union and Progress rejected God's word "A man shall have twice a woman's share" and made them equal. They went further, and removed one of the five corner stones of the faith, even the fast in Ramadan, by causing the soldiers in garrison in Mecca, Medina and Damascus to break their fast for new and foolish reasons, taking no account of the ordinance of God saying: "Those of you who are sick or on a journey. . . ." Yea, they went further. They made weak the person of the Sultan, and robbed from him his honour, forbidding him to choose for himself the chief of his personal cabinet. Other like things they did to sap the foundation of the Khalifate.

For this it had been clearly our part and our necessary duty to separate ourselves from them and renounce them and their obedience. Yet we would not believe their wickedness, and tried to think that they were the imaginings of evildoers to make a division between us and the Government. We bore with them until it was open to all men that the rulers in Turkey were Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha and Talaat Bey, who were doing whatever they pleased. They made their guilt manifest when they wrote to the Judge of the Sacred Court in Mecca, traducing the verses in the Cow, and laying upon him to reject the evidence of believers outside the court, and to consider only the deeds and contracts engrossed within the court. They made manifest their guilt when they hanged in one day twenty-one of the most honourable and enlightened Moslems, among them Emir Omar El Jezairi, Emir Arif El Shehabi, Shefik Bey Moayad, Shukri Bey El Asli, Abdel Wahab, Tewfik El Bassat, Abdel Hamid El Zahrawi, Abdel Gahni El Areisi and their learned companions.

To destroy so many, even of cattle, at one time would be hard for men void of all natural affection or mercy. And, if we suppose they had some excuse for this evil deed, by what right did they carry away to strange countries the innocent and most miserable families of these ill-fated men? Children, old men and delicate women, bereaved of their natural protectors, (1447) were subjected in exile to all foul usage, and even to tortures, as though the woes they had already suffered were not chastisement enough. Did not God say: “No punishment should be inflicted on any one for the sins of another”? Let us suppose they found for themselves some reason for ill-treating the harmless families of their victims. But why did they rob them of their properties and possessions that alone remained to keep them from death by famine? And, if we suppose for this evil deed also an excuse or reason, how shall we find pardon for their shattering the tomb of our most righteous and upright Lord and Brother, El Sayed El Sherif Abd El Kader El Jazairi El Hassani, whose bones they have polluted and whose dust they have scattered abroad?

We leave the judgment of these misdeeds, which we have touched on so briefly, to the world in general and to Moslems in particular. What stronger proof can we desire of the faithlessness of their hearts to the religion and their feelings towards the Arabs than their bombardment of that ancient House, which God had chosen for His House, saying: “Keep My House pure for all who come to it”—a House so venerated by all Moslems? From their fort of Jyad when the revolt began they shelled it. The first shot struck a yard and a half above the Black Stone. The second fell three yards short of it, so that the flame leapt up and took hold upon the Kiswa, which, when they saw, the thousands and thousands of Moslems first raised a lamentable cry, running to and fro, and then shouted in fierce anger, and rushed to save it. They had to burst open the door and mount upon the roof before they could quench the flames. Yet a third shell fell upon the tomb of Abraham, and other shells fell in and about the precincts, which they made a target for their guns, killing every day three or four who were at prayer within the mosque till they prevented the people coming near to worship. This will show how they despised His House and denied it the honour given it by believers.

We leave all this to the Moslem world for judgment.

Yes, we can leave the judgment to the Moslem world, but we may not leave our religion and our existence as a people to be the plaything of the Unionists. God (blessed be He) has made open for us the attainment of freedom and independence, and has shown us a way of victory, to cut off the hand of the oppressors, and to cast out their garrison from our midst. We have attained

independence—an independence of the rest of the Ottoman Empire, which is still groaning under the tyranny of our enemy. Our independence is complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on by any foreign influence or aggression, and our aim is the preservation of Islam, and the uplifting of its standard in the world. We fortify ourselves on the noble religion, which is our only guide and advocate in the principles of administration and of justice. We are ready to accept all things in harness with the faith, and all that leads to the Mountain of Islam, and in particular to uplift the mind and spirit of all classes of the people in so far as we have the strength and ability.

This is what we have done in accordance with the dictates of our religion, and on our part we trust that our brethren in all parts of the world will each do his duty also, as is incumbent upon him, that the bonds of brotherhood in Islam may be confirmed.

We beseech the Lord of Lords for the sake of the Prophet of Him who giveth all things, to grant us prosperity, and to direct us in the right way for the welfare of the faith and of the faithful.

We depend upon God the all-powerful, whose defence is sufficient for us.

Sherif and Emir of Mecca, HUSSEIN.
Shaaban 25, 1334.

Source: *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; Series H: The First World War, 1914–1918*, Vol. 2 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 410–412.

79. Sir Douglas Haig, Second Dispatch on the Somme Campaign of July—November 1916, 23 December 1916

On 1 July 1916 the British launched the Somme offensive, a major counterattack against German forces designed in part to relieve the German pressure on the French at Verdun. On the offensive's first day, the most bloody single day's fighting in history, the British suffered 58,000 casualties, one-third of them killed. The Somme offensive represented the greatest expenditure of artillery and ammunition of the entire war, surpassing even that at Verdun, as the British fired a total of 4 million rounds of ammunition in slightly less than five months, until 18 November. The British and French took approximately 100 square miles of territory from German forces, moving the front forward 12 kilometers, but did not attain their objective of breaking through German lines and ending the war.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations of the Forces under my Command since the 19th May, the date of my last Despatch.

The General Situation towards the End of May

1. The principle of an offensive campaign during the summer of 1916 had already been decided on by all the Allies. The various possible alternatives on the Western front had been (1448) studied and discussed by [French commander] General Joffre and myself, and we were in complete agreement as to the front to be attacked by the combined French and British Armies.

Preparations for our offensive had made considerable progress; but as the date on which the attack should begin was dependent on many doubtful factors, a final decision on that point was deferred until the general situation should become clearer.

Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to the general situation, I desired to postpone my attack as long as possible. The British Armies were growing in numbers and the supply of munitions was steadily increasing.

Moreover a very large proportion of the officers and men under my command were still far from being fully trained, and the longer the attack could be deferred the more efficient they would become. On the other hand the Germans were continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there and on the Italian front, where the Austrian offensive was gaining ground, it was evident

that the strain might become too great to be borne unless timely action were taken to relieve it.

Accordingly, while maintaining constant touch with General Joffre in regard to all these considerations, my preparations were pushed on, and I agreed, with the consent of H.M. Government, that my attack should be launched whenever the general situation required it with as great a force as I might then be able to make available.

2. By the end of May the pressure of the enemy on the Italian front had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian campaign was opened early in June, and the brilliant successes gained by our Allies against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German troops from the Western to the Eastern front.

This, however, did not lessen the pressure on Verdun. The heroic defence of our French Allies had already gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between General Joffre and myself that the combined French and British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June.

The object of that offensive was threefold:

1. i. To relieve the pressure on Verdun.
2. ii. To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the Western front.
3. iii. To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.

3. While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made two unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. . . . Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying the preparations for the major operations which I had in view.

Preparations for the Somme Battle

4. These preparations were necessarily very elaborate and took considerable time.

Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to be accumulated beforehand within a convenient distance of our front. To deal with these many miles of new railways—both standard and narrow gauge—and trench tramways

were laid. All available roads were improved, many others were made, and long causeways were built over marshy valleys.

Many additional dug-outs had to be provided as shelter for the troops, for use as dressing stations for the wounded, and as magazines for storing ammunition, food, water, and engineering material. Scores of miles of deep communication trenches had to be dug, as well as trenches for telephone wires, assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun emplacements and observation posts.

Important mining operations were undertaken, and charges were laid at various points beneath the enemy's lines.

Except in the river valleys, the existing supplies of water were hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the numbers of men and horses to be concentrated in this area as the preparations for our offensive proceeded.

To meet this difficulty many wells and borings were sunk, and over one hundred pumping plants were installed. More than one hundred and twenty miles of water mains were laid, and everything was got ready to ensure an adequate water supply as our troops advanced.

Much of this preparatory work had to be done under very trying conditions, and was liable to constant interruption from the enemy's fire. The weather, on the whole, was bad, and the local accommodation totally insufficient for housing the troops employed, who consequently had to content themselves (1449) with such rough shelter as could be provided in the circumstances.

All this labour, too, had to be carried out in addition to fighting and to the everyday work of maintaining existing defences. It threw a very heavy strain on the troops, which was borne by them with a cheerfulness beyond all praise.

The Enemy's Position

5. The enemy's position to be attacked was of a very formidable character, situated on a high, undulating tract of ground, which rises to more than 500 feet above sea-level, and forms the watershed between the Somme on the one side and the rivers of south-western Belgium on the other.

On the southern face of this watershed, the general trend of which is from east-south-east to west-north-west, the ground falls in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depressions to the valley of the Somme. Well down the forward slopes of this face the enemy's first system of defence, starting from the

Somme near Curlu, ran at first northwards for 3,000 yards, then westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, where it turned nearly due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's line.

Some 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and still running northwards passed over the summit of the watershed, about Hébuterne and Gommecourt, and then down its northern spurs to Arras.

On the 20,000 yards front between the Somme and the Ancre the enemy had a strong second system of defence, sited generally on or near the southern crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an average distance of from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind his first system of trenches.

During nearly two years' preparation he had spared no pains to render these defences impregnable. The first and second systems each consisted of several lines of deep trenches, well provided with bomb-proof shelters and with numerous communication trenches connecting them. The front of the trenches in each system was protected by wire entanglements, many of them in two belts forty yards broad, built of iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire, often almost as thick as a man's finger.

The numerous woods and villages in and between these systems of defence had been turned into veritable fortresses. The deep cellars usually to be found in the villages, and the numerous pits and quarries common to a chalk country, were used to provide cover for machine guns and trench mortars. The existing cellars were supplemented by elaborate dug-outs, sometimes in two storeys, and these were connected up by passages as much as thirty feet below the surface of the ground. The salients in the enemy's line, from which he could bring enfilade fire across his front, were made into self-contained forts, and often protected by mine fields; while strong redoubts and concrete machine gun emplacements had been constructed in positions from which he could sweep his own trenches should these be taken. The ground lent itself to good artillery observation on the enemy's part, and he had skillfully arranged for cross fire by his guns.

These various systems of defence, with the fortified localities and other supporting points between them, were cunningly sited to afford each other mutual assistance and to admit of the utmost possible development of enfilade and flanking fire by machine guns and artillery. They formed, in short, not merely a series of successive lines, but one composite system of enormous depth and strength.

Behind his second system of trenches, in addition to woods, villages and other strong points prepared for defence, the enemy had several other lines already completed; and we had learnt from aeroplane reconnaissance that he was hard at work improving and strengthening these and digging fresh ones between them, and still further back.

In the area above described, between the Somme and the Ancre, our front line trenches ran parallel and close to those of the enemy, but below them. We had good direct observation on his front system of trenches and on the various defences sited on the slopes above us between his first and second systems; but the second system itself, in many places, could not be observed from the ground in our possession, while, except from the air, nothing could be seen of his more distant defences.

North of the Ancre, where the opposing trenches ran transversely across the main ridge, the enemy's defences were equally elaborate and formidable. So far as command of ground was concerned, we were here practically on level terms; but, partly as a result of this, our direct observation over the ground held by the enemy was not so good as it was further south.

On portions of this front the opposing first line trenches were more widely separated from each other; while in the valleys to the north were many hidden gun positions from which the enemy could develop flanking fire on our troops as they advanced across the open.

Arrangement

6. The period of active operations dealt with in this Despatch divides itself roughly into three phases. The first phase (1450) opened with the attack of the 1st July, the success of which evidently came as a surprise to the enemy and caused considerable confusion and disorganization in his ranks.

The advantages gained on that date and developed during the first half of July may be regarded as having been rounded off by the operations of the 14th July and three following days, which gave us possession of the southern crest of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit.

We then entered upon a contest lasting for many weeks, during which the enemy, having found his strongest defences unavailing, and now fully alive to his danger, put forth his utmost efforts to keep his hold on the main ridge.

This stage of the battle constituted a prolonged and severe struggle for mastery between the contending armies, in which, although progress was slow and difficult, the confidence of our troops in their ability to win was never shaken. Their tenacity and determination proved more than equal to their task, and by the first week in September they had established a fighting superiority that has left its mark on the enemy, of which possession of the ridge was merely the visible proof.

The way was then opened for the third phase, in which our advance was pushed down the forward slopes of the ridge and further extended on both flanks, until, from Morval to Thiepval, the whole plateau and a good deal of ground beyond were in our possession. Meanwhile our gallant Allies, in addition to great successes south of the Somme, had pushed their advance, against equally determined opposition and under most difficult tactical conditions, up the long slopes on our immediate right, and were now preparing to drive the enemy from the summit of the narrow and difficult portion of the main ridge which lies between the Combles Valley and the River Tortille, a stream flowing from the north into the Somme just below Peronne.

The Somme Battle—First Phase

The Overrunning of the German Entrenched Positions

7. Defences of the nature described could only be attacked with any prospect of success after careful artillery preparation. It was accordingly decided that our bombardment should begin on the 24th June, and a large force of artillery was brought into action for the purpose.

Artillery bombardments were also carried out daily at different points on the rest of our front, and during the period from the 24th June to 1st July gas was discharged with good effect at more than forty places along our line, upon a frontage which in total amounted to over fifteen miles. Some 70 raids, too, were undertaken by our infantry between Gommecourt and our extreme left north of Ypres during the week preceding the attack, and these kept me well informed as to the enemy's dispositions, besides serving other useful purposes.

On the 25th June the Royal Flying Corps carried out a general attack on the enemy's observation balloons, destroying nine of them, and depriving the enemy for the time being of this form of observation.

The Opening Assault—1 July

8. On July 1st, at 7.30 am, after a final hour of exceptionally violent bombardment, our infantry assault was launched. Simultaneously the French attacked on both sides of the Somme, co-operating closely with us.

The British main front of attack extended from Maricourt on our right, round the salient at Fricourt, to the Ancre in front of St. Pierre Divion. To assist this main attack by holding the enemy's reserves and occupying his artillery, the enemy's trenches north of the Ancre, as far as Serre inclusive, were to be assaulted simultaneously; while further north a subsidiary attack was to be made on both sides of the salient at Gommecourt.

I had entrusted the attack on the front from Maricourt to Serre to the Fourth Army, under the command of General Sir Henry S. Rawlinson, with five Army Corps at his disposal. The subsidiary attack at Gommecourt was carried out by troops from the Third Army commanded by General Sir E. H. H. Allenby.

Just prior to the attack the mines which had been prepared under the enemy's lines were exploded, and smoke was discharged at many places along our front. Through this smoke our infantry advanced to the attack with the utmost steadiness, in spite of the very heavy barrage of the enemy's guns. On our right our troops met with immediate success, and rapid progress was made.

Before midday Montauban had been carried by the 30th Division, and shortly afterwards the Briqueterie to the east, and the whole of the ridge to the west of the village were in our hands (18th Division). Opposite Mametz part of our assembly trenches had been practically levelled by the enemy artillery, making it necessary for our infantry (7th Division) to advance to the attack across 400 yards of open ground.

None the less they forced their way into Mametz, and reached their objective in the valley beyond, first throwing out a defensive flank towards Fricourt on their left. At the same (1451) time the enemy's trenches were entered by the 21st Division north of Fricourt, so that the enemy's garrison in that village was pressed on three sides.

Further north, though the villages of La Boisselle and Ovillers for the time being resisted our attack, our troops (34th and 8th Divisions) drove deeply into the German lines on the flanks of these strongholds, and so paved the way for their capture later. On the spur running south from Thiepval the work known as the

Leipzig Salient was stormed by the 32nd Division, and severe fighting took place for the possession of the village and its defences.

Here and north of the valley of the Ancre as far as Serre on the left flank of our attack, our initial successes were not sustained . . . and, in spite of their gallant efforts, our troops were forced to withdraw during the night to their own lines. . . .

The Attack Continued

9. In view of the general situation at the end of the first day's operations, I decided that the best course was to press forward on a front extending from our junction with the French to a point halfway between La Boisselle and Contalmaison, and to limit the offensive on our left for the present to a slow and methodical advance. North of the Ancre such preparations were to be made as would hold the enemy to his positions, and enable the attack to be resumed there later if desirable.

In order that General Sir Henry Rawlinson might be left free to concentrate his attention on the portion of the front where the attack was to be pushed home, I also decided to place the operations against the front, La Boisselle to Serre, under the command of General Sir Hubert de la P. Gough, to whom I accordingly allotted the two northern corps of Sir Henry Rawlinson's Army.

My instructions to Sir Hubert Gough were that his Army was to maintain a steady pressure on the front from La Boisselle to the Serre Road, and to act as a pivot on which our line could swing as our attacks on his right made progress towards the north.

10. During the succeeding days the attack was continued on these lines. . . .

To sum up the results of the fighting of these five days, on a front of over six miles, from the Briqueterie to La Boisselle, our troops had swept over the whole of the enemy's first and strongest system of defence, which he had done his utmost to render impregnable. They had driven him back over a distance of more than a mile, and had carried four elaborately fortified villages.

The number of prisoners passed back to the Corps cages at the close of the 5th July had already reached the total of ninety-four officers and 5,724 other ranks. . . .

General Review

Our Main Objects Achieved

38. The three main objects with which we had commenced our offensive in July had already been achieved at the date when this account closes [November 1916]; in spite of the fact that the heavy autumn rains had prevented full advantage being taken of the favourable situation created by our advance, at a time when we had good grounds for hoping to achieve yet more important successes.

Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces had been held on the Western front; and the enemy's strength had been very considerably worn down.

Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme battle. The attainment of all three of them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of our troops and for the sacrifices made by ourselves and our Allies. They have brought us a long step forward towards the final victory of the Allied cause.

The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had invested that place with a moral and political importance out of all proportion to its military value. Its fall would undoubtedly have been proclaimed as a great victory for our enemies, and would have shaken the faith of many in our ultimate success.

The failure of the enemy to capture it, despite great efforts and very heavy losses, was a severe blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he had openly expressed as to the results of the struggle.

Information obtained both during the progress of the Somme battle and since the suspension of active operations has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the enemy's main forces tied to the Western front. A movement of German troops eastward, which had commenced in June as a result of the Russian successes, continued for a short time only after the opening of the Allied attack.

Thereafter the enemy forces that moved East consisted, with one exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme battle, and these troops were always replaced on the Western front by fresh divisions. In November the strength of the enemy in the Western theatre of war was greater than in July, notwithstanding the abandonment of his offensive at Verdun.

(1452)

It is possible that if Verdun had fallen large forces might still have been employed in an endeavour further to exploit that success. It is, however, far more probable, in view of developments in the Eastern theatre, that a considerable transfer of troops in that direction would have followed. It is therefore justifiable to conclude that the Somme offensive not only relieved Verdun, but held large forces which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the East.

The third great object of the Allied operations on the Somme was the wearing down of the enemy's powers of resistance. Any statement of the extent to which this has been attained must depend in some degree on estimates. There is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to place it beyond doubt that the enemy's losses in men and material have been very considerably higher than those of the Allies, while morally the balance of advantage on our side is still greater.

During the period under review a steady deterioration took place in the moral[e] of large numbers of the enemy's troops. Many of them, it is true, fought with the greatest determination, even in the latest encounters, but the resistance of still larger numbers became latterly decidedly feebler than it had been in the earlier stages of the battle.

Aided by the great depth of his defences, and by the frequent reliefs which his resources in men enabled him to effect, discipline and training held the machine together sufficiently to enable the enemy to rally and reorganise his troops after each fresh defeat.

As our advance progressed, four-fifths of the total number of divisions engaged on the Western front were thrown one after another into the Somme battle, some of them twice, and some three times; and towards the end of the operations, when the weather unfortunately broke, there can be no doubt that his power of resistance had been very seriously diminished.

The total number of prisoners taken by us in the Somme battle between the 1st July and the 18th November is just over 38,000, including over 800 officers. During the same period we captured 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns and field howitzers, 136 trench mortars, and 54 machine guns.

Our Troops

So far as these results are due to the action of the British forces, they have been attained by troops the vast majority of whom had been raised and trained during the war. Many of them, especially amongst the drafts sent to replace wastage, counted their service by months, and gained in the Somme battle their first experience of war. The conditions under which we entered the war had made this unavoidable.

We were compelled either to use hastily trained and inexperienced officers and men, or else to defer the offensive until we had trained them. In this latter case we should have failed our Allies. That these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions, and against an Army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years has been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history of our nation records no equal.

The difficulties and hardships cheerfully overcome, and the endurance, determination and invincible courage shown in meeting them, can hardly be imagined by those who have not had personal experience of the battle, even though they have themselves seen something of war. . . .

The style of warfare in which we have been engaged offered no scope for cavalry action, with the exception of the one instance already mentioned in which a small body of cavalry gave useful assistance in the advance on High Wood.

Intimately associated with the artillery and infantry in attack and defence, the work of various special services contributed much towards the successes gained.

Trench mortars, both heavy and light, have become an important adjunct to artillery in trench warfare, and valuable work has been done by the personnel in charge of these weapons. Considerable experience has been gained in their use, and they are likely to be employed even more frequently in the struggle in future.

Machine guns play a great part—almost a decisive part under some conditions—in modern war, and our Machine Gun Corps has attained to considerable proficiency in their use, handling them with great boldness and skill. The highest value of these weapons is displayed on the defensive rather than in the offensive, and we were attacking.

Nevertheless, in attack also machine guns can exercise very great influence in the hands of men with a quick eye for opportunity and capable of a bold initiative. The Machine Gun Corps, though comparatively recently formed, has done very valuable work and will increase in importance.

The part played by the new armoured cars known as "tanks" in some of the later fights has been brought to notice by me already in my daily reports. These cars proved of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour.

The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us, not only to discover ways (1453) to protect our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success with which these new arms have been developed and perfected, and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed in a difficult and dangerous service.

The Army owes its thanks to the chemists, physiologists and physicists of the highest rank who devoted their energies to enabling us to surpass the enemy in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world by surprise. Our own experience of the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used, of the great preparations which had to be made for their manufacture, and of the special training required for the personnel employed, shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately.

Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective. . . .

The great strain of the five months' battle was met with equal success by the Army Service Corps and the Ordnance Corps, as well as by all the other Administrative Services and Departments, both on the Lines of Communication and in front of them. The maintenance of large armies in a great battle under modern conditions is a colossal task.

Though bad weather often added very considerably to the difficulties of transport, the troops never wanted for food, ammunition, or any of the other many and varied requirements for the supply of which these Services and Departments are responsible. . . .

I also desire to record the obligation of the Army in the Field to the various authorities at home, and to the workers under them women as well as men by whose efforts and self-sacrifice all our requirements were met. Without the vast quantities of munitions and stores of all sorts provided, and without the drafts of men sent to replace wastage, the efforts of our troops could not have been maintained. . . .

Future Prospects

In conclusion, I desire to add a few words as to future prospects.

The enemy's power has not yet been broken, nor is it yet possible to form an estimate of the time the war may last before the objects for which the Allies are fighting have been attained. But the Somme battle has placed beyond doubt the ability of the Allies to gain those objects.

The German Army is the mainstay of the Central Powers, and a full half of that Army, despite all the advantages of the defensive, supported by the strongest fortifications, suffered defeat on the Somme this year. Neither the victors nor the vanquished will forget this; and, though bad weather has given the enemy a respite, there will undoubtedly be many thousands in his ranks who will begin the new campaign with little confidence in their ability to resist our assaults or to overcome our defence.

Our new Armies entered the battle with the determination to win and with confidence in their power to do so. They have proved to themselves, to the enemy, and to the world that this confidence was justified, and in the fierce struggle they have been through they have learned many valuable lessons which will help them in the future.

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/haigsommedespatch.htm>.

80. The War Spirit: Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador in London, to President Woodrow Wilson, 21 July 1916

Writing to President Woodrow Wilson in summer 1916, the U.S. ambassador in London gave a vivid picture of the manner in which the war had become all-consuming. By this time, almost two years into the war, much the same was probably true of the other belligerents.

The general belief here [in London] is, in and out of military circles, that the war has entered upon its last phase; that the end may be yet a long way off; but that there will be no “draw,” but a decisive victory for the Allies—not a crushing defeat (responsible men do not wish to humiliate the German people) but a real defeat of their military machine and party. How true a prophecy this is, it wd. be a waste of time to conjecture. But this is now the prevailing English mood, and this mood directly affects their spirit and their actions, military and political. They fear and expect set-backs, perhaps serious set-backs, but temporary. The Western Allies now have, they think, men and guns and munitions enough to break the Germans down; and they reckon also on the continued demoralizing effect of their economic pressure.

The getting of incalculable munitions, conscription, the French tenacity at Verdun, the initial success of the French and English offensive, the onrush of the Russians, the practical (1454) certainty that the German fleet will not risk another battle, the increasing underground rumbling of discontent in Germany—these and many lesser events of similar import have moved the English spirit to its present height of endeavor; they are “awake” at last. This awakened and expectant public opinion now rules this Kingdom. The Government is its pliant tool. I have never before seen anything so swift and determined as this public opinion; and you can hardly imagine anything more obedient than the Government. . . .

The truth is, the mind of this nation now takes in only one subject. Everybody thinks about that and works towards that—in his or her own way—all the time; and that is how to win the war. Nothing else concerns them. All other things seem of so little consequence in comparison, that most other things have to wait. If you picture to yourself the feeling in Washington while the battle of Gettysburg was going on, you will have something like a parallel. That battle lasted two (?) three days. The battle in France goes on, far more fiercely, month after month. Day after day the London papers will contain less than twenty lines of despatches from the U.S. and these have some direct bearing on the war, e.g. the despatches about the Deutschland. The same is true of other

neutral countries. It is a time of but one subject for this half of the world. You can not imagine the depressing monotony of this. Every American who comes here straight from home remarks after a week or less, "I didn't know it was this way. It seemed very different in the U.S."

When I went to a camp where there are 3,000 interned (civilian) Germans a few weeks ago and for nearly the whole afternoon heard the complaints of their committees, one doctor struck an original note. "Sir," said he in his most earnest address to me, "The solemn truth is we are all on the road to the mad house. We've been here—most of us—for nearly two years. We seem—or may seem to you—to have room enough; we have these grounds to walk and sit in; we do have enough air and space; but I assure you, sir, the monotony of this life is driving us to insanity. There are three men in the hospital now whose brains have gone wrong. I am a physician, and I assure you we will all be mad if we have to stay here much longer." I felt a strong impulse to applaud and to say that he wouldn't find it essentially different outside.

The English are now doing heavy fighting. My mail is loaded down with letters imploring me to inquire whether this and that "missing" man may be a prisoner in Germany. It takes one man all his time to answer these letters now. My calling hours are taken up with men and women who come to make such requests orally. Sometimes they come to my house before breakfast. Yet not one of them complains or breaks down. They, too, are determined to win the war. But it's war, war, war all the time. It seems ages since July 1914 when one read and talked and heard other subjects. The people you dine with have their houses piled with parcels that they are sending soldiers or prisoners, or with bandages and other hospital supplies. Of three boys that I had in succession as servants, one is in a German prison-camp, another in a hospital in England recovering from wounds, and the third is in the trenches in France. I think I wrote you that a little while before the war began my daughter gave a party one night to which she invited the 20 young Englishmen that she knew and liked best—fine young fellows, many of them heirs to fortunes and titles; and a little while ago I happened to find a list of her guests that night. Twelve out of the twenty (perhaps more but twelve I knew) had already been killed in the war. The interned German doctor, I have no doubt, told the truth; and we are all on the road that wd. at last lead to bedlam.

Yet, strange as this paradox is, people are very cheerful. War has come to be the normal state of life: it is not only taken for granted—it gives these people activity that brings in some a sort of exaltation, in many more a form of milder excitement. But the point I had chiefly in mind is the impossibility of inducing

anybody to think or talk about anything else or to consider or to do anything that doesn't seem immediately to help to win it. We are living almost within the sound of the guns of a continuous Gettysburg. I am told that people at certain places on the East coast of England hear the guns distinctly except when the wind is against the sound; and whole trains of wounded and of prisoners are constantly arriving. There is a hospital just through the wall from where I write and another two doors from the building where our offices are. These instances are typical of most of the residential neighbourhoods—A continuous Gettysburg; a tyrannical public opinion; a universal concentration on one subject; an obedient Government—to public opinion; a depressing monotony of subject and talk and work, relieved by the exaltation born of a belief in victory—this is the atmosphere we now live in. In the course of time—a long time, I hope—we'll all be on the way to the madhouse.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 37, May 9–August 7, 1916* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 456–462.

81. Romania Joins the Allies: The Treaty of Bucharest and Associated Military Convention, 4 [17] August 1916

After two years of wavering and indecision, in August 1916 Romania decided to throw in its lot with the Allies. Under the Treaty of Bucharest, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, Romania's new partners, promised it substantial gains at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the only one of the Central Powers (1455) on which, later that month, Romania troubled to declare war. It was stipulated that the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest and the associated military convention should remain secret until the end of the war.

Art. I. France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia guarantee the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Roumania in the total extent of its present boundaries.

II. Roumania binds herself to declare war and to attack Austria-Hungary in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the Military Agreement; Roumania promises also to discontinue all economic relations and commercial exchanges with the enemies of the Allies, as soon as she declares war.

III. France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia acknowledge Roumania's right to annex the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy stipulated and set by Article IV.

IV. The limits of the territories mentioned in the preceding article are set as follows:

The line of delimitation will start on the Pruth at a point of the present frontier between Roumania and Russia near Novosulitza and will ascend this river as far as the frontier of Galicia at the confluence of the Pruth and the Ceremos. After that it will follow the frontier of Galicia and Bucovina, and that of Galicia and Hungary, up to the point Steag (hill 1655). From that point it will follow the line of separation of the waters of the Theiss and the Viso until it reaches the Theiss at the village of Trebuza up-stream from the spot where it unites with the Viso. Starting from that point it will go down along the thalweg of the Theiss to a distance of 4 kilometres down-stream from its confluence with the Szamos, leaving the villages of Gasrares-Nemény to a point 6 km. east of the town of Debreczin. From that point it will reach the Crish (Körös) 3 km. down-stream from the union of its two affluents (the White Crish and the Swift Crish). It will then join the Theiss on a line with the village of Algyö, north of Szegedin, passing to the west of the villages of Croshaza and Bekessamson; 3 km. from the latter it will make a slight curve. From Algyö the line will

descend the thalweg of the Theiss down to its confluence with the Danube, and will finally follow the thalweg of the Danube down to the present frontier of Roumania.

Roumania binds herself not to erect fortifications opposite Belgrade in a zone to be later delimited, and to keep in that zone only the forces necessary for police service.

The Royal Roumanian Government binds itself to indemnify the Serbs of the region of the Banat who might want to abandon their properties and emigrate within a space of two years from the conclusion of peace.

V. Roumania on the one hand, and France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia on the other promise not to conclude a separate peace or general peace except conjointly and simultaneously. France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia bind themselves as well that at the Peace Treaty the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy stipulated in Art. IV shall be annexed to the Crown of Roumania.

VI. Roumania shall enjoy the same rights as the Allies in all that concerns the preliminaries of the peace negotiations, as well as the discussion of the questions which will be submitted to the decision of the Peace Conference.

VII. The contracting Powers bind themselves to keep the present convention secret until the conclusion of the general peace.

Military Convention between Roumania, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, 4 August 1916

Art. I. Following the Treaty of Alliance concluded on the 4/17 August 1916, between France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Roumania, Roumania binds herself by mobilizing all her forces on land and sea, to attack Austria-Hungary at the latest on Aug. 15/28, 1916 (eight days after the offensive of Saloniki). The offensive operations of the Roumanian Army will begin on the day of the declaration of war.

II. As soon as the present agreement is signed, and during the mobilization and concentration of the Roumanian Army, the Russian Army undertakes to act in a specially energetic way along the whole Austrian front so as to ensure the above-mentioned Roumanian operations. This action will be especially offensive and energetic in the Bucovina, where the Russian troops will have at any rate to maintain their present positions and effectives.

Beginning with the 12/25 August, 1916, the Russian fleet will have to ensure the security of the port of Constantza, prevent the disembarkation of enemy troops on the Roumanian coast, and any incursion on the Danube up-stream from the mouths of this stream.

On her part Roumania will acknowledge the right of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to utilize the port of Constantza and take the necessary measures against the enemies' submarine fleet.

The Russian warships which will use the Danube for protecting the banks as well as for giving aid to the Roumanian Army and Fleet, will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Armies, and will co-operate on that (1456) stream with the squadron of Russian monitors. The details of this cooperation will be settled according to the articles of the present Agreement.

III. Russia binds herself at the moment of the mobilization of the Roumanian Army, to send into the Dobrudja two infantry divisions and one cavalry division to cooperate with the Roumanian Army against the Bulgarian Army.

The Allies bind themselves to precede by at least a week the entry of Roumania into the war by a determined offensive of the Armies at Saloniki, in order to facilitate the mobilization and concentration of all the Roumanian military forces. This offensive will begin on the 7/20 August, 1916.

If, during the military operations, the Allied Powers, after an agreement between the respective General Staffs, should be induced to increase their military forces cooperating with the Roumanian Army, this increase of forces will not modify in anything the stipulations of the concluded agreements.

IV. France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia undertake to furnish to Roumania munitions and war material which will be transported by Roumanian or Allied vessels and transited through Russia.

These deliveries and transports are to be executed so as to assure the arrival in Roumania as continuously as possible of a minimum of 300 tons per diem, calculated at one month of transport.

Should the Allies have at their disposal new ways of access facilitating the transit of ammunition, Roumania may have the benefit of them.

V. The Allies undertake the engagement as well of furnishing to Roumania, within the limits of possibility, the horses, tires, medicaments, articles of subsistence and equipment which she may ask for in the quantities and categories which shall be fixed by mutual agreement.

VI. The Allies will put at Roumania's disposal the technical personnel necessary for the manufacture in that country of ammunition and war material.

VII. As soon as the present agreement is concluded, the General Staffs of the Russo-Roumanian Armies, as well as the General Staffs of the Armies of Saloniki, will come to an agreement for determining the exact form of their cooperation.

The accord during military operations of the Russo-Roumanian Armies or any change, elucidation and supplement with a view to establishing a permanent liaison, will be settled at respective Headquarters, as stated lower down.

VIII. The cooperation of the Allied Armies does not imply the subordination of one of the contracting parties to the other, it implies only the free acceptance of the dispositions or modifications due to the general situation, to the necessities of the object aimed at, and to brotherhood in arms. . . .

X. In principle, the armies of the one contracting party may not enter the national territory or occupied territory of the other, except if the general interest and the common object should demand it, and only with a written preliminary agreement in each particular instance. . . .

Source: Charles Upson Clark, *Greater Roumania* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1922), 171–177.

82. John Maynard Keynes, “The Financial Dependence of the United Kingdom on the United States of America,” 10 October 1916

By late 1916, 40 percent of British war expenditures were made in North America, in either Canada or the United States. Large portions of these purchases were funded by loans or credits from private American sources, either banks or individuals, and the continuance of such finance depended on the benign acquiescence of the U.S. government. In autumn 1916 Anglo-American tensions rose, due in part to the British practices of blacklisting American firms that dealt with Germany, of censoring all cable traffic between the United States and Europe, and of intercepting American cargoes bound for Germany in defiance of the blockade zone Britain had declared around the continent. As the U.S. Congress threatened retaliatory measures, the British Foreign Office summoned an interdepartmental committee to determine just “how far this country is dependent commercially and financially on the United States and to what extent measures of reprisal by the United States could effectively be met by commercial or other forms of retaliation.” The brilliant young economist John Maynard Keynes, who represented the British Treasury on this committee, made the following statement to the committee, unambivalently stressing Britain’s extreme financial dependence upon the United States.

Of the £5 million which the Treasury have to find daily for the prosecution of the war, about £2 million has to be found in North America.

There is no prospect of any sensible diminution in this amount without a radical change in the policy and activities of the war departments both of this country and of the other allies.

(1457)

During recent months about three-fifths of the sums required have been obtained by the sale of gold and securities, and about two-fifths by loans. The former resources are nearly independent of any action that the American execution is able to take, except that the Assay Office could put practicable difficulties in the way of the sale of gold at a sufficient rate. But the extent to which such resources can be used in the future will be greatly inferior to what it has been recently, and they cannot be relied on to supply more than one-fifth of the total requirements during the next six months.

Thus to the extent of four-fifths of their needs the allied powers must depend upon the issue of public loans. A statement from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility and thus lead to a situation of the utmost gravity.

It is not necessary, however, that matters should go so far as an overt act of the executive, in order that the financial arrangements of the allies should be prejudiced. Any feeling of irritation or lack of sympathy with this country or with its policy in the minds of the American public (and equally any lack of confidence in the military situation as interpreted by this public) would render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to carry through financial operations on a scale adequate to our needs. The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six or nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the entire national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more nearly than them.

It is, therefore, the view of the Treasury, having regard to their special responsibilities, that the policy of this country towards the U.S.A. should be so directed as not only to avoid any form of reprisal or active irritation but also to conciliate and to please.

Source: John Maynard Keynes, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 1971, Macmillan: St. Martin's Press, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

83. British Appeals to Control Venereal Disease: Women Social Workers' Appeal, *The Times*, 23 October 1916

The conditions of war, with millions of men away from families, facing the prospect of death, and turning to prostitutes for consolation, were highly conducive to the spread of venereal disease. In late 1916 leading British newspapers covered the subject in some depth, with women appealing for the protection not only of soldiers but also of those women at home whom they might contaminate.

Having knowledge of the terrible ravages venereal disease is making, we feel it our duty, as women, and on behalf of the present and future generations of the Empire, to urge that speedy steps be taken to assure more effective action now, although fully realizing the excellent work the Commission is doing as regards educating the public, and pressing forward provision for free treatment for the sufferers.

We wish specially to plead the extreme urgency of the question owing to the number of men passing through England. The Commissioners report that these diseases produce blindness, deafness, insanity, feeble mind, sterility in women, many forms of nervous diseases, and skin and bone diseases. Sir William Osler holds that of killing diseases they come third or fourth. . . .

The disease is certainly spreading, and that is why we suggest that something should be done immediately. Soldiers' mothers write that they have given their sons willingly to die for the Empire, but not like this. It seems almost incredible that men and women, known to be infectious, should be at liberty to spread the contagion when and where they will. Yet so it is. In many cases, even warnings are libellous before the law. It cannot be generally known that the disease is now very largely spread by girls of between 15 and 18 years of age. Can we wait while these girls of between 15 and 18 years of age, caught perhaps innocently, or in a moment of madness, become the mothers of the future generation, and give birth to children more miserable than themselves?

The proposed remedy for this state of things is the education of the public by lectures and by private admonition, but will you by these means get hold of one per thousand of the public you desire to educate? Will they come to the lectures? Who will be able to admonish the larger part of them? How can we wait to educate the young men and girls who are already infected? Who will educate the prostitutes, especially the foreign ones, who do not understand our

language? Only through legislation can the whole community be really educated and imbued with a full sense of responsibility towards the race.

The obvious remedies for every contagious disease are notification and compulsory treatment, and other dangerous and contagious diseases are thus treated.

The evidence is so strong under our personal observation that we believe when the general public becomes alive to the grave dangers arising, notification of all infected persons will be (1458) demanded, as the Commission states. Time is short, and that demand should be made now, or it will be too late.

Source: Joyce Marlow, ed., *The Virago Book of Women and the Great War* (London: Virago Press, 1998), 209–212.

84. The Federal Reserve Board Restricts Foreign Borrowing in the United States, 26–27 November 1916

Shortly after President Woodrow Wilson's reelection in November 1916 after a campaign in which he emphasized his past success in avoiding war and implicitly promised to continue such policies, the Federal Reserve Board decided after fierce debate to issue a statement warning Americans against lending further money to any of the belligerent nations. Since the Allies raised by far the great majority of such loans, this action was liable to affect them disproportionately. Federal Reserve Board chairman W. P. G. Harding sent the draft statement to Wilson, who not only approved but strengthened it in the hope that financial difficulties would pressure the Allies to acquiesce in the peace effort he planned to launch in the following weeks. After the Federal Reserve Board announcement in late November 1916 that American investors should be wary of further loans to belligerents, the British found it almost impossible to raise further funds in the United States, and the pound sterling came under heavy pressure. The U.S. Treasury insisted on supporting the pound, but the effort almost exhausted existing British reserves before the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 led to a relaxation of American credit.

Woodrow Wilson to William Procter Gould Harding, 26 November 1916

I am taking the liberty of using my own pen (for so I regard this typewriter) to make reply to the question you put to me yesterday about the enclosed statement.

I like it. I am glad that the Board has determined that it is its duty to make it. Such advice to the banks seems to me very timely and indeed very necessary. My only suggestion is that the statement be made a little stronger and more pointed and be made to carry rather explicit advice against these investments, as against the whole policy and purpose of the Federal Reserve Act, rather than convey a mere caution. The securities spoken of, though nominally liquid, will in the event, I should say, certainly not be so, and our domestic transactions might be seriously embarrassed and impeded should the national banks tie up their resources in them.

Thank you very much for consulting me on this extremely important matter, which might at any time be radically affected by a change in the foreign policy of our government.

Wilson's Redraft of Enclosed Statement by the Federal Reserve Board, 27 November 1916

The Federal Reserve Board today made public the following statement relating to foreign credits, which is to appear in the next issue of the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*:

In view of the contradictory reports which have appeared in the press regarding its attitude toward the purchasing by banks in this country of Treasury bills of foreign governments, the Board deems it a duty to define its position clearly. In making this statement the Board desires to disclaim any intention of discussing the finances or of reflecting upon the financial stability of any nation, but wishes it understood that it seeks to deal only with general principles which affect all alike.

. . . [T]he Board feels that member banks should pursue a policy of keeping themselves liquid; of not loaning down to the legal limit, but of maintaining an excess of reserves—not with reserve agents, where their balances are loaned out and constitute no actual reserve, but in their own vaults or preferably with their Federal Reserve Banks. The Board believes that at this time banks should proceed with much caution in locking up their funds in long-term obligations or in investments, which are short term in form but which, either by contract or through force of circumstances, may in the aggregate have to be renewed until normal conditions return. The Board does not undertake to forecast probabilities or to specify circumstances which may become important factors in determining future conditions. Its concern and responsibility lie primarily with the banking situation. If, however, our banking institutions have to intervene because foreign securities are offered faster than they can be absorbed by investors—that is, their depositors—an element would be introduced into the situation which, if not kept under control, would tend toward instability, and ultimate injury to the economic development of the country. The natural absorbing power of the investment market supplies an important regulator of the volume of our sales to foreign countries in excess of the goods that they send us. The form which the most recent borrowing is taking, apart from reference to its intrinsic merits, makes it appear particularly attractive as a banking investment. The Board, as a matter of fact, understands that it is expected to place it primarily with banks. In fact it would appear so attractive that unless a broader and national point of view be adopted, individual banks might easily be tempted to invest in it to such an extent that the banking resources of this country employed in this manner might run into many hundreds of millions of dollars. While the loans may be short in form,

and severally may be collected at maturity, the object of the borrower must be to attempt to renew (1459) them collectively, with the result that the aggregate amount placed here will remain until such time as it may be advantageously converted into a long-term obligation. It would, therefore, seem as a consequence that liquid funds of our banks, which should be available for short-credit facilities to our merchants, manufacturers and farmers, would be exposed to the danger of being absorbed for other purposes to a disproportionate degree, especially in view of the fact that many of our banks and trust companies are already carrying substantial amounts of foreign obligations, and of acceptances which they are under agreement to renew. The Board deems it therefore its duty to caution the member banks that it does not regard it in the interest of the country at this time that they invest in foreign Treasury bills of this character.

The Board does not consider that it is called upon to advise private investors but as the United States is fast becoming the banker of foreign countries in all parts of the world, it takes occasion to suggest that the investor should receive full and authoritative data—particularly in the case of unsecured loans—in order that he may judge the future intelligently in the light of present conditions and in conjunction with the economic developments of the past.

The United States has now attained a position of wealth and of international financial power, which, in the natural course of events, it could not have reached for a generation. We must be careful not to impair this position of strength and independence. While it is true that a slowing down in the process of credit extension may mean some curtailment of our abnormally stimulated export trade to certain countries we need not fear that our business will fall off precipitately should we become more conservative in the manner of investing in loans, because there are still hundreds of millions of our own and foreign securities held abroad which our investors would be glad to take over, and moreover trade can be stimulated in other directions.

In the opinion of the Board, it is the duty of our banks to remain liquid in order that they may be able to continue to respond to our home requirements, the nature and scope of which none can foresee, and in order that our present economic and financial strength may be maintained when, at the end of the war we shall wish to do our full share in the work of international reconstruction and development which will then lie ahead of us, and when a clearer understanding of economic conditions as they will then exist, will enable this country more safely and intelligently to do its proper part in the financial rehabilitation of the world.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 40, November 20, 1916–January 23, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 77–80.

85. The German Civilian Service Bill, 5 December 1916

By late 1916 Germany faced a manpower crisis as the demands of the army for more troops after the major depletions of the Verdun and Somme campaigns clashed with those of agriculture and industry. The kaiser demanded a Civilian Service Bill, which gave the government wide powers to redeploy any German man between the ages of 17 and 60 to employment considered of national value. The legislation exemplified the degree to which the demands of total war came to dominate the entire economies of the European belligerents. It also strengthened the rights of labor against employers.

We, Wilhelm, by the Grace of God, German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc., decree in the name of the Reich, with the consent of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, as follows:

I. Every male German between the ages of 17 and 60 who is not serving in the army is bound to render patriotic auxiliary service [*vaterländischer Hilfsdienst*] for the period of the war.

II. All persons will be considered to be rendering patriotic auxiliary service who are employed in Government Offices, in official institutions, in war industry, in agriculture and forestry, in caring for the sick, in war economic organizations of any kind, or in other occupations and trades which directly or indirectly are important for war administration or national supplies, so far as the number of these persons does not exceed the need.

Those who before August 1, 1916, were engaged in agriculture or forestry need not be taken from this occupation to be transferred to another form of patriotic service.

III. The administration of the patriotic auxiliary service will be carried on by a War Department established by the Prussian War Ministry.

IV. The question whether and to what extent the number of persons employed in a Government office exceeds the need will be decided by the Reichs- or Landeszentralbehörde in agreement with the War Department. The question what is to be regarded as an official institution as well as whether and to what extent the number of persons employed by such exceeds the need, will be decided by the War Department in agreement with the Reichs- or Landeszentralbehörde.

For the rest, the question whether an occupation or trade is important in the meaning of Section II, as well as whether and to what extent the number of persons engaged in an occupation, organization, or trade exceeds the need, will be decided (1460) by committees which will be formed for the district of every Acting General Command or for parts of the district.

V. Every Committee (Section IV, Clause 2) shall consist of an officer as president, two high state officials, one of whom must belong to the Department of Trade, and two representatives each from employers and employees. The officer and the representatives of capital and labor shall be appointed by the War Department, or in Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg by the War Ministry, which in these states is responsible also for executing the bill in agreement with the War Department. The higher state officials are appointed by the Landeszentralbehörde or by an authority appointed by it. If the district of an Acting General Command extends over the territory of several federal states, the officials shall be appointed by the authorities of these states; in the decisions of the committee the officials of the state in whose territory the business concerned lies will take part.

VI. Complaint against the decisions of the committee (Section IV, Clause 2) shall be made to the Zentralstelle established by the War Department, consisting of two officers of the War Department, one of whom shall be president, two officials nominated by the central authority of that state to which the business, organization, or person following the occupation belongs, and one representative each from employers and employees. These representatives will be appointed as in Section V, Clause 2. If maritime interests are affected, one of the officers shall be appointed from the Imperial Navy Department. In complaints against decisions of Bavarian, Saxon, or Württemberg committees, one of the officers is to be appointed by the War Ministry of the state concerned.

VII. Men liable to auxiliary service who are not employed in the meaning of Section II may at any time be compelled to serve in some form of patriotic auxiliary service.

The calling up will be as a rule through an announcement issued by the War Department or an authority to be appointed by the Landeszentralbehörd calling on men to report themselves voluntarily. If there is not sufficient response to this appeal, then an individual summons shall be sent out in writing by a committee to be formed, as a rule, for each district of a Recruiting Commission, which shall consist of an officer as president, a high official, and two

representatives each from employers and employees. When the voting is equal the president shall have the casting vote. The officer and the representatives of employers and employees shall be appointed as in Section V, Clause 2. The official shall be appointed by the Landeszentralbehörde, or an authority appointed by it.

Everyone who receives the special written summons must seek employment in one of the branches mentioned in Section II. If employment on the terms of the summons is not obtained in two weeks the committee will assign the man to an employment.

Appeals against the committee's decision will be decided by the committee formed by the Acting General Command. (Section IV, Clauses 2.) Appeals will not postpone the obligation to serve.

VIII. In making appointments due regard will be had as far as possible to age, family conditions, place of residence, and health, as well as to previous occupation. Also the question whether the prospective pay will be sufficient to support the employed and to provide for his dependents shall be investigated.

IX. No one may take into his employ a man liable to patriotic service who is employed in a position denoted in Section II or who has been employed during the two previous weeks unless the applicant produces a certificate from his late employer that he has agreed to the man's leaving his service. . . .

XI. In all businesses engaged in patriotic service to which Regulation 7 of the Industrial Legislation applies and in which as a rule at least fifty workmen are employed, there shall be standing committees of the workers.

If Standing Labor Committees according to Paragraph 134h of the Industrial Legislation, or according to the Mining Laws, do not exist for such businesses, they are to be established. The members of these Labor Committees shall be chosen by workmen of full age employed in the business, or in a branch of the business, from among themselves, by direct and secret voting, on the principle of proportionate representation. Details shall be fixed by the Landeszentralbehörde.

In businesses employing more than fifty clerks there shall be formed Clerks' Committees having the same powers as the Labor Committees and formed in the same manner as the standing labor committees in Clause I above.

XII. It is the duty of the Labor Committee to promote a good understanding among the workmen and between the workmen and their employer. It must bring to the employer's notice all suggestions, wishes, and complaints of the workmen referring to the organization of the business, the wages, and the other matters concerning the workmen and their welfare and must give its opinion upon them.

If at least one-fourth of the members of the Labor Committee desire it, a meeting must be held, and the subject to be discussed must be placed upon the order of the day.

(1461)

XIII. If in a business of the nature denoted in Section XI disputes arise over wages or other conditions of labor, and no agreement can be arrived at between the employer and the Labor Committee, then, unless both parties appeal to an Industrial Court or a Miners' Court or a Mercantile Court as a court of arbitration, the Committee referred to in Section IX, Clause 2, shall be called upon by each party to mediate. . . .

If the employer does not submit to the award, then the workmen shall receive, if they desire, the certificate (Section IX) entitling to leave their employment. If the workmen do not submit to the award, then the certificate will not be given to them for cause on which the award has been made.

XIV. The use of their present legal right to unite and meet shall not be restricted for persons engaged in patriotic auxiliary service.

XV. For industrial concerns of the Army and Navy Administrations, regulations shall be made by the proper superior authorities in the meaning of Sections XI and XIII.

XVI. Industrial workers appointed under this law to agricultural tasks are not subject to regulations of the legislation concerning agricultural laborers. . . .

XVIII. Imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding 10,000 marks, or either of these penalties, or detention, shall be the penalty for (1) anyone refusing employment assigned to him on the basis of Section VII, Clause 3, or without urgent reasons delaying to perform such work; (2) anyone employing a workman contrary to the regulation in Section IX, Clause 1; (3) anyone not imparting within the appointed time the information provided for in

Section XV or wilfully making false or incomplete statements in giving his information. . . .

XX. The law comes into operation on the day of publication. The Bundesrat will fix the time when it shall be abrogated. If the Bundesrat makes no use of this power within one month after the conclusion of peace with the European Powers, then the law is annulled. Witness our own signature and our imperial seal.

Wilhelm

Great Headquarters, 5 December 1916

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:99–103.

86. The German Peace Note, 12 December 1916

On 12 December 1916 German diplomats delivered the following missive from Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to U.S. and other neutral representatives in embassies and missions in Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia, the capitals of the Central Powers. The note suggested that, in the interests of all, the warring powers should reach a negotiated peace settlement, and it requested neutral assistance in conveying this message to the Allies. Under mounting military pressure to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, a measure he knew was likely to bring the United States into the war, the chancellor probably preferred to end the war at a juncture favorable to German retention of most of her territorial gains.

Mr. Chargé d’Affaires: The most formidable war known to history has been ravaging for two and a half years a great part of the world. That catastrophe that the bonds of a common civilization more than a thousand years old could not stop strikes mankind in its most precious patrimony; it threatens to bury under its ruins the moral and physical progress on which Europe prided itself at the dawn of the twentieth century. In that strife Germany and her allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, have given proof of their indestructible strength in winning considerable successes at war. Their unshakable lines resist ceaseless attacks of their enemies’ arms. The recent diversion in the Balkans was speedily and victoriously thwarted. The latest events have demonstrated that a continuation of the war can not break their resisting power. The general situation much rather justifies their hope of fresh successes. It was for the defense of their existence and freedom of their national development that the four allied powers were constrained to take up arms. The exploits of their armies have brought no change therein. Not for an instant have they swerved from the conviction that the respect of the rights of the other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their rights and legitimate interests. They do not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries. Conscious of their military and economic strength and ready to carry on to the end, if they must, the struggle that is forced upon them, but animated at the same time by the desire to stem the flood and to bring the horrors of war to an end, the four allied powers propose to enter even now into peace negotiations. They feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward and which would aim to assure the existence, honor, and free development of their peoples, would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace.

If notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation the struggle should continue, the four allied powers are resolved to carry it on to a victorious end while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history.

The Imperial Government has the honor to ask through your obliging medium, the Government of the United States, to be pleased to transmit the present communication to the (1462) Government of the French Republic, to the Royal Government of Great Britain, to the Imperial Government of Japan, to the Royal Government of Roumania, to the Imperial Government of Russia, and to the Royal Government of Serbia.

I take the opportunity to renew to you, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, the assurance of my high consideration.

VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916: Supplement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 94.

87. President Woodrow Wilson, An Appeal for a Statement of War Aims, 18 December 1916

In December 1916 President Woodrow Wilson, desperate to avoid U.S. intervention in the war, launched a final initiative to bring the warring powers to the negotiating table. He hoped that the financial pressure his administration had imposed on the Allies would induce them to acquiesce in his demands. Secretary of State Robert Lansing dispatched copies of Wilson's Peace Note to the ambassadors or other representatives of the various belligerents on the evening of 18 December 1916.

The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you are accredited and he requests that you present it with the utmost earnestness of support. He wishes the impression clearly conveyed that it would be very hard for the Government of the United States to understand a negative reply. After yourself reading it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and making the oral representations suggested please leave a copy of this paper with him.

The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the Government to which you are accredited a course of action with regard to the present war which he hopes that the Government of [whichever country to which the particular ambassador in question was accredited] will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is in fact in no way associated with them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms

upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He would be happy himself to serve or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another, if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war. Each wishes to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and the Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or government. They stand ready, and even eager, to cooperate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at (1463) their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President, therefore, feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitively stated.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be

understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 40, November 20, 1916–January 23, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, University Press, 1982), 273–276.

88. Tsar Nicholas II, Special Order of the Day, 25 December 1916

Despite Russian military reverses in late 1916 and growing social discontent at home, Tsar Nicholas II steadfastly refused to consider making peace with Germany. He had rejected earlier German feelers for a separate peace, and in late December 1916 he joined the other Allies in refusing peace terms suggested by Germany. The tsar's stance probably doomed his shaky regime and also signed his own death warrant and that of his family.

More than two years ago, in time of profound peace, Germany, who had long been secretly preparing to subjugate all the peoples of Europe, attacked Russia and her faithful Ally, France, which obliged England to join us and take part in the struggle. The complete contempt for all bases of law, which manifested itself by Germany's infringement of the neutrality of Belgium, and the merciless cruelty of the Germans in regard to the peaceful populations of the provinces occupied by their troops, gradually united all the Great Powers of Europe against Germany, and her Ally, Austria-Hungary.

Under the pressure of the German armies, inordinately strong owing to the superiority of their technical means, Russia, as well as France, were obliged, in the first year of the war, to cede a part of their territory to the foe. This temporary reverse, however, did not crush the spirit of our brave Allies, or yours, my gallant troops. Meanwhile, by the united efforts of all the forces of the Empire, the difference in our technical means and those of the Germans was gradually disappearing. But, long before this, even since the autumn of the past year of 1915, our enemy was unable to occupy another foot of Russian territory, and in the spring and summer of this current year, the German troops experienced a string of severe defeats, and passed from aggression to a state of defense on the whole of our front. Their forces are obviously wearing themselves out, while the might and power of Russia and her valorous Allies surely and steadily grow. Germany feels that she will be completely (1464) routed, that the hour of retaliation for all her cruelties and violations of the law is near. And so—similarly to her sudden declaration of war at a time when she felt her military superiority over her neighbors, Germany, feeling her weakness, suddenly comes forward with an offer of peace to the Allies, strongly united against her in an indissoluble bond. She, very naturally, wishes to begin peace negotiations before the measure of her weakness becomes evident to all, before she definitely loses her fighting capacity. At the same time, [taking] advantage of her temporary victory over Rumania—due to the latter's want of military experience—she endeavors to give her enemies a false idea of the strength of her armies. But, if Germany could declare war and attack Russia and her Ally,

France, at the most unfavorable moment for them—at the present moment these two countries, supported by noble Italy and powerful England, and fortified by the struggle, are able, in their turn, to enter into peace negotiations with Germany when they consider the time favorable for it. This time has not yet come: the enemy has not yet been expelled from the provinces which have been seized by him; Russia has not yet attained the aim created by this war—the possession of Tzargrad [Constantinople] and the Straits; the formation of a whole and independent Poland out of its three existing, but as yet separate parts,—is still not assured. To conclude a peace with Germany at the present moment would mean not to profit fully by the heroic efforts of the Russian Army and Fleet. These efforts, and the sacred memory of those gallant sons of Russia who have perished on the field of battle, forbid us even to think of making peace before achieving a final and complete victory over the foe, who dares to think that, if he could begin the war, he can end it whenever he likes.

I do not doubt for a moment that every loyal son of Russia, whether forming part of my glorious Army, or working for the might of that Army in the interior of the country, or pursuing his own peaceful labor, is imbued with this sentiment, and thinks alike on the subject. Peace can only be granted to the enemy when he is definitely broken and defeated, and gives us and the Allies solid proofs of the impossibility for him to renew his treacherous attack . . . when we may rest assured that he will be obliged, by the very force of circumstances, to keep his engagements, and fulfil the obligations laid upon him by the Treaty of Peace.

Let us then remain firm and immovable in our assurance of victory, and the Almighty[y] will bless our banners; He will cover them once more with undying glory, and will grant us a peace worthy of your heroic deeds, my glorious troops,—a peace for which the coming generations will bless you, and which will render your memory forever sacred to them.

Source: Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 51–53.

89. The Reply of the Entente Governments to the German Peace Proposals, 29 December 1916

By 29 December 1916 the Allied governments had reached agreement on their reply to the German peace proposals. The U.S. embassy in Paris served as a neutral intermediary and delivered this response to German officials on 1 January 1917.

The Allied Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, and Serbia, united in the defense of the liberty of nations and faithful to the engagement they have taken not to lay down arms separately, have resolved to answer collectively the so-called proposals of peace which have been addressed them on behalf of the enemy Governments, through the intermediary of the United States, of Spain, of Switzerland, and of the Netherlands.

The Allied Powers are constrained to preface their answer by protesting strongly against the two essential assertions in the note of the enemy Powers which attempts to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war and which proclaims the victory of the Central Powers.

The Allies can not admit an assertion which is doubly inexact and which is sufficient to render barren any attempt at negotiation.

For thirty months the Allied Powers have suffered a war which they had tried by every means to avoid. They have demonstrated their attachment to peace by their acts. This attachment is as strong today as it was in 1914; after the violation of her engagements, it is not upon the word of Germany that peace, broken by her, can be based.

A suggestion without any conditions for initiating negotiations is not an offer of peace. The so-called proposal, devoid of substance and of precision, circulated abroad by the Imperial Government, appears less as an offer of peace than as a maneuver of war.

It is based upon a systematic disregard of the nature of the struggle of the past, present, and future.

As to the past, the German note ignoring all the facts, dates, and figures which prove that the war was desired, incited, and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary. At The Hague it was the German delegate who rejected all suggestions of disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after

having addressed to Serbia an ultimatum of which there exists no precedent, declared war on her despite the satisfaction (1465) immediately obtained. The Central Empires thereafter repulsed every attempt made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution to what was a local conflict. England's offer of a conference, the French proposal of an international commission, the request for arbitration addressed by the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor of Germany, the understanding reached between Russia and Austria-Hungary on the eve of hostilities; all these endeavors were left by Germany without answer and without issue. Belgium was invaded by an Empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which itself unhesitatingly proclaimed that treaties are "mere scraps of paper" and that "necessity knows no law."

As regards the present, the so-styled offers of Germany are based upon a "war map" which covers Europe alone; which expresses only the exterior and transitory aspect of the situation, but not the real strength of the adversaries. To conclude a peace based on the above would be to the sole advantage of the aggressors, who, having believed they could attain their object in two months perceive after two years that it will never be attained.

For the future, the ruins caused by the German declaration of war, the innumerable aggressions committed by Germany and her allies against the belligerents and against neutrals demand penalties, reparations, and guarantees; Germany eludes one and all.

In reality, the overture made by the Central Powers is but an attempt calculated to work upon the evolution of the war and of finally imposing a German peace.

It has for its object the troubling of opinion in the Allied countries; this opinion, in spite of all the sacrifices endured, has already replied with an admirable firmness and has denounced the hollowness of the enemy declaration.

It desires to strengthen public opinion in Germany and amongst her allies already so gravely shaken by their losses, fatigued by the economic encirclement, and crushed by the supreme effort which is exacted from their peoples.

It seeks to deceive, to intimidate public opinion of neutral countries long ago satisfied as to the original responsibilities, enlightened as to the present responsibilities, and too farseeing to favor the designs of Germany by abandoning the defense of human liberties.

It strives finally to justify new crimes in advance before the eyes of the world: submarine warfare, deportations, forced labor, and enlistment of nationals against their own country, violation of neutrality.

It is with a full realization of the gravity, but also of the necessities of this hour that the Allied Governments closely united and in perfect communion with their peoples refuse to entertain a proposal without sincerity and without import.

They affirm, once again, that no peace is possible as long as the reparation of violated rights and liberties, the acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small States shall not be assured; as long as there is no assurance of a settlement to suppress definitely the causes which for so long a time have menaced nations and to give the only efficacious guarantees for the security of the world.

The Allied Powers, in termination, are constrained to expose the following considerations which bring into relief the particular situation in which Belgium finds herself after two and a half years of war. By virtue of international treaties signed by five of the great Powers of Europe, amongst which figured Germany, Belgium profited by a special status which rendered her territory inviolate, and placed the country itself under the guarantee of these Powers, sheltered from European conflicts. Nevertheless Belgium, despite these treaties, was the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. It is why the Belgian Government deems it necessary to specify the purpose which Belgium has never ceased to pursue in fighting beside the Powers of the Entente for the cause of right and justice.

Belgium has always scrupulously observed the duties imposed upon her by neutrality. She took arms to defend her independence and her neutrality violated by Germany and to remain faithful to her international obligations. On the fourth of August at the Reichstag the Chancellor acknowledged that this aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the right of nations and agreed in the name of Germany to repair it.

After two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the practice of war and occupation which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its cities and villages, multiplied the massacres, the executions, and imprisonments. And at the moment that Germany speaks to the world of peace and humanity she deports and reduces to servitude. Belgium before the war had no other wish than to live in concord with all her neighbors. Her King and her Government have only one purpose:

the reestablishment of peace and of right. But they will only consider a peace which Belgian citizens by the thousand demand shall assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees, and security for the future.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 26–28.

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90. The Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Proposals, 10 January 1917

On 10 January the Allies rejected President Woodrow Wilson's offer to assist in negotiating a peace settlement. They also protested strongly against the way in which the president's peace note appeared to treat the two sides as morally equivalent.

The Allied Governments have received the note which was delivered to them in the name of the Government of the United States on the nineteenth of December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them both by the (1468) exact realization which they have of the gravity of the hour and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to the American people.

In a general way they wish to declare that they pay tribute to the elevation of the sentiment with which the American note is inspired and that they associate themselves with all their hopes with the project for the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. . . . But they believe that it is impossible at the present moment to attain a peace which will assure them reparation, restitution, and such guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility rests with the Central Powers and of which the principle itself tended to ruin the security of Europe; a peace which would on the other hand permit the establishment of the future of European nations on a solid basis. The Allied nations are conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests, but above all to safeguard the independence of peoples, of right, and of humanity.

The Allies are fully aware of the losses and suffering which the war causes to neutrals as well as to belligerents and they deplore them; but they do not hold themselves responsible for them, having in no way either willed or provoked this war, and they strive to reduce these damages in the measure compatible with the inexorable exigencies of their defense against the violence and the wiles of the enemy.

It is with satisfaction therefore that they take note of the declaration that the American communication is in nowise associated in its origin with that of the Central Powers transmitted on the eighteenth of December by the Government of the United States. They did not doubt moreover the resolution of that Government to avoid even the appearance of a support, even moral, of the authors responsible for the war.

The Allied Governments believe that they must protest in the most friendly but in the most specific manner against the assimilation established in the American note between the two groups of belligerents; this assimilation, based upon public declarations by the Central Powers, is in direct opposition to the evidence, both as regards responsibility for the past and as concerns guarantees for the future; President Wilson in mentioning it certainly had no intention of associating himself with it.

If there is an historical fact established at the present date, it is the willful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hegemony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg and by her manner of conducting the war, her simulating contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small States; as the conflict developed, the attitude of the Central Powers and their allies has been a continual defiance of humanity and civilization. Is it necessary to recall the horrors which accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious regime imposed upon the invaded countries, the barbarities perpetrated against the populations of Syria, the raids of Zeppelins on open towns, the destruction by submarines of passenger steamers or merchantmen even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war, the judicial murder of Miss Cavell, of Captain Fryatt, the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil populations, et cetera? The execution of such a series of crimes perpetrated without any regard for universal reprobation fully explains to President Wilson the protest of the Allies.

They consider that the note which they sent to the United States in reply to the German note will be a response to the questions put by the American Government, and according to the exact words of the latter, constitute "a public declaration as to the conditions upon which the war could be terminated."

President Wilson desires more; he desires that the belligerent Powers openly affirm the objects which they seek by continuing the war; the Allies experience no difficulty in replying to this request. Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers Governments. Their objects in the war will not be made known in detail with all the equitable compensation and indemnities for damages suffered until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply in all necessity and in the first instance the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Roumania with just reparation;

the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty, economic development, which all nations, great and small possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations, the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly repugnant to Western civilization. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, (1469) it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all is to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligation, with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.

United in the pursuit of this supreme object the Allies are determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which they are convinced not only their own safety and prosperity depends but also the future of civilization itself.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 35–38.

91. The Zimmermann Telegram: German Foreign Minister, Count Arthur Zimmermann, to the German Minister to Mexico, 19 January 1917

In January 1917 relations between the United States and Germany deteriorated, as it seemed increasingly that the latter country would resume its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Since 1913, U.S. troops had intervened repeatedly in that country, which had been in some turmoil ever since experiencing a revolution in 1910. At this sensitive juncture, German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann suggested that should the United States declare war on Germany, Mexico might wish to declare war on its neighbor and take this opportunity to regain territory it had lost in the 1840s during the Mexican-American War. British intelligence intercepted the document, whose release on 24 February further inflamed American sentiment against Germany.

On the first of February we intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. . . .

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/zimmerman.html>.

92. "Peace Without Victory": President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the U.S. Senate, 22 January 1917

Just over a month after launching his December 1916 peace initiative, Woodrow Wilson addressed the U.S. Senate to explain his peace policies. He was well aware that this address would quickly be circulated around the world, especially to the governments and peoples of the warring powers, and therefore tailored his address not just toward the domestic American audience but also toward these international recipients. He expressed the desire that the United States should join any future "League for Peace" to prevent new conflicts but warned that any such U.S. participation would depend upon the current warring powers reaching a nonpunitive settlement based upon the principle of "peace without victory."

On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identic note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with (1470) me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in this great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for

which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purpose of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantee of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for

granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and (1471) a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principles which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable,—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and cooperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediate and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples in the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they

(1472) see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 40, November 20, 1916–January 23, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 533–539.

93. German Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 31 January 1917

In January 1917 German military and political leaders decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Although fully aware that this policy was likely to bring the United States into the war, they hoped, by cutting off the vital war supplies reaching the Allies from North America, to weaken their opponents sufficiently to enable German forces to administer a knockout blow. After this, German leaders believed, it would be possible to negotiate peace with the United States. The note the German ambassador delivered to Secretary Lansing sought to justify this policy, which ran counter to the "Peace Without Victory" address Woodrow Wilson had made before the Senate nine days earlier.

Mr. Secretary of State:

Your Excellency was good enough to transmit to the Imperial Government a copy of the message which the President of the United States addressed to the Senate on the 22nd inst [January]. The Imperial Government has given it the earnest consideration which the President's statements deserve, inspired, as they are, by a deep sentiment of responsibility.

It is highly gratifying to the Imperial Government to ascertain that the main tendencies of this important statement correspond largely to the desires and principles professed by Germany. These principles especially include self-government and equality of rights for all nations. Germany would be sincerely glad if, in recognition of this principle, countries like Ireland and India, which do not enjoy the benefits of political independence, should now obtain their freedom.

The German people also repudiate all alliances which serve to force the countries into a competition for might and to involve them in a net of selfish intrigues. On the other hand, Germany will gladly cooperate in all efforts to prevent future wars.

The freedom of the seas, being a preliminary condition of the free existence of nations and a peaceful intercourse between them, as well as the open door for the commerce of all nations, has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program. All the more the Imperial Government regrets that the attitude of her enemies, who are so entirely opposed to peace, makes it

impossible for the world at present to bring about the realization of these lofty ideals.

Germany and her allies were ready to enter now into a discussion of peace, and had set down as basis the guarantee of existence, honor, and free development of their peoples. Their aims, as had been expressly stated in the note of December 12, 1916, were n[o]t directed toward the destruction or annihilation of their enemies and were, according to their conviction, perfectly compatible with the rights of the other nations. As to Belgium, for which such warm and cordial sympathy is felt in the United States, the Chancellor had declared only a few (1473) weeks previously that its annexation had never formed part of Germany's intentions. The peace to be signed with Belgium was to provide for such conditions in that country, with which Germany desires to maintain friendly neighborly relations, that Belgium should not be used again by Germany's enemies for the purpose of instigating continuous hostile intrigues. Such precautionary measures are all the more necessary, as Germany's enemies have repeatedly stated, not only in speeches delivered by their leading men, but also in the statutes of the Economical Conference in Paris, that it is their intention not to treat Germany as an equal, even after peace has been restored, but to continue their basic attitude and especially to wage a systematical economic war against her.

The attempt of the four allied powers to bring about a peace has failed, owing to the lust of conquest of their enemies, who desired to dictate the conditions of peace. Under the pretense of following the principle of nationality, our enemies have disclosed their real aims in this way, viz., to dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. To the wish of reconciliation they oppose the will of destruction. They desire a fight to the bitter end.

A new situation has thus been created which forces Germany to new decisions. Since two years and a half England is using her naval power for a criminal attempt to force Germany into submission by starvation. In brutal contempt of international law, the group of powers led by England not only curtail the legitimate trade of their opponents, but they also, by ruthless pressure, compel neutral countries either to altogether forego every trade not agreeable to the Entente Powers, or to limit it according to their arbitrary decrees.

The American Government know the steps which have been taken to cause England and her allies to return to the rules of international law and to respect the freedom of the seas. The English Government, however, insists upon continuing its war of starvation, which does not at all affect the military power

of its opponents, but compels women and children, the sick and the aged, to suffer for their country pains and privations which endanger the vitality of the nation. Thus British tyranny mercilessly increases the sufferings of the world, indifferent to the laws of humanity, indifferent to the protests of the neutrals whom they severely harm, indifferent even to the silent longing for peace among England's own allies. Each day of the terrible struggle causes new destruction, new sufferings. Each day shortening the war will, on both sides, preserve the lives of thousands of brave soldiers and be a benefit to mankind.

The Imperial Government could not justify before its own conscience, before the German people, and before history the neglect of any means destined to bring about the end of the war. Like the President of the United States, the Imperial Government had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. Since the attempts to come to an understanding with the Entente Powers have been answered by the latter with the announcement of an intensified continuation of the war, the Imperial Government—in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people—is now compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal.

Sincerely trusting that the people and the Government of the United States will understand the motives for this decision and its necessity, the Imperial Government hopes that the United States may view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist, on their part, to prevent further misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life.

Inclosing two memoranda [second omitted here] regarding the details of the contemplated military measures at sea, I remain, etc.

J. Bernstorff

First Memorandum Enclosed with the Bernstorff Note

After bluntly refusing Germany's peace offer, the Entente-Powers state in their note addressed to the American Government that they are determined to continue the war in order to deprive Germany of German provinces in the West and the East, to destroy Austria-Hungary, and to annihilate Turkey. In waging war with such aims, the Entente-Allies are violating all rules of international law, as they prevent the legitimate trade of neutrals with the Central Powers, and of the neutrals among themselves. Germany has, so far, not made unrestricted use of the weapon which she possesses in her submarines. Since

the Entente-Powers, however, have made it impossible to come to an understanding based upon equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central Powers, and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible which shall be dictated by the Entente-Allies and shall result in the destruction and humiliation of the Central Powers, Germany is unable further to forego the full use of her submarines. The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente-Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente-Allies give back to Germany the freedom of the action which she reserved in her (1474) note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc., etc. All ships met within that zone will be sunk.

The Imperial Government is confident that this measure will result in a speedy termination of the war and in the restoration of peace which the Government of the United States has so much at heart. Like the Government of the United States, Germany and her allies had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. Now that the war, through the fault of Germany's enemies, has to be continued, the Imperial Government feels sure that the Government of the United States will understand the necessity of adopting such measures as are destined to bring about a speedy end of the horrible and useless bloodshed. The Imperial Government hopes all the more for such an understanding of her position, as the neutrals have, under the pressure of the Entente Powers, suffered great losses, being forced by them either to give up their entire trade or to limit it according to conditions arbitrarily determined by Germany's enemies in violation of international law.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Documents of the German Revolution: Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:276–281.

94. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the U.S. Congress, 3 February 1917

Although it broke relations with Germany, the United States did not declare war immediately upon the German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare. Instead, while protesting the German action, for over two months President Woodrow Wilson waited to see how the situation developed. Early in February, the president addressed the U.S. Congress, detailing the actions he intended to take in response to the new German policy.

The Imperial German Government on the 31st day of January announced to this Government and to the Governments of the other neutral nations that on and after the 1st day of February, the present month, it would adopt a policy with regard to the use of submarines against all shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas, to which it is clearly my duty to call your attention. . . . [The president summarized the history of earlier American negotiations and agreements with Germany on the subject of submarine warfare, quoting extensively from diplomatic exchanges of March–May 1916.]

I think that you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the 18th of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.

I have therefore directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United State and the German Empire are severed and that the American Ambassador to Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand His Excellency his passports.

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the

ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them, and destroy American ships, and take the lives of American citizens in the willful prosecution of the ruthless naval program they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded: if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral Governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people, and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it; (1475) and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people, which I have sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant that we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 11–15.

95. American Labor's Position in Peace or in War: Report of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor, 12 March 1917

As American intervention in World War I appeared ever more likely, in March 1917 the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the mainstream American labor organization, met to determine what its position should be in the event of war. Its officers concluded that while the AFL should be ready to support the government, it should also insist that organized labor unions be recognized representatives of American working men and that the rights of labor should be respected in industrial mobilization for war.

A conference of the representatives of the national and international trade unions of America, called by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor, was held in the American Federation of Labor Building, March 12, 1917, in which conference the representatives of affiliated national and international trade unions and the railroad brotherhoods participated.

The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor had the subject-matter for three days under advisement prior to the conference and submitted a declaration to the conference. The entire day was given over to a discussion of the recommendation and such suggestions as were submitted. After a thorough discussion the following document was adopted by a unanimous vote:

We speak for three millions of Americans. We are not a sect. We are not a party. We represent the organizations held together by the pressure of our common needs. We represent the part of the nation closest to the fundamentals of life. Those we represent wield the nation's tools and grapple with the forces that are brought under control in our material civilization. The power and use of industrial tools is greater than the tools of war and will in time supersede agencies of destruction.

A world war is on. The time has not yet come when war has been abolished.

Whether we approve of it or not, we must recognize that war is a situation with which we must reckon. The present European war, involving as it does the majority of civilized nations and affecting the industry and commerce of the whole world, threatens at any moment to draw all countries, including our own, into the conflict. Our immediate problem, then, is to bring to bear upon war conditions instructive forethought, vision, principles of human welfare and conservation that should direct our course in every eventuality of life. The way to avert war is to establish constructive agencies for justice in times of peace

and thus control for peace situations and forces that might otherwise result in war.

The methods of modern warfare, its new tactics, its vast organization, both military and industrial, present problems vastly different from those of previous wars. But the nation's problems afford an opportunity for the establishment of new freedom and wider opportunities for all the people. Modern warfare includes contests between resources of the countries involved; and necessarily applies our own country now faces an impending peril, it is fitting that the masses of the people of the United States should take counsel and determine what course they shall pursue should a crisis arise necessitating the protection of our Republic and defense of the ideals for which it stands.

In the struggle between the forces of democracy and special privilege, for just and historic reasons the masses of the people necessarily represent the ideals and the institutions of democracy. There is in organized society one potential organization whose purpose is to further these ideals and institutions—the organized labor movement.

In no previous war has the organized labor movement taken a directing part.

Labor has now reached an understanding of its rights, of its power and resources, of its value and contributions to society, and must make definite constructive proposals.

It is timely that we frankly present experiences and conditions which in former times have prevented nations from benefiting by the voluntary, whole-hearted cooperation of wage-earners in war time, and then make suggestions how these hindrances to our national strength and vigor can be removed.

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War has never put a stop to the necessity for struggle to establish and maintain industrial rights. Wage-earners in war times must, as has been said, keep one eye on the exploiters at home and the other upon the enemy threatening the national government. Such exploitation made it impossible for a warring nation to mobilize effectively its full strength for outward defense.

We maintain that it is the fundamental step in preparedness for the nation to set its own house in order and to establish at home justice in relations between men. Previous wars, for whatever purpose waged, developed new opportunities for exploiting wage-earners. Not only was there failure to recognize the

necessity for protecting rights of workers that they might give that whole-hearted service to the country that can come only when every citizen enjoys rights, freedom and opportunity, but under guise of national necessity. Labor was stripped of its means of defense against enemies at home and was robbed of the advantages, the protections, the guarantees of justice that had been achieved after ages of struggle. For these reasons workers have felt that no matter what the result of war, as wage-earners they generally lost.

In previous times Labor had no representatives in the councils authorized to deal with the conduct of war. The rights, interest and welfare of workers were autocratically sacrificed for the slogan of “national safety.”

The European war has demonstrated the dependence of the governments upon the cooperation of the masses of the people. Since the masses perform indispensable service, it follows that they should have a voice in determining the conditions upon which they give service.

The workers of America make known their beliefs, their demands and their purposes through a voluntary agency which they have established—the organized labor movement. This agency is not only the representative of those who directly constitute it, but it is the representative of all those persons who have common problems and purposes but who have not yet organized for their achievement.

Whether in peace or in war the organized labor movement seeks to make all else subordinate to human welfare and human opportunity. The labor movement stands as the defender of this principle and undertakes to protect the wealth-producers against the exorbitant greed of special interests, against profiteering, against exploitation, against the detestable methods of irresponsible greed, against the inhumanity and crime of heartless corporations and employers.

Labor demands the right in war times to be the recognized defenders of wage-earners against the same forces which in former wars have made national necessity an excuse for more ruthless methods.

As the representatives of the wage-earners we assert that conditions of work and pay in government employment and in all occupations should conform to principles of human welfare and justice.

A nation can not make an effective defense against an outside danger if groups of citizens are asked to take part in a war though smarting with a sense of keen injustice inflicted by the government they are expected to and will defend.

The corner-stone of national defense is justice in fundamental relations of life—economic justice.

The one agency which accomplishes this for the workers is the organized labor movement. The greatest step that can be made for national defense is not to bind and throttle the organized labor movement but to afford it greatest scope and opportunity for voluntary effective cooperation in spirit and in action.

During the long period in which it has been establishing itself, the labor movement has become a dynamic force in organizing the human side of industry and commerce. It is a great social factor, which must be recognized in all plans which affect wage-earners.

Whether planning for peace or war the government must recognize the organized labor movement as the agency through which it must cooperate with wage-earners.

Industrial justice is the right of those living within our country. Within this right there is associated obligation. In war time obligation takes the form of service in defense of the Republic against enemies.

We recognize that this service may be either military or industrial, both equally essential for national defense. We hold this to be incontrovertible that the government which demands that men and women give their labor power, their bodies or their lives to its service should also demand the service, in the interest of these human beings, of all wealth and the products of human toil—property.

We hold that if workers may be asked in time of national peril or emergency to give more exhausting service than the principles of human welfare warrant, that service should be asked only when accompanied by increased guarantees and safeguards, and when the profits which the employer shall secure from the industry in which they are engaged have been limited to fixed percentages.

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We declare that such determination of profits should be based on cost of processes actually needed for product.

Workers have no delusions regarding the policy which property owners and exploiting employers pursue in peace or in war and they also recognize, that wrapped up with the safety of this Republic are ideals of democracy, a heritage which the masses of the people received from our forefathers, who fought that liberty might live in this country—a heritage that is to be maintained and handed down to each generation with undiminished power and usefulness.

The labor movement recognizes the value of freedom and it knows that freedom and rights can be maintained only by those willing to assert their claims and to defend their rights. The American labor movement has always opposed unnecessary conflicts and all wars for aggrandizement, exploitation and enslavement, and yet it has done its part in the world's revolutions, in the struggles to establish greater freedom, democratic institutions and ideals of human justice.

Our labor movement distrusts and protests against militarism, because it knows that militarism represents privilege and is the tool of special interests, exploiters and despots. But while it opposes militarism, it holds that it is the duty of a nation to defend itself against injustice and invasion.

The menace of militarism arises through isolating the defensive functions of the state from civil activities and from creating military agencies out of touch with masses of the people. Isolation is subversive to democracy—it harbors and nurtures the germs of arbitrary power.

We hold that industrial service should be deemed equally meritorious as military service. Organization for industrial and commercial service is upon a different basis from military service—the civic ideals still dominate. This should be recognized in mobilizing for this purpose. The same voluntary institutions that organized industrial, commercial and transportation workers in times of peace will best take care of the same problems in time of war.

It is fundamental, therefore, that the government cooperate with the American organized labor movement for this purpose. Service in government factories and private establishments, in transportation agencies, all should conform to trade union standards.

The guarantee of human conservation should be recognized in war as well as in peace. Wherever changes in the organization of industry are necessary upon a war basis, they should be made in accord with plans agreed upon by representatives of the government and those engaged and employed in the

industry. We recognize that in war, in certain employments requiring high skill, it is necessary to retain in industrial service the workers specially fitted therefor. In any eventuality when women may be employed, we insist that equal pay for equal work shall prevail without regard to sex.

Finally, in order to safeguard all the interests of the wage-earners organized labor should have representation on all agencies determining and administering policies of national defense. It is particularly important that organized labor should have representatives on all boards authorized to control publicity during war times. The workers have suffered much injustice in war times by limitations upon their right to speak freely and to secure publicity for their just grievances.

Organized labor has earned the right to make these demands. It is the agency that, in all countries, stands for human rights and is the defender of the welfare and interests of the masses of the people. It is an agency that has international recognition which is not seeking to rob, exploit or corrupt foreign governments but instead seeks to maintain human rights and interests the world over, nor does it have to dispel suspicion nor prove its motives either at home or abroad.

The present war discloses the struggle between the institutions of democracy and those of autocracy. As a nation we should profit from the experiences of other nations. Democracy can not be established by patches upon an autocratic system. The foundations of civilized intercourse between individuals must be organized upon principles of democracy and scientific principles of human welfare. Then a national structure can be perfected in harmony with humanitarian idealism—a structure that will stand the tests of the necessities of peace or war.

We, the officers of the National and International Trade Unions of America in national conference assembled in the capital of our nation, hereby pledge ourselves in peace or in war, in stress or in storm, to stand unreservedly by the standards of liberty and the safety and preservation of the institutions and ideals of our Republic.

In this solemn hour of our nation's life, it is our earnest hope that our Republic may be safeguarded in its unswerving desire for peace; that our people may be spared the horrors and the burdens of war; that they may have the opportunity to cultivate and develop the arts of peace, human brotherhood and a higher civilization.

But, despite all our endeavors and hopes, should our country be drawn into the maelstrom of the European conflict, we, (1478) with these ideals of liberty and justice herein declared, as the indispensable basis for national policies, offer our services to our country in every field of activity to defend, safeguard and preserve the Republic of the United States of America against its enemies whomsoever they may be, and we call upon our fellow workers and fellow citizens in the holy name of Labor, Justice, Freedom and Humanity to devotedly and patriotically give like service.

Source: Samuel Gompers, *American Labor and the War* (New York: George H. Doran, 1919), 289–295.

96. Formation and Program of Russian Provisional Government, 16 March 1917

In mid-March 1917 the Duma's Provisional Executive Committee appointed a Russian provisional government, a coalition of most of the liberal and progressive parties. The new administration immediately announced its intention to carry out an extensive reform program.

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the members of the Duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has triumphed over the dark forces of the Old Régime to such an extent as to enable it to organize a more stable executive power. With this idea in mind, the Provisional Committee has appointed as ministers of the first Cabinet representing the public, men whose past political and public life assures them the confidence of the country.

1. Prince George E. Lvov, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior [Nonparty]
2. P. N. Miliukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs [Kadet]
3. A. I. Guchkov, Minister of War and Marine [Octobrist]
4. M. I. Tereschenko, Minister of Finance [Nonparty]
5. A. A. Manuilov, Minister of Education [Kadet]
6. A. I. Shingarev, Minister of Agriculture [Centrist]
7. N. V. Nekrasov, Minister of Transportation [Kadet]
8. A. I. Konovalov, Minister of Commerce and Industry [Kadet]
9. A. F. Kerenski, Minister of Justice [Social Revolutionary]
10. Vl. Lvov, Holy Synod [Centrist]

The Cabinet will be guided in its actions by the following principles:

1. An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts, military revolts, agrarian offenses, etc.
2. Freedom of speech and press; freedom to form labor unions and to strike. These political liberties should be extended to the army in so far as war conditions permit.
3. The abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions.
4. Immediate preparation for the calling of a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal and secret vote, which shall determine the form of government and draw up the Constitution for the country.
5. In place of the police, to organize a national militia with elective officers, and subject to the local self-governing body.

6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage.
7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall not be disarmed or removed from Petrograd.
8. On duty and in war service, strict military discipline should be maintained, but when off duty, soldiers should have the same public rights as are enjoyed by other citizens.

The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay the realization of the above-mentioned measures of reform.

President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko
President of the Council of Ministers, Prince Lvov
Ministers Miliukov, Nekrasov, Manuilov, Konovalov,
Tereschenko, Vl. Lvov, Shingarev, Kerenski.

Source: *Izvestiia*, 16 March 1917, in Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 308–309.

97. First Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, 19 March 1917

The new provisional government rapidly asserted its commitment both to fundamental liberal reform within Russia and also to the continuation of the war. It appealed to the people to support the war effort and to endorse its own efforts to implement major constitutional changes as soon as possible.

Citizens of Russia:

A great event has taken place. By the mighty assault of the Russian people, the old order has been overthrown. A new, free Russia is born. The great revolution crowns long years of struggle. By the act of 17 October [30 October] 1905, under the pressure of the awakened popular forces, Russia was promised constitutional liberties. Those promises, however, were not kept. The First State Duma, interpreter of the nation's hopes, was dissolved. The Second Duma suffered the same fate, and the Government, powerless to crush the national will, decided, by the act of 3 June [16 June] 1907, to deprive the people of a part of those rights of participation in legislative work which had been granted.

(1479)

In the course of nine long years, there were taken from the people, step by step, all the rights that they had won. Once more the country was plunged into an abyss of arbitrariness and despotism. All attempts to bring the Government to its senses proved futile, and the titanic world struggle, into which this country was dragged by the enemy, found the Government in a state of moral decay, alienated from the people, indifferent to the fate of our native land, and steeped in the infamy of corruption. Neither the heroic efforts of the army, staggering under the crushing burdens of internal chaos, nor the appeals of the popular representatives, who had united in the face of the national peril, were able to lead the former Emperor and his Government into the path of unity with the people. And when Russia, owing to the illegal and fatal actions of her rulers, was confronted with gravest disasters, the nation was obliged to take the power into its own hands.

The unanimous revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, fully conscious of the gravity of the moment, and the determination of the State Duma, have created the Provisional Government, which considers it to be its sacred and responsible duty to fulfil the hopes of the nation, and lead the country out onto the bright path of free civic organization.

The Government trusts that the spirit of lofty patriotism, manifested during the struggle of the people against the old régime, will also inspire our valiant soldiers on the field of battle. For its own part, the Government will make every effort to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victorious end.

The Government will sacredly observe the alliances which bind us to other powers, and will unswervingly carry out the agreements entered into by the Allies. While taking measures to defend the country against the foreign enemy, the Government will, at the same time, consider it to be its primary duty to make possible the expression of the popular will as regards the form of government, and will convoke the Constituent Assembly within the shortest time possible, on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, also guaranteeing participation in the elections to the gallant defenders of our native land, who are now shedding their blood on the fields of battle.

The Constituent Assembly will issue the fundamental laws, guaranteeing to the country the inalienable rights of justice, equality, and liberty. Conscious of the heavy burden which the country suffers because of the lack of civic rights, which lack stands in the way of its free, creative power at this time of violent national commotion, the Provisional Government deems it necessary, at once, before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to provide the country with laws for the safeguarding of civic liberty and equality, in order to enable all citizens freely to apply their spiritual forces to creative work for the benefit of the country. The Government will also undertake the enactment of legal provisions to assure to all citizens, on the basis of universal suffrage, an equal share in the election of local governments.

At this moment of national liberation, the whole country remembers with reverent gratitude those who, in the struggle for their political and religious convictions, fell victims to the vindictive old régime, and the Provisional Government will regard it as its joyful duty to bring back from their exile, with full honors, all those who have suffered for the good of the country.

In fulfilling these tasks, the Provisional Government is animated by the belief that it will thus execute the will of the people, and that the whole nation will support it in its honest efforts to insure the happiness of Russia. This belief inspires it with courage. Only in the common effort of the entire nation and the Provisional Government can it see a pledge of triumph of the new order.

Source: Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 311–313.

98. President Woodrow Wilson, War Message to the U.S. Congress, 2 April 1917

As the submarine crisis continued and increasing numbers of Americans lost their lives to German attacks, Woodrow Wilson finally decided to declare war on Germany. On 2 April 1917 he addressed a joint session of Congress and requested a declaration of war on Germany (though not, at this stage, on any of Germany's allies). It was in this speech that he described the U.S. purpose in entering the war: "The world must be made safe for democracy."

Gentlemen of the Congress:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the 3d of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the 1st day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the (1480) western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. . . . The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe-conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This

minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people can not be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of February last, I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. . . . The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we can not make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which

we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it, and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the Navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed (1481) forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty,—for it will be a very practical duty,—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.

Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous

knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbour states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. . . .

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and (1482) without our industries and our commerce. . . . [T]hey have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted [Zimmermann] note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation

to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancour and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honour. . . . We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship—exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy, who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbours and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the

few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 41, January 24–April 6, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 519–527.

99. Opposition to Wilson's War Message: Speech by Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, 4–5 April 1917

Although the Senate voted 90–6 and the House 373–50 to declare war on Germany, the decision was still rather unpopular. On the evening of 4–5 April 1917 leading progressive Republican senators, including George W. Norris of Nebraska, spoke (1483) strongly against intervention in the war on the grounds that the interests at stake were insufficient to justify U.S. belligerency.

While I am most emphatically and sincerely opposed to taking any step that will force our country into the useless and senseless war now being waged in Europe, yet, if this resolution passes, I shall not permit my feeling of opposition to its passage to interfere in any way with my duty either as a senator or as a citizen in bringing success and victory to American arms. I am bitterly opposed to my country entering the war, but if, notwithstanding my opposition, we do enter it, all of my energy and all of my power will be behind our flag in carrying it on to victory.

The resolution now before the Senate is a declaration of war. Before taking this momentous step, and while standing on the brink of this terrible vortex, we ought to pause and calmly and judiciously consider the terrible consequences of the step we are about to take. We ought to consider likewise the route we have recently traveled and ascertain whether we have reached our present position in a way that is compatible with the neutral position which we claimed to occupy at the beginning and through the various stages of this unholy and unrighteous war.

No close student of recent history will deny that both Great Britain and Germany have, on numerous occasions since the beginning of the war, flagrantly violated in the most serious manner the rights of neutral vessels and neutral nations under existing international law, as recognized up to the beginning of this war by the civilized world.

. . . The only difference is that in the case of Germany we have persisted in our protest, while in the case of England we have submitted. . . .

. . . To my mind, what we ought to have maintained from the beginning was the strictest neutrality. If we had done this, I do not believe we would have been on the verge of war at the present time. We had a right as a nation, if we desired, to cease at any time to be neutral. We had a technical right to respect the

English war zone and to disregard the German war zone, but we could not do that and be neutral.

I have no quarrel to find with the man who does not desire our country to remain neutral. While many such people are moved by selfish motives and hopes of gain, I have no doubt but that in a great many instances, through what I believe to be a misunderstanding of the real condition, there are many honest, patriotic citizens who think we ought to engage in this war and who are behind the President in his demand that we should declare war against Germany. I think such people err in judgment and to a great extent have been misled as to the real history and the true facts by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war.

We have loaned many hundreds of millions of dollars to the Allies in this controversy. While such action was legal and countenanced by international law, there is no doubt in my mind but the enormous amount of money loaned to the Allies in this country has been instrumental in bringing about a public sentiment in favor of our country taking a course that would make every bond worth a hundred cents on the dollar and making the payment of every debt certain and sure. Through this instrumentality and also through the instrumentality of others who have not only made millions out of the war in the manufacture of munitions, etc., and who would expect to make millions more if our country can be drawn into the catastrophe, a large number of the great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known to manufacture sentiment in favor of war.

It is now demanded that the American citizens shall be used as insurance policies to guarantee the safe delivery of munitions of war to belligerent nations. The enormous profits of munition manufacturers, stockbrokers, and bond dealers must be still further increased by our entrance into the war. This has brought us to the present moment, when Congress, urged by the President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known. . . .

To whom does war bring prosperity? Not to the soldier who for the munificent compensation of \$16 per month shoulders his musket and goes into the trench, there to shed his blood and to die if necessary; not to the brokenhearted widow who waits for the return of the mangled body of her husband; not to the mother who weeps at the death of her brave boy; not to the little children who shiver

with cold; not to the babe who suffers from hunger; nor to the millions of mothers and daughters who carry broken hearts to their graves. War brings no prosperity to the great mass of common and patriotic citizens. It increases the cost of living of those who toil and those who already must strain every effort to keep soul and body together. War brings prosperity to the stock gambler on Wall Street—to those who are already in possession of more wealth than can be realized or enjoyed. . . .

Their object in having war and in preparing for war is to make money. Human suffering and the sacrifice of human life are necessary, but Wall Street considers only the dollars and the cents. The men who do the fighting, the people who make the (1484) sacrifices are the ones who will not be counted in the measure of this great prosperity that he depicts. The stockbrokers would not, of course, go to war because the very object they have in bringing on the war is profit, and therefore they must remain in their Wall Street offices in order to share in that great prosperity which they say war will bring. The volunteer officer, even the drafting officer, will not find them. They will be concealed in their palatial offices on Wall Street, sitting behind mahogany desks, covered up with clipped coupons—coupons soiled with the sweat of honest toil, coupons stained with mothers' tears, coupons dyed in the lifeblood of their fellowmen.

We are taking a step today that is fraught with untold danger. We are going into war upon the command of gold. We are going to run the risk of sacrificing millions of our countrymen's lives in order that other countrymen may coin their lifeblood into money. And even if we do not cross the Atlantic and go into the trenches, we are going to pile up a debt that the tolling masses that shall come many generations after us will have to pay. Unborn millions will bend their backs in toil in order to pay for the terrible step we are now about to take.

We are about to do the bidding of wealth's terrible mandate. By our act we will make millions of our countrymen suffer, and the consequences of it may well be that millions of our brethren must shed their lifeblood, millions of brokenhearted women must weep, millions of children must suffer with cold, and millions of babes must die from hunger, and all because we want to preserve the commercial right of American citizens to deliver munitions of war to belligerent nations.

Source: *Congressional Record*, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. LV, pt. 1, pp. 212–214.

100. Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador in London, Cable to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 6 April 1917

Once the United States was formally at war with Germany, the British foreign secretary, Arthur J. Balfour, immediately handed the U.S. ambassador in London a memorandum detailing the needs of the Allies if they were to continue the war. In a revelation of how dependent the Allies were on U.S. assistance, Balfour requested shipping, finance, and manpower, together with railway rolling stock for Russia. Page immediately cabled the memorandum to the State Department, adding a brief covering message.

5949. My 5941, April 5, 7 p.m. Following my conversation with Mr. Balfour, I have just received from him a memorandum of the chief needs of the Allies which he sends to me informally for transmission to you. It is as follows:

Without doubt the most pressing need of the Allies at this moment is shipping. This is not merely, nor even perhaps mainly, due to the fact that Great Britain being an island, largely dependent for its foodstuffs on oversea sources of supply, communications with these is not a luxury but a necessity. The difference between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Italy on the other is in this respect not so great as might be supposed. Both France and Italy are largely dependent upon imported foodstuffs and in addition they require coal and iron from the United Kingdom.

Quite apart, therefore, from German piracy the tonnage question would be important and difficult and if the rate of loss by submarine attack is going to be maintained (and according to our calculation it is likely to increase rather than diminish) it becomes evident not merely from the point of view of Great Britain, but from that of the Allies generally, that the tonnage problem is the one most urgently in need of solution. If Your Excellency asks how the United States can contribute to lighten this particular difficulty, I venture to lay before you the following suggestions for consideration:

1. (1) The seizure of enemy ships and their employment at the earliest moment on the important trade routes;
2. (2) The charter of neutral shipping which might be transferred from the European trade to safer waters;
3. (3) The release of shipping from coastal or lake trade to work on the main lines of communication; and most important of all—
4. (4) The rapid increase of shipbuilding to the extreme limits of possible production not only during the present year but also during next year.

This work will no doubt have to be carried on chiefly in American yards, but I would press upon Your Excellency that even in British yards shipbuilding might be increased could an additional supply of steel be obtained from the United States of America, a matter which we greatly hope may be taken into favourable consideration by the American Government.

In this connection I would beg Your Excellency to consider whether it would not be desirable, as it would certainly be legitimate, to requisition ships now building for neutrals in the yards of the United States.

The second need of the Allies, in order of immediate importance, is financial, especially for the purpose of facilitating the purchase in the United States by the Allied countries of munitions and other necessities. As Your Excellency is aware, the difficulty in this case is largely one of exchange. The imports of the Allies from the United States far exceed their exports to that country and the balance of indebtedness has to be met in some (1485) other fashion. Practically the whole burden of so meeting it has hitherto been borne by the United Kingdom but our power to finance, not merely ourselves, but all our Allies has inevitable limitations and if the burden could be diminished by direct arrangements between the United States and the various Allied countries immense assistance would thereby be given towards the efficient conduct of the war. Great care would no doubt have to be taken lest this change should lead to competitive buying by one belligerent country against another in the same market, but good organization and mutual confidence should be sufficient to guard against so unfortunate a result.

In the third place (while I am on the subject of transport and supply) I ought to mention the extreme need of all the Allies, and especially the Russians, for locomotives and other rolling stock, nor is it merely material that is required. If all stories are true the capacity of the Vladivostok railway and port could be many times increased if America could provide not merely the needful rolling stock but the still more needful management; this no doubt might involve a somewhat difficult and delicate negotiation with the Russian Government but if they were convinced that the American management was purely a war measure and had no financial aspect, something important might be accomplished towards making the efficiency of organizations correspond more closely with the size of Russia's territories and the number of her population.

I have said nothing so far on the question of naval and military assistance though, if the war last, the service that could be rendered by the United States to the cause of the Allies in this direction is incalculable.

As regards maritime affairs, indeed there seems so far as we can judge, to be no immediate sphere of employment for the American battle fleet, but the share which American cruisers could take in policing the Atlantic is of the greatest importance and all craft from destroyers downwards capable of dealing with submarines would be absolutely invaluable.

It is in the matter of fighting men however that the most vital aid could be given to the Allied cause should the war unhappily continue. The experience of the British Empire has shown what can be done by a nonmilitary nation in the creation of a military force. Doubtless the United States with a far larger population could better the example should the necessity arise. It must be admitted no doubt that after the United States had determined on the best method of training their new levies, difficult questions of transport will arise but on these I need say nothing in this memorandum.

In conclusion let me assure Your Excellency that any lessons which we may have succeeded in learning from two and a half years' fighting are entirely at the disposal of your Government and that we shall be glad to place at your service experts familiar with the new problems of which the war has produced so plentiful a supply.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: Supplement 2, Pt. 1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 11–13.

101. Easter Decree of the Emperor and King Wilhelm II to the Reichschancellor and President of the State Ministry Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Issued from German Military General Headquarters, 7 April 1917

By spring 1917 demands that Kaiser Wilhelm II replace the graduated voting system in Prussia, the kingdom of his own Hohenzollern dynasty, with universal manhood suffrage had become close to irresistible. Internally, growing domestic food shortages, labor unrest, and the army's continuing demand for manpower made it necessary for the German government to offer concessions to demands for democratic political reforms. In a decree issued at Easter that year, addressed to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the kaiser promised universal manhood suffrage to all Prussians and instructed the chancellor to prepare legislation to modify the existing franchise. This pledge was never effectively implemented until after Wilhelm's abdication, since in 1918 the Prussian legislature declined to endorse legislation to this effect.

Never before have the German people proved so unshakable as in this war. The realization that the Fatherland was facing a time of grave emergency exerted a wonderful reconciliatory influence. Notwithstanding all the sacrifices of blood on the foreign field and severe privations at home, the will to risk the utmost for the final victorious struggle has remained unshakable.

National and social spirit have worked together in full mutual understanding, and have given us lasting strength. Everybody feels that which has been built up during long years of peace, amid many internal difficulties, is worth defending.

The achievements of the whole nation in times of war and in times of stress stand before my eyes in glorious array. The experiences of this struggle for our national existence inaugurate with seriously solemnity a new epoch. As Chancellor of the German Reich, responsible to us and First Minister of our Government in Prussia, it was incumbent upon you to help to fulfill the demands of this age at the right time and with the proper measures. On various occasions you have (1486) explained to us in what the aspects of our state life must be improved in order to render possible the free and active co-operation of all the people of our nation. The principles which you have advanced on these occasions have been approved by us, as you know. In doing this I am convinced that I am following the lead of our grandfather, the founder of the Reich, who performed his duties as monarch in an ideal way; as King of Prussia by improving the military organization, and as German Emperor by

inaugurating social reform; and who made it possible for the German people to withstand this dreadful time with unanimous stern perseverance.

To preserve the military power as a true army of and for the people, to further the social improvement of all classes of the people, has been our aim from the very beginning of our reign. Anxious as we are to serve the commonwealth, without disturbing that unity between the people and the monarchy, we have decided to put into effect the improvement of our political, economic, and social life at home, as far as the conditions of war permit.

There are still millions of fellow-countrymen on the field of battle. The settlement of differences behind the front, which are unavoidable by a definite change of the Constitution, must be postponed in the highest interest of the Fatherland until the time of our soldiers' return has come and until they can help by word and deed to further the progress of the new age.

For the reason that immediately after the victorious completion of the war, which I confidently hope to be no longer far off, everything that is necessary and adequate in this respect may be done, I desire that all preparations be finished without delay.

We have at heart, especially, the change of the Prussian Landtag and the release of our whole political life at home from this problem. We now charge you to submit to us definite proposals of the State Ministry that on our soldiers' return this work, which is fundamental for the improvement of Prussia's internal structure, can be carried out quickly by legislative measures. After the great achievements of the whole people in this terrible war, there is in our opinion no more room for the three-class franchise in Prussia. The bill, furthermore, ought to provide for direct and secret election of the representatives.

No King of Prussia will undervalue the merits of the Herrenhaus and its lasting importance for the state. But the Herrenhaus can better meet the demands of the coming age, by taking into its midst, to a larger and more uniform degree than before, leading men of the various circles and professions of the people who are distinguished by the respect of their fellow-citizens.

We only follow the traditions of great ancestors when we show in a loyal, brave, clever, and highly-developed people the confidence which they deserve in re-establishing important parts of our steadfast and storm-proof state.

I charge you to publish this decree at once.

Wilhelm I.R.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:423–425.

102. Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government on War Aims, 9 April 1917

The provisional government was under heavy pressure from its Allies—Britain, France, and eventually the United States—to continue active fighting against Germany and Austria. The military reverses of late 1916 and early 1917, compounded by disorder in the Russian army, meant that the war situation was critical. While affirming its commitment to liberal war aims, the provisional government therefore fervently exhorted the Russian people not to give up the fight.

CITIZENS: The Provisional Government, having considered the military situation of the Russian State, and being conscious of its duty to the country, has resolved to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth.

The overthrown government has left the defense of the country in an utterly disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and inefficient methods, it disorganized our finances, food supply, transportation, and the supply of the army. It has undermined our economic organization.

The Provisional Government, with the active and vigorous assistance of the whole country, will make every effort to remove the dire consequences of the old régime. But time does not wait. The blood of large numbers of the sons of our fatherland has been flowing without limit during these two and a half years of war, and still the country remains exposed to the blows of a powerful enemy, who has seized entire provinces of our country, and is now, in the days of the birth of Russian freedom, menacing us with a new, determined assault.

The defense of our own inheritance by every means, and the liberation of our country from the invading enemy, constitute (1487) the foremost and most urgent task of our fighters, defending the nation's liberty.

Leaving to the will of the people, in close union with our Allies, the final solution of all problems connected with the World War and its conclusion, the Provisional Government considers it to be its right and its duty to declare at this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to enslave or degrade any one. In the name of the loftiest principles of justice, it has removed

the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great struggle humiliated and sapped in its vital forces.

These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which is unswervingly executing the will of the people and defending the rights of our fatherland, fully observing at the same time all obligations assumed towards our Allies.

The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to withhold the truth from the people. The State is in danger. Every effort must be made for its salvation. Let the answer of the nation to the truth here revealed be, not fruitless despair, not discouragement, but a concerted effort to create a single national will. This will give us fresh strength to carry on the fight, and will lead us to salvation.

In this hour of severe trial, let the whole nation find within itself the strength to consolidate the freedom it has won, and work tirelessly for the welfare of free Russia. The Provisional Government, which has taken a solemn oath to serve the people, firmly believes that, with the general and unanimous support of each and every one, it will be enabled to do its duty to the nation to the end.

Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov

Source: Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 329–331.

103. Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Statement for the Press on Issue of War Bonds, 9 April 1917

Although the U.S. government increased taxes substantially to cover war costs, it also issued large quantities of war bonds. The first such "Liberty Loan" was offered to the American public within a few days of U.S. entry into the war. In a public statement, the secretary of the Treasury described his plans for an issue of government bonds. Significantly, 60 percent of the sum requested was designated for the financing of Allied war purchases in the United States.

The Administration will ask Congress for authority to issue \$5,000,000,000 of Government bonds to meet the situation created by the war with Germany. The proposed bonds will be exempt from taxation and bear interest probably at three and one-half (3½) per centum per annum. Two billion dollars of these bonds will be required to finance, in part, the expenditures involved in the proper organization and operation of the army and navy and the conduct of the war generally. Of course, a large amount of additional revenue will have to be raised by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives. It will naturally take a reasonable time to discuss and agree upon the new items for taxation, which should not and, I am confident, will not become the subject of partisan treatment.

Three billion dollars of the proposed issue of bonds should be used to supply credit to the Governments making common cause with us against Germany to enable them to secure essential supplies in the United States and carry on the war with increased effect. The most serviceable thing we can do immediately for the common cause is to furnish credit to these foreign Governments who, in conjunction with us, are fighting Germany. This financial aid ought to be extended at the earliest possible moment. It will be trebly valuable and effective if extended now.

The purpose is to purchase the obligations of the foreign Governments to which credit is given—such obligations to bear the same rate of interest and, in other essentials, to contain the same terms and conditions as the bonds of the United States.

The bonds of the United States will be offered as a great popular loan and the widest opportunity will be given to the public to subscribe, and, by subscribing, to perform one of the most patriotic services that can be rendered to the country at this time. . . .

The wealth of the United States is so great, the investment resources of the country are so large, the strength of our banking situation is so phenomenal, and the patriotism of our people is so aroused, that I am confident that when the Government offers its bonds for public subscription, the amount will be overwhelmingly subscribed. . . .

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 42, April 7–June 23, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 25–27.

(1488)

104. A German View of the Introduction of Tanks: General von Maur's Memorandum on the English Tank Attack of 11 April 1917

In September 1916 the British introduced a new form of battlefield technology, the tank, an armored car that also drew extensively on the techniques used in manufacturing heavy farm machinery. Only one tank made it to the battlefield in September 1916, but in April 1917 a substantial number were used against German troops. After this encounter, German General von Maur wrote an appraisal of the new weapon and its effectiveness.

I. Conduct of the Tanks

1. The tanks are made ready and brought forward in the darkness. The noise of the motors can be heard for kilometers.
2. The tanks at first follow one another, then march up, and finally attack alongside of each other. On the 11.4 [11 April 1917] distances of 80 yards were ordered. Single tanks for the time being are held back.
3. The speed off the roads is at most 4 km. per hour.
4. The built-in machine guns in the front side of the tank open fire at a distance of 500 to 1,000 meters before approaching our trenches. The guns of the male tanks can shoot only sideways, forward, and sideways. Their range possibility is quite great.
5. After reaching or passing over our trenches the majority of the tanks turn right or left, in order to aid the following infantry in mopping up the trenches. Individual tanks prepare the way for the infantry to break through. The tanks signal to each other and to the infantry by means of colored lights.
Among other things: green means, "Approach" or "Wire is cut"; red means, "Danger" or "Wire is not cut"; red-green means, "Wait a little."
6. The tanks overcome ordinary wire entanglements playfully; but by high, thick and wide interferences, as we have them at the Siegfried position, came difficulties. The wire winds itself easily around the transport bands. On the 11.4 one tank was hopelessly stuck in our entanglements.
7. The tanks seem to regard deep trenches of 2.5 m. [meters] width as an unpleasant hindrance.
8. The tanks avoid road crossings near the front or behind the German position because there they suspect traps or mines. (This can be seen from the English maps.) The tanks use the roads leading to our position for marching up only as long as they are far away from our trenches.

Later on they leave the roads and use them solely for the purpose of orientation, in that they drive parallel to them.

II. Resisting the Tanks

1. a. Ditches of 4 m. depth and width are the tank's destruction. One of the many Siegfried foundation-trenches which was to be filled with concrete became a trap for the tank. Tank-ditches are much more profitably placed on both sides of the roads than on the roads. It is by mere chance that a tank gets into one; therefore, it hardly pays to make the effort.
2. b. The tanks are being fired upon during the daytime by all those batteries which can observe the effect of their fire at long distances and which at the moment do not have more important tasks. All kinds of batteries have on the 11.4 placed tanks out of commission. The independent activity of battery commanders must be left the widest field of play.
3. c. During the night only fire at the closest range promises success. April 11 has shown that guns and machine guns which fire with S.M.K. ammunition can put tanks out of commission. The fire upon the sides of the tanks is more effective than upon the front. The greatest danger for the tank is the inflammability of its gasoline and oil supplies. M.G. [machine-gun] fire, too, can ignite them.
4. d. Tank guns cannot be spared; especially for the fighting of tanks which have broken through our positions, and for resisting the infantry which follows the tank they are valuable. As long as the tanks are within our front line, the tank guns endanger their own infantry. On 11.4 seven tanks were destroyed, three of which were destroyed by tank guns.
5. e. *The most effective weapons against the tanks are small trench cannon operated by infantrymen, which until their use find protection in a depression and which fire from close range.* The cannon must not be much less manageable than machine guns.
6. f. Also bomb-throwers of all kinds are suitable for fighting the tank. On the 11.4 a small bomb-thrower put one tank out of commission.
7. g. The moral effect of the tanks upon the infantry is very great; however, it has somewhat palled in the division after the successful fighting on 11.4.17. Also the actual effect of the tank guns and the tank machine-guns must not be underestimated. Infantry Regiment 124 suffered appreciable losses through them on the 11.4. Equipping the infantry with sufficient K-munition and trench cannon, however, will give the infantry a weapon which must mean practically the end of the tank attacks.

(1489)

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:625–627.

105. The French Mutinies of 1917: French Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, “A Crisis of Morale in the French Nation at War, 16th April–23rd October 1917”

In spring 1917 large numbers of French troops, demoralized by more than thirty months of war, the Verdun and Somme campaigns, growing weakness on the Russian front, and a recent failed Nivelle offensive, mutinied and in many cases refused to fight. This was a development whose impact on the Allied ability to continue the war was potentially devastating. Through a combination of ruthless suppression of dissent, the improvement of food and leave arrangements for his troops, efforts to enhance the caliber of officers as well as leadership and morale, and personal visits to all units, General Henri Philippe Pétain, the newly appointed French commander-in-chief, successfully scotched the mutinies. He subsequently wrote an account of this period of the war.

Towards the end of April 1917, the fortune of war appeared to turn against the Allied armies after having smiled on them for a brief moment. The dazzling hopes of the early spring, which the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, America’s entry into the war, and the anticipated impact of the Franco-British offensive had caused the leaders of coalition to hold out, were dashed to the ground. The grand strategic triumph on which so much had been staked turned into a series of dearly-bought minor successes in a prolonged campaign of merciless attrition. Russia defaulted and her army began to disintegrate. The newspapers reported, often with approval, the early revolutionary measures—the setting up of workers’ and soldiers’ committees, the abolition of saluting and of military ranks. The enemy Command, its confidence restored, directed with dogged determination the battles in Artois, the Chemin-des-Dames, and Champagne, and after holding up our progress, banked on renewing their successes.

The French army was exhausted. Hopelessness and pessimism spread to it from the interior, swamping as it did so the mood of superficial enthusiasm, whipped up from above, which had never really taken root.

The fighting troops were at the end of their tether. Those in authority must have seen this quite well, yet they continued to count on them, so often in the past three years had they witnessed the capacity for performing the impossible. This time, however, there were men in the ranks who not only could not but would not answer the call. This was the crisis. It struck, like a bolt from the blue, among the units due to be sent up the line to the two deadliest of the danger-spots, the Chemin-des-Dames and the Monts-de-Champagne.

First Incidents between 29th April and 17th May. Reorganisation of the French High Command. Gravity and Rapid Extension of the Crisis.

On 29th April an infantry regiment stationed at Mourmelon [20th Infantry Regiment, 33rd Infantry Division] was ordered up the line to the sector of the Moronvilliers Heights, where it had carried out attacks on the 17th April and subsequent days and from which it had been withdrawn for a short period of rest only five days before. It was known to the men that they would be employed in a new offensive. They also knew that their division was being sent back into action when other major formations which had also taken part in the attack of 17th April were still resting far from the front. Two or three hundred men, almost all from the battalion chosen to lead the new offensive, failed to appear when their unit was leaving for the front and then announced that they would not march. The unit's officers and NCOs proved incapable of quelling the outbreak, which, however, was put down by the divisional commander within twenty-four hours.

News of this incident soon got round and other mutinous outbreaks followed. On 4th May a number of sudden desertions occurred among members of an infantry regiment [321st Infantry Regiment, 133rd Infantry Division] in action in the Chemin-des-Dames area. In the quarters of a colonial regiment [43rd Colonial Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Colonial Infantry Division] due to take part in an attack in the same sector the men noisily refused to fight, an action clearly provoked by the circulation of leaflets on which were blazoned such inflammatory slogans as "Down with the War!", "Death to the Warmongers!", etc. On 16th and 17th May serious troubles of a similar nature broke out in a battalion of Chasseurs [25th Battalion of Chasseurs-a-pied, 127th Infantry Division], and in an infantry regiment [32nd Infantry Regiment, 18th Infantry Division] in a reserve position on the Aisne. These unhappy incidents multipl[i]ed to a point where the safety and cohesion of the whole army were in jeopardy.

It was precisely on this same date, the 17th, that the French High Command was reorganized. Its first duty was to assess objectively the seriousness of the trouble so as to weigh the gravity of its task. It saw the deadly virus of indiscipline spreading. It received alarming reports from all sides. They poured in—almost uninterruptedly, alas! . . .

(1490)

Example of a Premeditated and Methodically Planned Mutiny in a Regiment: 28th–30th May

This was an example of a type of mutiny conceived in cold blood, systematically organized and obstinately conducted in an infantry regiment [129th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division] which up to that moment had been regarded as quite first class. Planned over a long period, it developed without a hitch, and in an atmosphere of total assurance.

This unit had taken part in May 1916 in the first attempt to recapture Fort Douaumont, where it showed great courage and sustained heavy losses. From June 1916 to February 1917 it was almost continuously in the line in the tough Eparges sector, exposed to constant shelling, surprise attacks and enemy mines. At this point symptoms of serious physical and moral exhaustion became noticeable in its ranks—symptoms which affected the junior officers as well, and to which their superiors, up to the regimental and brigade commanders themselves, appeared to pay too little regard, whereas it should have made them doubly watchful and active, doubly willing to show themselves and take personal risks, to give encouragement and set an example. Action had been taken against certain of these officers whose grip on the situation had been notoriously feeble, and in February 1917 the unit was withdrawn for a rest. By the spring, there were grounds for hoping that when it returned to the fighting line it would once more justify its future reputation. But this moment was delayed, since the grand plan for a strategic exploitation of the attack of 16th April failed to materialize, and the regiment was left in inglorious inactivity near Paris. There the men, too closely in touch with the rear, were affected by the bad spirit in the interior. They listened to the complaints of a multitude of camp-followers whose attitude reflected the labour unrest and strikes spreading throughout the country. They settled down all too well to their prolonged inactivity, to the absence of danger, and to the enjoyment of the comforts which came their way as a result. And when, on Whit Sunday, the lorries arrived to trundle them off to the dreaded destination of Laffaux, the harrowing farewells overcame their sense of duty. It was then that they began to be influenced by the propaganda directed at them at the departure point, and to believe—what they were always being told—that they would be fools indeed to go and get themselves killed when so many others had apparently refused to march.

On 28th May, at the end of its journey, the regiment installed itself in three small villages in a sector to the south of Soissons.

After the midday meal, “la Soupe,” between 150 and 180 men attended a meeting in one of the hamlets, listened to a number of inflammatory speeches, fell in on the road in marching order, and coolly informed their company officers, when these arrived to disperse them, that they refused to go up to the line. They had, they said, had enough of the war. They wanted a cease-fire immediately and thought the Deputies had been wrong in December not to negotiate on the German proposals. They claimed that as Russia crumbled, leaving the German war-machine free to re-mass on the French front, the Government were simply pulling the wool over people’s eyes, and that in fact everyone knew that the Americans would not be able to come into the war in time to be of any use. The fighting soldiers, they complained, were not getting proper leave; their rations were inadequate, their wives and children were “starving to death.” They were no longer willing to sacrifice their lives when shirkers at home were earning all the money, taking the women around in cars, cornering all the best jobs, and while so many profiteers were waxing rich.

The mood of these demonstrators was calm and resolute. They were not drunk. They wanted their protest reported to the Government. They still respected their officers and dispersed when these told them to do so.

Misled by the ease with which they appeared to have won this round, the officers, from the divisional commander down to the most junior second lieutenants, spent the night of the 28th/29th advising each other that the best line to adopt was one of patience and accommodation. They moved around talking to each other when each officer should instead have returned immediately to exert his authority in his unit. They looked on the mutineers, naïvely, as mere strikers whom words would certainly soon restore to a better way of thinking. Then at dawn on the 29th they all returned to their units, with instructions to put the men to light fatigues around the camp, to give them a few pep talks, but to make no reference to the outbreak of the day before, and, most important, in no circumstances to resort to force, even if individual soldiers or groups of men tried to go off on their own.

This made it possible for the demonstrators of the day before to assemble again on the morning of the 29th and form themselves into a column—this time some 400 strong. Most of these had got themselves up to look like strikers, and appeared with walking sticks, flowers in their button-holes, and unbuttoned jackets. They marched in turn to the quarters of each of the other two battalions. There they were joined in the course of the morning by several hundred more supporters. By the end of the midday meal there were more than 800 of them, from every unit in the regiment. They answered to a bugle, and in

due course moved off to rally support from the regiment next in line. Their discipline was excellent. They had been told by their leaders to do nothing which might provoke (1491) violence and to confine themselves to signifying their fixed and unalterable determination to take no part in any further costly attacks. They made this point firmly to the Divisional Commander, "You have nothing to fear, we are prepared to man the trenches, we will do our duty and the Boche will not get through. But we will not take part in attacks which result in nothing but useless casualties. . . ." They maintained the same position when harangued by the Corps Commander, who upbraided them, offered them fatherly advice, and threatened dire punishments in his various attempts to move them. All to no avail. With unshakeable politeness they repeated their complaints against the Government and what was happening in the interior, adding that they would hold the line but would refuse to take part in any new offensive and demanded immediate peace. About mid-afternoon they reached the quarters of the neighbouring regiment. Here the mutineers were fewer in number but much wilder. They urged them to be calm and to maintain respect for their officers. Then, led on as usual by some extremely skilful organizers, who seem from the evidence to have acted like true mob leaders throughout, they decided to continue their impressive march round the other units of the division and then to go on and capture some trains in which to set off for Paris with their own crews in the drivers' cabs. But, if necessary, they were prepared to march on the capital by stages in order to bring their demands before the Chambers of Deputies. Meanwhile they returned to their own cantonments for the night.

At dawn on the 30th, under orders from the High Command, motor convoys arrived at the camps to act as transport for the three battalions. This time the officers were at their posts, and with tougher instructions. They shouted louder than the agitators and made their men obey them. The mutineers put up some resistance but did board the lorries. On the journey they continued their attempts at incitement, and tried to stir up the troops they met on the way. They made "hands up" and "thumbs down" signs. They whistled. They sang the Internationale. They waved bits of red cloth. They distributed leaflets containing the text of their refusal to fight and encouraged others to follow their example.

On the evening of the 30th and on the following days the regiment was halted in isolation from other units, then moved to the Verdun sector by train. The rebellious spirit persisted, but the demonstrations became less frequent. The High Command split up the battalions, and during the month of June Courts Martial were held. A corporal and three privates were sentenced to death for

“deserting their post and refusing to obey orders in the presence of the enemy.” The regiment itself supplied the firing squads and several detachments for the expiatory ceremony, which took place without incident on 28th June. On 29th June, the regiment was stripped of its colours. The battalion to which the leading spirits of the mutiny had belonged was disbanded on 16th July, and the necessary new postings among the officers took place.

That was the end of it. In July the two remaining battalions gave an honourable account of themselves at Verdun. In 1918 the regiment was reconstituted. It was twice mentioned in dispatches, received back its colours, and was decorated with the lanyard of the Croix de Guerre on the very spot where the 1917 mutinies had taken place. . . .

General Character of the Crisis from June to September

The mutinies . . . reached their peak on 2nd June, when seventeen outbreaks were reported. The situation remained serious up to 10th June, with an average of seven incidents a day. During the rest of the month the daily average was one. In July the total fell to seven incidents altogether, in August to four, and in September to one.

Altogether, 151 incidents were recorded and examined, of which 110 were concerted outbreaks of genuine gravity. Out of the total of 151, 112 took place in the Aisne area behind the Chemin-des-Dames sector of the front (plus five on the other parts of the front but among units which had come from the Chemin-des-Dames sector). Eight occurred in the Monts-des-Champagne district (plus two which took place in other parts of the front but involved troops from Champagne), and twenty-two occurred in various other parts of the army zone.

A total of 110 units were affected. Sixty-eight of them were present (in the line or in reserve) on the Aisne on 16th April, and six were before Monts-de-Champagne. Between them they consisted of:

1. 76 Infantry Regiments
- 2 Colonial Infantry Regiments
- 21 Chasseur Battalions
- 1 Territorial Infantry Regiment
- 8 Artillery Regiments
- 1 Regiment of Dragoons
- 1 Senegalese Battalion

These units belonged to fifty-four different divisions—that is, more than half the total number of divisions in the French army at that time.

Disturbances also occurred on 110 trains and had repercussions in 130 stations due to repeated acts of indiscipline along the whole length of the lines. These disorders were an extension (1492) of those in the interior of the country, and all converged to reach their point of greatest intensity in the area just behind the line. Angoulême, Bourdeaux, Nantes, Toulouse, St Pierre-des-Corps, St Etienne and Limoges had all been centres of serious unrest. This spread along the lines of communication towards the army zone until it reached the main lines, of which the principal was the line Paris-Châlons-Nancy.

Such was the storm of madness which for several weeks swept a harassed and distracted France, threatening to blind her both to her objectives and to her duties.

Source: Edward Spears, *Two Men Who Saved France: Pétain and De Gaulle* (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), 86–98.

106. An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States (Draft Act), 18 May 1917

Within a few weeks of U.S. entry into the war, Congress passed an act enlarging the U.S. military and instituting registration of all young men between ages 21 and 30 for this purpose. In the last major American conflict, the Civil War of 1861–1865, those drafted had been allowed, could they afford it, to pay substitutes to serve in their place. Reflecting the changed temper of the early twentieth century and the sense that such practices were inherently undemocratic, in 1917 no such loopholes were allowed, and all young men in this age group were liable to conscription. There were, by contrast, provisions for exemption from combatant service for conscientious objectors who based their stance on religious grounds, though in practice such individuals were often subjected to brutal harassment.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in view of the existing emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized—

First. Immediately to raise, organize, officer and equip all or such number of increments of the Regular Army provided by the national defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, or such parts thereof as he may deem necessary; to raise all organizations of the Regular Army, including those added by such increments, to the maximum enlisted strength authorized by law. Vacancies in the Regular Army created or caused by the addition of increments as herein authorized which can not be filled by promotion may be filled by temporary appointment for the period of the emergency or until replaced by permanent appointments or by provisional appointments made under the provisions of section twenty-three of the national defense Act, approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, and hereafter provisional appointments under said section may be terminated whenever it is determined, in the manner prescribed by the President, that the officer has not the suitability and fitness requisite for permanent appointment. . . .

Sec. 2. That the enlisted men required to raise and maintain the organizations of the Regular Army and to complete and maintain the organizations embodying the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, at the maximum legal strength as by this Act provided, shall be raised by voluntary enlistment, or if and whenever the President decides that they cannot effectually be so raised or maintained, then by selective draft; and all other

forces hereby authorized, except as provided in the seventh paragraph or section one, shall be raised and maintained by selective draft exclusively; but this provision shall not prevent the transfer to any force of training cadres from other forces. Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of this Act. Quotas for the several States, Territories and District of Columbia, or subdivisions thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the population thereof, and credit shall be given to any State, Territory, District, or subdivision thereof, for the number of men who were in the military service of the United States as member of the National Guard on April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, or who have since said date entered the military service of the United States from any such State, Territory, District or subdivision, either as members of the Regular Army or the National Guard. . . .

Sec. 3. No bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in the military service of the United States; and no person liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the military service of the United States; and no such person shall be permitted to escape such service by the payment of money or any other valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from military service or liability thereto.

Sec. 4. That the Vice President of the United States, the officers, legislative, executive, and judicial of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, students who at the time of the approval of this act are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or divinity (1493) schools, and all persons in the military or naval service of the United States shall be exempt from the selective draft herein prescribe; and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized or existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted shall declare to be noncombatant; and the President is hereby authorized to exclude or discharge from said selective draft and from the draft under the second paragraph of section one hereof, or to draft for

partial military service only from those liable to draft as in this Act provided, persons of the following classes: County and municipal officials; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mails; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States, and such other persons employed in the service of the United States as the President may designate; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant or merchant within the United States; persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military Establishment or the effective operation of the military forces or the maintenance of national interest during the emergency; those in a status with respect to persons dependent on them for support which renders their exclusion or discharge advisable; and those found to be physically or morally deficient. No exemption or exclusion shall continue when a cause therefor no longer exists; *Provided*, That notwithstanding the exemptions enumerated herein, each State, Territory and the District of Columbia shall be required to supply its quota in the proportion that its population bears to the total population of the United States.

The President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to create and establish throughout the several States and subdivisions thereof and in the Territories and the District of Columbia local boards, and where, in his discretion, practicable and desirable, there shall be created and established one such local board in each county or similar subdivision in each State, and one for approximately each thirty thousand of population in each city of thirty thousand population or over, according to the last census taken or estimates furnished by the Bureau of Census of the Department of Commerce. Such Boards shall be appointed by the President, and shall consist of three or more members, none of whom shall be connected with the Military Establishment, to be chosen from among the local authorities of such subdivisions or from other citizens residing in the subdivision or area in which the respective boards will have jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such boards shall have power within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to review as hereafter provided, all questions of exemption under the Act, and all questions of or claims for including or discharging individuals or classes of individuals from the selective draft, which shall be made under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, except any and every question or claim for including or excluding persons or classes or persons from the selective draft under the provisions of this Act authorizing the President to exclude or discharge from the selective draft "Persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military

Establishment, or the effective operation of the military forces, or the maintenance of the national interest during the emergency.”

The President is hereby authorized to establish additional boards, one in each Federal judicial district of the United States, consisting of such number of citizens, not connected with the Military Establishment, as the President may determine, who shall be appointed by the President. The President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to establish more than any one such board in any Federal judicial district of the United States, or to establish one such board having jurisdiction of an area extending into more than one Federal judicial district.

Such district boards shall review on appeal and affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of any local board having jurisdiction in the area in which any such district board has jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such district boards shall have exclusive original jurisdiction within their respective areas to hear and determine all questions or claims for including or excluding or discharging persons or classes of persons from the selective draft, under the provisions of this Act, not included within the original jurisdiction of such local boards. . . .

Sec. 5. That all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President; and upon proclamation by the President or other public notice given by him or his direction stating the time and place of such registration it shall be the duty of all persons of the designated ages, except officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, and the National Guard and Naval Militia while in the service of the United States, to present themselves for and submit to registration under the provisions of this Act; and every such person shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of this Act upon the publication of such proclamation or other notice as aforesaid given by the President or by his direction; and any person who shall (1494) wilfully fail or refuse to present himself for registration or to submit thereto as herein provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, and shall thereupon be duly registered. . . .

Source: *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 40, pp. 76–80, reprinted in John O. Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, *The Draft and Its Enemies: A Documentary History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 123–127.

107. The U.S. Espionage Act, 15 June 1917

Two months after the United States declared war on Germany, Congress passed an act defining a broad range of activities as espionage and therefore liable to prosecution. Besides forbidding what might narrowly be defined as conventional spying, the act also banned the circulation of information intended to hamper the prosecution of the war or damage military morale, a provision that the attorney general quickly interpreted as allowing him to forbid any socialist or antiwar publication using the facilities of the U.S. Postal Service.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled

Title I

Espionage

Section 1

That:

(a) whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defence with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information, concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defence, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defence, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section six of this title; or

(b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue

print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing or note of anything connected with the national defence; or

(c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any other person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defence, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or

(d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defence, wilfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(e) whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national defence, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Section 2

Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury or the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicated, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids, or induces another to, communicate, deliver or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, (1495) or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly and document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defence, shall be punished by imprisonment

for not more than twenty years: *Provided*, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection:

(a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and

(b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification of any place, or any other information relating to the public defence, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years.

Section 3

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall wilfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall wilfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

Section 4

If two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions of section two or three of this title, and one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy. Except as above provided conspiracies to commit offences under this title shall be punished as provided by section thirty-seven of the Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine.

Section 5

Whoever harbours or conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed, or is about to commit, an offence under this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Section 6

The President in time of war or in case of national emergency may by proclamation designate any place other than those set forth in subsection:

(a) of section one hereof in which anything for the use of the Army or Navy is being prepared or constructed or stored as a prohibited place for the purpose of this title: Provided, That he shall determine that information with respect thereto would be prejudicial to the national defence. . . .

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/espionageact.htm>.

108. Conscription of Russian Women for War Work: Decree of Minister of War Alexander Kerenski, 28 June 1917

As the war situation became ever more desperate, the Russian provisional government took the step—unusual even for war governments in World War I—of conscripting women as well as men.

In recognition of the fact that the extraordinary conditions through which our country is at the present moment passing, demand a full accounting and mobilization of all forces that are capable of reviving and increasing the physical and spiritual forces of the nation, I consider it timely to proceed to a solution of the problem of utilizing the ability and capacity of Russian women (whose rights have already been recognized in principle), in concrete, direct form to take the place of male labor in all the central administrative offices and auxiliary organizations of the Ministry of War.

To carry out this task, I order:

1. A special commission organized, under the Principal Bureau of the General Staff, to examine the possibilities and conditions for the employment of women in the Ministry of War.
2. That if the Commission agrees in principle that the conscription of women for work is practicable, it shall at once prepare an appropriate bill for submission to the higher governmental institutions.

(1496)

3. That representatives of the Union of Women's Democratic Organizations and other women's associations (which have taken the initiative in the matter here discussed), be invited to cooperate with the Commission, as well as representatives of other ministries and public organizations whose participation may be necessary.
4. As the chairman of the Commission, I designate O. K. Nechaeva.
5. The Commission must complete its report in two weeks and submit its report to me for confirmation.

A. Kerenski, Minister of War

Source: *Izvestiia*, 29 June 1917, in Frank Alfred Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century, 1927), 422.

(1497)

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World War I Documents (July–December 1917)

109. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser and King, Wilhelm II, 12 July 1917, 6:25 p.m.
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118. President Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union Message, 4 December 1917
119. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “For Bread And Peace,” Written in Petrograd, 14 December 1917, First Published in German in May 1918 in the Newspaper *Jugend-Internationale*
120. Leon Trotsky, Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Note to the Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries regarding Peace Negotiations, 29 December 1917

109. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser and King, Wilhelm II, 12 July 1917, 6:25 p.m.

A domestic political crisis shook Germany in early July as four major "fractions" or political groups within the Reichstag demanded the opening of peace negotiations and the granting of greater democracy within Germany. On 10 July Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg submitted his resignation, which was declined the following day after Austro-Hungarian leaders asked that he remain in office. As domestic political pressure to open peace negotiations mounted, German military leaders argued forcefully against any such policy. At the instigation of the Prussian Minister of War General Hermann von Stein, on the evening of 12 July Hindenburg sent the following telegram to the kaiser.

The War Minister informs me that the Reichstag is intending to make a declaration in the shape of a peace offer, which might be regarded as a peace of renunciation. I must offer the most serious objections to such a declaration, as it would intensify the existing unrest in the army and would be regarded as a sign of internal weakness at the present moment. In view of the declarations of enemy countries it would meet with no welcome, but rather strengthen the determination of our enemies to fight on.

Remembering the army I humbly beg Your Majesty graciously to command the Government to prevent such a declaration.

Source: General Erich von Ludendorff, *The General Staff and Its Problems*, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson, 1920), 2:462.

110. The July Crisis: The Reichstag Peace Resolution, 19 July 1917

By mid-1917 popular and political support for the war in Germany was decreasing as the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare failed to bring a quick victory and as food shortages and manpower demands hit home. Leading (1498) politicians demanded moves toward greater democracy, including the swift implementation of the kaiser's Easter decree. The crisis forced the resignation of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, whom the kaiser—without consulting the Reichstag—replaced with Georg Michaelis, whose tenure of office only lasted three months. At this juncture a majority of the German Reichstag, including the Center Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Progressive People's Party, representatives from Alsace-Lorraine, and various others, by a vote of 212–126 passed a resolution demanding a liberal peace settlement, without annexations or indemnities. The centrist Deputy Konstantin Fehrenbach presented this resolution in the Reichstag.

Gentlemen, on behalf of the “Fraktion” [political grouping] of the Center, the Social-Democrats, and the Progressive People's Party, I have the honor to present to the distinguished House the following resolution with the request that it be adopted:

The Reichstag declares: As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of war, the word of the Speech from the Rhine holds good for the German people. “We are not impelled by lust of conquest.” Germany resorted to arms in order to defend her people and independence and the integrity of her territorial possessions.

The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples. Forced territorial acquisitions and political, economic, or financial oppressions are irreconcilable with such a peace. The Reichstag also rejects all plans which aim at the economic isolation and hostility among nations after the war. The freedom of the seas must be made secure. Only an economic peace will prepare the ground for a friendly intercourse between the nations.

The Reichstag will strongly promote the creation of international judicial organizations.

However, as long as the enemy governments will not enter upon such a peace, as long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquests and coercion the German nation will stand together as a man and steadfastly hold out and

fight until its own and its allies' right to life and development is secured. The German nation is invincible in its unity. The Reichstag knows that it is in harmony with the men who in heroic struggle are defending the Fatherland. The imperishable gratitude of the whole people is assured them.

Permit me to add the following remarks in the name of the "Fraktion" of the Center:

The day on which the German Reichstag announces its peace intentions is a memorable one. It has maintained great reserve with regard to foreign affairs since the Empire was established. Now, on the threshold of the fourth year of the war, it comes forward and announces to the world the readiness of the German people for a peace, honorable for all sides, for friends and foes alike. It does not interfere in that which is the business of the Government; it makes no peace offer to the enemy Governments; it is the business of the Government to decide as to the time and the precise circumstances for that. What it undertakes today is only a peace demonstration. It affirms the readiness of its own people for peace, and solemnly invites enemy nations to let themselves be animated by the same willingness for peace. Its intention is, in perfect agreement with the words we have just heard from the Imperial Chancellor [Michaelis], a peace through understanding; its object is the lasting reconciliation of the nations, not conquests, not oppression, not growing enmity between the nations, but a return to peace occupations, to the blessings of culture and civilization.

The question has been raised and it has been deemed necessary to answer it in the negative: Will our enemies be convinced of the honesty of our purpose? I know not, but this I do know: hatred and passion are evil counselors. The German people have been frightfully caricatured, but in the end, though perhaps not for some time, quiet reflection will come to its own once more, and will say: the German nation is a strong and brave nation, but it has distinguished itself even more in works of peace than in the arts of war and has devoted itself to the work of peace with such ardor that all warlike thought seemed to be excluded. And now, if an imposing majority of a whole nation makes its readiness for understanding so clear as to preclude all possibility of doubt, and renounces all policy of violent conquest, can anyone doubt its honesty? One would have to lose all faith in humanity, in the morality of the human soul, if one believed such a train of thought to be impossible in enemy countries. In any case, our honest peace declaration does justice to the serious responsibility of the hour. We have been warned against such a declaration lest our enemies should take it as a sign of weakness, a sign that we are beginning to slacken. I do not doubt that this will be said in the enemy camp, especially in

the coming days and weeks; but we will prove, day in, day out, that we are ready to strike and resolved to conquer. Our brave armies will not fail in deeds of valor so long as the enemy elects to go on fighting. From week to week the increasing activity of our U-boats will reduce the enemy's tonnage and increase his anxiety as to munitions and food supplies; and our people at home, who have shown such wonderful endurance during these three hard years of war, will stand firm, all the more, as in many parts of the Fatherland the harvest is unusually rich. Need we then give up hope that even our enemies will recognize, though possibly not for months, that it is not necessity, (1499) but longing for the blessings of peace, which impels the representatives of the German people to come forward and offer their hands toward mutual understanding.

We felt the moment had now come seriously to advocate peace. For three whole years the most terrible of wars has raged; things of inestimable value are destroyed day after day; towns and countries are devastated; the fields are drenched with the blood of the best sons of the nations. Mutilations, diseases, and infirmity are heaped up a million-fold; millions of lives are sacrificed to the hatred between nations; the nations are destroying what is of most value to them, human life. And therefore on the threshold of the fourth year of the war the frightful question each nation must ask of its own conscience is: "Is this war to last another year?" We felt ourselves bound before God and our own conscience, as far as it rests with us, to put an end to this misery. No forced surrender of territory, no political, economic, or financial oppression would compensate for the amount of misery a continuance of the war would involve, and it would make a lasting reconciliation of the nations impossible. Our military situation precludes the possibility of misinterpretation; hence our declaration of a desire for peace. The next word rests with the enemy. The man who is for peace, be he ever so strong and brave a man, does not boast of his power and rattle his saber. But this is the holy vow of a serious people in the gravest hour; should the hand now offered for the first time by the representatives of the German people be rejected, then the whole German people will rise up in righteous wrath; then our brave troops will accomplish even greater deeds of valor; then we at home shall behold a wonderful example of cohesion and endurance, and prove to the world that the German nation in its unity is invincible.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:282–285.

111. Pope Benedict XV, Peace Note, 1 August 1917

In summer 1917 the Pope addressed all the belligerent powers suggesting a seven-point peace plan, which all the combatants except Austria-Hungary largely ignored. Indeed, when the Allies signed the 1915 Treaty of London with Italy, they had secretly undertaken to ignore any papal initiatives, a fact that only became generally known early in 1918 when the Soviet government published the texts of the various secret treaties the Allies had made with each other as to the disposition of their enemies' territories after the war ended.

To the leaders of the warring nations! Since the beginning of our pontificate, in the midst of the horrors which this fearful war has brought to Europe, we have held fast to these three aims: To maintain *complete impartiality* towards all parties to the strife, as befits the universal Father who loves all his children equally; secondly, to devote all our efforts to do all the good we could, without respect of persons or discriminating between nations and faiths, in accordance with the general commandment of love and in consideration of the spiritual office we hold, which office was entrusted to us by Christ; lastly, as our mission of peace also requires, to neglect nothing, so far as within us lies, which might aid in hastening the end of this disaster, and for that end we have striven to adjure the nations and their rulers to make far-reaching resolutions and clear declarations such as might lead to a just and lasting peace. Not all that we have done with this high aim is known to the world. But everyone who has carefully followed our rule during the three tragic years which have just passed will easily appreciate that we have remained as faithful to our decision to preserve complete impartiality as to our strivings to give help, and that we have repeatedly implored the nations and their leaders to be friends and brothers once more. Towards the close of the first year of war we directed the most urgent warnings to the warring peoples and their leaders, and pointed the way to a lasting peace honourable for all. Unhappily our summons resounded but was not heard, and for two more years the war has raged pitilessly with all its horrors, indeed on an increasing scale of cruelty, and has extended from land to sea and even into the air. It has hurled destruction and death on unfortified towns, on peaceful villages and their innocent inhabitants. No one can even imagine how the sufferings of all would multiply and intensify if these three bloodstained years are followed by several months or perhaps years more. Is the civilized world to become nothing more than a heap of corpses? Shall Europe, so rich in glory and achievement, precipitate itself into the gulf and commit suicide, as if seized by universal madness?

In this ghastly situation and in [the] face of such serious dangers we once more issue our cry for peace and renew our urgent appeal to those to whom the destinies of the nations are entrusted. We have no kind of political aim of our own, and the ambitions and strivings of the States involved in the war have no influence upon us. We are inspired solely by the consciousness of the loftiest duty imposed upon the common Father of all believers, by the urgent prayers of our children who implore us to mediate in the cause of peace, and lastly by the call of humanity and reason. Yet at this moment we do not desire to confine ourselves to a general appeal such as circumstances have hitherto dictated; we wish to proceed to more definite and feasible proposals. We invite the governments of the warring nations to agree upon the following principles, which seem fitted to form the basis of a just and lasting peace. We leave to those governments the duties of restricting or expanding them.

(1500)

First and foremost it must be accepted as a starting-point and foundation that the moral power of justice must take the place of the material power of force. From that we must come to a fair common agreement with regard to the *reduction of armaments*, which must be simultaneous and proportionate. The regulations and securities to be established in this matter must, as a general and normal standard, be such as are required and sufficient to maintain public order in each State. Further, a Court of Arbitration must take the place of armies. It will fulfil its appointed task of maintaining peace in accordance with agreed principles and employ its definite powers against every State which either refuses to submit international questions to the Court of Arbitration or accept its decrees. When once the supremacy of law has been established, all restrictions on communication between nations should cease, while the true *freedom of the seas*, which belongs to all [*communauté des mers*], will be secured by definite provisions which will remove many causes of conflict and also open new sources of well-being and progress.

With regard to the question of compensation and indemnities we see no other means of solving this problem than an agreement in principle by all parties to renounce them utterly. The justification of such an agreement is to be found in the enormous benefits which a reduction of armaments will bring, and also in the fact that the prolongation of this wholesale slaughter for the sake of questions of money alone would seem to be incomprehensible. If there are contrary reasons and special claims in particular cases, these must be considered in accordance with justice and equity.

A peaceful agreement, with the incalculable blessings it will bring, is obviously impossible without the mutual restoration of the areas now occupied. Thus, Belgium must be completely evacuated by Germany and security be given for her integral political, military and economic independence of any and every Power. In the same way French territory must be evacuated and the German colonies given back by the other warring Powers.

As regards territorial questions which are in dispute, as for instance those between Italy and Austria, Germany and France, we may hope that in consideration of the incalculable blessings accruing from a peace the permanency of which would be guaranteed by disarmament, the parties to the dispute would examine their claims in a spirit of conciliation, while, as we said in another place, the aspirations of the peoples would be judged by the standard of what is just and possible, and particular interests would be brought into harmony with the general well-being of the great human family.

The aforesaid spirit of equity and justice must prevail in considering other territorial and political questions, notably those having reference to Armenia, the Balkan States and those countries which once formed the Kingdom of Poland, which has gained the sympathy of all nations not only by her noble historical traditions but also by her sufferings in the present war.

Such are the most vital of the principles on which we think a future resuscitation of the league of nations should be based. They are of a nature to make the recurrence of similar wars impossible and to secure a corresponding solution of the economic question which is of such immense consequence to the future welfare of all the peoples involved in the war. In laying them before you—you, who in this fateful hour guide the destinies of the warring nations—we are inspired by the sweet hope that they will meet with your assent so that a speedy end will be put to this fearful conflict which seems more and more to be nothing but purposeless massacre. For the rest, the whole world recognizes that the honour of arms has been maintained on both sides. Listen to our pleading, heed the fatherly appeal which we make to you in the name of the Heavenly Redeemer, the Prince of Peace. Think of your terrible responsibility to God and Humanity. Upon your decisions depend the peace and joy of families innumerable, the lives of thousands of young men—in a word, the happiness of the nations, to secure which is your urgent and highest duty. May God guide you to decisions which fulfil His Holy will. God grant that with the enthusiastic assent of your contemporaries, the coming generations will give you glorious praise for having restored peace to the world.

United in prayer and penitence with all pious souls who are longing for peace I entreat the Holy Spirit to bring you enlightenment and wisdom.

Source: General Erich von Ludendorff, *The General Staff and Its Problems*, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson, 1920), 2:483–487.

112. Max Eastman to President Woodrow Wilson, 8 September 1917

*Half a year after U.S. intervention, wartime suppression of free speech greatly disturbed many American liberals and radicals. The New York socialist Max Eastman, editor of the journal **The Masses**, which since 1914 had consistently taken an antiwar stance, complained to President Wilson of the legal restrictions imposed upon that magazine's circulation when it refused to alter its policy. He also gave a vivid picture of the harassment and physical intimidation to which American troops had subjected him when he tried to speak in Fargo, North Dakota. Although Eastman wrote to Wilson in September 1917 protesting against the government's attitude, his representations were clearly ineffective. The attorney general soon closed the journal down and prosecuted Eastman and his fellow editors and contributors for violations of the Espionage Act. Two trials, in (1501) April 1918 and January 1919, ended with hung juries, after which the government dropped the case.*

Now you have declared for substantially the Russian terms—no “punitive damages,” no “dismemberment of empires,” “vindication of sovereignties,” and by making a responsible ministry in Germany the one condition of your entering into negotiations, you have given a concrete meaning to the statement that this is a war for democracy. The manner in which you have accomplished this—and apparently bound the allies to it into the bargain—has my profound admiration. I am encouraged by this renewed assurance of your faith in democracy to lay before you two matters in which I believe that democracy is suffering at home more than the exigencies of military organization demand.

The first is the matter of the right of free speech and assemblage for the minority.

A week ago Tuesday I went to Fargo, North Dakota, to speak in favour of the very peace terms which on Wednesday were made public as your own in the letter to the Pope. I had not spoken for five minutes when an entire company of United States soldiers in their uniforms (Company B, I believe) burst into the hall, took possession of the platform, began to put out the lights, ordered all ladies to leave the building, and openly threatened me with violence. After a futile attempt to address them, I stepped down from the platform, and on the advice of persons in the audience made my escape from a side door while they were celebrating their victory. I went to the house of a friend, where I was called up on the telephone and told me that the soldiers were hunting for me and intended to lynch me. I armed myself and left town in an automobile,

leaving my bags at the hotel. The soldiers formed a cordon around my hotel stopping everyone who came in or out, and openly declared their intention to hang me. This continued until midnight when they learned that I had left town. These facts were published in full in the Fargo morning paper, but they were not sent out by the Associated Press.

My friend in Fargo whose name I can furnish privately, informed me that officers were present at the meeting, including a colonel. I cite this only as one example of the wanton violations of constitutional right which are being perpetrated in the name of the war for democracy, and perpetrated by soldiers in your command. Is there not grave danger to our civil liberties in these hundreds of thousands of armed men, if in the name of patriotism they are allowed with impunity to degenerate into gangs of marauders?

The other principle of democracy which I believe is being violated beyond the necessities of military efficiency, and illegally violated too by officers of your appointment, is the freedom of the press. As I think you know, I edit a monthly magazine, THE MASSES. In that magazine I have endeavoured to state my full opinions about the war policy, as far as the statement of them did not violate the law. Nevertheless, the Post Office department declared the August issue of my magazine unmailable. I appeared before Judge Learned Hand in the 2nd district court of New York, and asked for a court order compelling the Post Office to receive the magazine. It was granted, Judge Hand ruling not only that my magazine was mailable under the law, but that there was not even a question whether it was mailable or not, as on such a question the Postmaster General would have power to decide. The post office, however, secured from Judge Hough of the Circuit Court of Appeals a stay of this order pending appeal to that court, which will probably convene in October. He also put the Post Office under a bond of \$10,000 to secure me of my damage in case the appeal was lost. Meanwhile, however, the Postmaster General has revoked my mailing privilege altogether, on the ground that the continuity of mailing of my periodical has been interrupted—it having been interrupted only tentatively, and that at the request of the Post Office, by a stay of execution, pending an appeal which should determine whether it was to be interrupted or not. It is not necessary for you to consider what it is in the magazine in order to be assured that this action is beyond the powers that a republic should depute to an appointed bureaucracy even in war-time. For I have repeatedly requested the post office to inform me what specific things of kinds of things in my magazine they consider unmailable, so that I might make up the magazine in such a way as to be mailable in the future, and they have stubbornly and contemptuously refused. Moreover the Postmaster General, in endeavoring to justify the

suppression of the **MASSSES** to the Senate, stated that it was denied the mails because it is a part of an organized propaganda to promote resistance to the draft. This accusation of crime is absolutely false.

I am informed by my attorneys that in ordinary times they could proceed against the Postmaster General and the Secretary of Treasury and Solicitor Lamar of the Post Office, for conspiracy to destroy my magazine, and win the case without difficulty. At least it is a fact that I am ready to make my magazine conform to the laws, if it does not. I have so stated to the Post Office, and I have been unable to extract any response from them but this grim and underhanded act of bureaucracy which I have described.

You know that the powers which would like to kill the propaganda of socialism are mighty, and you also know that this propaganda will surely play a great part in the further democratizing of the world. I ask you whether it is with your authority that an appointee of yours endeavors to destroy the life of (1502) one of the three growing Socialist magazines in this country, as a war measure in a war for democracy—and to do this without even giving its editor the opportunity which he has demanded to alter it or mould it somewhat to meet the exigencies of a military situation?

I believe that the support which your administration will receive from radical-minded people the country over, depends greatly on its final stand on these two critical matters of free speech and assemblage and freedom of the Press.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 44, August 21–November 10, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 169–172. Courtesy of the Eastman family.

113. “The Children of the Crucible,” 11 September 1917

This statement called upon all Americans to support the war wholeheartedly, condemning not just hyphenated Americans of Irish and German descent who did not do so but also pacifists and socialists. It was drafted by the almost hyperbolically prowar ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and signed by the German Jewish leader Oscar S. Straus “and many other persons of foreign descent.” It was an example of the fierce superpatriotism characteristic of World War I, which equated doubts over the war with a total absence of loyalty to the United States. Predictably, it was circulated by one of the unofficial prowar groups, the Vigilantes’ Special Service.

We Americans are the children of the crucible. It has been our boast that out of the crucible, the melting pot of life in this free land, all the men and women of all the nations who come hither emerge as Americans and as nothing else; Americans who proudly challenge as a right, not as a favor, that they “belong” just as much as any other Americans and that they stand on a full and complete equality with them; Americans therefore, who must, even more strongly, insist that they have renounced completely and without reserve, all allegiance to the lands from which they or their forefathers came, and that it is a binding duty on every citizen of this country in every important crisis, to act solidly with all his fellow Americans, having regard only to the honor and interest of America and treating every other nation purely on its conduct in that crisis, without reference to his ancestral predilections or antipathies. If he does not so act, he is false to the teachings and the lives of Washington and Lincoln, he is not entitled to any part or lot in our country, and he should be sent out of it. If he does not act purely as an American, he shows that in his case the crucible has failed to do its work. The crucible must melt all who are cast in it; it must turn them out in one American mould; and this must be the mould shaped a hundred and forty years ago by the men who under Washington founded this as a free nation, separate from all others. Even at that time, true Americans were of many different race strains; Paul Revere and Charles Carroll, Marion Herkimer, Sullivan, Schuyler and Muhlenberg, stood on an equality of service and achieved respect with Lighthorse Harry Lee and Israel Putnam. But the majority of the leaders and of their followers were of English blood. They did not, because of this, hesitate to resist and antagonize Great Britain when Great Britain wronged this nation: they stood for liberty and for the eternal rule of right and justice and they stood as Americans and nothing else.

All Americans of other race origin must act towards the countries from which their ancestors sprang as Washington and his associates in their day acted.

Otherwise they are traitors to America. This applies especially today to all Americans of German blood who directly or indirectly in any manner support Germany as against the United States and the Allies of the United States; it applies no less specifically to all American citizens of Irish blood who are led into following the same course not by their love of Germany but by their hatred of England. One motive is as inexcusable as the other; and in each case the action is treasonable to the United States.

The professional pacifists have, during the last three years, proved themselves the evil enemies of their country. They now advocate an inconclusive peace. In so doing they have shown themselves to be the spiritual heirs of the Tories who in the name of peace opposed Washington, and of the Copperheads who in the name of peace opposed Lincoln. We regard these men and women as traitors to the republic; we regard them as traitors to the great cause of justice and humanity. This war is a war for the vital interests of America. When we fight for America abroad we save our children from fighting for America at home beside their own ruined hearthstones. We believe that the large majority of Americans are proudly ready to fight to the last for the overthrow of the brutal German militarism which threatens America no less than every other civilized nation. We believe that it would be an act of baseness and infamy, an act of unworthy cowardice and a betrayal of this country and of mankind to accept any peace except the peace of overwhelming victory, a peace based on the complete overthrow of the Prussianized Germany of the Hohenzollerns.

We hold that the true test of loyal Americanism today is effective service against Germany. We should exert as speedily as possible every particle of our vast lazy strength to win the triumph over Germany. Therefore we should demand that the Government act at once with unrelenting severity against the traitors here at home, whether their treasonable activity take the form of editing and publishing newspapers, of uttering speeches, or of intrigue and conspiracy.

(1503)

We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. That must be the language of the Declaration of Independence, of Washington's Farewell Address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg Speech and Second Inaugural. We cannot tolerate any attempt to oppose or supplant the language and culture that has come down to us from the builders of this Republic with the language of any European country. The greatness of this nation depends on the swift assimilation of the aliens she welcomes to her shores. Any force which attempts to retard that assimilative process is a force hostile to the highest

interests of our country. It is a force which, if allowed to develop, will, for the benefit of this group or that, undermine our national institutions and pervert our national ideals. Whatever may have been our judgment in normal times, we are convinced that today our most dangerous foe is the foreign language press and every similar agency such as the German-American Alliance, which holds the alien to his former associations and through them to his former allegiance. We call upon all loyal and unadulterated Americans to man the trenches against the enemy within our gates.

We ask that good Americans . . . uphold the hands of the Government at every point efficiently and resolutely against our foreign and domestic foes, and that they constantly spur the Government to speedier and more effective action. Furthermore, we ask that where governmental action cannot be taken, they arouse an effective and indignant public opinion against the enemies of our country, whether these enemies masquerade as pacifists, or proclaim themselves the enemies of our Allies, or act through organizations such as the I.W.W. [International Workers of the World] and the Socialist party machine, or appear nakedly as the champions of Germany. Above all, we ask that they teach our people to spurn any peace save the peace of overwhelming victory in the war to which we have set our hands.

Of us who sign some are Protestants, some are Catholics, some are Jews. Most of us were born in this country of parents born in various countries of the old world—in Germany, France, England, Ireland, Italy, the Slavonic and the Scandinavian lands; some of us were born abroad; some of us are of Revolutionary stock. All of us are Americans, and nothing but Americans.

Source: Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., *America at War: A Handbook of Patriotic Education References* (New York: George H. Doran, 1918), 314–316.

114. President Woodrow Wilson to Max Eastman, 18 September 1917

Replying to Max Eastman's complaints of the excesses of wartime suppression of free speech, President Woodrow Wilson essentially justified these as measures necessary to the successful prosecution of the war.

I thank you very warmly for your generous appreciation of my reply to the Pope, and I wish that I could agree with those parts of your letter which concern the other matters we were discussing when you were down here. I think that a time of war must be regarded as wholly exceptional and that it is legitimate to regard things which would in ordinary circumstances be innocent as very dangerous to the public welfare, but this line is manifestly exceedingly hard to draw and I cannot say that I have any confidence that I know how to draw it. I can only say that a line must be drawn and that we are trying, it may be clumsily but genuinely, to draw it without fear or favor or prejudice.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 44, August 21–November 10, 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 210–211. Courtesy Lilly Library, Bloomington, IN.

115. The U.S. Government Mobilizes for War: “The Work of the Government,” Statement of the Committee on Public Information, 6 October 1917

Once war was declared, the U.S. government quickly introduced major measures constituting a program to prepare the country for active participation in the fighting in Europe. Six months after U.S. intervention, the Committee on Public Information, a newly established governmental propaganda agency, issued this statement detailing the measures the government had taken to this end.

The extraordinary session of the 65th Congress has enacted more legislation of importance than any preceding session in our history. Responding patriotically to the demands of war, it has broken all records in the enactment of great appropriation bills and laws bestowing powers upon the Chief Executive and his assistants. Here are a few of the important legislative enactments:

Joint resolution declaring war against the Imperial Government, approved April 6.

The first wartime general deficiency appropriation bill, carrying in round figures \$163,000,000, of which \$100,000,000 was to be expended by the President for national security and defense.

The first bond issue bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to sell \$5,000,000,000 worth of bonds (of which amount \$3,000,000,000 was for loans to our allies) and \$2,000,000,000 in one year certificates of indebtedness.

(1504)

The army, military academy and sundry civil appropriations bills which had failed in the 64th Congress. Total appropriations carried about \$422,000,000.

The selective draft law, providing for the raising of an army of one million men by the draft.

A bill authorizing the President to take over any vessel owned wholly or in part by any citizen, corporation or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war.

The first great war budget, appropriating \$3,281,000,000 for the military and naval establishments on account of war expenses.

A bill temporarily increasing the strength of the Navy and Marine Corps.

The espionage bill and the bill authorizing condemnation of lands for military purposes.

Authorization for an aviation service and an appropriation of \$640,000,000 therefor.

The food control bill and legislation making more effective the war risk insurance bureau.

The second bond issue bill, authorizing an issue of \$4,000,000,00 additional to meet loans to foreign governments, \$2,000,000,000 of one-year certificates of indebtedness and \$2,000,000,000 of five-year war-saving certificates.

A deficiency appropriation bill carrying more than \$5,300,000,000 for the fiscal year 1918. This authorizes additional contract obligations of two billion dollars and raises the limit of cost to carry out the provisions of the shipping act to \$1,734,000,000. It further appropriates for the shipping fund \$635,000,000.

The trading with the enemy bill and the soldiers' and sailors' family insurance bill.

A taxation bill to raise approximately \$2,500,000,000 in revenue toward defraying the expenses of the war.

Without accident or disaster, the War Department already has sent a large expeditionary force to France. Within three months the department constructed sixteen cantonments, or sixteen cities each capable of accommodating a population of 40,000. The sum of approximately \$150,000,000 was spent for cantonment construction. In these cantonments, or virtually en route thereto, there are today about a half million men.

When they are trained, others can be readily supplied for similar training. The selective draft law is working smoothly, fairly and successfully.

Following the April announcement of the Adjutant General of the establishment of sixteen officers' training camps, approximately 27,000 young officers received intensive training and are receiving commissions for the various branches of the service. A second series of training camps for officers has begun and the third will begin in January. The Adjutant General's office also procured more than 50,000 trained specialists for the Enlisted Reserve

Corps. About 30,000 officers in the reserve corps have been commissioned. At the beginning of the war, we had approximately 20,000 officers. There are now around 80,000 officers.

Development of the "Liberty Motor" which has withstood every aviation engine test is one of the major achievements of the War Department, and the Aircraft Production Board. This was followed by the designing of a standard military truck. Then came the letting of contracts for the great aerial fleet authorized in the \$640,000,000 aviation appropriation bill. This aviation program calls for more than 20,000 airplanes ranging from light training machines to great battle planes. Aviation experts from the Allied countries are in Washington and help to form an "international general staff on aviation."

Twenty-four flying schools have been authorized for training aviators in this country and the majority of them are in operation. There are eight ground schools. Many American aviators are now receiving intensive training behind the battle fronts.

Plans have been made for the construction of a large hospital at each one of the 32 National Guard and National Army cantonments, and for the construction of other large base hospitals at a dozen or twenty points scattered over the country. A thoroughgoing plan for caring for the wounded and for returning them to civil life thoroughly fitted to be useful and valuable, has been worked out and is being put into effect.

The Navy now has in service more than three times as many men and nearly three times as many vessels as when war was declared.

The Navy and Marine Corps constitute a force of more than a quarter of a million men. On April 6 there were 64,680 enlisted men in the regular Navy; now there are 143,726, an increase of 79,406. There are about 12,000 officers in the Navy and 1,122 in the Marine Corps.

Hundreds of vessels of various types, yachts and fast motor-boats, have been taken over and transformed into patrol (1505) boats, submarine chasers, mine sweepers and the various types needed for anti-submarine warfare, coast defense and other purposes.

The Atlantic Fleet comprises twice as many vessels as in peace times. Every battleship and cruiser that was in reserve has been fully manned and commissioned. Every warship is now a training school for the instruction of

men in gunnery and engineering, and notable results have been achieved, especially in target practice with guns of the smallest calibres used in fighting submarines.

The largest ship construction program in history is being carried out by the Navy Department, comprising hundreds of vessels of various types from super-dreadnoughts to submarine-chasers.

Twenty training camps have been erected, accommodating 85,000 men, for housing and training recruits.

Navy yards have been enlarged, immense foundries, machine shops and warehouses erected; work is being pushed on dry-docks, shipways and piers. A big projectile plant is being erected at Charleston, W. Va., and a \$1,000,000 aircraft factory at Philadelphia. Extensions of the naval gun factory will make that plant one of the largest of its kind. The entire "shore building" program embraces an expenditure of \$100,000,000.

Source: Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., *America at War: A Handbook of Patriotic Education References* (New York: George H. Doran, 1918), 259–261.

116. The Balfour Declaration: British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild, 2 November 1917

On 2 November 1917 Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, wrote an official letter to Lord Rothschild, a leading British Zionist figure. Although its terms were somewhat ambivalent, this brief communication offered Jews a homeland in Palestine, a development that eventually led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Correctly or not, Sharif Husayn ibn 'Al of Mecca, a British ally in revolt against Turkey, believed that he too had been promised this territory.

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Source: The World War I Document Archive,
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/balfour.html>.

117. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 2 November 1917

As part of its compensation for joining the Allies in World War I, Japan sought recognition of the special status it claimed for itself in China. Although the United States was the power that had committed itself most firmly to protecting China's political and territorial integrity, in practice U.S. officials were prepared to accord Japan most of the privileges she sought in China. In October and November 1917 an eminent Japanese diplomat, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, visited Washington on a special mission and negotiated an effective Japanese-American understanding over China. On 2 November 1917 Secretary of State Robert Lansing addressed the following note to him.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the parts to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

(1506)

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special right or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

The same day, Ishii promptly replied to Lansing:

Sir:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note today, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in questions set forth in the following terms: [He then repeated the language of the agreement as set out in Lansing's note.]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: The World War, Supplement 2*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 1:264–267.

118. President Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union Message, 4 December 1917

At the end of 1917 the U.S. president made his annual State of the Union address, using the occasion to ask Congress for a declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary. It seems that by this date Germany's enemies had come to believe that Austria-Hungary was inextricably subordinated to Germany and had therefore finally abandoned hope of persuading her to make a separate peace. Wilson took this occasion to state that he did not seek a peace of vengeance, nor did he wish to interfere in the domestic political affairs of either Germany or Austria-Hungary. His speech nonetheless made clear that he believed Germany's existing government unrepresentative of its people and a danger to international peace and implied that its overthrow would be necessary to German reconciliation with the Allied Powers.

. . . Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won?

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise,—deeply and indignantly impatient,—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this Thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace,—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the

bases of law and the covenant for the life of the world,—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice,—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends.

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula “No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.” Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the (1507) people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.

But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has [been] done can Right be set up as arbiter and peace-maker among the nations. But when that has been done,—as, God willing, it assuredly will be,—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or of materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement

based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own,—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey, and within Asia,—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enterprise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of manufacture, science, and commerce that were involved for us in her success and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away, to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms, by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated.

The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life

and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candour as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are in fact fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own,—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbours or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable (1508) because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they can not and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of

the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides. . . .

From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude towards the settlement that must come when it is over.

When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations, and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient.

What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is in fact the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They are also the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations carry us and not heed any others. . . .

If I have overlooked anything that ought to be done for the more effective conduct of the war, your own counsels will supply the omission. What I am perfectly clear about is that in the present session of the Congress our whole attention and energy should be concentrated on the vigorous, rapid, and successful prosecution of the great task of winning the war.

We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honour; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honour forever sullied and brought into contempt were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together (1509) for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardour of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honour among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favour, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of his own justice and mercy.

Source: Arthur S. Link, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 45, November 11, 1917–January 15, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 194–202.

119. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “For Bread And Peace,” Written in Petrograd, 14 December 1917, First Published in German in May 1918 in the Newspaper *Jugend-Internationale*

Lenin’s brief editorial of December 1917, circulated in the international socialist press the following spring, quickly became the rallying cry of many on the left.

Two questions now take precedence over all other political questions—the question of bread and the question of peace. The imperialist war, the war between the biggest and richest banking firms, Britain and Germany, that is being waged for world domination, the division of the spoils, for the plunder of small and weak nations; this horrible, criminal war has ruined all countries, exhausted all peoples, and confronted mankind with the alternative—either sacrifice all civilisation and perish or throw off the capitalist yoke in the revolutionary way, do away with the rule of the bourgeoisie and win socialism and durable peace.

If socialism is not victorious, peace between the capitalist States will be only a truce, an interlude, a time of preparation for a fresh slaughter of the peoples. Peace and bread are the basic demands of the workers and the exploited. The war has made these demands extremely urgent. The war has brought hunger to the most civilised countries, to those most culturally developed. On the other hand, the war, as a tremendous historical process, has accelerated social development to an unheard-of degree. Capitalism had developed into imperialism, i.e., into monopoly capitalism, and under the influence of the war it has become state monopoly capitalism. We have now reached the stage of world economy that is the immediate stepping stone to socialism.

The socialist revolution that has begun in Russia is, therefore, only the beginning of the world socialist revolution. Peace and bread, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, revolutionary means for the healing of war wounds, the complete victory of socialism—such are the aims of the struggle.

Source: George Hanna, ed., *Lenin’s Collected Works*, Vol. 26, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 386–387. Used by permission under the Creative Commons License.

120. Leon Trotsky, Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Note to the Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries regarding Peace Negotiations, 29 December 1917

At the end of December 1917, the Soviet Union announced a ten-day hiatus in the peace negotiations with Germany it had opened at Brest Litovsk. Its purpose in doing so, according to Leon Trotsky, the new Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, was to give the Allies a final chance to begin peace talks. Much more aggressive in tone than previous Soviet utterances had been, Trotsky's note challenged Western imperialism and called upon the peoples of Europe to overthrow their rulers. At this stage Trotsky was relatively sympathetic toward the Central Powers, whose professed commitment to a peace of no future annexations and no indemnities he apparently believed, even as he condemned their readiness to retain territories acquired in the past.

The Peace negotiations which are being carried on at Brest-Litovsk between the delegation of the Russian Republic and the delegations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria have been interrupted for ten days until January 8, 1918, in order to give the last opportunity to the Allied countries to take part in further negotiations, and by doing this to secure themselves from all consequences of a separate peace between Russia and the enemy countries.

At Brest-Litovsk there are represented two programs—one which expresses the point of view of the All-Russian Congress (1510) of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, and the other that of the Governments of Germany and her allies.

The program of the Republic of Soviets is the program of a consistent socialistic democracy. This program has for its aim the creation of conditions under which, on the one hand, each nationality regardless of its will and the state of its development would receive complete freedom of national development, and on the other hand, all peoples could be united in economic and cultural co-operation.

The program of the Governments of the countries at war with us is characterized by their statement that "it is not the intention of the Allied Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) to forcibly annex territories occupied during the war." This means that the enemy countries are ready to evacuate by a peace treaty the occupied territories of Belgium, the Northern Departments of France, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, in order that the future fate of disputed territories should be decided

by the population concerned in the matter. That step which the enemy Governments under the pressure of conditions, and especially of their own laboring masses, are taking to meet the program of democracy, consists in their renunciation of new forcible annexations and indemnities. But while renouncing new forcible annexations, the enemy governments base their conclusion on the idea that old annexations, old violations by the strong of the weak, are hallowed by historic remoteness. This means that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine, Transylvania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, etc., on the one hand, and of Ireland, Egypt, India, Indo-China, etc., on the other hand, is not to be reconsidered. Such a program is highly inconsistent and presents a plan of unprincipled compromise between the aims of imperialism and the resistance of the labor-democracy. But the very fact of the proposal of this program is a great step forward.

The Governments of the allied peoples up to now have not joined in the peace negotiations for reasons which they stubbornly refused to state.

Now it cannot be said again that the war is being carried on for the liberation of Belgium, of the Northern Departments of France, Serbia, etc., because Germany and her allies are expressing their readiness to evacuate these territories in case of a general peace. Now, after the proposal by the opposite of the terms of peace, general phrases about the necessity of carrying on the war to a finish are not sufficient. It is necessary to clearly and definitely state what is the peace program of France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States: whether they demand together with us the right of self-determination for the peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, Posen, Bohemia, and Jugo-Slav territories. If they do, are they ready on their part to give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Indo-China, etc., in the same way that the Russian government gave this right to the peoples of Finland, Ukraine, White Russia, etc.? For it is clear that to demand self-determination for peoples who form part of the enemy states and to deny self-determination to peoples of their own state or their own colonies means the advance of a program of a most open cynical imperialism. If the Governments of the Allied countries would display a readiness, together with the Russian revolution, to build a peace on the basis of complete and unquestionable recognition of the right of self-determination for all peoples and all states, if they would begin with the real granting of this right to the oppressed peoples of their own states, it would create international conditions under which the compromising, internally-contradictory program of Germany and especially of Austria-Hungary would appear in all its inconsistency and would be overcome by the pressure of the peoples concerned.

But up to now the Allied Governments did not demonstrate, and owing to their class character could not demonstrate by any move whatever a readiness to make a real democratic peace. They are no less suspicious of and opposed to the principle of national self-determination than the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But regarding this the class-conscious proletariat of the Allied countries has as few illusions as we.

With the existing Governments it is a case of presenting in opposition to the program of imperialistic compromise which is represented in the peace terms of Germany and her allies, another program of imperialistic compromise from the side of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. What is the program of the latter? In the name of what aims could they demand a continuation of the war? To these questions now, after the two programs of peace have been presented at Brest-Litovsk, it is necessary to give a clear, definite, categorical answer.

Ten days separate us from the renewal of peace negotiations. Russia will not be bound in these negotiations by the consent of the Allied Governments. If the latter continue to sabotage the cause of general peace, the Russian delegation will appear anyhow for the continuation of negotiations. A separate peace signed by Russia would no doubt be a heavy blow to the Allied countries, especially to France and Italy. But the foreseeing of the inevitable consequences of a separate peace must define the policy not only of Russia but also of France, Italy, and the other Allied countries. The Soviet Government until now has struggled by all means for a general peace. Nobody can deny the importance of results attained by us in this direction. But in the future everything depends on the (1511) Allied peoples themselves. The question of compelling their own Governments to immediately present their peace programs and to participate on the basis of them in the negotiations now becomes a question of national self-preservation for the Allied peoples.

The Russian revolution opened the door to an immediate general peace by agreement. If the Allied Governments are ready to take advantage of this last opportunity, general negotiations can immediately open in one of the neutral countries. In these negotiations on the indispensable condition of their full publicity, the Russian delegation will as before defend the program of international socialist democracy as a counter-weight to the imperialistic programs of the Governments of the enemy as well as the Allied countries. The success of our program will depend on to what degree the will of imperialistic classes will be paralyzed by the will of the revolutionary proletariat in each country.

If the Allied Governments in the blind stubbornness which characterizes decadent and perishing classes, once more refuse to participate in the negotiations, then the working class will be confronted by the iron necessity of taking the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give the people peace.

During these ten days is being decided the fate of hundreds of thousands and millions of human lives. If on the French and Italian fronts an armistice will not be made now, a new offensive just as senseless and merciless and inconclusive as all the previous offensives will swallow innumerable victims on both sides.

The ultimate logic of this butchery let loose by the ruling class leads to the complete annihilation of the flower of the European nations. But the people want to live and have the right to. They have the right and they must throw aside all those who interfere with their living.

Addressing to the Governments the last proposal to participate in the peace negotiations, we at the same time promise full support to the working class of each country which will rise against its national imperialists, against chauvinists, against militarists, under the banner of peace, brotherhood of peoples, and socialistic reconstruction of society.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 61–64.

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World War I Documents (January–June 1918)

121. General John J. Pershing, Training of the American Expeditionary Force (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)
122. Training the American Infantryman: Recollections of Army Field Clerk Will Judy, 33rd Division
123. President Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points,” Address to Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, 8 January 1918
124. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Theses on the Question of Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace,” 7 [20] January 1918
125. Great Britain, The Representation of the People Act, 6 February 1918
126. Text of Decree Repudiating Russia’s Debts, 8 February 1918
127. The Treaty of Peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Ukraine, Signed at Brest Litovsk, 9 February 1918
128. Russian Proclamation of the End of the War and of Demobilization, 10–11 February 1918
129. General Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the Field Army, Notes for the Conference at Homburg on 13 February 1918
130. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Petition Presented to President Woodrow Wilson, 19 February 1918
131. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk between the Central Powers and Russia, 3 March 1918
132. Paraphrase of a Telegram from British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to Lord Reading, British Ambassador to the United States, 28 March 1918
133. The Pact of Rome, 10 April 1918
134. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France, Special (Backs-to-the-Wall) Order of the Day, 11 April 1918

135. Resolution of the 5th Session of the Allied Supreme War Council, 2 May 1918
136. U.S. Sedition Act, 16 May 1918
137. General John J. Pershing, "Employment of American Divisions from March to September, 1918," (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)
138. Allied Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Joint Note 31, 3 June 1918
139. Allied Intervention in North Russia, May 1918–October 1919: Recollections of Major Edward MacMorland
140. German Assessments of American Prisoners: Report of Lieutenant von Berg, 15 June 1918
141. African-American Troops in World War I: General John J. Pershing to General Peyton March, 19 June 1918
142. German Propaganda Flyer, "To the Colored Soldiers of the U.S. Army," Circa 1918

121. General John J. Pershing, Training of the American Expeditionary Force (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)

U.S. military leaders deliberately chose to train their troops for offensive fighting rather than the defensive trench warfare that had prevailed on the Western Front since late 1914. This decision reflected a confidence that the arrival of the U.S. forces would turn the tide and lead to a war of movement. In his final report, General John J. Pershing, the U.S. commander-in-chief, dealt in some detail with the training of American soldiers.

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20. Soon after our arrival in Europe careful study was made of the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both the French and British maintained continuously a great system of schools and training centers, which provided for both theoretical and practical instruction of inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers. These centers were required not only to train new troops, but to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by giving them a short course in the duties of their new grades. These school systems made it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge of the latest methods developed by experience and at the same time counter false notions.

21. A similar scheme was developed in August, 1917, for our Armies, in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces a sound fighting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop training in all units up to include divisions. Corps centers of instruction for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders of all arms were established. These centers also provided special training for the instructors needed at corps schools. Base training centers for replacement troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks and mechanics, were designated. The army and corps schools were retained under the direct supervision of the Training Section, General Staff. The schools mentioned graduated 21,330 noncommissioned officers and 13,916 officers.

Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most promising soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command of platoons and companies. There were graduated from these candidate schools in France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have 22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January 1, 1919, graduating 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were to be graduated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen, making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to November 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as officers.

It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the imperative and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers.

22. Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Department that French and British officers be asked for to assist in the instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization and development of our own schools, a large number of our officers were sent to centers of instruction in the Allied armies. The training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following paragraph on divisional training:

Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and in practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for future offensive.

For training our artillery units, special localities such as Valdahon, Coëtquidan, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and the instruction was usually carried on in conjunction with French artillery followed up later, as far as possible, with field practice in cooperation with our own infantry.

23. The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result in our Army and to encourage the offensive spirit that the following was published in October, 1917:

1. . . .

1. The above methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our own.
2. All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.
3. The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations, and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and

- constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters.
4. The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.
 5. All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards for the American Army will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France. . . .

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and (1515) recommending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare so far as necessary be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions, whether serving temporarily with the British or French, were trained as indicated. The assistance of the French units was limited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instructors taught the use of French arms and assisted in the preparation of elementary trench warfare problems.

Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training completed in the United States, one month was allotted for the instruction of small units from battalions down, a second month of experience in quiet sectors for battalions, and a third month for field practice in open warfare tactics by division, including artillery. Unfortunately many divisions did not receive the requisite amount of systematic training before leaving the States and complete preparation of such units for battle was thus often seriously delayed.

24. The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efficiency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement. Instructions which had hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and conceptions of inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent instructors, was brought under a system based on correct principles. Approved and systematic methods were maintained and enforced largely by the continual presence of members of the Training Section with the troops both during the training period and in campaign.

Source: General John J. Pershing's Final Report, in *The United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919, Vol. 12, Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services*, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Historical Division, 1948), 21–22.

122. Training the American Infantryman: Recollections of Army Field Clerk Will Judy, 33rd Division

Preparation for combat was a brutalizing experience. When the American Expeditionary Force reached France, many of the troops were trained by British or French instructors. Army Field Clerk Will Judy of the 33rd Division recalled the teaching the men received in bayonet combat and killing.

Four qualities the soldier must possess to attack effectively with the bayonet—nerve, good direction, strength and quickness. The charge with the bayonet should be made amid excitement, amid shouting and noise, for men kill best when little time is had for reflection.

Five feet is the greatest killing range—five feet from eye to eye. Don't stop to measure. Watch your opponent's eyes, not his feet. Rush at the enemy, holding the bayonet level with his throat, and as you come within plunging range, do not lose the one-fifth of a second which determines whether you or he will be killed. The surgeon dresses few bayonet wounds.

Vulnerable parts of the body are the face, chest, lower abdomen, and if the back is turned, the kidneys. A cut in the arm pit is as fatal as a plunge into the throat. Six inches is deep enough for a thrust else the bayonet can not be withdrawn; if it sticks, fire a round to loosen it. Many men have been killed by others of the enemy while trying to pull the bayonet out of the killed man beneath them.

When the knife comes out, if the air is sucked in, the wounded man begins to bleed inside, feels pain, and quickly gives up the spirit.

If the enemy parries the thrust and the fray is at close quarters kick him on the knee cap or in the crotch. . . . Don't chase a fleeing enemy to stab him in the back—shoot him.

Source: Will Judy, *A Soldier's Diary* (Chicago: Judy Publishing, 1930), 70–71, reprinted as "Recollections of Army Field Clerk Will Judy, United States 33rd Division," in James H. Hallas, *Doughboy War: The American Expeditionary Force in World War I* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 53–54.

123. President Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points,” Address to Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, 8 January 1918

By early 1918 the Allies felt it necessary to reaffirm their own credentials as the representatives of liberal ideals and objectives. In November 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. Their calls for an immediate general peace, their appeals to the international working class to cease supporting the war, and their publication of the secret treaties and agreements the Allies had made with each other all called into question the credibility of Allied claims to be fighting for high ideals. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States rather distrusted the governments of the other powers arrayed with his country against the Central Powers, and he insisted that rather than joining the Allies, the United States should remain merely an “Associated Power.” He hoped to position himself above the fray as the leader of liberal forces in all countries, Allied, Central, and neutral powers alike, and perceived Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as a dangerous rival for the loyalties of the European left. In January 1918, Wilson therefore laid out a program of liberal war aims that envisaged nothing less than the creation of a new, liberal world order, one based upon the self-determination of peoples as well as upon democracy, justice, and open diplomacy. The ideals enshrined in his address quickly became an inspiration for liberals around the world.

(1516)

. . . It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life,

determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities (1517) which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are

ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 45, November 11, 1917–January 15, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 534–539.

124. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Theses on the Question of Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace,” 7 [20] January 1918

As Russia continued its peace negotiations with the Central Powers at the Polish town of Brest Litovsk, Germany demanded extremely harsh concessions, including the cession of much Russian territory in the present-day Baltic states of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and in Poland and the Ukraine, together with the payment of a substantial indemnity. Reluctantly, Lenin told his sometimes skeptical colleagues that if the Bolshevik regime were to survive, Russia had no alternative but to accept these demands.

1. The position of the Russian revolution at the present moment is that nearly all the workers and the vast majority of the peasants undoubtedly side with the Soviet power and the socialist revolution which it has started. To that extent the socialist revolution in Russia is assured.
2. At the same time, the civil war, provoked by the frantic resistance of the wealthy classes, who perfectly realize that they stand before the last and decisive fight for the preservation of private ownership of the land and means of production, has not yet reached its climax. The victory of the Soviet power in this war is assured, but some time must inevitably elapse, no little exertion of effort will inevitably be required, a certain period of acute economic dislocation and chaos, such as attend all wars, and civil war in particular, is inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is crushed.
3. Furthermore, this resistance, in its less active and nonmilitary forms—sabotage, hiring of the declassed elements and of agents of the bourgeoisie, who work their way into the ranks of the Socialists in order to ruin their cause, and so on and so forth—has proved so stubborn and capable of assuming (1518) such diversified forms, that the fight against it will inevitably require some more time, and, in its main forms, is scarcely likely to end before several months. And unless this passive and covert resistance of the bourgeoisie and its supporters is definitely crushed the socialist revolution cannot succeed.
4. Lastly, the organizational problems of the socialist transformation of Russia are so immense and difficult that their solution—in view of the abundance of petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the socialist proletariat, and of the latter’s low cultural level—will also require a fairly long time.
5. All these circumstances taken together are such as to make it perfectly clear that for the success of Socialism in Russia a certain amount of time, several

months at least, will be necessary, during which the hands of the socialist government must be absolutely free for achieving victory over the bourgeoisie in our own country first, and for launching on a wide scale far-reaching organizational work.

6. . . . That the socialist revolution in Europe must come, and will come, is beyond doubt. All our hopes for the final victory of Socialism are founded on this certainty and on this scientific prognosis. Our propagandist activities in general, and the organization of fraternization in particular, must be intensified and extended. But it would be a mistake to base the tactics of the Russian socialist government on attempts to determine whether the European, and especially the German, socialist revolution will take place in the next six months (or some such brief period) or not. Inasmuch as it is quite impossible to determine this, all such attempts, objectively speaking, would be nothing but a blind gamble.

7. The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have by this date—January 7, 1918—made it perfectly clear that the upper hand in the German government . . . has undoubtedly been gained by the military party, which has virtually already presented Russia with an ultimatum . . . : either the continuation of the war, or an annexationist peace, i.e., peace on condition that we surrender all the territory we have occupied, while the Germans retain all the territory they have occupied and impose upon us an indemnity (outwardly disguised as payment for the maintenance of prisoners)—an indemnity of about three thousand million rubles, payable over a period of several years.

8. The socialist government of Russia is faced with the question—a question which brooks no postponement—of whether to accept this annexationist peace now, or at once to wage a revolutionary war. Actually speaking, no middle course is possible. No further postponement can now be achieved, for we have already done everything possible and impossible to protract the negotiations artificially. . . .

12. It is said that in a number of party statements we bluntly “promised” a revolutionary war, and that by concluding a separate peace we would be going back on our word.

That is not true. We said that in the era of imperialism it was necessary for a socialist government to “prepare for and wage” a revolutionary war; we said this in order to combat abstract pacifism and the theory that “defence of the fatherland” must be completely rejected in the era of imperialism, and, lastly, to

combat the purely selfish instincts of a part of the soldiers, but we never gave any pledge to start a revolutionary war without considering how far it is possible to wage it at a given moment. . . .

13. Summing up the arguments in favour of an immediate revolutionary war, we have to conclude that such a policy might perhaps answer the human yearning for the beautiful, dramatic and striking, but that it would totally disregard the objective relation of class forces and material factors at the present stage of the socialist revolution which has begun.

14. There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely in no condition at the present moment, and will not be for the next few weeks (and probably for the next few months), to beat back a German offensive successfully. . . .

17. Consequently, the situation at present in regard to a revolutionary war is as follows:

If the German revolution were to break out and triumph in the coming three or four months, the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist revolution.

If, however, the German revolution does not eventuate in the next few months, the course of events, if the war is continued, will inevitably be such that grave defeats will compel Russia to conclude a still more disadvantageous separate peace, a peace, moreover, which would be concluded, not by a socialist government, but by some other (for example, a bloc of the bourgeois [Ukrainian nationalist] Rada and the [right-wing Social Revolutionary] Chernovites, or something similar). For the peasant army, which is unbearably exhausted by the war, will after the very first defeats—and very likely within a matter of weeks, and not of months—overthrow the socialist workers' government.

18. Such being the state of affairs, it would be absolutely impermissible tactics to stake the fate of the socialist movement (1519) which has already begun in Russia merely on the chance that the German revolution may begin in the immediate future, within a period measurable in weeks. Such tactics would be a reckless gamble. We have no right to take such risks.

19. And the German revolution will by no means be made more difficult of accomplishment as far as its objective premises are concerned, if we conclude a separate peace.

Source: Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism*, Vol. 1. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 135–139.

125. Great Britain, The Representation of the People Act, 6 February 1918

In Britain, governmental demands that every individual support the war effort to the best of his or her ability gave additional force to long-standing campaigns for universal manhood suffrage and female suffrage. In February 1918 (coincidentally on the same day that the catchment of the Military Service Act was extended substantially, making many more men liable to conscription), the British Parliament passed an act granting universal manhood suffrage to all men aged 21 and above and all women aged 30 or more. Men of 19 and above serving in the armed forces were also entitled to vote. Conscientious objectors, by contrast, were banned from voting in national or local elections for a period of five years, an illustration of the degree to which the vote was perceived as a just reward for loyal wartime service.

1.—(1) A man shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a constituency (other than a university constituency) if he is of full age [21 years or above] and not subject to any legal incapacity and—

1. has the requisite residence qualification; or
2. has the requisite business premises qualification.

(2) A man, in order to have the requisite residence qualification or business premises qualification for a constituency—

1. must on the last day of the qualifying period be residing in premises in the constituency, or occupying business premises in the constituency, as the case may be; and
2. must during the whole of the qualifying period have resided in premises, or occupied business premises, as the case may be, in the constituency, or in another constituency within the same parliamentary borough or parliamentary county, or within a parliamentary borough or parliamentary county contiguous to that borough or county, or separated from that borough or county by water, not exceeding at the nearest point six miles in breadth, measured in the case of tidal water from low-water mark.

For the purposes of this subsection the administrative county of London shall be treated as a parliamentary borough. . . .

4.—(1) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a constituency (other than a university constituency) if she—

1. has attained the age of thirty years; and
2. is not subject to any legal incapacity; and
3. is entitled to be registered as a local government elector in respect of the occupation in that constituency of land or premises (not being a dwelling-house) of a yearly value of not less than five pounds or of a dwelling-house, or is the wife of a husband entitled to be so registered.

(2) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a university constituency if she has attained the age of thirty years and either would be entitled to be so registered if she were a man, or has been admitted to and passed the final examination, and kept under the conditions required of women by the university the period of residence, necessary for a man to obtain a degree at any university forming, or forming part of, a university constituency which did not at the time the examination was passed admit women to degrees.

(3) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a local government elector for any local government electoral area—

1. where she would be entitled to be so registered if she were a man; and
2. where she is the wife of a man who is entitled to be so registered in respect of premises in which they both reside, and she has attained the age of thirty years and is not subject to any legal incapacity.

For the purpose of this provision a naval or military voter who is registered in respect of a residence qualification which he would have had but for his service, shall be deemed to be resident in accordance with the qualification. . . .

5.—(1) A person to whom this section applies (in this Act referred to as “a naval or military voter”) shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for any constituency for which he would have had the necessary qualification but for the service which brings him within the provisions of this section.

(1520)

The right to be registered in pursuance of the foregoing provision shall be in addition to any other right to be registered, but a naval or military voter shall not be entitled to be registered for a constituency in respect of an actual residence qualification in the constituency except on making a claim for the purpose accompanied by a declaration in the prescribed form that he has taken reasonable steps to prevent his being registered under the foregoing provision for any other constituency.

(2) The statement of any person, made in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, that he would have had the necessary qualification in any constituency but for the service which brings him within the provisions of this section, shall for all purposes of this section be sufficient if there is no evidence to the contrary.

(3) This section applies to any person who is of the age required under this Act in the case of that person and is not subject to any legal incapacity, and who—

1. is serving on full pay as a member of any of the naval, military or air forces of the Crown; or
2. is abroad or afloat in connection with any war in which His Majesty is engaged, and is
 1. in service of a naval or military character for which payment is made out of moneys provided by Parliament, or (where the person serving was at the commencement of his service resident in the United Kingdom) out of the public funds of any part of His Majesty's Dominions, or in service as a merchant seaman, pilot or fisherman, including the master of a merchant ship or fishing boat and an apprentice on such ship or boat; or
 2. serving in any work of the British Red Cross Society, or the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, or any other body with a similar object; or
 3. serving in any other work recognized by the Admiralty, Army Council, or Air Council, as work of national importance in connection with the war.

(4) A male naval or military voter who has served or hereafter serves in or in connection with the present war shall, notwithstanding anything in this or any other Act, be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector if that voter at the commencement of service had attained, or during service attains, the age of nineteen years, and is otherwise qualified. . . .

9.—(2) Any person, being a conscientious objector to whom this subsection applies, shall be disqualified during the continuance of the war and a period of five years thereafter from being registered or voting as a parliamentary or local government elector, unless, before the expiration of one year after the termination of the war, he proves to the central tribunal as established for the purposes of the Military Service Act, 1916:

1. that he has during the continuance of the war taken up and, so far as reasonably practicable, continued service which constitutes a person (other than a person serving on full pay as a member of any of the naval, military, or air forces of the Crown) a naval or military voter for the purposes of this Act; or
2. that having been exempted from military service on condition of doing work of national importance he has done such work in accordance with the decision and to the satisfaction of the appropriate tribunal or authority; or
3. that having obtained an absolute exemption from military service without any such condition, he has nevertheless (whether before or after the passing of this Act) been engaged in and, so far as reasonably practicable, continued some work of national importance;

and obtains a certificate from the central tribunal to that effect.

This subsection shall apply to a conscientious objector who either—

1. has been exempted from all military service (including non-combatant service) on the ground of conscientious objection; or
2. having been convicted by court martial of an offence against military law, and having represented that the offence was the result of conscientious objection to military service, has been awarded imprisonment or detention.

The central tribunal established under the Military Service Act, 1916, shall be continued for the purpose of this subsection for a period of a year after the termination of the present war.

If a person disqualified under this subsection would have been entitled to be registered as a parliamentary or local government elector but for that disqualification, the disqualification shall not extend so as to affect the right of the wife of that person to be registered or vote as a parliamentary or local government elector as the case may be.

Source: Hugh Fraser, *The Representation of the People Act, 1918* (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1918).

(1521)

126. Text of Decree Repudiating Russia's Debts, 8 February 1918

Early in 1918 the Bolsheviks repudiated the former government's debts, including those from foreign sources, governmental and private. The measure did little to endear the Bolsheviks to the Allied governments, most of whom, together with their bankers, Russia had borrowed from extensively during the war. The move was also another indication of the extent to which the new Bolshevik government challenged existing international norms and practices.

1. All loans contracted by former Russian Governments which are specified in a special list are canceled as from December 1, 1917. The December coupons of these loans will not be paid.
2. All the guarantees for these loans are canceled.
3. All loans made from abroad are canceled without exception and unconditionally.
4. The short-term series of State Treasury bonds retain their validity. The interest on them will not be payable, but they will circulate on a par with paper money.
5. Indigent persons who hold stock not exceeding 10,000 rubles in internal loans will receive in exchange, according to the nominal value of their holdings, certificates in their own name for a new loan of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic of Soviets for an amount not exceeding that of their previous holding. The conditions of this loan are specially defined.
6. Deposits in the State savings banks and interest upon them are not to be touched. All holdings in the canceled loans belonging to these banks will be replaced by debt entered to their credit in the Great Book of the Russian Socialist Republic.
7. Co-operative and other institutions of general or democratic utility, and possessing holdings in the canceled loans, will be indemnified in accordance with the special regulations laid down by the Supreme Council of Political Economy, in agreement with their representatives, if it is proved that the holdings were acquired before the publication of the present decree.

8. The State Bank is charged with the complete liquidation of loans and the immediate regulation of all holders of bonds in the State loans and other funds, whether annulled or not.
9. The Soviets of the Workmen's, Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, in accord with the local economic councils, will form committees for the purpose of deciding whether a citizen is to be classed as "indigent." These committees will be competent to cancel entirely all savings acquired without working for them, even in the case of sums below 5,000 rubles.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March, 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 77–78.

127. The Treaty of Peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Ukraine, Signed at Brest Litovsk 9 February 1918

After the revolution of March 1917, a provisional government was established in the Russian territory of the Ukraine and, after the Bolshevik government refused to accept its national policies, declared its independence. On 9 January 1918 the Central Powers recognized the Ukraine as an independent state, entitled to make a separate peace. Representatives from the Ukraine sent a delegation to the Brest Litovsk peace conference with the Central Powers. In exchange for recognition from the Central Powers and the cession of territory in Poland and Galicia, the Ukraine agreed to provide Russia with an annual 100,000 tons of cereals, grain, and oilseeds.

Whereas the Ukrainian People has, in the course of the present world war, declared its independence, and has expressed the desire to establish a state of peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Powers at present at war with Russia, the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Government of the Ukrainian People's republic; they wish in this way to take the first step towards a lasting world peace, honorable for all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of the war, but shall also conduce to the restoration of friendly relations between the peoples in the political, legal, economic, and intellectual spheres.

To this end the Plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned Governments, viz.: . . . have met at Brest-Litovsk, and having presented their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following points:

Article I

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and amity with one another.

(1522)

Article II

1. As between Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, in so far as those two Powers border upon one

another, those frontiers which existed between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia prior to the present war will be preserved.

2. Further north, the frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic starting at Tarnograd, will in general follow the line Bilgoray, Szozebrzeszyn, Krasnostav, Pugashov, Radin, Miedzyzheche, Sarnaki, Melnik, Vysoki-Litovsk, Kameniec-Litovsk, Prujany, and Vydonovsk Lake. This frontier will be delimited in detail by a mixed commission, according to the ethnographical considerations and after taking the wishes of the inhabitants into consideration.

3. In the event of the Ukrainian People's Republic having boundaries coterminous with those of another of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, special agreements are reserved in respect thereof.

Article III

The evacuation of the occupied territories shall begin immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. . . .

Article IV

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties shall commence immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. . . .

Article V

The contracting parties mutually renounce repayment of their war costs, that is to say, their State expenditure for the prosecution of the war, as well as payment for war damages, that is to say, damage sustained by them and their nationals in the war areas through military measures, including all requisitions made in enemy territory.

Article VI

Prisoners of war of both parties shall be released to their homeland in so far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State in whose territory they shall be, to remain within its territories or to proceed to another country. Questions connected with this will be dealt with in the separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.

Article VII

It has been agreed as follows with regard to economic relations between the contracting parties:

I. The contracting parties mutually undertake to enter into economic relations without delay and to organize the exchange of goods on the basis of the following stipulations:

Until 31 July of the current year a reciprocal exchange of the surplus of their more important agricultural and industrial products, for the purpose of meeting current requirements, is to be effected according to the following provisions:

1. The quantities and classes of products to be exchanged in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be settled on both sides by a commission composed of an equal number of representatives of both parties, which shall sit immediately after the Treaty of Peace has been signed.
2. The prices of products to be exchanged as specified above shall be regulated on the basis of mutual agreement by a commission composed of an equal number of representatives of both parties. . . .

The exchange of such products as are not determined by the abovementioned under (a) shall be effected on a basis of free trading, arranged for in accordance with the conditions of the provisional commercial treaty, which is provided for in the following Section II.

II. In so far as there is not otherwise provided for under Section I hereof, economic relations between the contracting parties shall be carried on provisionally in accordance with the stipulations specified below until the conclusion of the final Commercial Treaty, but in any event until a period of at least six months shall have elapsed after the conclusion of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the European States at present at war with them, the United States of America and Japan on the other hand:

1. For economic relations between the German Empire and the Ukrainian People's Republic, the conditions laid down in the following provisions of the Germano-Russian Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1894–1904. . . .

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:802–805.

128. Russian Proclamation of the End of the War and of Demobilization, 10–11 February 1918

Although the Russian delegation temporarily withdrew from the Brest Litovsk talks in February 1918 to protest the separate (1523) peace with the Ukraine, Russian leaders recognized the overriding need for peace. On 10 February the Bolshevik delegation at Brest Litovsk therefore declared the end of the war. A demobilization order to the army followed the next day.

Comrades: The peace negotiations are at an end. German capitalists, bankers, and landlords, supported by the silent cooperation of the English and French bourgeoisie, submitted to our comrades, the members of the peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such as could not be subscribed to by the Russian Revolution.

The Governments of Germany and Austria desire to possess countries and people vanquished by the force of arms. To this the authority of the Russian peoples of workmen and peasants could not give its acquiescence. We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression, and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants. But we also can not, will not, and must not continue a war which was begun by Czars and capitalists, in alliance with Czars and capitalists. We will not, and we must not, continue to be at war with Germans and Austrians—workmen and peasants like ourselves.

We are not signing the peace of landlords and capitalists. Let German and Austrian soldiers know who are placing them in the field of battle, and let them know for what they are struggling. Let them know also that we refuse to fight against them.

Our delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility before the Russian people and the oppressed workers and peasants of other countries, declared on February 10, in the name of the Council of the People's Commissioners of the Governments of the Federal Russian Republic, to the Governments of the peoples involved in war with us and of neutral countries, that it refuses to sign an annexationist treaty.

Russia, for her part, declares the present war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria at an end.

Simultaneously, the Russian troops receive the order for complete demobilization on all fronts.

Brest-Litovsk, 10 Feb. 1918

L. Trotsky, President of the Russian Peace Delegation,
and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; A. Bicenکو,
Commissioner for State Properties; W. Karelin, A. Joffe,
M. Pokrovsky, Members of the Peace Delegation;
W. Medvedioff, President of the All-Ukrainian Executive
Committee of the Soviets; Shakhrai, Secretary for War
of the Ukrainian Republic; L. Karahan.

[Unsigned] Demobilization Order, 11 February 1918

In connection with the above, I order that the necessary steps be immediately taken for declaring to the troops that the war with Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria is regarded from the present moment as being at an end. No military operations must again take place. With the present order the beginning of a general demobilization on all fronts is decreed.

I order the Staffs on the front to issue instructions for the withdrawal of troops from the first lines and for their concentration in the rear, and further for their being sent to the interior of Russia, in accordance with the general plan for demobilization.

For the defense of the frontier some detachments of the younger soldiers must be left.

I beg our soldier comrades to remain calm, and to await with patience the moment for the return of each detachment to its home and in its turn.

I beg that no effort be spared in bringing into stores all artillery and other military equipment, which has cost milliards of the people's money.

Remember that only systematic demobilization can be carried out in the shortest time, and that systematic demobilization alone can prevent interference with the sending of food supplies to those detachments which remain for a certain period at the front.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 263–265.

129. General Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the Field Army, Notes for the Conference at Homburg on 13 February 1918

In February 1918 top German civil and military leaders met at Homburg to decide whether they should launch a major offensive on the Western Front. All recognized that this was probably Germany's last chance of achieving genuine victory in the war. Ludendorff argued forcefully that immediate action was essential and might well pay vast dividends in terms of success in the war.

The campaign in the west which the year 1918 will bring is the most colossal military problem which has ever been set to any army, a problem which the French and English have in vain (1524) attempted to solve for two years. I spoke yesterday with the commander of one army. He told me that the more he thought about our task, the more was he impressed by its magnitude. That opinion is held by all responsible officers in the west and the men too, if I am not mistaken. I think I have no need to give assurances that I, who have to give the Field-Marshal the data on which to base his request for His Majesty's decision, am more impressed than anyone by the magnitude of the military task. It can only be brought to a successful conclusion if the organizers are relieved of everything which can possibly hamper them, the very last man is brought up for the decisive struggle, and everyone is animated by the conviction which comes from love of the Kaiser and Fatherland and confidence in the resolution of the military leaders. These moral factors are not to be under-estimated: they are the foundation of all the greatest achievements.

Their effect must be intensified by the energy of our action in the east.

It must not be imagined that it will be a matter of an offensive like those in Galicia or Italy. It will be a colossal struggle which will begin at one point, continue at others and last a long time, a struggle which is desperate but will end victoriously if the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army is hampered in his plans and measures by nothing more than strict military necessities.

His first task is to release still more troops for the west from the east, not absolutely at once but in the course of the first six months. Hitherto, His Majesty's command is that 37 divisions must remain behind. That number is too large. Some divisions can still be withdrawn. It will not be possible to do more until the situation in Rumania with regard to Russia and Rumania has been completely cleared up. It can only be cleared up by action or the conclusion of peace. In my opinion any other alternative would be intolerable

for us from the military point of view. I must say this in the fullest sense of responsibility.

If we do not act while the position remains obscure and our troops are tied up in the east, we run the following risks:

1. We may let bolshevik Great Russia turn against the Ukraine. It has not recognized the independence of the Ukraine and in its last public utterance it speaks in the name of the federal Russian Republic. We shall endanger our treaty with the Ukraine and therewith the food supplies which we and Austria-Hungary need. We thus make our ultimate victory uncertain.
2. We may make it possible for the Russian Government and its recognized representatives to devote themselves continuously to the business of agitation in the German army and nation. This is an appalling prospect and as disastrous to our dignity as menacing to the moral of the army. As the recent strikes have shown our frontiers lie open to hostile propaganda. Our prestige in the occupied territories would suffer. At Vilna there is already a list of the Red Guard. Disaffection stalks through the land. Strong forces would have to be left behind.
3. Finland would go over to the Bolsheviks. We have supported her efforts to secure her independence and we should be leaving her in the lurch. We would thereby lose respect, confidence and moral authority.
4. We should abandon Esthonia and Livonia, a prey to agitators, to English influence, and perhaps even drive them into the arms of England. The Entente might get a new friend.
5. The courage of the Entente might be revived. The war would drag on even longer. If we make peace with the Entente Russia will come in too. We shall therefore fail to reach that most necessary goal of dealing with our beaten enemies in turn, and it will be difficult to secure the military guarantee required. It would have an unfavourable effect on the negotiations with Rumania, and we need the divisions now stationed there and the opening of the Danube.
6. If we do not act, all these evil possibilities will materialize. With our rifles idle in our hands we shall watch the whole situation being transformed to our own disadvantage; we shall drive the good elements in Russia—that means the real Russia of the future—into the arms of the Entente.

But if we act, we shall consolidate our position against the Entente, confirm our peace with the Ukraine, make peace with Rumania, strengthen our position in the Ukraine and Courland, improve our military situation by occupying Dvinsk and part of the Baltic region. We may, perhaps, give Bolshevism its death blow, thereby ameliorating our internal situation and helping our relations with the best elements in Russia. We could also release strong forces from the east, and concentrate all our military and moral resources for the great blow which His Majesty has commanded in the west. A few days ago I had a conversation with [German Foreign Minister] Herr [Richard] von Kühlmann. He was of opinion that we must immediately start an offensive in the east. I do not know what is responsible for his change of view.

In accordance with my duty I say that inaction in the west would create an intolerable military situation for me, and I humbly beg Your Majesty, when the Imperial Chancellor has recognized that the armistice is at an end and the way is open (1525) for operations, to prevent the military leaders from being hampered by political fetters and restore that freedom of action which it enjoyed at the beginning of the war and before the conclusion of the armistice. That alone is really compatible with the very nature of war and the welfare of Your Majesty, the Fatherland and the army which is faced with the greatest task in its history.

Source: General Erich von Ludendorff, *The General Staff and Its Problems*, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson, 1920), 2:548–551.

130. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Petition Presented to President Woodrow Wilson, 19 February 1918

African-American soldiers who transgressed against military discipline often suffered harsh punishment. In August 1917 race riots occurred in Houston, Texas, where the largely black 24th Infantry was stationed. Numerous soldiers who participated were arrested, and the following December thirteen of them were hanged. A further five were subsequently sentenced to death, leading the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to circulate a petition, which attracted 12,000 signatures. In February 1918 an NAACP delegation led by James Earl Johnson had a lengthy meeting with President Woodrow Wilson, during which they not only presented the petition but asked the president to make a public statement against the lynching of African Americans. Wilson subsequently urged Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to reconsider these cases.

We come as a delegation from the New York Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, representing the twelve thousand signers of this petition which we have the honor to lay before you. And we come not only as the representatives of those who signed this petition, but we come representing the sentiments and aspirations and sorrows, too, of the great mass of the Negro population of the United States.

We respectfully and earnestly request and urge that you extend executive clemency to the five Negro soldiers of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry now under sentence of death by court martial. And understanding that the cases of the men of the same regiment who were sentenced to life imprisonment by the first court martial are to be reviewed, we also request and urge that you cause this review to be laid before you and that executive clemency be shown also to them.

We feel that the history of this particular regiment and the splendid record for bravery and loyalty of our Negro soldiery in every crisis of the nation give us the right to make this request. And we make it not only in the name of their loyalty, but also in the name of the unquestioned loyalty to the nation of twelve million Negroes—a loyalty which today places them side by side with the original American stocks that landed at Plymouth and Jamestown.

The hanging of thirteen men without the opportunity of appeal to the Secretary of War or their Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, was a punishment so drastic and so unusual in the history of the nation that the

execution of additional members of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry would to the colored people of our country savor of vengeance rather than of justice.

It is neither our purpose nor is this the occasion to argue whether this attitude of mind on the part of colored people is justified or not. As representatives of the race we desire only to testify that it does exist. This state of mind has been intensified by the significant fact that, although white persons were involved in the Houston affair, and the regiment to which the colored men belonged was officered entirely by white men, none but colored men, so far as we have been able to learn, have been prosecuted or condemned.

We desire also respectfully to call to your attention the fact that there were mitigating circumstances for the action of these men of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry. Not by any premeditated design and without cause did these men do what they did at Houston; but by a long series of humiliating and harassing incidents, culminating in the brutal assault on Corporal Baltimore, they were goaded to sudden and frenzied action. This is borne out by the long record for orderly and soldierly conduct on the part of the regiment throughout its whole history up to that time.

And to the end that you extend the clemency that we ask, we lay before you this petition signed by white as well as colored citizens of New York; one of the signers being a white man, president of a New York bank, seventy-two years of age, and a native of Lexington, Kentucky.

And now, Mr. President, we would not let this opportunity pass without mentioning the terrible outrages against our people that have taken place in the last three-quarters of a year; outrages that are not only unspeakable wrongs against them, but blots upon the fair name of our common country. We mention the riots at East St. Louis, in which the colored people bore the brunts of both the cruelty of the mob and the processes of law. And we especially mention the savage burnings that have taken place in the single state of Tennessee within nine months; the burnings at Memphis, Tennessee; at Dyersburg, Tennessee; and only last week at Estill Springs, (1526) Tennessee, where a Negro charged with the killing of two men was tortured with red-hot irons, then saturated with oil and burned to death before a crowd of American men, women, and children. And we ask that you, who have spoken so nobly to the whole world for the cause of humanity, speak against these specific wrongs. We realize that your high position and the tremendous moral influence which you wield in the world will give a word from you greater force than could come from any other source.

Our people are intently listening and praying that you may find it in your heart to speak that word.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 46, January 16–March 12, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 383–384.

131. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk between the Central Powers and Russia, 3 March 1918

After Leon Trotsky temporarily withdrew the Russian delegation from the Brest Litovsk conference over the issue of Ukrainian independence, German forces resumed military operations against Russia. Eventually the Russian representatives, feeling they had no alternative, signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. During the Russian delegates' absence, the terms of the treaty had become even harsher. The treaty was highly disadvantageous to Russia, ceding much territory to Germany and conceding the independence of Estonia, the Ukraine, and Finland, all of which had previously been under Russian rule. In most respects, therefore, this treaty completely ignored the liberal principles of no annexations and no indemnities that the Bolsheviks and some German radicals had supported. Despite considerable reservations over the treaty, the majority of Bolshevik leaders could no longer contemplate continuing the war.

Article 1

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other declare that the condition of war between them has ceased. They have decided to live in peace and accord in the future.

Article 2

The contracting parties will refrain from all agitation or propaganda against the governments or all state and military institutions of the other side. Inasmuch as this obligation affects Russia, it affects also the territories occupied by the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

Article 3

The territories lying to the west of the line determined by the contracting powers and which formerly belonged to Russia will no longer be under her sovereignty. The line determined upon is marked on the appended map (Appendix I [omitted]), which is an important part of the present treaty of peace. The precise location of this line will be worked out by a German-Russian commission.

In respect to the mentioned territories no obligations towards Russia are to be considered as issuing from their formerly having belonged to that country.

Russia gives up all interference in the internal affairs of the said territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of the said territories with the consent of their inhabitants.

Article 4

Germany is ready, as soon as general peace is established and Russian demobilization will have completely taken place, to vacate the territories lying east of the line mentioned in part 1 of Article 3, insomuch as Article 6 does not rule otherwise.

Russia will do all in her power to have the provinces of eastern Anatolia promptly evacuated and returned to Turkey.

The territories of Ardakhan, Kars and Batum will also be cleared without delay of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of internal juridical and international juridical relations of such territories, but will allow the populations of these territories to establish new governments in agreement with neighboring states, especially with Turkey.

Article 5

Russia will, without delay, proceed to demobilize her army, including those army units newly formed by her present government.

Moreover Russia will either bring her warships into Russian ports and keep them there until general peace is concluded, or will disarm them at once. The warships of the countries continuing in a state of war with the Quadruple Alliance, in so far as such warships are within the sphere of Russian sovereignty, must be treated as Russian warships.

The prohibition zone of the Arctic Ocean remains in force until the conclusion of general peace. In the Baltic Sea and those parts of the Black Sea under Russia's supremacy, the clearing away of mine defense must be begun at once. Merchant navigation in those sea regions is free and is to recommence at once. Mixed commissions are to be formed for the purpose of framing more concise regulations and especially for the purpose of publication of general information as to safe courses of sailing for trading vessels. Such courses must always be free of floating mines.

(1527)

Article 6

Russia undertakes to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian people's republic and to recognize the treaty of peace between the state and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The territory of the Ukraine must be, at once, cleared of Russian troops and of the Russian Red Guard. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian people's republic.

Esthonia and Livonia must be also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern boundary of Esthonia passes in general along the River Narova. The eastern boundary of Livonia, in general, crosses the Lakes Chud [Peipus] and Pskov up to the southwestern corner of the latter, thence it runs across Lake Luban in the direction of Lievenhof on the Western Dvina. Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by German police force until public safety is secured by proper institutions of the country and until governmental order is reestablished. Russia will at once liberate all the inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia who have been arrested or deported and will secure a safe return of all deported Esthonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Aland Islands will be also, without delay, cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard and Finnish ports of the Russian fleet and of Russian naval forces. While ice renders impossible the conveying of warships to Russian ports there must remain on board only a limited crew. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of Finland.

The fortifications constructed on the Aland Islands must be razed at the first opportunity. As regards the prohibition to erect fortifications of these islands in the future, as well as the question of their future in general in a military respect and in respect to the technical side of navigation, a special agreement must be concluded between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden; the parties consent that at Germany's desire other countries bordering the Baltic Sea may be called upon to take part in the above agreement.

Article 7

Considering the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent countries, the contracting parties bind themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial inviolability of Persia and Afghanistan.

Article 8

The prisoners of war of both parties will be allowed to return home. The regulation of questions in connection with the above will be the subject of special treaties mentioned in Article 12.

Article 9

The contracting parties mutually renounce all indemnifications for their war expenses, that is, for government expenses for conducting the war, as well as all compensation of war losses, that is, such losses as were caused them and their citizens in the zone of war by military operations, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country.

Article 10

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties are resumed at once after ratification of the treaty of peace. The question of allowing consuls of both parties free entrance will be decided by a separate agreement.

Article 11

The economic relations between the powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia are regulated by decisions contained in Appendices II to V. Appendix II determines the relations between Germany and Russia, Appendix III between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Appendix IV between Bulgaria and Russia and Appendix V between Turkey and Russia. [Appendices omitted.]

Article 12

The reestablishment of public and private legal relations, the exchange of war and civil prisoners, the question of amnesty as well as the question regarding merchant ships which have been seized by one or the other side, will be provided for in separate treaties with Russia, which form an important part of the present peace treaty, and as far as it is possible come into force simultaneously with the latter. . . .

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), 1:442–470.

132. Paraphrase of a Telegram from British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to Lord Reading, British Ambassador to the United States, 28 March 1918

In its early days the massive German offensive of March 1918 came so close to success that it finally persuaded the Allies to establish the unity of command that Lloyd George in particular had long urged. In three successive telegrams, of which this is the first, the prime minister cabled his ambassador in Washington, urging him to implore the president to submit U.S. troops to the centralized supreme command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch. He implored the president to send over new troops as fast as possible, warning that otherwise the Allies might well (1528) face defeat before these forces arrived. British and French leaders argued, as they had ever since December 1917, that rather than constituting a separate U.S. army, American troops would be incorporated into Allied units as they arrived. General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in France, strongly opposed this request and insisted on the domestically far more popular course of the creation of a distinct U.S. army that could play its own part in the fighting.

Please see the President immediately and beg him to approve the action proposed in this telegram.

A great success has been won by the German forces and although, largely as a result of exhaustion, their advance has been stayed for the moment, there can be no doubt that they will make another terrific onslaught as soon as they possibly can with the object of capturing Amiens, the great railway centre, and effecting a separation between the French and British Armies. It is impossible to say that they will not succeed in their object although we are hurrying reinforcements with all possible speed to the crucial point.

It has unfortunately not proved possible to achieve through the machinery set up at Versailles the perfect co-operation between the British and French Armies which is essential, in spite of all the efforts that have been made to that end. This had been due to the inherent difficulty of welding into a single whole the armies of two or three different nationalities, and in no way to a lack of desire on the part of one Government or the other. In these circumstances a meeting took place yesterday between the British and French Governments and they decided, with a view to this grave defect being remedied, that General Foch should be entrusted with the co-ordinating authority over all the dispositions of the Allies on the Western Front. The arrangement is actually worded as follows:

“General Foch has been entrusted by the British and French Governments with the task of co-ordinating the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. He will consult for this purpose with the Commanders-in-Chief who are requested to furnish him with all necessary information.”

We feel sure that the President will realize that the extreme urgency of the situation made it impossible to delay action for the purposes of consultation, and we are confident that he will approve the decision which does no more than carry out the policy of unity of control which it had been intended to secure by the Versailles agreement and to which he gave his strong approval. The action of General Foch is of necessity confined for the moment to the co-ordination of the movements of the British and French Armies, but it is earnestly hoped that the President will agree to the same authority being exercised by him in regard to the movements of the American Army which it is desired shall come into the fight.

Further, it is of paramount importance that American troops should be sent to France with the utmost speed possible and I wish you to urge this on the President. Should the present object of the enemy, viz: the separation of the British and French Armies, prove successful, the second operation will certainly be an attempt completely to destroy one of these armies while the other is being held. If this second operation also succeeds, he will turn upon the remaining one with the whole of his strength. If, on the other hand, the Allies now succeed in holding off the enemy, my military advisers are of opinion that he will go off and help the Austrians to smash Italy, returning afterwards with Austro-Hungarian forces in an attempt to seize the Channel ports before our armies can again be made up to their fighting strength. The late Spring or early Summer of this year is, in any case, certain to see further fighting of the most desperate nature. France has no further reserves at her disposal. We are scraping men from every possible side. Our military age is being raised to 50 and possibly to 55, and we are considering whether conscription shall not be applied to Ireland. As we have already raised over five millions of men it is inevitable, however, that the further numbers we can get by this scraping process will be small. It is, therefore, of vital importance that American troops of all arms should be poured into France as rapidly as possible, whatever may be the outcome of the present battle. I beg you to press this fact upon President Wilson with all the force you can. For the present it is not material which is required, but man power to make good the losses in killed, wounded and missing.

Finally, there is the question as to how to make available in the quickest possible time the American forces now in France and those which may arrive later on. I am advised that it is not possible to use many of the American divisions in active operations in their present state of training. As regiments they are, however, excellent. Arrangements for the use of a great part of this force have already been made with General Pershing, and we should like to know if the President would agree to the brigading, during the crisis, of all other units that may become available with the French or British divisions, as regiments are fit for incorporation into experienced divisions long before they can be formed into divisions by themselves. We most earnestly trust that he will agree. Before this battle is over every man may count who is capable of fighting, and American troops may be of inestimable service if they can be employed in whatever way they may be of most use. I can see no other way of utilizing this splendid material which should (1529) be made available for fighting in France this summer when the whole war may be decided one way or the other.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 47, March 13–May 12, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 181–183.

133. The Pact of Rome, 10 April 1918

As fighting continued, the fate of the postwar Austro-Hungarian Empire became ever more precarious. In spring 1918 Italian, Polish, Romanian, Czech, and Yugoslav representatives, all of whom sought Austro-Hungarian territory for their own existing or potential national states, held a congress in Rome. Although some of their claims overlapped, they declared their common intention to work together to achieve their objectives. Italian and Yugoslav delegates also reached tentative agreement as to the division of territory between their two states.

General Agreement among the Nationalities of Austria-Hungary

The representatives of the nationalities subject, wholly or in part, to the domination of Austria-Hungary: Italians, Poles, Rumanians, Czecho-slovaks, and Yugoslavs have agreed, with a view to common action, to the following declarations:

1. Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its unity as a national state or to complete that unity in order to attain its full political and economic independence.
2. Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and of its rights.
3. The Congress therefore recognizes the necessity of a joint struggle against the common oppressors until each one of these peoples shall have secured its complete liberation, its complete national unity, and its political liberty.

Bases of an Italo-Yugoslav Agreement

The representatives of the Italian people and of the Yugoslav people agree in particular on the following:

4. In regard to the relations between the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also known as the Yugoslav nation, the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is of vital interest to Italy, just as the achievement of Italian national unity is of vital interest to the Yugoslav nation. The representatives of the two peoples therefore undertake to use all their efforts

during the war and at the time of the conclusion of peace in order that this aim of the two nations may be wholly realized.

5. They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defense against any present or future enemy is of vital interest to both peoples.

6. They undertake to settle amicably, also in the interest of the amicable and sincere future relations between the two peoples, the pending territorial questions, on the basis of the principle of nationality and of the right of peoples to determine their own fate, and to do this in such a way as not to prejudice the vital interests of either nation, which shall be defined at the time of peace.

7. To the nuclei of either people which may have to be included within the frontiers of the other shall be recognized and guaranteed the right to have their language respected, as well as their culture and their moral and economic interests.

Source: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 347–348.

134. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France, Special (Backs-to-the-Wall) Order of the Day, 11 April 1918

As the German spring offensive of 1918 intensified on the Western Front, it seemed quite possible that British and French forces would suffer defeat before U.S. troops arrived in sufficient numbers to save the situation. At this desperate moment Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander-in-chief, issued the following order of the day to the British armies, entreating them to fight on to the bitter end.

TO ALL RANKS OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS

Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel Ports and destroy the British Army.

In spite of throwing already 106 Divisions into the battle and enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.

We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops. Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our Army under the most trying circumstances.

(1530)

Many amongst us now are tired. To those I would say that Victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support.

There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.

(Signed) D. Haig F.M.
Commander-in-Chief
British Armies in France
General Headquarters
Tuesday, April 11th, 1918

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/backstothewall.htm>.

135. Resolution of the 5th Session of the Allied Supreme War Council, 2 May 1918

Meeting in Abbeville, France, at the beginning of May, the Supreme War Council, on which the United States was represented, passed a resolution stating its position on the issue of American troops. The U.S. secretary of war, Newton D. Baker, who was present in Europe and had attended these deliberations, immediately forwarded this to President Woodrow Wilson in the United States. In a personal statement Ferdinand Foch, the new Allied supreme commander, strongly endorsed this request.

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own Commander and under its own flag.

In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, without losing sight of the necessity of building up an American Army, priority of transport be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British Armies; on the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. . . .

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 2:282–283.

136. U.S. Sedition Act, 16 May 1918

In spring 1918 the United States amended the Espionage Act passed the previous year. Under the new version, it became a criminal offense to attempt to persuade others to avoid military service or to obstruct government recruiting efforts. The use of the mail service for such purposes was explicitly forbidden. Prosecutions under the new legislation swiftly followed.

Sec. 3. Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies, or shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements, or say or do anything except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with intent to obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds or other securities of the United States or the making of loans by or to the United States, and whoever when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause, or incite or attempt to incite, insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment services of the United States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or the imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both: *Provided*, That any employee or official of the United States Government who commits any disloyal act or utters any unpatriotic or disloyal language, or who, in an abusive

and violent manner criticizes (1531) the Army or Navy or the flag of the United States shall be at once dismissed from the service. . . .

Sec. 4. When the United States is at war, the Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or concern is using the mails in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, instruct the postmaster at any post office at which mail is received addressed to such person or concern to return to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed all letters or other matter so addressed, with the words "Mail to this address undeliverable under Espionage Act" plainly written or stamped upon the outside thereof, and all such letters or other matter so returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to the senders thereof under such regulations as the Postmaster General may prescribe.

Source: *The United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. 40 (April 1917–March 1919) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 553–554.

137. General John J. Pershing, “Employment of American Divisions from March to September, 1918” (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)

Only in spring 1918 did U.S. troops begin to arrive in large numbers in France. While their numbers were still increasing, in late May 1918 they saw service at Cantigny and in the second half of July 1918 at Château-Thierry, their first major engagement. During the third and last German spring offensive, U.S. forces then participated in the Marne counteroffensive, fighting at Soissons. John J. Pershing, the commander-in-chief of U.S. forces, later summarized their activities in his final report.

11. The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to [overall Allied commander] Gen. Foch’s headquarters at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the Allies demanded this divergence from our plans.

On March 21, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available—the 1st and 2d then in line, and the 36th and 42d just withdrawn from line after one month’s trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the 26th relieved the 1st Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve; the 42d relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the 93d Division was with the French in the Argonne, the 41st Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions (3d, 32d, and 5th) were arriving.

12. On April 25 the 1st Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy’s new offensive launched May 27 toward Château-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new position and counterattack succeeded counterattack. The desperate

efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

13. Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the 32d, intended for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the 5th Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The 3d Division was assembling in its training area and the III Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the 28th and 77th had arrived in the British area, and the 4th, 27th, 30th, 33d, 35th, and 82d were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The 2d Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the 1st Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31 and, early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Château-Thierry Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained 3d Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Château-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river crossing.

The enemy having been halted, the 2d Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting.

(1532)

14. To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their front from the Oise to Akiens, about 60 kilometers, and during the German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist the British. The French lines had been further lengthened about 45 kilometers as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French reserves to an extremely low point.

Our II Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the 10 divisions with the British, which were held back in training

areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, 5 American divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. The 77th and 82d Divisions were moved south to release the 42d and 26th for employment on a more active portion of the front; the 35th Divisions entered the line in the Vosges, and the 4th and 28th Divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Château-Thierry as reserves.

On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficial to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that the German losses were unusually heavy.

15. On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 26th Divisions were on the Château-Thierry front with the 4th and 28th in support, some small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with our troops or with the French; the 42nd Division was in support of the French east of Reims; and four colored regiments were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the British Army, three having elements in the line. In our training areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the process of arrival.

The Marne Salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or the offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne Salient. Although the prevailing view among the allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under American command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The 42d Division entered the line near Somme-Py immediately, and five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. Southwest of Reims and along the Marne to the east of Château-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 kilometers beyond the river being effected against the French immediately to the right of our 3d Division. The following quotation from the report of the commanding general 3d Division gives the result of the fighting on his front:

Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front-line positions, causing the infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the 3d Division sector except the dead.

On this occasion a single regiment of the 3d Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

16. The Selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching of the counterattack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of reserves. Every American division with my sort of training was made available for use in a counter-offensive.

(1533)

Gen. Pétain's initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire western face of [the] Marne salient. The American 1st and 2d Divisions, with the French Moroccan 1st Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18,

without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

The 1st Division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the 7 German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British division. The 2d Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first 26 hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2nd Divisions the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the allies.

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counteroffensive. A little to the south of the 2d Division, the 4th was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The American I Corps, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett commanding, with the 26th Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Château-Thierry-Soissons Road on the 21st. At the same time the 3d Division crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont-St-Pere and the villages of Charveaux and Jaulgonne.

In the I Corps, the 42d Division relieved the 26th on July 25 and extended its front on the 26th, relieving the French division. From this time until August 2 it fought its way through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward the Vesle until relieved by the 4th Division on August 3. Early in this period elements of the 28th Division participated in the advance.

Farther to the east the 3d Division forced the enemy back to Poncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the 32d Division from the Vosges front. The 32d, after relieving the 3d and some elements of the 28th on the line of the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the 42d toward the Vesle. On August 3 it passed under control of our III Corps, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard commanding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the 4th Division took up the task of the 42d Division and advanced with the 32d to the Vesle River, where, on August 6, the operation for the reduction of the Marne Salient continued.

In the hard fighting from July 18 to August 6 the Germans were not only halted in their advance but were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

Source: “General John J. Pershing’s Final Report,” in *The United States Army in the World War 1917–1919, Vol. 12: Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services*, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Historical Division, 1948), 33–36.

138. Allied Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Joint Note 31, 3 June 1918

From February 1918 onward, the Supreme War Council studied the possibility of intervention in Siberia and North Russia. In Siberia, the military representatives believed intervention would be advantageous so that the Allies could seize large quantities of military stores held at Vladivostok and Harbin and take control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad between those two terminals. In North Russia, they hoped to deny the ports of Murmansk and Archangel to Germany as well as safeguard further Allied supplies. In both areas Britain and France also hoped to work with anti-Bolshevik Russian forces who sought to continue the war against Germany. After several months of discussion and negotiation, the Supreme War Council adopted a note of the military representatives on the subject.

At their joint meeting on the 23d of March, 1918, the Inter-Allied Naval Council and the Permanent Military Representatives considered the possibility of sending an Inter-Allied Military Expedition to Murmansk and Archangel with the object of protecting the stocks of military material warehoused in those ports.

While recognizing the impossibility for the moment of such an operation, the Representatives in their Joint Report of 23d March, 1918, expressed the hope that the naval effort at Murmansk would be continued in order to maintain Allied possession of that port as long as possible.

The Permanent Military Representatives are of opinion that since the 23d of March the general situation in Russia and especially in the Northern Ports has completely altered.

(1534)

1. The German threat to Murmansk and Archangel has become more definite and more imminent. Finland has completely fallen under German domination and is now openly hostile to the Entente and makes no concealment of its claims to Carelia, the Kola Peninsula and the Murmansk railway. The Germans are preparing for an advance on Petrograd.
2. We are urged to occupy these ports not only by the Allied Representatives in Russia but also by the majority of the Russian parties.

Such occupation is an indispensable corollary of Allied intervention in Siberia.

3. It is hoped that the available Serbian and Czech units will render the land defence of the maritime bases possible without the transport of any considerable expeditionary force.
4. The Serbian and Czech units gathered at those points cannot be conveyed immediately to France and, should the German-Finnish Armies advance rapidly, they run the risk of capture unless organized and supported without delay. Further, the following considerations must be noted:—
 1. The lines of communication both by land and sea terminating at the ports of Murmansk and Archangel are the only routes the Allies have left by which to penetrate into the heart of Russia to keep in touch with the various nationalities and to combat German influence.
 2. These ports are the only free economic outlets towards Western Europe that are left to Russia and Siberia.
 3. The occupation by Germany of Murmansk alone and its conversion into a first rate submarine base would make the sea route to Archangel impracticable for the Entente.
 4. On the other hand, the occupation of Murmansk and Archangel by the Entente would protect the flanks of the Allied Armies which may eventually operate in Siberia and facilitate and expedite liaison with them.
 5. The agreement of the Czecho-Slovaks to the maintenance of a portion of their forces in those regions will be conditional on the moral and material support of a few Allied units on the spot to co-operate with them against the Germans.

Hence the Military Representatives are of opinion:—

1) That a military effort be made by the Allies to retain in their possession, first in importance, the port of Murmansk; afterwards or even simultaneously if possible the port of Archangel.

2) In order to limit this effort to the minimum, that it would be desirable to obtain from the National Czecho-Slav Council approval of the principle of retaining in these regions during the necessary time some Czech units, it being understood that the number of these units would be reduced to the minimum necessary and that the remainder would be sent to France as previously agreed.

3) Provided that the assistance defined above is obtained, the effort to be made by the Allies can then be limited to the sending to the Russian Arctic ports:—

1. Of some English, French, American or Italian battalions, four to six in all;
2. Of officers and specialists from the Allies or Czechs in France, to complete the instruction and cadres of the Serbo-Czech troops and to provide for the general administration and supply of the garrisoning force;
3. Of the materiel and supplies which cannot be found there.

4) That the organization of the command can be effected in the following way:

There will be a single commander who will be charged with the direction of both naval defense and land defense of the Russian Arctic ports, as well as of the important points on the railroad which terminates at each of these ports.

This command will be exercised by a commander-in-chief designated by the British Government until such time as the Supreme War Council may otherwise direct.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 2:273–275.

139. Allied Intervention in North Russia, May 1918—October 1919: Recollections of Major Edward MacMorland

By spring 1918, a confused civil war between Bolsheviks and White Russian forces who sought to reverse the Russian revolution was well under way. The Allies decided to send troops to Siberia and North Russia to protect the large quantities of war supplies they had stockpiled there and also to keep railway lines open. The British and French also hoped to encourage antirevolutionary forces in Russia and possibly to bring Russia back into the war, while the Japanese sought territorial and economic privileges in Siberia. U.S. forces also participated in these interventions, and one unstated purpose of their mission was to restrain the Japanese. Fighting in Russia continued for many months after the Allied conclusion of an armistice with Germany in (1535) November 1918. For many decades Soviet Russia would hold these interventions against all the Allied governments.

In March 1919 the American officer Major Edward MacMorland was given command of the North Russian Transportation Corps Expeditionary Force, bound for the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk area in the Arctic circle. The North Russian intervention was primarily a British undertaking, but MacMorland was allowed to remain with the forces there. This undertaking was also a more explicitly anti-Bolshevik operation than its counterpart in Siberia. In an article published in the 13 October 1951 edition of Collier's Magazine, MacMorland, by then a major general, recounted the U.S. rationale for this expedition and his experiences as a participant.

In the summer of 1918, with Russia in a state of utter chaos, the Germans had established themselves in Finland and were pressing northward with the obvious intention of seizing the ice-free port of Murmansk and establishing it as a submarine and military base. They also had their eyes on the railroad which ran from Murmansk to Petrozavodsk and connected with the famous and strategically important Trans-Siberian railroad, the one means of communication with Vladivostok in Siberia.

To add to this threat to the Allies, the Reds were carrying on a savage seesaw guerrilla warfare with the White Russians, and were menacing constantly the stores of Allied materials which had been built up at Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, and at other points along the Trans-Siberian line.

At about this time, a great, disorganized army of Czech troops, whose number has been estimated up to 100,000, deserted from the Austrian forces and began

pouring into Russia—seizing cities on the Volga and the Trans-Siberian and declaring war on German and Bolshevik alike.

It was with the dual motive of re-establishing an Eastern Front and protecting their supplies—as well as with the vague hope that their presence might inspire the Russians to set up a representative government—that the Allies determined to move into Russia. (Originally it was believed that the Czechs would supply most of the men for this new front; the idea was later abandoned.)

Once the decision was made, the democracies moved fast. On May 24, 1918, British-led Allied forces slipped into Murmansk under the very noses of the numerically superior Germans. Not long afterward, the U.S. War Department alerted the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments, in the Philippines, for duty in Siberia under Major Gen. William S. Graves, and arranged for the shipment of 5,000 additional troops from California to bring the two regiments up to full war strength.

On July 31st a multilingual, 1,400 men landing party (including 50 American sailors) appeared at Arkhangelsk under the command of a British general and drove the Bolsheviks from the city after brief resistance.

On August 15th, the first American soldiers of the Siberian Expeditionary Force, which was to reach an ultimate strength of more than 9,000, landed at Vladivostok—the first American soldiers to set foot in such numbers on Russian ground. Three weeks later, on September 4th, 4,000 doughboys—mostly from the 85th Division, which had been in England ready for shipment to France—reached Arkhangelsk under Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) George E. Stewart to back up the small 11-nation contingent which had arrived there earlier. . . .

The Allies were now established in Russia in force—and their numbers were to increase later. Ultimately there would be some 15,000 Allied troops in Russian Europe—including an additional 1,000 Americans, a large number of British and French and some Italians, Lithuanians, Chinese, White Russians, Poles, Finns, Czechs and Estonians. Eventually the Siberian Allies would grow in strength until the Japanese alone had an estimated 70,000 troops on the ground, plus the Americans and some French, English and Chinese contingents.

The two fronts, some 5,000 miles apart, had no direct communication, and might have been involved in entirely separate wars against the same enemy.

Before MacMorland arrived in Russia, U.S. forces there had already encountered problems with Bolsheviks and other Russians, as one of his fellow officers recalled.

But we never knew what to expect from the Bolsheviks. I recall, for example, an event that occurred in front-line Toulgas on Nov. 11th, 1918, the day the Armistice was signed by Germany and the Allies. The Reds suddenly attacked a hospital—against no opposition but that of an orderly who, seeing them coming, had picked up a rifle and fired through a window. Storming the doors, the Bolshevik soldiers poured into the building and began to murder their patients.

Suddenly a young Russian woman in enemy uniform entered, took command, and halted the slaughter. She posted a sentry at each door and remained during the day. Later, when the Communists withdrew, she refused to accompany them; instead, she surrendered as an Allied prisoner. She revealed that she was 22 and the friend of a former czarist officer. She was well educated and gave the Allies considerable information about the location and supply situation of the Red troops. I regret that I don't know her name or what became of her, for she saved many lives that day.

(1536)

There were, however, tragic incidents that resulted from the actions of “friendly” Russians. On Oct. 1st [1918] two American platoons, plus 50 Russian volunteers and 18 Cossacks, who had just joined the Allied command, moved in to attack a force of Reds, estimated at between 500 and 700 men, on the front just south of the White Sea. When the attack began, the Cossacks promptly effected a retreat—in good order, but without orders. The Russian volunteers fled. The two U.S. platoons, now heavily outnumbered, dug in; by the time they were able to pull back under cover of darkness, they had lost 6 killed and 3 wounded (and had inflicted casualties on the enemy reckoned at 30 killed and 500 wounded).

Besides the unit mentioned above, a number of other small Cossack groups attached themselves to the Allied forces, as did some Bolshevik deserters and Russian peasant volunteers. Serving under both Russian and Allied officers many of these men were molded into good, well-trained soldiers. By and large, however, they were extremely unreliable. Some, of course, had joined up just for the clothing and food—and pay—they got.

In three cases, these units mutinied. In Arkhangelsk on Dec. 11th, for instance, two companies of Russians refused to go to the front, and barricaded themselves in their barracks, refusing to surrender to other Russian and Allied troops. Firing broke out, but ended when a mortar shell was dropped into the Red barracks. The mutineers gave up then and named 11 of their number as the leaders. These men were shot by a detachment of their own mutineers, and this outfit later became one of the finest Russian units serving with the Allies. . . .

This service, according to orders from Washington, consisted simply in holding operation in the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk area. At no time was there any plan to push inland. However, in order to protect the two cities from attack and keep them in communication with each other, the Allied forces herded the Bolsheviks back, in heavy fighting, some 350 miles from Arkhangelsk, in the general direction of Moscow. The most bitter battles were fought by troops operating out of the White Sea port; they advanced as far south as Toulgas and also cleared an area extending for about 100 miles on either side of the base city.

When MacMorland arrived in Russia, he concentrated on repairing the railroad to the south, to facilitate the Allied drive toward St. Petersburg.

The Murmansk operation became devoted to holding most of the railroad line to Petrozavosk. This was important because it connected with another line that ultimately tied in with the Trans-Siberian line. It was this front that I was concerned with; although I was an artillery officer, I was named commander of the American contingent in Murmansk (all volunteers), whose job it was to keep the railroad open. Eventually, in carrying out this task, the Allied forces—including, of course, the Americans—beat the Reds back as far as Lake Onega, roughly 400 miles from Murmansk.

The part of the railroad which ran from Murmansk to the junction with a rough trail which skirted the White Sea from Arkhangelsk was fairly safe from Red attack, and we turned this section over to friendly Russians to operate. We worked south from the junction and the efficiency of American methods was a constant source of amazement to the Russians.

Captain E. S. Waid was superintendent of the line. He replaced the Russian station crews with half as many Americans and immediately got the road on a regular operating schedule—the first occasion on which it had run on time. He kept empty cars rolling northward so fast that the Russians, controlling the road north of the junction, had to evacuate their own yards in self-defense. As a

result, in a very short time the whole line from Murmansk was operating smoothly.

The equipment we worked with was far from satisfactory. We found 12 locomotives barely running and 33 others decrepit and immobile. Captain C. E. Macallan, in charge of maintenance, swiftly repaired the dozen good locomotives and, by cannibalizing the others, succeeded in putting an additional 10 on the road. All 22 were wood burners, and none had brakes; the engineer stopped by traversing the steam. The engines broke down so often that when one engineer succeeded in operating 6,238 miles without a failure he was cited in official orders for his excellent performance.

In order to keep my headquarters completely mobile, I took over an old second-class dining car, fitted it with four tiny state rooms, an office, kitchen, dining room and sleeping quarters for the cook and orderlies, and moved in, along with my personal officer and our chaplain. From early May to early June of 1919, I traveled 8,000 miles in that car, never remaining in one place for more than a week.

During a large part of this time, we were under fire. Our men were operating so close to the enemy that we had an armored train on the line, with our steel-sheathed gondolas, each mounting a Vickers three-pounder naval gun; our sand-bagged tenders with places for 22 machine guns; two passenger cars for the personnel; a kitchen car, and two ammunition cars. We had this train in action a few times—but usually just its presence was enough to scare off the enemy.

(1537)

In April 1919 the Allies were engaged in clearing the Bolsheviks from the southern part of the Murmansk railroad, and 85 of my men, led by Capt. C. G. Jones, went along under the protection of a single flatcar on which was mounted a 75-millimeter gun. Within a couple of weeks, Jones's units had built eight bridges, laid a mile of track, repaired numerous junctions and switches and were so far along in their work that 30 men were detached from this force to aid in the attack. Two of these men were killed a day later, and one was injured; about ten days afterward another died in action. The records indicate that these were the only battle casualties in the entire U.S. Transportation Corps during World War I. . . .

Medvyejya Gora was taken on May 21st, and the attack pressed on. Some 15 miles beyond this place, a large bridge was out; [Captain C. G.] Jones and his men built a 1,075 foot detour at a lower level in 48 hours. It was early in July when the track men finally reached the town of Kyapeselga, the high-water mark of the Allied advance.

For us, this was the “end of the line.” We were ordered out of Russia shortly thereafter. In little more than a month we had followed the infantry 70 miles, repaired so many miles of track we couldn’t count them, and built 75 bridges ranging up to 142 ft. in length and 36 ft. in height.

There were no more engagements involving Allied troops after this. The order had come to withdraw. The first American contingent embarked at Arkhangelsk on June 3rd; the railroaders were the last to leave, on July 28th. When the men of the 85th Division returned to Michigan, they were wearing a distinctive, eye-catching shoulder patch—a lumbering polar bear.

The remaining British troops all withdrew from North Russia in August and September, the last men leaving on 1 October 1919. In recognition of his achievements in Russia, the British awarded MacMorland the Distinguished Service Order.

Source: Edward MacMorland, “Our First War with the Russians,” *Collier’s Magazine* (13 October 1951), reproduced in Martin Marix Evans, ed., *American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917–1920* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), 161–163, 177–178, 180–182.

140. German Assessments of American Prisoners: Report of Lieutenant von Berg, 15 June 1918

German officers scrutinized the performance of the American troops just as closely as the Allies did. In mid-June 1918 a German intelligence officer interrogated a number of American prisoners from the 2nd Infantry Division and submitted a detailed report on their training, abilities, and outlook. Allied forces who captured this document on 7 July 1918 in their turn read it with great interest.

Intelligence officer of the Supreme Command at Army Headquarters, No. 7, J., No. 3,528, Army Headquarters, June 17, 1917.

Second American Infantry Division.

Examination of prisoners from the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 23rd Regiments captured from June 5th to 14th in the Bouresches sector.

Purpose of the Attacks

The prisoners were not informed of the purpose of the attacks. The order for the attacks on Belleau Wood were made known only a few hours before the attacks took place.

Arrival in Line and Relief

The marine brigades went into sector from June 2nd to June 4th, and elements of the other two regiments from June 5th to 6th in the area Torcy-Vaux (4 KM. W. [kilometers west] of Château-Thierry), one battalion from each unit being in the front line. There they relieved French troops of various divisions whose identity they did not know. They had no information concerning their relief. Only the prisoners from the marine brigade considered that on account of heavy losses their relief was imminent.

The 3rd Marine Brigade belongs to the Marine Corps, which was already in existence in the United States during peace time. The 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades are said to be still at home.

Section Two

Regarding the distribution of machine guns, the prisoners made contradictory statements. They claim that in the 3rd Marine Brigade, for instance, each regiment, in addition to the infantry battalion, has one machine-gun battalion of

four platoons, each platoon having twelve machine guns. Furthermore, each brigade is said to have one brigade machine-gun battalion.

According to a captured order of battle of the 26th American Division (Intelligence Office 7, No. 3,228, June 8, 1918), that division has only one machine-gun company to a battalion in each regiment. In case the vague statements of the prisoners are correct, the discrepancy can be perhaps explained by the fact that the Marine Corps was part of the United States peace (1538) army and was therefore equipped according to principles other than in the case of the 26th American Division, which has been formed from the National Guard troops since the war began.

Elements of the 2nd American Division were put into the Moulanville (Verdun) sector from the middle of March to the middle of May for training, and were relieved by unknown French troops.

The division was then moved by rail to the vicinity of Vitry-le-François, where it remained about five days. From there the division was transferred by rail, via Coulommiers-Denis-Pont-Oise, into the regions west of Beauvais. The 5th Regiment of Marines was in the vicinity of Gisors, thirty kilometers southwest of Beauvais. The 6th Regiment of marines was at Chars, seven kilometers northwest.

The division rested eight days in this region. Maneuvers on a large scale with large units were not held; only exercises in minor tactics, hand grenade throwing, and target practice were carried out. A few long practice marches were made.

On May 31st the 3rd Marine Brigade was ordered to move and put into French motor trucks (twenty men or ten officers in each truck). The 5th Regiment of the marines was the first to leave and traveled via Beaumont, Lucarches, Ermenonville (west of Nateuilles Plessis), Belleville, and Meaux to Lisy-sur-Ourcq, where they were unloaded after a journey of eighteen hours.

The next regiment to leave was the 6th Regiment of marines, which followed the same route, while the 9th and 23rd Regiments apparently moved via Beaumont, Ecoven Genesse, Aulnay (environs of Paris), Clave, Meaux, and were unloaded in the neighborhood of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. The 5th Regiment of marines was put into line during the night of June 2nd–3rd as the first regiment of the division, the other elements taking up their positions in the sector in echelon.

Summary

The 2nd Division may be classified as a very good division, perhaps even as assault troops. The various attacks of both regiments on Belleau Wood were carried out with dash and recklessness. The moral effect of our firearms did not materially check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are still unshaken.

Value of the Individual

The individual soldiers are very good. They are healthy, vigorous, and physically well developed men of ages ranging from 18 to 28, who at present lack only necessary training to make them redoubtable opponents. The troops are fresh and full of straightforward confidence. A remark of one of the prisoners is indicative of their spirit: "We kill or get killed."

Method of Attack

In both attacks on Belleau Wood, which were carried out by one or two battalions, the following method of attack was adopted: Three or four lines of skirmishers at about thirty to fifty paces distance; rather close behind these isolated assault parties in platoon column; abundant equipment of automatic rifles and hand grenades. The assault parties carried forward machine guns and were ordered to penetrate the German position at a weak point, to swing laterally, and to attack the strong points from the rear.

Particulars on the American Position

No details are available. The prisoners are hardly able to state where they were in position. According to their statements, it may be assumed that the front line consists only of rifle pits one meter deep, up to the present not provided with wire entanglements. The organization of the positions in rear is unknown.

Morale

The prisoners in general make an alert and pleasing impression. Regarding military matters, however, they do not show the slightest interest. Their superiors keep them purposely without knowledge of military subjects. For example, most of them have never seen a map. They are no longer able to describe the villages and roads through which they marched. Their ideas on the organization of their unit is entirely confused. For example, one of them claimed that his brigade has six regiments, his division twenty-four. They still

regard the war from the point of view of the “big brother” who comes to help his hard-pressed brethren and is, therefore, welcomed everywhere. A certain moral background is not lacking. The majority of the prisoners simply took as a matter of course that they have come to Europe in order to defend their country.

Only a few of the troops are of pure American origin; the majority is of German, Dutch, and Italian parentage, but these semi-Americans, almost all of whom were born in America and have never been in Europe, fully feel themselves to be true-born sons of their country.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *The Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (New York: National Alumni, 1921), 6: 204–208.

141. African-American Troops in World War I: General John J. Pershing to General Peyton March, 19 June 1918

Close to 400,000 African-American troops served in World War I, and 10 percent of these saw combat service, including New (1539) York's 369th Infantry, the "Harlem Hell Fighters." Rumors circulated among blacks in the United States that black troops were exposed to danger far more often than whites and if wounded received inferior treatment. They undoubtedly had far fewer social facilities available to them. When black troops returned to the United States after the war, many whites held such veterans in great suspicion; some were even lynched. While many army officers opposed drafting African Americans on the grounds that their performance was inferior, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, who had earlier commanded the all-black 10th Cavalry in Cuba, thought highly of black troops. Concerned to rebut the assorted rumors, in June 1918 he sent the following confidential cable to General Peyton C. March, the U.S. Army's chief of staff.

Reference to your cablegram 1523, the stories probably invented by German agents that have been widely circulated among colored people in the United States to the effect that colored soldiers in France are always placed in most dangerous positions and sacrificed to save white soldiers; that when wounded they are left on ground to die without medical attention etc. are absolutely false.

The following are the losses as reported up to June 18th in the 4 colored combat regiments now in France: 369th Infantry, died of wounds 3; died of disease 8; severely wounded 2; 370th Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 3; severely wounded 0; 371st Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 8; severely wounded 0; 372nd Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 3; severely wounded 0. These figures show conclusively that negro troops have not thus far occupied positions as dangerous as those occupied by white troops and that their physical condition is excellent.

A tour of inspection, just completed among American negro troops by officers of the Training Section, these headquarters, shows a comparatively high degree of training and efficiency among these troops. Their training is identical with that of other American troops serving with the French Army, the effort being to lead all American troops gradually to heavy combat duty by preliminary service in trenches in quiet sectors. Colored troops in trenches have been particularly fortunate, as one regiment had been there a month before any losses were suffered. This is almost unheard of on western front.

Exploit of colored infantrymen some weeks ago repelling much larger German patrol killing and wounding several Germans and winning Croix de Guerre by their gallantry has roused fine spirit of emulation throughout colored troops all of whom are looking forward to more than active service. Only regret expressed by colored troops is that they are not given more dangerous work to do. They are especially amused at the stories being circulated that the American colored troops are placed in the most dangerous positions and all are desirous of having more active service than has been permitted them thus far. I cannot commend too highly the spirit shown among the colored combat troops who exhibit fine capacity for quick training and eagerness for the most dangerous work.

Source: Papers of John Joseph Pershing, Library of Congress, published in Andrew Carroll, ed., *War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 139–140.

142. German Propaganda Flyer, "To the Colored Soldiers of the U.S. Army," Circa 1918

German propagandists habitually devised leaflets intended to destroy the morale of the troops opposing German armies. When African-American troops began arriving on the Western Front in mid-1918, German forces distributed a leaflet intended specifically for them, stressing the discrimination African Americans routinely encountered.

Hell boys, what are you doing over here? Fighting the Germans? Why? Have they ever done you any harm? Of course, some white folks and the lying English-American papers told you that the Germans ought to be wiped out for the sake of humanity and democracy. What is Democracy? Personal Freedom, all citizens enjoying the same rights socially and before the law! Do you enjoy the same rights as the white people do in America, the land of Freedom and Democracy? Or aren't you rather treated over there as second-class citizens? Can you go into a restaurant where white people dine; can you get a seat in a theater where white people sit; can you get a Pullman seat or berth in a railroad car, or can you even ride, in the South, in the same street car with white people? And how about the law? Is lynching and the most horrible cruelties connected therewith a lawful proceeding in a democratic country?

Now, all this is entirely different in Germany, where they do like colored people, where they treat them as gentlemen and not as second-class citizens. They enjoy exactly the same social privileges as every white man, and quite a number of colored people have mighty fine positions in business in Berlin and other big German cities.

Why then fight the Germans only for the benefit of the Wall Street robbers to protect the millions they have lent to the English, French, and Italians? You have been made the tool of the egotistic and rapacious rich in England and in America, and there is nothing in the whole game for you but broken bones, horrible wounds, spoiled health, or—death. No satisfaction (1540) whatever will you get out of this unjust war. You have never seen Germany; so you are fools if you allow people to teach you to hate it. Come over to see for yourself. Let those do the fighting who make profit out of this war; don't allow them to use you as cannon food. To carry the gun in their service is not an honor but a shame. Throw it away and come over to the German lines. You will find friends who help you along.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *The Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:145–146.

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World War I Documents (July–December 1918)

143. The Death of Tsar Nicholas II and His Family, 16–17 July 1918
144. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Aide-Mémoire to the Allied Ambassadors, 17 July 1918
145. President Woodrow Wilson, A Statement to the American People, 26 July 1918
146. The German Military Situation: Signed Protocol of Conference at German General Headquarters, 14 August 1918
147. General John J. Pershing, “The St.-Mihiel Operation,” September 1918 (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)
148. General John J. Pershing, The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 26 September–11 November 1918 (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)
149. William Harrison and Others to President Woodrow Wilson, 1 October 1918
150. Statement of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, 3 October 1918
151. The First German Peace Note: Imperial Chancellor Prince Max of Baden to President Woodrow Wilson, 6 October 1918
152. President Woodrow Wilson, First Reply to the German Request for an Armistice, 8 October 1918
153. The Second German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 14 October 1918
154. President Woodrow Wilson, Second Reply to the German Government, 14 October 1918
155. Request of the Government of Ottoman Turkey for an Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 14 October 1918
156. U.S. Note to the Austrian Government: Secretary of State Robert Lansing to W. A. F. Ekengren, Swedish Minister in Washington, 19 October 1918

157. The Third German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 20 October 1918

158. President Woodrow Wilson, Third Reply to the German Government, 23 October 1918

159. Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Vasilyevich Chicherin to President Woodrow Wilson, 24 October 1918

160. The Fourth German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 27 October 1918

161. Austro-Hungarian Note to the United States: W. A. F. Ekengren, Swedish Minister in Washington, to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 27 October 1918

162. Proclamation of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, Announcing Representative German Government, 28 October 1918

163. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Julius Andrassy, Note to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 29 October 1918

164. Roger Baldwin, Speech on the Draft, 30 October 1918

165. Frank P. Walsh of the National War Labor Board to President Woodrow Wilson, 30 October 1918

166. Official British Paraphrase of the Allied Armistice with Turkey, 31 October 1918

167. German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf, Memorandum Relative to

1542

Abdication of the Kaiser as an Armistice Condition, Berlin, 31 October 1918

168. Colonel Edward M. House, U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Cable No. 14 to President Woodrow Wilson, Sent via Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 31 October 1918

169. Allied Supreme War Council, 22nd Resolution on the Armistice Terms, 4 November 1918
170. Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 9 November 1918
171. Statement Issued by the German People's Government, 9 November 1918
172. Terms of German Armistice with Allied and Associated Powers, 11 November 1918
173. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Joint Session of Congress, 11 November 1918
174. Thomas Hardy, "And There Was a Great Calm"
175. Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary, Abdication Proclamation, 11 November 1918
176. Li Dazhao, "The Victory of Bolshevism," November 1918
177. The Chinese Government Demands an End to Foreign Dominance: Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, Washington, 27 November 1918
178. Marcus Garvey, "Advice of the Negro to Peace Conference," Editorial, *The Negro World*, 30 November 1918
179. The Spartacist Uprising, Germany, "Manifesto of the Spartacist Group," Signed by Klara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Franz Mehring, December 1918
180. Reflections on War on the Western Front: Sir Douglas Haig, Final Dispatch, 21 March 1919

143. The Death of Tsar Nicholas II and His Family, 16–17 July 1918

After his abdication in March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II and his family were kept in captivity. In spring 1918 the Bolshevik regime exiled the former imperial family to the distant Siberian town of Yekaterinburg (later Sverdlovsk) in the Urals, but by summer 1918 anticommunist White Russian forces and their allies threatened to take the area. According to his own account, on the evening of 16 July 1918 the Bolshevik commissar Yakov Yurovsky received orders from the government to kill all the imperial family, which he carried out that same night. Executed in the cellar of the house where they were living were the tsar; his wife Tsarina Alexandra Fyodorovna; their son Aleksei, the former heir to the throne; their four daughters, the Grand Duchesses Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia; three servants; and the family doctor.

Yakov Yurovsky's Account of the Execution of the Imperial Family and the Concealment of the Corpses, as Told to a Meeting of Old Bolsheviks in Sverdlovsk, 1 February 1934

. . . It was presumed that a trial would have been organized for them had time permitted. But as I have already said above, the front had been moving closer and closer since the beginning of July and was then only about 25 miles away, inevitably hastening a denouement.

This was a question of great political significance then and could not be resolved without a decision by the center, because the situation at the front also depended not only on the Urals but on the center's possibilities (by this time, you see, the Red Army was becoming more and more centralized and concentrated). There were continual contacts and conversations with the center about this. Around 10 July, the decision had already been made about what to do if abandoning Yekaterinburg became unavoidable. You see, only this can explain why execution without a trial was put off until 16 July, with Yekaterinburg being finally abandoned on 25–26 July; moreover, Yekaterinburg's evacuation was conducted in a completely, so to speak, orderly and timely way. Around 10 or 11 July, Filipp [Goloshchekin] told me that Nicholas would have to be liquidated and that it was necessary to prepare for this. . . .

On the 15th I immediately undertook preparations, for everything had to be done quickly. I decided to assemble the same number of men as there were people to be shot, gathered them all together, and told them what was happening—that they all had to prepare themselves for this, that as soon as we

got the final order everything was going to have to be ably handled. You see, it has to be said that shooting people isn't the easy matter that it might seem to some. After all, this wasn't going on at the front but in a "peaceful" situation. You see, these weren't bloodthirsty people, but people performing the difficult duty of the revolution. . . .

On the morning of the 16th . . . I prepared 12 Nagant revolvers and determined who would shoot whom. Comrade Filipp warned me that a truck would arrive at 12 o'clock that night. Those who arrived would give a password; they would be allowed in and would be given the corpses, which they would take away for burial. Around 11 o'clock at night on the 16th I gathered the men together again, gave out the revolvers, and stated that we would soon have to start liquidating the arrested. I warned Pavel Medvedev about the thorough check of the sentries outside and in, about how he and the guard (1543) commander should be on watch themselves in the area around the house and at the house where the external guard was lodged, and about how they should keep in contact with me. Only at the last minute, when everything was ready for the shooting, were they to warn all the sentries as well as the rest of the detachment that if they heard shots coming from the house they shouldn't worry and shouldn't come out of their lodgings, and that if something was especially worrisome they should let me know through the established channel.

The truck did not show up until half past one in the morning; the fact that we waited longer than expected couldn't help but create anxiety, in addition to the anxiety of waiting in general, but the main thing was that the [summer] nights were so short. Only after the truck came—or after I learned by telephone that the truck was on its way—did I go to wake the arrested.

Botkin was asleep in the room closest to the entrance; he came out and asked what the matter was. I told him that everyone had to be woken up right away as the town was uneasy, that staying upstairs was dangerous for them, and that I would transfer them to another place. Preparations took a lot of time, around 40 minutes. When the family was dressed, I led them to a room previously selected in the downstairs part of the house. We had thought this plan through with comrade Nikulin. Here I have to say that we didn't think in advance about the fact that the windows could not contain the noise; second, that the wall against which those to be shot were to be lined up was made of stone; and, finally, that the shooting would take on a chaotic character, but this was impossible to foresee. This last thing wasn't supposed to occur because each man was going to shoot one person, and so everything was to be orderly. The reasons for the chaos—that is, disorderly and confused shooting—became clear

later. Although I warned them through Botkin that they didn't need to bring anything with them, they nevertheless gathered up various little things—pillows, little bags, and so forth—and, I believe, a little dog.

Once they had descended to the room (at the entrance to the room on the right is a very wide window, almost the size of the whole wall), I suggested they stand by the wall. Apparently, at that moment they still did not imagine anything of what was in store for them. Alexandra Fyodorovna said: "There aren't even chairs here." Nicholas was carrying Aleksei in his arms. And he continued to stand with him like that in the room. Then I ordered a pair of chairs to be brought. Alexandra Fyodorovna sat on one of them to the right of the entrance, almost in the corner and by the window. Next to her, toward the left side of the entrance, stood the daughters and Demidova. Here Aleksei was set down beside them on a chair; after him came Doctor Botkin, the cook, and others, and Nicholas was left standing opposite Aleksei. Simultaneously, I ordered the people to come down and ordered that everyone be ready and that each be at his place when the command was given. Nicholas, having seated Aleksei, stood so that he was blocking him. Aleksei sat in the left-hand corner of the room from the entrance, and I immediately, as I recall it, told Nicholas approximately the following: that his imperial relatives and close associates both inside the country and abroad had tried to free him and that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies had decreed that they be shot. He asked: "What?" and turned to face Aleksei. Right then, I shot him and killed him on the spot. He didn't manage to turn to face us to get an answer. Now, instead of order, chaotic shooting began. The room was very small, but still everyone could have entered the room and performed the shooting in an orderly way. But, apparently, many shot across the threshold, and the bullets began to ricochet, since the wall was made of stone. Moreover, the firing intensified when those being shot began to scream. It took a great effort on my part to stop the shooting. A bullet from one of those shooting behind me whizzed by my head, and I can't remember whether it was the palm, hand, or finger of someone else that was hit and pierced by a bullet. When the shooting stopped, it turned out that the daughters, Alexandra Fyodorovna, the lady-in-waiting [actually, the personal maid] Demidova, I think, and also Aleksei were still alive. Then we began to finish them off (I had earlier suggested that they be shot in the region of the heart so that there would be less blood.) Aleksei remained seated, petrified, and I finished him off. They shot the daughters but nothing happened, then Yermakov set the bayonet in motion and that didn't help, then they were finished off by being shot in the head. Only in the forest did I discover what hampered the shooting of the daughters and Alexandra Fyodorovna.

Now that the shooting was over, the corpses had to be moved, and it was rather a long way. How could they be carried? Here someone thought of stretchers (they didn't think of it at the proper time). They took harness beams from sleighs and stretched sheets over them, I think. Having checked that everyone was dead, we began to carry them. Then we realized that blood stains would be everywhere. I immediately ordered that the stretchers be lined with available soldiers' blankets and that the truck be covered with them. . . .

Only when it was beginning to be light did we reach the well-known "clearing." . . .

. . . I ordered the corpses [un]loaded and the clothing removed and burned. That is, I ordered the things destroyed (1544) without a trace, and saw to it that any incriminating evidence was removed, in case someone were to discover the corpses. I ordered bonfires built. Things that had been sewn into the daughters' and Alexandra's clothing were discovered when the corpses began to be undressed; I can't remember exactly what was discovered on the latter or if it was simply the same sort of things as were sewn into the daughters' clothing. The daughters had bodices made up of solid diamonds and other precious stones that served not just as receptacles for valuables but also as protective armor. That was why neither bullets nor bayonets yielded results during the shooting and bayonet blows. No one is responsible for their death agonies but themselves, it has to be said. There turned out to be about 18 pounds of such valuables. By the way, their greed turned out to be so great that on Alexandra Fyodorovna there was a simply huge piece of gold wire bent into the shape of a bracelet around a pound in weight. All these valuables were immediately ripped out so that we wouldn't have to drag the bloody clothing with us. . . . We gathered the valuables, burned the things, and threw the stark-naked corpses into the mine.

Since it was clear that the bodies were not secure in their tomb, in a macabre postscript they were disinterred less than twenty-four hours later. Over the next two days, several schemes to dispose of the corpses were aborted before they were eventually buried early in the morning of 19 July.

. . . We piled everything onto the cart as evening fell. . . . We headed for the Siberian highway. Having crossed the railway embankment, we loaded the corpses into the truck again and quickly got in. We had been struggling for two hours, so it was getting close to midnight, and I decided that we had to bury them somewhere around here because at this late hour it was certain that no one at all could see us. I had sent for railroad ties to be brought to cover the place

where the corpses would be piled, so there was only one person who might see a few of the men—the railroad night watchman. I had in mind that if anyone found the ties, they might guess that they were put down to let a truck pass through. . . .

I have to say that we were all so devilishly exhausted that we didn't want to dig new graves, but, as always happens in these cases, two or three began doing it and then others joined in. We immediately lit fires, and while the grave was being readied, we burned two corpses: Aleksei and, apparently, Demidova, instead of Alexandra Fyodorovna, as we had intended. We dug a pit by the spot where they were burned, piled in the bones, evened it over, lit another big fire, and covered all traces with ashes. Before putting the rest of the corpses in the pit, we poured sulfuric acid on them; then we filled in the pit, tamped the ties down a little, and were done with it. At 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning, we gathered everyone together, explained the importance of what we had accomplished, warned everyone to forget about what they had seen and never speak of it with anyone, and left for town.

Source: Yakov Yurovsky, account of the execution of the tsar and his family as told at a meeting of old Bolsheviks in Sverdlovsk (formerly Yekaterinburg), 1 February 1934, translation in Mark D. Tucker and Vladimir M. Khrustal'ev, *The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 356–365. Copyright Yale University Press.

144. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Aide-Mémoire to the Allied Ambassadors, 17 July 1918

Although the United States agreed to participate in the Allied interventions in North Russia and Siberia, U.S. officials sought to limit both their own commitment and the broader scope of the interventions to measures directly necessary to effective prosecution of the Allied war effort. Secretary of State Robert Lansing therefore addressed a memorandum to all the Allied governments, carefully describing what the United States understood to be the bounds of these undertakings, limitations that he and President Woodrow Wilson expected the Allies to observe and honor.

The whole heart of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied Governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact.

In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the Allied Governments. It is now considering, (1545) at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or upon a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere.

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander in Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer to all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It can not, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any attempts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or

from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and self-justification. Recent developments have made it evident that it is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola, and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw those forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no wise to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the (1546) Allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the

political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 2:287–290.

145. President Woodrow Wilson, A Statement to the American People, 26 July 1918

The First World War offered new opportunities to African Americans, who enlisted in the U.S. Army and took jobs in munitions factories and other wartime industrial plants. The new visibility of American blacks often provoked resentment, and the long-established practice of lynching, whereby white mobs seized and often killed blacks accused of crimes, flared up dramatically. In summer 1918 President Wilson appealed to Americans to uphold national honor and dignity in the war by eschewing “mob violence” and allowing African Americans the fair trial every other American could expect.

My Fellow Countrymen: I take the liberty of addressing you upon a subject which so vitally affects the honor of the Nation and the very character and integrity of our institutions that I trust you will think me justified in speaking very plainly about it.

I allude to the mob spirit which has recently here and there very frequently shown its head among us, not in any single region, but in many and widely separated parts of the country. There have been many lynchings, and every one of them has been a blow at the heart of ordered law and humane justice. No man who loves America, no man who really cares for her fame and honor and character, or who is truly loyal to her institutions, can justify mob action while the courts of justice are open and the governments of the States and the Nation are ready and able to do their duty. We are at this very moment fighting lawless passion. Germany has outlawed herself among the nations because she has disregarded the sacred obligations of law and has made lynchers of her armies. Lynchers emulate her disgraceful example. I, for my part, am anxious to see every community in America rise above that level with pride and a fixed resolution which no man or set of men can afford to despise.

We proudly claim to be the champions of democracy. If we really are, in deed and in truth, let us see to it that we do not discredit our own. I say plainly that every American who takes part in the action of a mob or gives it any sort of countenance is no true son of this great Democracy, but its betrayer, and does more to discredit her by that single disloyalty to her standards or law and of right than the words of her statesmen or the sacrifices of her heroic boys in the trenches can do to make suffering peoples believe her to be their savior. How shall we commend democracy to the acceptance of other peoples, if we disgrace our own by proving that it is, after all, no protection to the weak? Every mob contributes to German lies about the United States what her most

gifted liars cannot improve upon by the way of calumny. They can at least say that such things cannot happen in Germany except in times of revolution, when law is swept away!

I therefore very earnestly and solemnly beg that the governors of all the States, the law officers of every community, and, above all, the men and women of every community in the United States, all who revere America and wish to keep her name without stain or reproach, will cooperate—not passively merely, but actively and watchfully—to make an end of this disgraceful evil. It cannot live where the community does not countenance it.

I have called upon the Nation to put its great energy into this war and it has responded—responded with a spirit and a genius for action that has thrilled the world. I now call upon it, upon its men and women everywhere, to see to it that its laws are kept inviolate, its fame untarnished. Let us show our utter contempt for the things that have made this war hideous among the wars of history by showing how those who love liberty and right and justice and are willing to lay down their lives for them upon foreign fields stand ready also to illustrate to all mankind their loyalty to the things at home which they wish (1547) to see established everywhere as a blessing and protection to the peoples who have never known the privileges of liberty and self-government. I can never accept any man as a champion of liberty either for ourselves or for the world who does not reverence and obey the laws of our own beloved land, whose laws we ourselves have made. He has adopted the standards of the enemies of his country, whom he affects to despise.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 49, July 18–September 13, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 97–98.

146. The German Military Situation: Signed Protocol of Conference at German General Headquarters, 14 August 1918

With the failure of Quartermaster General Erich von Ludendorff's spring 1918 offensive, the German military situation became increasingly desperate. The German high command had effectively staked all its resources on the effort to win a quick and decisive victory on the Western Front. In August 1918 Germany's top military and political leaders met to discuss the existing position and the unpalatable alternatives before them. They decided to open peace negotiations with the Entente.

Present: His Majesty the Emperor and King; His Royal Highness the Crown Prince; The Imperial Chancellor [Georg von Hertling]; General Field-Marshal [Paul] von Hindenburg; General [Erich von] Ludendorff, First Quartermaster-General; The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Paul von Hintze]; Adjutant-General [Hans] von Plessen; [Friedrich Wilhelm] von Berg, Chief of the Civil Cabinet; Baron [Ulrich] von Marschall, Chief of the Military Cabinet.

The Imperial Chancellor describes the internal situation. Public tired of war. Food supplies insufficient, clothing conditions even worse. Suffrage reform.

General Ludendorff: More severe internal discipline required. Most energetic co-ordination of international forces. Punishment of Lichnowsky [the Austrian foreign minister, who had openly suggested that Austria must sue for peace].

The Secretary of State describes the external situation. At the present time, the enemy is more confident of victory and more willing to fight than ever. The reason for this is partly their recent military successes in the west; the chief cause, however, is their original and ever-increasing conviction that the Allied Powers, with their comparatively inexhaustible reserves of men, raw materials, and manufactures, must crush the allied Central Powers, *with the help of time alone*. According to the view of our enemies, time is working in their favor. The longer the war lasts, so much more is the Central Powers' stock of men, raw materials, and manufactures diminished, while the Allies can count on an increase along all three lines. And in addition, the Allies have just lately been inspired with the hope of adding to the time factor the advantage of military successes. So much for the enemy.

The neutral Powers are heartily sick of war; they, too, are becoming fixed in the belief that the Central Powers are doomed to defeat by time alone; to be sure, the neutral Powers would prefer to see a peace without victory for either party.

Most of the neutral Powers are in sympathy with a victory for our enemies. But more than anything else they want to see the war come to an end, no matter by what means. Spain's attitude with regard to our torpedoing is a proof of this—an attitude which leaves us to face the problem of either limiting the U-boat war, or of going to war with that country. This attitude is all the more serious, in that if it becomes known, other neutrals would adopt it.

Our allies: Austria declares, and our own information corroborates this opinion, that she has come to the end of her rope, that she can only hold out through the winter at the longest; that even a winter campaign is more than doubtful.

Bulgaria is making the most exorbitant demands for subsidies and for the delivery of supplies, and is ostensibly capable of little, on account of the exhaustion of her army.

Turkey has plunged herself into a war of booty and extermination in the Caucasus, is crossing our designs, and meets our warnings and expostulations with the familiar resistance of the Oriental and the weaker party. We have the choice of either letting our allies go their own way, or of complying with their arrogant demands. In our position, that choice is determined for us in advance. *The Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field has so far defined the military situation as to say that we can no longer hope to break down the fighting spirit of our enemies by military action, and that we must set as the object of our campaign that of gradually wearing down the enemy's fighting spirit by a strategic defensive.* The political leaders of the Government bow to this decision of the greatest military leader that the war has brought forth, and draw from it the political conclusion that it would be politically impossible for us to break down the fighting spirit of our opponents, and that we are therefore compelled to consider this military situation in the further conduct of our policies.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince declares that he subscribes to all that has been said by General Ludendorff and (1548) the Secretary of State, and emphatically declares that the "home" front must be subjected to the strictest discipline.

His Majesty: General officers commanding army corps districts and the Minister of War must preserve better order in the interior. New orders to this effect will be issued to the generals. The civil officials should co-operate in the strictest maintenance of the national authority.

With regard to recruits, the country must be more finely combed. There are still crowds of young men running loose about Berlin.

His Majesty approved the comment on the political situation abroad, but the enemy was suffering also; it was losing many men by death, its industries were already beginning to lie idle for lack of raw materials; even food supplies were running short. This year's harvest in England was poor; her tonnage was diminishing daily. Perhaps England would gradually become a convert to the cause of peace as a result of these deficiencies.

His Majesty stated that the description of the political situation was correct; we must prepare to seek the opportune moment for coming to an understanding with the enemy. Neutral nations (the Emperor designated some) were suitable intermediaries. The establishment of a propaganda commission was desirable for the object of weakening the enemy's confidence in victory and for the purpose of increasing the confidence of the German people. Fiery speeches must be made by eminent private citizens (Ballin, Heckscher), or by statesmen. Men of suitable capacity should be called to serve on the commission, rather than officials. The Foreign Office ought to give it political instructions.

Individual departments should not work against each other, as they have long been doing, or prosecute a policy of mystic secrecy toward each other. Military and civil authorities should co-operate; the War Minister should support the commanding generals, and not leave them in the lurch.

The Imperial Chancellor spoke in favor of the energetic maintenance of authority in the interior. With regard to propaganda, there already existed a comprehensive program which was being put into execution.

Diplomatic feelers must be thrown out at an opportune moment preparatory to an understanding with the enemy. Such a moment might present itself *after the next successes in the west*.

General Field-Marshal von Hindenburg argued *that it would be possible to remain fixed on French territory, and thereby in the end enforce our will upon the enemy*.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:456–459.

147. General John J. Pershing, "The St.-Mihiel Operation," September 1918 (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)

In early August 1919, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Allied commander-in-chief in France, authorized the withdrawal of U.S. regiments from the various British and French units to which they had previously been assigned and their formation into an independent U.S. army. The first major operation the American Expeditionary Force undertook was the Saint-Mihiel operation of 11–15 September 1918.

21. At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Commanders-in-Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations. Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command and these formed the basis of future cooperation of the Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude should be to maintain the offensive. As the first operation of the American Army, the reduction of the salient of St.-Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially important that the movement be undertaken and finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about the middle of September.

Arrangements were concluded for successive belief of American divisions and the organization of the American First Army under my personal command was announced on August 10, with La Ferte-sous-Jouarre as my headquarters. This Army nominally assumed control of a portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were given for its secret concentration in the St.-Mihiel Sector.

22. The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps headquarters to participate in the St.-Mihiel attack were the I, IV, and V. The I was on the Vesle, the IV at Toul, and the V not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation, within the short period available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in artillery, aviation, and special troops, caused by the shipment of an undue proportion of infantry and machine guns during the summer, were largely met by the French.

(1549)

23. The reduction of the St.-Mihiel salient was important, as it would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north through St.-Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan railroad system which was vital to the German armies were of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armament and munitions.

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the general line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)-heights south of Gorze-Mars-la-Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use on the western face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported by the attack of 6 divisions of the French Second Army on their left, while 7 American divisions would attack on the southern face, and 3 French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be taken by the French Second Army would be closely related to the attack of the American First Army, Gen. Pétain placed all the French troops involved under my personal command.

By August 30, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, and army troops, of the quantities of supplies and munitions required, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads, were well under way.

24. In accordance with the previous general consideration of operations at Bombon on July 24, an allied offensive extending practically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After the reduction of the St.-Mihiel sector the Americans were to cooperate in the concrete effort of the Allied armies. It was the sense of the conference of July 24, that the extent to which the different operations planned might carry us could not be then foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved before the season was far advanced. It seemed reasonable at the time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919.

On August 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at my headquarter at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable results toward the Chemin-des-Dames on the French front, it was now believed that the limited Allied offensive, which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the year. At this meeting it was proposed by

Marshal Foch that the general operations as far as the American Army was concerned should be carried out in detail by:

An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the French Second Army, reinforced by from four to six divisions;

A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west to the Souain Road, to be executed on the right by an American Army astride the Aisne and on the left by the French Fourth Army.

To carry out these attacks the 10 to 11 American divisions suggested for the St.-Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the French Second Army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Army on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St.-Mihiel operation should be initiated on September 10 and the other two on September 15 and 20, respectively.

25. The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the immediate separation of the recently formed American Army into several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was directly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American Army, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking to the use and supply of our Armies on a particular front. The inherent disinclination of our troops to serve under Allied commanders would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

A further conference at Marshal Foch's Headquarters was held on September 2, at which Gen. Pétain was present. After discussion the question of employing the American Army as a unit was conceded. The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at provided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be exploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the Allied Armies were to be employed in a converging action. The British Armies, supported by the left of the French Armies, west of Reims, would continue the actions, already begun, to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American Army, supported by the right of the French Armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mézières.

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French High Command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations.

(1550)

26. The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to me. In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers of front, extending from Port-sur-Seuille, east of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions in that zone. The American First Army was to proceed with the St.-Mihiel operation, after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later than September 25.

As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St.-Mihiel operation was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Régnieville. The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. 18 to 19 divisions were to be in the front line. There were 4 French and 15 American divisions available, 6 of which would be in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were to advance. Furthermore, two army corps headquarters, with their corps troops, practically all the Army artillery and aviation, and the 1st, 2d, and 4th Divisions, the first two destined to take a leading part in the St.-Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.

27. The salient had been held by the Germans since September, 1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the western front; namely, the Mézières-Sedan-Metz Railroad and the Briey Iron Basin; it threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for 8 kilometers to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woëvre, including within the German lines the

detached heights of Loup-mont and Montsec which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had reinforced his positions by every artificial means during a period of four years.

28. On the night of September 11, the troops of the First Army were deployed in position. . . .

The French independent air force was at my disposal which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with the German rail movements.

At dawn on September 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the infantry of the I and IV Corps advanced. The infantry of the V Corps commenced its advance at 8 a.m. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight on September 13, elements of the 1st and 26th Divisions made a junction near Hattonchâtel and Vigneulles, 18 kilometers northeast of St.-Mihiel. The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13. The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000 casualties during the actual period of the advance.

During the next four days the right of our line west of the Moselle River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force.

29. The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American Army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small

losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theater of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

Source: “General John J. Pershing’s Final Report,” in *The United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919, Vol. 12, Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services*, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Historical Division, 1948), 37–40.

(1551)

148. General John J. Pershing, The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 25 September–11 November 1918 (Extract from Final Report, September 1919)

The most sustained action undertaken by U.S. forces on the Western Front was the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which lasted approximately seven weeks. Heavy fighting took place in the Argonne Forest, which the Germans had fortified heavily as part of the Hindenburg Line, and upon those portions that had not been broken they had fallen back. Troops of the U.S. First Army were stretched to the limit during this offensive, whose objective was to break the remaining Hindenburg Line, but ultimately they were victorious.

30. The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal Foch and General Pétain on September 2. It was planned to use all available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St.-Mihiel front. The Army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line, on the front Brioules-Romagne-sous-Montfaucon-Grandpré, and thereafter, by developing pressure toward Mézières, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the French Fourth Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defenses were virtually continuous throughout this depth.

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counteroffensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

31. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems—one in the north, passing through Liege, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line

Carignan-Sedan-Mézières. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through that region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mézières line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mézières and the Dutch frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to the Carignan-Mézières Railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formed the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German defensive positions. . . . [F]or example, . . . the distance between "No Man's Land" and the third German withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometers; the distance between the corresponding points near the tip of the great salient of the western front as about 65 kilometers, and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers. The effect of penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army would be equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west; furthermore, such an advance on our front was far more dangerous to the enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion of this position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometers or more in depth.

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only protected his left but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne forest covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and the forest, the heights of Montfaucon offered perfect observation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate defense which the importance of the position would require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting.

32. When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne (1552) battle, over the few roads available, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included 15 divisions, of which 7 were involved in the pending St.-Mihiel drive, 3 were in sector in the Vosges, 3 in the neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training area, and 1 near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the artillery, aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the St.-Mihiel attack and therefore could not be moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St.-Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on September 13, the second day of St.-Mihiel, reserve divisions and army artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne front. . . .

33. At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle, the enemy had 10 divisions in line and 10 in reserve on the front between Fresnes-en-Woëvre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

34. The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases, the first from September 26 to October 3, the second from October 4 to 31, and the third from November 1 to 11.

Meuse-Argonne, First Phase

35. On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in the attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the III Corps, Maj. Gen. Bullard commanding, with the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions in line; next came the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Cameron commanding, with the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions; on the left was the I Corps, Maj. Gen. Liggett commanding, with the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions. Each Corps had 1 division in reserve and the Army held 3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to

support the attacks of the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation, and the enemy had no tanks.

36. Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, the infantry advanced at 5:30 a.m. on September 26, accompanied by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of defenses. Montfaucon was held tenaciously by the enemy and was not captured until noon of the second day.

By the evening of the 28th a maximum advance of 11 kilometers had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Septsarges, and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of Briulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left was meeting strong resistance on the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw into first line before September 29. He developed a powerful machine-gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counterattacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the 28th and 35th Divisions. These divisions had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was within 2 kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

37. By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Nantillois-Apremont-southwest across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily. . . .

38. The critical problem during the first few days of the battle was the restoration of communications over "No Man's Land." There were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increased the difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting the infantry action.

Meuse-Argonne, Second Phase

39. At 5:30 a.m. on October 4 the general attack was renewed. The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woëvre to the Argonne had increased from 10 in the first line to 16, and included some of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small advances were realized, except by the 1st Division on the right of the I Corps. By evening of October 5 the line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fléville-Chehery-southwest through the Argonne.

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his commanding positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was (1553) even more important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further stabilization of the new St.-Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse River.

40. On the 7th the I Corps, with the 82d Division added, launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay to draw attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day the French XVII Corps, Maj. Gen. Claudel commanding, initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the German Armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of 6 kilometers to a line well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make more rapid retirements farther west and withdraw his forces from northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications through Sedan.

41. We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replacements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October, combat units required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than 45,000 would be available before November 1 to fill the existing and prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and Allies, especially as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of the Allied Armies further west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to

continue its aggressive tactics our divisions then with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions.

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Marshal Foch and Gen. Pétain, on October 10, the former expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the Allied attack should continue. Gen. Pétain agreed that the American divisions with the French were essential to us if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks and, before those divisions with the French had been released, it became necessary for us to send the 37th and 91st Divisions from the First Army to assist the French Sixth Army in Flanders.

42. At this time the First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. Therefore, on October 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur-Seuille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second Army with Lieut. Gen. Robert L. Bullard in command, under whom it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. On October 16, the command of the First Army was transferred to Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, and my advance headquarters was established at Ligny-en-Barrois, from which the command of the group of American Armies was exercised.

43. Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order particularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. The 1st and 5th Divisions were relieved by the 32d and 80th Divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole front was made on October 14. The resistance encountered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometers north of Sommerance. A maximum advance of 17 kilometers had been made since September 26 and the enemy had been forced to throw into the fight a total of 15 reserve divisions.

During the remainder of the month, important local operations were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. . . .

44. Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing number of Germany's best divisions, rising from 20 in line and reserve on September 26, to 31 on October 31; the enemy's elaborately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg line, in our front had been broken; the almost impassable Argonne Forest was in our hands; an advance of 21 kilometers had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and the great railway artillery from Carignan to Sedan was now seriously threatened.

The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casualties and the guns were towed out of line by motor trucks. The (1554) American soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in this continuous fighting during most inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position. Through experience, the Army had developed into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the task successfully.

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was forced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tactical organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated portions of the field.

Every member of the American Expeditionary Force, from the front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replacements, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919.

Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase

45. The detailed plans for the operations of the Allied Armies on the western front changed from time to time during the course of this great battle, but the mission of the American First Army to cut the great Carignan-Sedan-Mézières Railroad remained unchanged. . . .

46. On the 21st my instructions were issued to the First Army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be decisive if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and that of the French Fourth Army on its left should be simultaneous, our attack was delayed until November 1. The immediate purpose of the first Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, to turn the forest north of Grandpré, and to establish contact with the French Fourth Army near Boult-aux-Bois. The Army was directed to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall of the first day and then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boult-aux-Bois in preparation for the drive towards Sedan. By strenuous effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the initial advance of the infantry.

On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our divisions were either on the line or close in rear; the French artillery, aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up our deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations; and our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experience second to none.

47. On the morning of November 1, three army corps were in line between the Meuse River and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the right the III Corps had the 5th and 90th Divisions; the V Corps occupied the center of the line, with the 89th and 2d Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the first day; and on the left the I Corps deployed the 88th, 77th and 78th Divisions.

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation the infantry advanced closely followed by accompanying guns. The artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the infantry. By nightfall the V Corps, in the center, had realized an advance of

almost 9 kilometers, while the III Corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grandpré. On the 2d and 3d we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the fronts of the right and center corps; to the left the troops of the I Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-Sedan Railroad and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans. By the evening of the 4th, our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and had swept through the great Forêt de Dieulet, reaching the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were 8 kilometers north of Boult-aux-Bois.

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with increasing swiftness. The III Corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse in a brilliant operation by the 5th Division, driving the enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.

By the 7th the right of the III Corps had exploited its river crossing to a distance of 10 kilometers east of the Meuse, completely (1555) ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into the swamp plain of the Woëvre; the V and I Corps had reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategical goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, 41 kilometers from our point of departure on November 1. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for a complete armistice on November 6.

48. Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while the Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on November 5.

Between the 7th and 10th of November the III Corps continued its advance eastward to Rémoiville, while the French XVII Corps, on its right, with the American 79th, 26th and 81st Divisions, and 2 French divisions, drove the enemy from his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 p.m. on

November 9 appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the Commander of each of the Allied Armies:

The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreats along the entire front.

It is important to coordinate and expedite our movements.

I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief and of their Armies to make decisive the results obtained.

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th/11th and the morning of the 11th the V Corps, in the First Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the commanding heights within the reentrant of the river, thus completing our control of the Meuse River line. At 6 a.m. on the 11th notification was received from Marshal Foch's Headquarters that the Armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an Armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the 11th had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficult that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after 11 a.m.

49. Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire Divisional strength on the western front. Of these enemy divisions 20 had been drawn from the French front and 1 from the British front. Of the 22 American divisions 12 had, at different times during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine guns, and large quantities of material.

The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed to this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began until the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his divisions to our front was continuous. . . .

Source: “General John J. Pershing’s Final Report,” in *The United States Army in the World War 1917–1919, Vol. 12, Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services*, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Historical Division, 1948), 40–46.

149. William Harrison and Others to President Woodrow Wilson, 1 October 1918

War offered opportunities to American blacks even as it made considerable demands on them. African Americans served in the armed forces and worked in growing numbers in the factories producing war supplies of every kind. The ideals that President Wilson, in particular, proclaimed appealed to African Americans, even as their new military and industrial visibility sometimes provoked harsh reactions from whites. In autumn 1918 the National Race Congress, an organization whose leaders included black educators, journalists, and ministers of religion, met in Washington and appealed to Wilson for assistance against the prejudice and discrimination they so often encountered.

The National Race Congress is an annual Conference of delegates from the several States, convened to consider the condition of our people in the United States and to construct a program for the development of the social, economic and spiritual life of our race. We seek to foster the aims and aspirations of a free people; and to secure to our fellows the guarantees of the Constitution of the United States, by lawful agitation, fellowship and service.

(1556)

We meet this year when our country is at war. We feel with all other Americans the burdens the war imposes, and we offer to our country, not our bit, but our best. Our loyalty is unwavering, our service is whole hearted. Our history has no taint of treason. Our blood has been freely given in all our country's wars. Hence, we have earned the right to speak in our own defence if our rights are abridged.

We are grateful Mr. President, for the fine ideals you have set forth to America and the world; and we are particularly pleased with your pronouncement against mob violence. It gave encouragement to the heart of every true American, and is the harbinger of hope to all colored men in the United States. It made us feel that the day will come when you may exercise the full power delegated to you as chief executive of the United States Government by which such lawless acts may be suppressed.

We know that offences will be committed. We do not condone crime, but we ask for our people what is accorded to others: viz, that all individuals charged with crime, should be given a fair and impartial trial by a jury of their peers.

We now bring to your attention Mr. President, a matter that heads up under the Interstate Commerce Commission, but which we bring to you because relief has not come from that source. Our people are unfairly treated by the railroads of the South. The laws of the Southern States prescribe that "there shall be separate but equal accommodations for white and colored passengers on trains." It is a fact that while there are separate accommodations, they are in no sense equal. The treatment our people receive as passengers on railways in the South, is in open violation of the law; it is unfair, unjust and degrading. Therefore we beg that you use the authority of your exalted office to change these conditions making travel equally safe, comfortable and healthful to all who pay the same tariff.

The black soldier fights best when his mother, wife and sister are not humiliated on the common carriers of his country because of race prejudice.

Another grievance that is hindering the war spirit in our race is, the fact that in some of the administrative office[s] of the government in Washington D.C. and elsewhere, race discrimination is nullifying the letter and spirit of the Civil Service law, and delaying the winning of the war by depressing the enthusiasm of the aspiring people of our race. Our people who aspire to positions above the menial grade in some departments, are flatly denied consideration, and sometimes, if a fair official gives work to such aspirants, they are marked for insult or humiliation by boorish officials or discourteous employees. These discriminations disturb the morale of our young people and lower the efficiency of both the offender and the offended.

This species of prejudice against race and color, sometimes, nay too often, finds its way into the Army and Navy of the United States.

Our brave black boys have given a good account of themselves in the fight against the Hun and we protest against any discrimination in the Army and Navy based on race or color. We ask a fair trial in all branches of the military service.

Mr. President, we seek just and impartial dealing from the officials of our government, and we believe you to be providentially directed in the guiding of our Nation at such a time as this and we beg you to give us the protection we are fighting hard to win and offer to others.

We ask you to encourage us in honoring the freedom you love. Let us be Americans in character regardless of color. Let us have no "Jim Crow Cars," no

segregation, no disfranchisement, no pro[s]cription no partiality and no prejudice in the government administration of public affairs.

Finally, Mr. President; wrongs so open, weigh down the hearts and slow the movement of the people who are otherwise happy and anxious to serve their country. Now, as never before, do we as black men need to give to our people the spirit of hope, inspiration and love of country. Changing the conditions complained of will make it easier for the leaders of our race to direct and influence our people in the activities and sacrifices incident to winning the war for democracy and righteousness.

Signed: William Harrison

John R. Hawkins

Wm. Calvin Chase

I. N. Ross

H. C. Garner

W. H. Jernagin President

J. Harvey Randolph Assistant Secretary

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 191–193. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

150. Statement of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, 3 October 1918

On 2 October 1918, Major Hilmar von dem Bussche, speaking on behalf of the German high command, delivered an extremely gloomy summary of the military situation to the Reichstag. The following day, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg sent a formal message to the chancellor confirming it.

(1557)

TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR:

The High Command insists on the immediate issue of a peace offer to our enemies in accordance with the decision of Monday, September 29, 1918.

In consequence of the collapse of the Macedonian front, and the inevitable resultant weakening of our reserves in the West, and also the impossibility of making good the heavy losses which have occurred during the battles of the last few days, there is no prospect, humanly speaking, of forcing our enemies to sue for peace. The enemy, on the other hand, is continuing to throw fresh reserves into the battle.

The German army still stands firm and is defending itself against all attacks. The situation, however, is growing more critical daily, and may force the High Command to momentous decisions.

In these circumstances it is imperative to stop the fighting in order to spare the German people and their allies unnecessary sacrifices. Every day of delay costs thousands of brave soldiers their lives.

VON HINDENBURG

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 6:351.

151. The First German Peace Note: Imperial Chancellor Prince Max of Baden to President Woodrow Wilson, 6 October 1918

Beginning in early October 1918, German leaders addressed a series of peace notes to their enemies. They chose to negotiate primarily with President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, in the hope that his eloquent affirmation of the liberal peace objectives stated in his “Fourteen Points” speech of January 1918 would reflect better armistice terms than they could expect from Great Britain or France. Within a few days of taking office the kaiser’s cousin, centrist liberal Prince Max of Baden, who became German chancellor on 3 October 1918, used the good offices of neutral Switzerland to send the initial note to Wilson.

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

Max, Prince of Baden, Imperial Chancellor

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:464.

152. President Woodrow Wilson, First Reply to the German Request for an Armistice, 8 October 1918

Upon receiving the German peace note, President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and other advisors conferred to draft a reply. On 8 October 1918 Lansing sent the fourth and final draft to Friedrich Oederlin, the Swiss minister in Washington, for transmission to the German government. Wilson was uncompromising in his demand that a precondition for any armistice would be the withdrawal of German troops from all occupied territory.

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States of the eighth of January last and in subsequent addresses and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of these powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view.

(1558)

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 268–269.

153. The Second German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 14 October 1918

Once President Woodrow Wilson had sent a reply to the German note, detailed negotiations were handled by the two countries' respective foreign ministers, communicating through neutral intermediaries.

In reply to the question of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January eighth and in his subsequent addresses as the foundations of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently, its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the governments of the powers associated with the United States also accept the position taken by President Wilson in his addresses.

The German Government in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about an armistice declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2: 471–472.

154. President Woodrow Wilson, Second Reply to the German Government, 14 October 1918

On 14 October Robert Lansing, again using Friedrich Oederlin as an intermediary, dispatched President Woodrow Wilson's second note to the German government. The president now added a demand that in earnest faith German submarines cease their operations against Allied and neutral shipping. He also hinted that the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II would facilitate U.S. acquiescence in the negotiation of armistice terms.

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the eighth and twelfth of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants.

The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly (1559) call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the fourth of July last. It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

The President will draft a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 333–334.

155. Request of the Government of Ottoman Turkey for an Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 14 October 1918

A week after Germany and Austria-Hungary sought to open peace negotiations with the Allies, the government of Ottoman Turkey presented a similar request to the United States. The U.S. Department of State immediately published the text of the Turkish note. The relationship of the United States with Turkey was rather more complicated than that with Germany or Austria-Hungary, since although the United States and Turkey had broken diplomatic relations, they were not formally at war. Turkey almost certainly approached the American president in the hope of obtaining more lenient peace terms than the Allies were likely to grant.

The undersigned, chargé d'affaires of Turkey, has the honor, acting upon instructions from his Government, to request the Royal Government [of Spain] to inform the Secretary of State of the United States of America by telegraph, that the Imperial Government [of Turkey] requests the President of the United States of America to take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace; to notify all belligerent States of this demand and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations. It [the Imperial Government of Turkey] accepts as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially the speech of September 27.

In order to put an end to the shedding of blood, the Imperial Ottoman Government requests that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 419.

156. U.S. Note to the Austrian Government: Secretary of State Robert Lansing to W. A. F. Ekengren, Swedish Minister in Washington, 19 October 1918

After considering the Austrian request for an armistice, the U.S. government pointed out that important issues had changed since President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech the previous January. Robert Lansing drew attention to U.S. recognition of Czecho-Slovak claims for an independent state and acceptance of Yugoslav desires for a greatly expanded Serbian state. He warned that should the peoples of these areas seek full independence, Austria should be prepared to accept this.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 7th instant in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am now instructed by the President to instruct you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of the utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent Government clothed with proper authority (1560) to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest measure the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not

he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

Source: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 350.

157. The Third German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 20 October 1918

In their third note, German officials emphasized that their form of government was undergoing radical change and that in the future the country would be a constitutional democracy. The implication was, of course, that such a government deserved more lenient treatment from the Allies, who had represented themselves during the war as the champions of democracy.

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary and are in so far permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions of peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not

been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this government. In future no government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Government associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:495–496.

**158. President Woodrow Wilson, Third Reply to the German Government,
23 October 1918**

Wilson's third note to the German government made even more explicit his desire for major constitutional changes in that country's form of government.

To Germany.

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of (1561) peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the twenty-seventh of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed,—provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reasons why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the twentieth of October, it does not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been, and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will, that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 417–419.

159. Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Vasilyevich Chicherin to President Woodrow Wilson, 24 October 1918

As armistice negotiations progressed and it became clear that the war would end in an Allied victory, the Soviet government addressed a lengthy letter on peace terms to President Wilson. Georgi Chicherin, the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, protested once more against Allied intervention in Russia and demanded that it cease. The Soviets demanded the cancellation of all war loans, something that would help their own government in its dealings with foreign nations; the employment of American capital in international recovery; and nationalization or internationalization by the League of Nations of all the assets of banks and other major industries. Finally, Chicherin asked that the Allied governments specify what terms they would require before withdrawing their forces from Russia.

To the President of the United States of North America, Mr. Woodrow Wilson.

(1562)

Mr. President:

In your message of January 8th [1918] to the Congress of the United States of North America, in the sixth point, you spoke of your profound sympathy for Russia, which was then conducting, single handed, negotiations with the mighty German imperialism. Your program, you declared, demands the evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and national policy, and assure her a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome assistance of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. And you added that “the treatment accorded to her by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.”

The desperate struggle which we were waging at Brest-Litovsk against German imperialism apparently only intensified your sympathy for Soviet Russia, for you sent greetings to the Congress of the Soviets, which under the threat of a

German offensive ratified the Brest peace of violence—greetings and assurances that Soviet Russia might count upon American help.

Six months have passed since then, and the Russian people have had sufficient time to get actual tests of your Government's and your Allies' good-will, of their comprehension of the needs of the Russian people, of their intelligent unselfish sympathy. This attitude of your Government and of your Allies was shown first of all in the conspiracy which was organized on Russian territory with the financial assistance of your French Allies and with the diplomatic co-operation of your Government as well—the conspiracy of the Czechoslovaks to whom your Government is furnishing every kind of assistance.

For some time attempts had been made to create a pretext for a war between Russia and the United States of North America by spreading false stories to the effect that German war prisoners had seized the Siberian railway, but your own officers and after them Colonel Robins, the head of your Red Cross Mission, had been convinced that these allegations were absolutely false. The Czechoslovak conspiracy was organized under the slogan that unless these misled unfortunate people be protected, they would be surrendered to Germany and Austria; but you may find out, among other sources, from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, of the French Military Mission, how unfounded this charge is. The Czechoslovaks would have left Russia in the beginning of the year, had the French Government provided ships for them. For several months we have waited in vain that your Allies should provide the opportunity for the Czechoslovaks to leave. Evidently these Governments have very much preferred the presence of the Czechoslovaks in Russia—the results show for what object—to their departure for France and their participation in the fighting on the French front. The best proof of the real object of the Czechoslovak rebellion is the fact that although in control of the Siberian railway, the Czechoslovaks have not taken advantage of this to leave Russia, but by the order of the Entente Governments, whose directions they follow, have remained in Russia to become the mainstay of the Russian counter-revolution. Their counter-revolutionary mutiny which made impossible the transportation of grain and petroleum on the Volga, which cut off the Russian workers and peasants from the Siberian stores of grain and other materials and condemned them to starvation—this was the first experience of the workers and peasants of Russia with your Government and with your Allies after your promises of the beginning of the year. And then came another experience: an attack on North Russia by Allied troops, including American troops, their invasion of Russian territory without any cause and without a declaration of war, the occupation of

Russian cities and villages, executions of Soviet officials and other acts of violence against the peaceful population of Russia.

You have promised, Mr. President, to co-operate with Russia in order to obtain for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and her national policy. Actually this co-operation took the form of an attempt of the Czechoslovak troops and later, in Archangel, Murmansk, and the Far East, of your own and your Allies' troops, to force the Russian people to submit to the rule of the oppressing and exploiting classes, whose dominion was overthrown by the workers and peasants of Russia in October, 1917. The revival of the Russian counter-revolution which has already become a corpse, attempts to restore by force its bloody domination over the Russian people—such was the experience of the Russian people, instead of co-operation for the unembarrassed expression of their will which you promised them, Mr. President, in your declarations.

You have also, Mr. President, promised to the Russian people to assist them in their struggle for independence. Actually this is what has occurred: while the Russian people were fighting on the Southern front against the counter-revolution, which has betrayed them to German imperialism and was threatening their frontiers, they were forced to move (1563) their troops to the East to oppose the Czechoslovaks who were bringing them slavery and oppression, and to the North—against your Allies and your own troops which had invaded their territory, and against the counter-revolution organized by these troops.

Mr. President, the acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia gave quite different results from those that might have been expected from your message to the Congress. But we have reason not to be altogether dissatisfied with even these results, since the outrages of the counter-revolution in the East and North have shown the workers and peasants of Russia the aims of the Russian counter-revolution, and of its foreign supporters, thereby creating among the Russian people an iron will to defend their liberty and the conquests of the revolution, to defend the land that it has given to the peasants and the factories that it has given to the workers. The fall of Kazan, Symbyrsk, Syzran, and Samara should make it clear to you, Mr. President, what were the consequences for us of the actions which followed your promises of January 8th. Our trials helped to create a strongly united and disciplined Red Army, which is daily growing stronger and more powerful and which is learning to defend the revolution. The attitude toward us, which was actually displayed by your Government and by your Allies could not destroy us; on the contrary, we

are now stronger than we were a few months ago, and your present proposal of international negotiations for a general peace finds us alive and strong and in a position to give in the name of Russia our consent to join the negotiations. In your note to Germany you demand the evacuation of the occupied territories as a condition which must precede the armistice during which peace negotiations shall begin. We are ready, Mr. President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions, and we ask you to notify us when you, Mr. President, and your Allies intend to remove troops from Murmansk, Archangel, and Siberia. You refuse to conclude an armistice, unless Germany will stop the outrages, pillaging, etc., during the evacuation of occupied territories. We allow ourselves therefore to draw the conclusion that you and your Allies will order the Czechs to return that part of our gold reserve fund which they seized in Kazan, that you will forbid them to continue as heretofore their acts of pillaging and outrage against the workers and peasants during their forced departure (for we will encourage their speedy departure, without waiting for your order).

With regard to other peace terms, namely, that the Governments which would conclude peace must express the will of their people, you are aware that our Government fully satisfies this condition, our Government expresses the will of the Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, representing at least eighty per cent of the Russian people. This cannot, Mr. President, be said about your Government. But for the sake of humanity and peace we do not demand as a prerequisite of peace negotiations that all nations participating in the negotiations shall be represented by Councils of People's Commissaries elected at a Congress of Councils of Workmen's, Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. We know that this form of Government will soon be the general form, and that precisely a general peace, when nations will no more be threatened with defeat, will leave them free to put an end to the system and the clique that forced upon mankind this universal slaughter, and which will, in spite of themselves, surely lead the tortured peoples to create Soviet Governments, which give exact expression to their will.

Agreeing to participate at present in negotiations with even such Governments as do not yet express the will of the people we would like on our part to find out from you, Mr. President, in detail what is your conception of the League of Nations, which you propose as the crowning work of peace. You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. You probably mean by this that the masses of the people must everywhere first become the masters of their own fate in order to unite afterwards in a league of free nations. But strangely enough, we do not find among your demands the liberation of Ireland, Egypt, or India, nor even the

liberation of the Philippines, and we would be very sorry to learn that these people should be denied the opportunity of participating together with us, through their freely elected representatives, in the organization of the League of Nations.

We would also, Mr. President, very much like to know, before the negotiations with regard to the formation of a League of Nations have begun, what is your conception of the solution of many economic questions which are essential for the cause of future peace. You do not mention the war expenditures—this unbearable burden, which the masses would have to carry, unless the League of Nations should renounce payments on the loans to the capitalists of all countries. You know as well as we, Mr. President, that this war is the outcome of the policies of all capitalistic nations, that the governments of all countries were continually piling up armaments, that the ruling groups of all civilized nations pursued a policy of annexations, and that it would, therefore, be extremely unjust if the masses, having paid for these policies with millions of lives and with economic ruin, should yet pay to those who are really responsible for the war a tribute for their policies which resulted in all these countless miseries.

We propose, therefore, Mr. President, the annulment of the war loans as the basis of the League of Nations. As to the restoration of the countries that were laid waste by the war, (1564) we believe it is only just that all nations should aid for this purpose, the unfortunate Belgium, Poland, and Servia, and however poor and ruined Russia seems to be, she is ready on her part to do everything she can to help these victims of the war, and she expects that American capital, which has not at all suffered from this war, and has even made billions in profits out of it, will do its part to help these peoples.

But the League of Nations should not only liquidate the present war, but also make impossible any wars in the future. You must be aware, Mr. President, that the capitalists of your country are planning to apply in the future the same policies of encroachment and of super profits in China and Siberia, and that, fearing competition from Japanese capitalists, they are preparing a military force to overcome the resistance which they meet from Japan. You are no doubt aware of similar plans of the capitalist ruling circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other peoples. Knowing this, you will have to agree with us that the factories, mines, and banks must not be left in the hands of private persons, who have always made use of the vast means of production created by the masses of the people to export products and capital to foreign countries in order to reap super profits in return for the benefits forced on them,

their struggle for spoils resulting in imperialistic wars. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the League of Nations should be based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries. In your country, Mr. President, the banks and the industries are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, as your personal friend, Colonel Robins, assured us, the arrest of twenty heads of capitalist cliques and the transfer of the control, which by characteristic capitalistic methods they have to possess, into the hands of the masses of the people is all that would be required to destroy the principal source of new wars.

If you will agree to this, Mr. President—if the source of future wars will thus be destroyed, then there can be no doubt that it would be easy to remove all economic barriers and that all peoples, controlling their means of production, will be vitally interested in exchanging the things they do not need for the things they need. It will then be a question of an exchange of products between nations, each of which produces what it can best produce, and the League of Nations will be a league of mutual aid of the toiling masses. It will then be easy to reduce the armed forces to the limit necessary for the maintenance of internal safety.

We know very well that the selfish capitalist class will attempt to create this internal menace, just as the Russian landlords and capitalists are now attempting with the aid of the American, English, and French armed forces to take the factories from the workers and the land from the peasants. But, if the American workers, inspired by your idea of a League of Nations, will crush the resistance of the Russian capitalists, then neither the German nor any other capitalists will be a serious menace to the victorious working class, and it will then suffice, if every member of the commonwealth, working six hours in the factory, spends two hours daily for several months in learning the use of arms, so that the whole people will know how to overcome the internal menace.

And so, Mr. President, though we have had experience with your promises, we nevertheless accept as a basis your proposals about peace and about a League of Nations. We have tried to develop them in order to avoid results which would contradict your promises, as was the case with your promise of assistance to Russia. We have tried [to] formulate with precision your proposals on the League of Nations in order that the League of Nations should not turn out to be a league of capitalists against the nations. Should you not agree with us, we have no objection to an “open discussion of your peace terms,” as your first point of your peace program demands. If you will accept our proposals as a basis, we will easily agree on the details.

But there is another possibility. We have had dealings with the President of the Archangel attack and the Siberian invasion and we have also had dealings with the President of the League of Nations Peace Program. Is not the first of these—the real President actually directing the policies of the American capitalist government? Is not the American Government rather a Government of the American corporations, of the American industrial, commercial, and railroad trusts, of the American banks—in short, a Government of the American capitalists? And is it not possible that the proposals of this Government about the creation of a League of Nations will result in new chains for the peoples, in the organization of an International trust for the exploitation of the workers and the suppression of weak nations? In this latter case, Mr. President, you will not be in a position to reply to our questions, and we will say to the workers of all countries: Beware! Millions of your brothers, thrown at each others throats by the bourgeoisie of all countries are still perishing on the battlefields and the capitalist leaders are already trying to come to an understanding for the purpose of suppressing with united forces those that remain alive, when they call to account the criminals who caused the war!

However, Mr. President, since we do not at all desire to wage war against the United States, even though your Government has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissaries and your post is not yet taken by Eugene Debs, whom you have imprisoned; since we do not at all desire to wage war against England, even though the cabinet of Mr. Lloyd-George has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's (1565) Commissaries with MacLean at its head; since we have no desire to wage war against France, even though the capitalist Government of Clemenceau has not yet been replaced by a workmen's Government of Merheim, just as we have concluded peace with the imperialist government of Germany, with Emperor Wilhelm at its head, whom you, Mr. President, hold in no greater esteem than we, the Workmen's and Peasants' Revolutionary Government hold you, we finally propose to you, Mr. President, that you take up with your Allies the following questions and give us precise and business-like replies: Do the Governments of the United States, England, and France intend to cease demanding the blood of the Russian people and lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian people will agree to pay them a ransom, such as a man who has been suddenly attacked pays to the one who attacked him? If so, just what tribute do the Governments of the United States, England, and France demand of the Russian people? Do they demand concessions, that the railways, mines, gold deposits, etc., shall be handed over to them on certain conditions, or do they demand territorial concessions, some part of Siberia or Caucasia, or perhaps the Murmansk coast?

We expect from you, Mr. President, that you will definitely state what you and your Allies demand, and also whether the alliance between your Government and the Governments of the other Entente powers is in the nature of a combination which could be compared with a corporation for drawing dividends from Russia, or does your Government and the other governments of the Entente powers have each separate and special demands, and what are they? Particularly are we interested to know the demands of your French Allies with regard to the three billions of rubles which the Paris bankers loaned to the Government of the Czar—the oppressor of Russia and the enemy of his own people? And you, Mr. President, as well as your French Allies surely know that even if you and your Allies should succeed in enslaving and covering with blood the whole territory of Russia—which will not be allowed by our heroic revolutionary Red Army—that even in that case the Russian people, worn out by the war and not having sufficient time to take advantage of the benefits of the Soviet rule to elevate their national economy, will be unable to pay the French bankers the full tribute for the billions that were used by the Government of the Czar for purposes injurious to the people. Do your French Allies demand that a part of this tribute be paid in installments, and if so, what part, and do they anticipate that their claims will result in similar claims by other creditors of the infamous Government of the Czar which has been overthrown by the Russian people? We can hardly think that your Government and your Allies are without a ready answer, when your and their troops are trying to advance on our territory with the evident object of seizing and enslaving our country.

The Russian people through the People's Red Army, are guarding their territory and are bravely fighting against your invasion and against the attack of your Allies. But your Government and the Governments of the other powers of the Entente undoubtedly have well prepared plans, for the sake of which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We expect that you will state your demands very clearly and definitely. Should we, however, be disappointed, should you fail to reply to our quite definite and precise questions, we will draw the only possible conclusion—that we are justified in the assumption that your Government and the Governments of your Allies desire to get from the Russian people a tribute both in money and in natural resources of Russia, and territorial concessions as well. We will tell this to the Russian people as well as to the toiling masses of other countries, and the absence of a reply from you will serve for us as a silent reply. The Russian people will then understand that the demands of your Government and of the Governments of your Allies are so severe and vast that you do not even want to communicate them to the Russian Government.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 258–266.

160. The Fourth German Note: German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 27 October 1918

The final German peace note anticipated moving from talks about future talks to the actual negotiation of armistice terms. Once again, it stressed German hopes that the eventual peace settlement would be a lenient one. Eager to demonstrate to the U.S. president that genuine constitutional changes had occurred, the German government included with this note a supplementary memorandum detailing the new amendments to its constitution. Although the kaiser still remained, his powers were now symbolic.

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States. The President knows the far-reaching changes which have taken place and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice, which is the first step toward a peace of justice, as described by the President in his pronouncements.

(1566)

Memorandum Supplementary to the Communication from the German Government, 27 October 1918

The amendments to the German constitution, as passed by the Reichstag, signify nothing less but a complete change of the system in German constitutional life. Germany has, thereby, entered the family of States by parliamentary government. The most striking changes are as follows:

First: The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace as well as the conclusion of all treaties are subject to the decision of the Reichstag;

Second: The position of the chancellor is completely changed. Whilst hitherto the chancellor was merely a minister appointed by the confidence of the Emperor, henceforward, according to a new and explicit clause of the constitution, he can assume office only with the confidence of the Reichstag, and hold office only as long as the confidence of this body is assured to him. Contrary to other states where such rules are merely observed by custom, it is in Germany now established by the constitution that a vote of non-confidence

on the part of the Reichstag obliges the chancellor as well as any other responsible member of the government of the empire to resign;

Third: Another important change is the following: Whilst hitherto the chancellor was only responsible for the orders and decrees of the Emperor as far as countersigned by him, the amended constitution now holds him responsible for all acts and actions of political significance including even the personal utterances of the Emperor, made in speeches or letters, as far as they are liable to influence interior politics or the foreign policy of the empire;

Fourth: The position of the Emperor as the supreme war lord of the German army and navy has been completely abolished. No longer can military acts of political consequence be performed without the consent of the chancellor. The subordination of the military power under the civil power goes so far that even the commission, appointment and dismissal of all offices of the army and navy, done thus far by advice of the constitutionally irresponsible chiefs of the military and naval cabinets, now require the countersignature of the Minister of War, or the Secretary for the Navy, respectively, who, thereby, assume responsibility to the Reichstag;

Fifth: The former clause of the constitution, providing that a representative accepting an office, paid out of the Treasury, lost his mandate, wherefore no representative was able to be a member of the government, has been abolished. In consequence the leaders of the majority parties of the Reichstag have already been appointed to the posts of secretaries and undersecretaries of State within the new government. In this connection an entirely new departure has been made by the appointment of secretaries of State without portfolio. Moreover, the influence of the secretaries of State, chosen from among the members of the Reichstag, has been considerably increased by the fact that, together with and under the presidency of the chancellor, they form the War Cabinet;

Sixth: The introduction, now definitely assured, of the universal, equal and secret electoral law for the Prussian Landtag precludes in future that undemocratic influences may be exercised by the Prussian government on decision of the executive of the empire;

Seventh: By the amendments to the constitution of the empire as well as of Prussia, it has now been secured for all times that in the same degree as in other states, governed since long by parliamentary government, the popular will embodied in parliament, will be decisive within all spheres of public life, in

peace as well as in war. Any possibility for personal government is, thereby, definitely eliminated and precluded.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 518–520.

**161. Austro-Hungarian Note to the United States: W. A. F. Ekengren,
Swedish Minister in Washington, to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 27
October 1918**

After a few days for reflection, the Austro-Hungarian government acquiesced in the U.S. demand that it accept the right to independence of the Czechs, Yugoslavs, and other peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The note was dispatched to the Swedish government on 27 October and reached the U.S. secretary of state two days later.

Excellency: By order of my Government, I have the honor to beg you to submit to the President of the United States the following communication from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary:

In reply to the note of President Wilson to the Austro-Hungarian Government dated October 18 [19] of this year, with regard to the decision of the President to take up with Austria-Hungary separately the question of armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the President and his opinion of the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, (1567) notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had put upon entering negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente states and for an immediate armistice on all the Austro-Hungarian fronts and begs President Wilson to take the necessary measures to that effect.

Source: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 351.

162. Proclamation of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, Announcing Representative German Government, 28 October 1918

By late October 1918 reformist political groups in Germany had forced the passage of drastic amendments to the Imperial Constitution, granting universal suffrage to men and instituting representative government in Germany. Many hoped that the Allies would grant more generous peace terms to a more democratic German government. The kaiser signed the necessary legislation and issued a proclamation, formally endorsing the new constitution.

I return herewith for immediate publication the bill to amend the Imperial Constitution and the law of March 17, 1870, relative to the representation of the Imperial Chancellor, which has been laid before me for signature.

On the occasion of this step, which is so momentous for the future history of the German people, I have a desire to give expression to my feelings. Prepared for by a series of Government acts, a new order comes into force which transfers the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's person to the people.

Thus comes to a close a period which will stand in honor before the eyes of future generations. Despite all struggles between invested authority and aspiring forces, it has rendered possible to our people that tremendous development which imperishably revealed itself in the wonderful achievements of this war.

In the terrible storms of the four years of war, however, old forms have been broken up, not to leave their ruins behind but to make a place for new, vital forms.

After the achievements of these times, the German people can claim that no right which may guarantee a free and happy future shall be withheld from them.

The proposals of the Allied Governments which are now adopted and extended owe their origin to this conviction. I, however, with my exalted allies, indorse these decisions of Parliament in firm determination, so far as I am concerned, to cooperate in their full development, convinced that I am thereby promoting the weal of the German people.

The Kaiser's office is one of service to the people. May, then, the new order release all the good powers which our people need in order to support the trials

which are hanging over the empire and with a firm step win a bright future from the gloom of the present.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 6:354–355.

163. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Julius Andrassy, Note to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 29 October 1918

On 24 October 1918 Count Julius Andrassy von Csik-Szent-Kiraly und Kraszna Horka, a liberal Hungarian noble politician who had long favored a negotiated peace, replaced Count Stephan von Burián von Rajecz as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. Andrassy dissociated Austria-Hungary from Germany, opening negotiations for a separate armistice. Facing the prospective disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on 29 October he sent a near-desperate appeal to Secretary of State Robert Lansing that the Allies should conclude an armistice with Austria-Hungary forthwith.

Immediately after having taken direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and after the dispatch of the official answer to your note of October 18, 1918, by which you were able to see that we accept all the points and principles laid down by President Wilson in his various declarations and are in complete accord with the efforts of President Wilson to prevent future wars and to create a league of nations, we have taken preparatory measures in order that Austrians and Hungarians may be able, according to their own desire and without being in any way hindered, to make a decision as to their future organization and to rule it.

Since the accession to power of Emperor King Karl his immovable purpose has been to bring an end to the war. More than ever this is the desire of the sovereign of all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, who acknowledged that their future destiny can only be accomplished in a pacific world, by being freed from all disturbances, privations and sorrows of war.

(1568)

This is why I address you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, praying that you will have the goodness to intervene with the President of the United States in order that in the interest of humanity, as in the interest of all those who live in Austria-Hungary, an immediate armistice may be concluded on all fronts, and for an overture that immediately negotiations for peace will follow.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 441–442.

164. Roger Baldwin, Speech on the Draft, 30 October 1918

Roger Baldwin was one of the founders of the American Union against Militarism (AUM), which led the fight against increased defense spending in the years of U.S. neutrality. After U.S. intervention in the war, the AUM split as to whether it should oppose the government over its war policies. Baldwin and others who dissented from the AUM's prevailing nonconfrontational line established the National Civil Liberties Bureau in an effort to defend the rights of those who objected to U.S. wartime legislation. Baldwin was himself a conscientious objector whose refusal to attend a preinduction physical examination led to his trial and condemnation for breaching the Draft Act. Before his sentencing, Baldwin made the following speech to the court.

I want to read to the Court, if I may, for purposes of record, and for purposes of brevity too, a statement which I have prepared, and which I hope will get across a point of view which the United States Attorney does not consider logical, but which I trust, at least, with the premises I hold, is consistent.

I am before you as a deliberate violator of the draft act. On October 9, when ordered to take a physical examination, I notified my local board that I declined to do so, and instead presented myself to the United States Attorney for prosecution. I submit herewith for the record the letter of explanation which I addressed to him at the time.

I refused to take bail, believing that I was not morally justified in procuring it, and being further opposed to the institution of bail on principle. I have therefore been lodged in the Tombs Prison since my arraignment on October 10. . . .

The compelling motive for refusing to comply with the draft act is my uncompromising opposition to the principle of conscription of life by the State for any purpose whatever, in time of war or peace. I not only refused to obey the present conscription law, but I would in the future refuse to obey any similar statute which attempts to direct my choice of service and ideals. I regard the principle of conscription of life as a flat contradiction of all our cherished ideals of individual freedom, democratic liberty, and Christian teaching.

I am the more opposed to the present act, because it is for the purpose of conducting war. I am opposed to this and all other wars. I do not believe in the use of physical force as a method of achieving any end, however good.

The District Attorney calls your attention, your Honor, to the inconsistency in my statement to him that I would, under extreme emergency, as a means of protecting the life of any person, use physical force. I don't think that is an argument that can be used in support of the wholesale organization of men to achieve political purposes in nationalistic or domestic wars. I see no relationship at all between the two.

My opposition is not only to direct military service but to any service whatever designed to help prosecute the war. I could accept no service, therefore, under the present act, regardless of its character.

Holding such profound convictions, I determined, while the new act was pending, that it would be more honest to make my stand clear at the start and therefore concluded not even to register, but to present myself for prosecution. I therefore resigned my position as director of the National Civil Liberties Bureau so as to be free to follow that personal course of action. . . .

I realize that to some this refusal may seem a piece of wilful defiance. It might well be argued that any man holding my views might have avoided the issue by obeying the law, either on the chance of being rejected on physical grounds, or on the chance of the war stopping before a call to service. I answer that I am not seeking to evade the draft; that I scorn evasion, compromise, and gambling with moral issues. It may further be argued that the War Department's liberal provisions for agricultural service on furlough for conscientious objectors would be open to me if I obey the law and go to camp, and that there can be no moral objection to farming, even in time of war. I answer first, that I am opposed to any service under conscription, regardless of whether that service is in itself morally objectionable and second, that, even if that were not the case, and I were opposed only to war, I can make no moral distinction between the various services which assist in prosecuting the war—whether rendered in the trenches, in the purchase of bonds or thrift stamps at home, or in raising farm products under the lash of the draft act. All serve the same end—war. Of course all of us render involuntary assistance to the war in the processes of our daily living. I refer only to those direct services undertaken by choice.

(1569)

I am fully aware that my position is extreme, that it is shared by comparatively few, and that in the present temper it is regarded either as unwarranted egotism or as a species of feeble-mindedness. I cannot, therefore, let this occasion pass

without attempting to explain the foundations on which so extreme a view rests.

I have had an essentially American upbringing and background. Born in a suburban town of Boston, Massachusetts, of the stock of the first settlers, I was reared in the public schools and at Harvard College. Early my mind was caught by the age-old struggle for freedom; America meant to me a vital new experiment in free political institutions; personal freedom to choose one's way of life and service seemed the essence of the liberties brought by those who fled the mediaeval and modern tyrannies of the old world. But I rebelled at our whole autocratic industrial system—with its wreckage of poverty, disease, and crime, and upon leaving college, going to St. Louis as director of a settlement and instructor in sociology at Washington University. For ten years I have been professionally engaged in social work and political reform, local and national. That program of studied, directed social progress, step by step, by public agitation and legislation, seemed to me the practical way of effective service to gradually freeing the mass of folks from industrial and political bondage. At the same time I was attracted to the solutions of our social problems put forth by the radicals. I studied the programs of socialism, the I.W.W. [Industrial Workers of the World, or "Wobblies"], European syndicalism and anarchism. I attended their meetings, knew their leaders. Some of them became my close personal friends. Sympathizing with their general ideals of a free society, with much of their program, I yet could see no effective way of practical daily service. Some six years ago, however, I was so discouraged with social work and reform, so challenged by the sacrifices and idealism of some of my I.W.W. friends, that I was on the point of getting out altogether, throwing respectability overboard and joining the I.W.W. as a manual worker.

I thought better of it. My traditions were against it. It was more an emotional reaction than a practical form of service. But ever since, I have felt myself heart and soul with the worldwide radical movements for industrial and political freedom—wherever and however expressed—and more and more important with reform.

Personally, I share the extreme radical philosophy of the future society. I look forward to a social order without any external restraints upon the individual, save through public opinion and the opinion of friends and neighbors. I am not a member of any radical organization, nor do I wear any tag by which my views may be classified. I believe that all parts of the radical movement serve the common end—freedom of the individual from arbitrary external controls.

When the war came to America, it was an immediate challenge to me to help protect those ideals of liberty which seemed to me not only the basis of the radical economic view, but of the radical political view of the founders of the Republic, and of the whole mediaeval struggle for religious freedom. Before the war was declared I severed all my connections in St. Louis, and offered my services to the American Union Against Militarism to help fight conscription. Later, that work developed into the National Civil Liberties Bureau, organized to help maintain the rights of free speech and free press, and the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberty of conscience, through liberal provisions for conscientious objectors. This work has been backed both by pro-war liberals and so-called pacifists. It is not anti-war in any sense. It seemed to me the one avenue of service open to me, consistent with my views, with the country's best interest, and with the preservation of the radical minority for the struggle after the war. Even if I were not a believer in radical theories and movements, I would justify the work I have done on the ground of American ideals and traditions alone—as do many of those who have been associated with me. They have stood for those enduring principles which the revolutionary demands of war have temporarily set aside. We have stood against hysteria, mob-violence, unwarranted prosecution, the sinister use of patriotism to cover attacks on radical and labor movements, and for the unabridged right of a fair trial under war statutes. We have tried to keep open those channels of expression which stand for the kind of world order for which the President is battling today against the tories and militarists.

Now comes the Government to take me from that service and to demand of me a service I cannot in conscience undertake. I refuse it simply for my own peace of mind and spirit, for the satisfaction of that inner demand more compelling than any consideration of punishment or the sacrifice of friendships and reputation. I seek no martyrdom, no publicity. I merely meet as squarely as I can the moral issue before me, regardless of consequences.

I realize that your Honor may virtually commit me at once to the military authorities, and that I may have merely taken a quicker and more inconvenient method of arriving at a military camp. I am prepared for that—for the inevitable pressure to take an easy way out by non-combatant service—with guard-house confinement—perhaps brutalities, which hundreds of other objectors have already suffered and are suffering today in camps. I am prepared for court martial and sentence to military prison, to follow the 200–300 objectors already sentenced to terms of 10–30 years for their loyalty to (1570) their ideals. I know that the way is easy for those who accept what to me is compromise, hard for those who refuse, as I must, any service whatever. And I

know further, in military prison I shall refuse to conform to the rules for military salutes and the like, and will suffer solitary confinement on bread and water, shackled to the bars of a cell eight hours a day—as are men of like convictions at this moment.

I am not complaining for myself or others. I am merely advising the court that I understand full well the penalty of my heresy, and am prepared to pay it. The conflict with conscription is irreconcilable. Even the liberalism of the President and Secretary of War in dealing with objectors leads those of us who are “absolutists” to a punishment longer and severer than that of desperate criminals.

But I believe most of us are prepared even to die for our faith, just as our brothers in France are dying for theirs. To them we are comrades in spirit—we understand one another’s motives, though our methods are wide apart. We both share deeply the common experience of living up to the truth as we see it, whatever the price.

Though at the moment I am of a tiny minority, I feel myself just one protest in a great revolt surging up from among the people—the struggle of the masses against the rule of the world by the few—profoundly intensified by the war. It is a struggle against the political state itself, against exploitation, militarism, imperialism, authority in all forms. It is a struggle to break in full force only after the war. Russia already stands in the vanguard, beset by her enemies in the camps of both belligerents—the Central Empires break asunder from within—the labor movement gathers revolutionary forces in Britain—and in our own country, the Nonpartisan League, radical labor, and the Socialist Party hold the germs of a new social order. Their protest is my protest. Mine is a personal protest at a particular law, but it is backed by all the aspirations and ideals of the struggle for a world freed of our manifold slaveries and tyrannies.

I ask the Court for no favor. I could do no other than what I have done, whatever the court’s decree. I have no bitterness or hate in my heart for any man. Whatever the penalty, I shall endure it, firm in the faith, that whatever befalls me, the principles in which I believe will bring forth out of this misery and chaos, a world of brotherhood, harmony, and freedom for each to live the truth as he sees it.

. . . I know that it is pretty nigh hopeless in times of war and hysteria to get across to any substantial body of people, the view of an out and out heretic like myself. I know that as far as my principles are concerned, they seem to be

utterly impractical—mere moon-shine. They are not the views that work in the world today. I fully realize that. But I fully believe that they are the views which are going to guide in the future.

Having arrived at the state of mind in which those views mean the dearest things in life to me, I cannot consistently, with self-respect, do other than I have, namely, to deliberately violate an act which seems to me to be a denial of everything which ideally and in practice I hold sacred.

Source: Roger N. Baldwin, *The Individual and the State: The Problem Presented by the Sentencing of Roger N. Baldwin* (n.p., November 1918), 5–11.

165. Frank P. Walsh of the National War Labor Board to President Woodrow Wilson, 30 October 1918

Large numbers of American women took wartime jobs, which in turn led to demands that their rights be respected. In October 1918 the head of the National War Labor Board told President Wilson of growing demands from women's organizations that two women become members of his board, with the objective of protecting working women from the discrimination and harassment to which they were often subjected.

War necessities in industry, combined with other narrower economic reasons, have increased the number of women and girls in industry in the United States to approximately 1,650,000, according to our best available information. Every case which comes before the National War Labor Board is impressed deeply with the necessity of handling the new and complicated situation.

Requests have come to me from organizations of women in different parts of the country from sources that might be divided as industrial, political and social, requesting and in some cases insistently demanding that recommendations be made to you to the effect that two women be added as full voting members to the National War Labor Board. In my opinion, this demand has a substantial basis, in reason, justice and the effective working out of the principles which govern the Board. The abnormal influx of women in industry frequently meets with opposition, sometimes extremely violent, on the part of the men workers. In many cases I have observed that the women in the presentation of their grievances are not fairly and vigorously represented by the men. This is due, in my opinion, partly to this prejudice and in part to the lack of understanding of the peculiar problems applying to women in industry. The women as a rule are wholly uninformed as (1571) to their rights and, undoubtedly advantage is being taken of them to their very serious detriment by many employers.

I feel sure that our Board could act with much more intelligence if we had the advice and co-operation of two women who could act with us in the settlement of controversies constantly coming before us in which conditions surrounding women workers are among the principal issues. . . .

Considering this as I do a most vital and pregnant question, I am making bold to suggest that you call upon the National Industrial Conference of which Mr. Frederick P. Fish, 15 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass., is President, and upon the American Federation of Labor of which Mr. John R. Alpine, Washington, D.C.,

is Acting President in the absence of Mr. Samuel Gompers, requesting each organization to nominate a woman to serve upon the National War Labor Board, and intimating, perhaps, that if the nominations are not promptly made you may, on account of the urgency of the situation, feel compelled to make the appointments by executive order.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51, September 14–November 8, 1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 522–523.

166. Official British Paraphrase of the Allied Armistice with Turkey, 31 October 1918

The terms of the Allied armistice with Turkey gave the Allies represented near-surrender by the Turks, since they would make it almost impossible for Turkey to resume war. They also gave the Allies almost unlimited discretion in their treatment of occupied Turkish territory.

1. Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.
2. Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.
3. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.
4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.
5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish Army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.
6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or in waters occupied by Turkey. These ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.
7. The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.
8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and demobilization of the Army.
9. Use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.
10. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northwest Persia to behind the prewar frontier has already been ordered, and will be carried out. Part of Transcaucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops and remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.
12. Wireless telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.
13. Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.
14. Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal, oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.
15. Allied Control officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Transcaucasian railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.
16. The surrender of all garrisons in the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander (1572) and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause 5.
17. The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.
18. The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.
19. All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions. Those in remote districts as soon after as may be possible.
20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under Clause 5.

21. An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all necessary for this purpose.
22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.
23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.
24. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.
25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, October 31, 1918.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 444–446.

**167. German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Wilhelm von Solf,
Memorandum Relative to Abdication of the Kaiser as an Armistice
Condition, Berlin, 31 October 1918**

By the end of October 1918, German politicians were coming to realize that Kaiser Wilhelm II represented a major political liability in their dealings with the Allies, especially with the United States. It was increasingly clear that President Woodrow Wilson would regard any German government in which the kaiser remained head of state as nondemocratic, and this in turn was likely to bring the imposition of harsher armistice and peace terms upon Germany. At the end of October the German foreign minister produced a memorandum rather cold-bloodedly detailing the advantages that jettisoning the kaiser was likely to bring his country. Interestingly, German officials who believed that their best chance of lenient peace terms lay with the United States sought to strengthen Wilson's position in his dealings with the other Allies.

In none of the previous communications of President Wilson was the renunciation of the throne by the Emperor expressly demanded. Hints are contained in the following passages in his notes. . . . [Passages omitted here.]

Up to this time it could not be unequivocally determined whether in these phrases the President was aiming only at the system and constitutional provisions, or whether he had distinct personalities in view. Attempts at elucidation were made and are still in progress, but have so far attained no definite result. In neutral countries the view predominates that he wishes actual abdication. This view is based on the interpretation of Wilson's messages, on impressions gained from conversations with representatives of America and the Entente, and especially on the following considerations:

Wilson himself wants a just peace on the basis of the points of his program. The Entente bitterly opposes the acceptance of this program. It wants to conclude peace on the basis of its own and very much more severe conditions. The Republican party in America under the leadership of [ex-President Theodore] Roosevelt likewise demands the unconditional subjection of Germany. Wilson, as a politician, is all the more dependent on these currents because the elections for the American House of Representatives will take place on the 5th of November and the Democratic party, Wilson's party, has a majority of only a few votes. If this majority is lost, the execution of the President's peace program will be rendered difficult, if not impossible. For in spite of all his power and authority, the American President is in the end dependent on the opinion of the voters. Even if Wilson personally looks upon

abdication as a demand only of secondary importance, he stands in need of this symbol, in order to prove to the Entente and the American public by a striking success that his war aim, the democratization of the world through the removal of the German military autocracy, has been attained. Constitutional amendments do not suffice for this purpose, as the American masses do not understand the German constitution, and, therefore, its amendments. The Emperor, on the other hand, is shown by a reading of the newspapers and (1573) the illustrated journals to be the personification of autocracy and militarism in the eyes of the American public. Therefore, the abdication of the Emperor as an undeniable result of Wilson's policy, would strengthen the latter's position and would probably make it possible for him to carry out his program despite all opposition. It is asserted that without this reinforcement of his position, Wilson will have to succumb to pressure and that severer peace terms in agreement with the views of the Entente will be imposed on Germany.

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:498–500.

168. Colonel Edward M. House, U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Cable No. 14 to President Woodrow Wilson, Sent via Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 31 October 1918

As protracted negotiations with Germany over armistice terms continued, General John J. Pershing, U.S. commander-in-chief in France, argued that any such arrangement was premature. He submitted a memorandum to the Allied Supreme War Council, presenting his case that nothing short of a total Allied victory would suffice to persuade Germany that it had genuinely lost the war. In all probability Pershing also hoped that a lengthier war would win him greater military acclaim. Colonel Edward M. House, at that time the president's special representative in Europe, indignantly told the president that Pershing had strayed well outside his assigned military responsibilities.

For the President.

Five minutes before I entered into conference this afternoon of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries and without previous notification General Pershing handed me a copy of the communication I quote herewith, the original thereof having already been sent to the Supreme War Council at Versailles and when [British Prime Minister David Lloyd] George read this his comment was: "Political not military; some one put him up to it." When [French Prime Minister Georges] Clémenceau read it his comment was: "theatrical and not in accordance with what he has said to Marshal Foch." No Allied general has ever submitted a document of this character to the Supreme War Council without a previous request having been made by the civilian authorities. I have written the following letter to General Pershing: "In regard to the communication which you sent in to the Supreme War Council this afternoon will you not let me know whether your views are shared by any of the other Allied generals?" He sent me a verbal answer saying he had not gotten the views of the other Allied commanders on this question.

The text of Pershing's memorandum followed.

Paris, October 30, 1918.

To the Allied Supreme War Council, Paris.

Gentlemen: In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view:

1. Judging from their excellent conduct during the three months the British, Belgian and American armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.
2. The American army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its growth, both in personnel and material, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied armies.
3. German man power is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over 1,000 piece[s] of artillery during the last three months in their efforts to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.
4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the western front, not counting Italy, and of Germany in rifles is: Allies, 1,564,000; Germany, 1,134,000; an advantage in favor of the Allies of 37 per cent. In guns: Allies, 22,413; Germany, 16,495; advantage of 35 per cent in favor of the Allies. If Italy's forces should be added to the western front we would have a still greater advantage.
5. Germany's morale is undoubtedly low, her allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.
6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army and enable it to organize and resist later on and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.
7. As the apparent humility of German military leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice (1574) is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.
8. On the other hand, the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save

the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.

9. A cessation of hostilities short of any capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory.

10. An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult if not impossible to resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have fought for.

11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace, the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.

12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy's strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.

13. Finally, I believe that complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany; but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.

Respectfully submitted. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief American Expeditionary Forces.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 2:169–171.

169. Allied Supreme War Council, 22nd Resolution on the Armistice Terms, 4 November 1918

Despite some reservations, the Allied governments acquiesced in the leading role that President Woodrow Wilson took in armistice negotiations with Germany and his insistence that peace be made on the basis of his Fourteen Points. They did, however, have some misgivings regarding the president's position on freedom of the seas and on indemnities to territories that had been occupied. The Supreme War Council therefore passed a resolution insisting on its reservations on these two particular points.

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January [8] 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause two relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8th, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

Source: World Peace Foundation, *A League of Nations*, Vol. 7 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, October 1918), 388.

170. Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 9 November 1918

Defeat in war generally led to the overthrow of monarchical government. The Russian Tsar Nicholas II, the Austrian Emperor Karl, and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II all lost their thrones. Only reluctantly did Wilhelm II reach the decision to renounce his throne, persuaded by the liberal Prince Max of Baden that his abdication was the only alternative to his deposition in the popular uprising that accompanied the ending of the war in Germany. In urging this course on his sovereign Max of Baden hoped to prevent the replacement of the moderate Social Democratic government by a radical, Bolshevik-influenced regime. After toying with the possibility of retaining the throne of his personal kingdom of Prussia without the imperial title, on 9 November 1918 the kaiser took the decision to abdicate, which Prince Max promptly announced. Only at the end of November, when he had already begun a lifelong exile in the Netherlands, (1575) did the kaiser issue his own formal abdication proclamation. At the time he decided to abdicate, the kaiser and most of his entourage still hoped that the crown prince, his son and heir, or another family member, such as his brother, would replace him as sovereign. One of his aides, Freiherr Werner von Grunau, left the following account of his deliberations on 9 November.

The Kaiser . . . was still hesitating; it was, however, clear from his utterances, which betrayed a mood of melancholy resignation, that he had inwardly resigned himself to the idea of abdication and that he would finally bring himself to the point of taking the painful decision. The rest of the company had the same impression as I. While [the Kaiser's aide] Herr von Hintze was at the telephone I remained for some time alone with His Majesty, and was now able to carry out the instructions which I had received [from Max of Baden] on the previous evening and which had as their object the saving of the Dynasty—in fact, of the Monarchy itself—through a timely and voluntary renunciation on the part of the Kaiser. I represented to the Kaiser once again that in the view of the highest military experts no other course remained to him but that of declaring his abdication. It would be quite impossible for the Kaiser to let things come to civil war at a moment when after more than four years of war the conclusion of the armistice was imminent, and everyone longing for peace and for home. At the end of so long a war, and after all the privations which the country had suffered, no one could take the responsibility of leading the army, which had so long kept the enemy at bay beyond the frontiers, to wage in its own country a civil war, with all the horrors and the embitterment which that necessarily involved. The whole burden of the responsibility would be laid on his head, and he would be charged with having overwhelmed his people in the

miseries of civil war for his own personal gratification. If, however, he were to make the great sacrifice and retire now, his people at peace in their homes would value it as such in days to come, they would be grateful to him for all that he accomplished and attempted, and would honour him for his noble decision and his tragic fate. The sacrifice would thus, from the point of view of the Monarchical principle and of the Dynasty, not have been made in vain.

The Kaiser emphatically rejected the idea of his being the cause of civil bloodshed, but expressed once again his conviction that his abdication at the present moment would bring the Republic, and that would mean the disintegration of the country and its reduction to a state of utter powerlessness. He spoke with bitterness of the way in which the democratic Government, in spite of his ready acquiescence in all the reforms and changes of personnel proposed, had neglected to take any effective steps to counter the attacks which had been directed against his person and which aimed ultimately at destroying the institution of the Monarchy itself; it had allowed itself to be taken in tow by the Social Democrats, who were only concerned to establish their own supremacy. Finally the Kaiser expressed his willingness to abdicate, if that was what the German people really wanted; he had reigned long enough to know what a thankless business it was; far from clinging to his Imperial position, he had only done his duty in remaining at his post and not deserting army and people at such a time as the present. Now the others might show whether they would manage things any better.

Source: Prince Max of Baden, *Memoirs*, 2 vols., trans. W. M. Calder and C. W. H. Sutton (London: Constable, 1928), 2:364–365.

Prince Max of Baden, Proclamation Announcing the Kaiser's Abdication, 9 November 1918

The Kaiser and King has decided to renounce the throne. The Imperial Chancellor will remain in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the Kaiser, the renouncing by the Crown Prince of the throne of the German Empire and of Prussia, and the setting up of a regency have been settled. For the regency, he intends to appoint Deputy [Max] Ebert as Imperial Chancellor, and he proposes that a bill shall be brought in for the immediate promulgation of general suffrage and for a constitutional German National Assembly, which will settle finally the future form of government of the German Nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the empire.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 6:389.

171. Statement Issued by the German People's Government, 9 November 1918

With the announcement of the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the appointment of Friedrich Ebert as imperial chancellor, there were fears for the maintenance of order in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. The new government immediately issued a statement appealing for order and support.

In the course of the forenoon of Saturday the formation of a new German people's government was initiated. The greater part of the Berlin garrison, and other troops stationed there temporarily, went over to the new Government.

The leaders of the deputations to the Social-Democratic Party declared that they would not shoot against the people. They said they would, in accordance with the people's government, intercede in favor of the maintenance of order. Thereupon in the offices and public buildings the guards which had been stationed there were withdrawn.

(1576)

The business of the Imperial Chancellor is being carried on by the Social-Democratic Deputy, Herr Ebert.

It is presumed that, apart from the representatives of the recent majority group, the independent Social-Democrats will enter the future government.

Source: James Brown Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 468–469.

172. Terms of German Armistice with Allied and Associated Powers, 11 November 1918

The armistice between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers was signed at 5 a.m. (French time) on 11 November 1918 and came into effect six hours later. Initially, it was to last for a period of thirty-six days, with renewals possible thereafter. The provisions for the evacuation by German troops of all occupied territories within fifteen days, and for an Allied occupation of Germany, effectively placed German forces in so disadvantageous a position that it would, in any case, have been impossible for them to recommence hostilities. Interestingly, even though President Woodrow Wilson had been so intimately involved in negotiating the agreement, no U.S. representative signed it. This was probably because the American commander-in-chief, General John J. Pershing, would have preferred to continue fighting until defeated German armies had been driven well back into their own country.

Conditions of the Armistice Concluded with Germany

A. The Western Front

I. Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signing of the Armistice.

II. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, as also Alsace-Lorraine,—so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the Armistice.

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war.

Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation of these areas.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a Note (Appendix A [omitted]) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

III. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, and persons under trial or convicted).

IV. Surrender in good condition by the German Armies of the following equipment: 5,000 guns (to wit 2,500 heavy and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 *Minenwerfer* [trench mortars], 1,700 fighting and bombing aeroplanes—primarily all the D.7's and all the night bombing machines. The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the Note (Appendix I [omitted]) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

V. Evacuation by the German Armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation.

The occupation of these territories by Allied and United States troops will be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with bridge-heads at these points of a 30-kilometre [about 19 miles] radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be set apart on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridge-heads and to the river, and 10 kilometres [$6\frac{1}{4}$ miles] deep, from the Dutch frontier to the Swiss frontier.

Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (right and left bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the Armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the Note (Appendix I [omitted]) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

VI. In all territories evacuated by the enemy, all evacuation of inhabitants shall be forbidden; neither damage nor harm shall be [done] to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures prior to the signing of the Armistice.

No destruction of any kind shall be committed.

Military establishments of all kind shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munition, and equipment, which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

(1577)

Stores of food for all kinds for the civil population, cattle, &c., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

VII. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain so employed.

5,000 complete locomotives, 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in Appendix No. II [omitted], the total of which shall not exceed 31 days.

5,000 motor lorries are also to be delivered in good condition within 36 days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days, together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system.

Further, working material in territories of the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for upkeep of permanent way, signals, and repair shops shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany, as far as the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine are concerned.

All lighters taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The Note attached as Appendix I [omitted] defines the details of these measures.

VIII. The German Command must reveal, within 48 hours after the signing of the Armistice, all mines or delay-action engines laid within the territories

evacuated by the German troops, and shall facilitate their discovery or destruction.

Further, the German Command shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of wells, springs, &c.). All the foregoing under penalty of reprisals.

IX. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States Armies in all occupied territories, except payment to those who are entitled thereto.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

X. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including those under trial and those already convicted. The Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they see fit. This condition annuls the previous conventions regarding prisoners of war, including that of July 1918, now being ratified. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The repatriation of the German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the peace preliminaries.

XI. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who will be left *in situ* with the necessary material.

B. Clauses Relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany

XII. All German troops at present in any territory which, before the war, formed part of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1st, 1914. All German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, account being taken of the internal situation of these territories.

XIII. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once; and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as existing on August 1st, 1914) to be recalled.

XIV. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures, and any other coercive measure with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as existing on August 1st, 1914).

XV. Denunciation of the treaties of Bukarest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

XVI. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

C. East Africa

XVII. Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period specified by the Allies.

(1578)

D. General Clauses

XVIII. Repatriation without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians including hostages and persons under trial and convicted who may be subjects of other Allied or Associated States other than those mentioned in Clause III.

Financial Clauses

XIX. With the exception of any future concessions and claims by the Allies and United States of America:

Repair of damage done.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of war losses.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stock, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power. This gold shall be held in trust by the Allies and peace is signed.

E. Naval Clauses

XX. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the position and movements of all German ships.

Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in the territorial waters is given to the Naval and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, without raising questions of neutrality.

XXI. All Naval and Mercantile Marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned, without reciprocity.

XXII. The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States of all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and mine-layers), with armament and equipment complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the Armistice.

XXIII. The German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be dismantled and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. They shall remain there under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only care and maintenance parties being left on board.

The vessels designated by the Allies are: 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers (of which two shall be mine-layers), 50 destroyers of the most modern type.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German Naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, completely dismantled, and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. The military equipment of all vessels of the Auxiliary Fleet is to be landed. All vessels specified for internment shall be

ready to leave German ports seven days after the signing of the Armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

XXIV. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine-fields and to destroy obstructions laid by Germany, outside German territorial waters, the positions of which are to be indicated.

XXV. Free access to and from the Baltic for the Naval and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, secured by the occupation of all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in the channels between the Cattegat and the Baltic, and by the sweeping up and destruction of all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated by Germany, who shall be permitted to raise no question of neutrality.

XXVI. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, German merchant ships found at sea remaining liable to capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice as shall be found necessary.

XXVII. All aerial forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

XXVIII. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and intact the port material and material (1579) for inland waterways, also all merchant ships, tugs, and lighters, all naval aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

XXIX. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized in the Black Sea are to be released; all warlike and other material of all kinds seized in those ports are to be handed over, and German materials as specified in Clause XXVIII are to be surrendered.

XXX. All merchant ships at present in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored to ports specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

XXXI. No destruction of ships or materials to be permitted before evacuation, delivery, or restoration.

XXXII. The German Government shall formally notify all the neutral Governments, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for special concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately canceled.

XXXIII. No transfer of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag is to take place after signature of the Armistice.

F. Duration of Armistice

XXXIV. The duration of the Armistice is to be 36 days, with power of extension. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the Armistice may be repudiated by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that failure to execute Articles III and XVIII completely in the period specified is not to give reason for a repudiation of the Armistice, save where such failure is due to malice aforethought.

To ensure the execution of the present convention under the most favorable conditions, the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission is recognized. This Commission will act under the supreme authority of the High Command, military and naval, of the Allied Armies.

The present Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, at 5 o'clock (French time).

F. FOCH ERZBERGER
R. E. WEMYSS OBERNDORFF
WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW

Declaration Made by German Plenipotentiaries on Signing Armistice

German Government will naturally endeavour with all its power to take care that the duties imposed upon it shall be carried out.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries recognize that in certain points regard has been paid to their suggestions. They can therefore regard the comments made on November 9th on the conditions of the Armistice with Germany and the

answer handed to them on November 10th as an essential condition of the whole agreement.

They must, however, allow no doubt to exist on the point that in particular the short time allowed for evacuation as well as the surrender of indispensable means of transport threaten to bring about a state of things which without its being the fault of the German Government and the German people may render impossible the further fulfilment of the conditions.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries further regard it as their duty with reference to their repeated oral and written declaration once more to point out with all possible emphasis that the carrying out of this agreement must throw the German people into anarchy and famine. According to the declarations which preceded the Armistice, conditions were to be expected which while completely ensuring the military situation of our opponents would have ended the sufferings of women and children who took no part in the war.

The German people, which has held its own for fifty months against a world of enemies, will in spite of any force that may be brought to bear upon it preserve its freedom and unity.

A people of 70 millions suffers but does not die.

ERZBERGER
OBERNDORFF
WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW

Text of Conditions Added to Clauses of Armistice

11 November 1918

The representatives of the Allies declare that owing to further occurrences it seems to them necessary that the following conditions should be added to the clauses of the Armistice:

(1580)

“In case that the German vessels should not be surrendered within the time indicated the Allies and United States Governments will have the right to occupy Heligoland in order to ensure their surrender.”

R. E. WEMYSS, Admiral
F. FOCH

The German delegates state that they will transmit this declaration to the German Chancellor with the recommendation that it shall be accepted, adding the reasons which have given rise to this demand on the part of the Allies.

ERZBERGER VANSELOW
WINTERFELDT ROULEAU
OBERNDORFF

Source: Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., *Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 2:508–519.

173. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Joint Session of Congress, 11 November 1918

As the war ended in an armistice, President Woodrow Wilson addressed the U.S. Congress, describing the terms of the armistice in detail. In very general language, he also expressed his hope that the future world would be appreciably better than the past. He nonetheless described frankly the prevailing disorder and uncertainty in much of Europe.

Gentlemen of the Congress: In these anxious times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

He then gave a very detailed breakdown of the armistice terms.

The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

It is not now possible to assume the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such force as to contribute in a way of which we are all deeply proud . . . [of] the great result. We know, too, that the object of the war is attained: the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will now seek to revive it? The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany which once could secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world is discredited and destroyed. And more than that—much more than that—has been accomplished. The great nations which associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely united in the common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice, embodied in settlements which are based upon something much better and more lasting than the selfish competitive interests of powerful states. There is no longer conjecture as to the objects the victors have in mind. They have a mind in the matter, not only, but a heart also. Their avowed and concerted purpose is to satisfy and protect the weak as well as to accord their just rights to the strong.

The humane temper and intention of the victorious governments has already been manifested in a very practical way. Their representatives in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives; and steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. By the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand. Hunger does not breed reform; it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible.

For with the fall of the ancient governments which rested like an incubus upon the peoples of the Central Empires has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves, With what governments, and of what sort, are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements is it to rest?

Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered now or at once.

(1581)

But the moral is not that there is little hope of an early answer that will suffice. It is only that we must be patient and helpful and mindful above all of the great hope and confidence that lie at the heart of what is taking place. Excesses accomplish nothing. Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant proof of that.

Disorder immediately defeats itself. If excesses should occur, if disorder should for a time raise its head, a sober second thought will follow and a day of constructive action, if we help and do not hinder.

The present and all that it holds belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their governments; the

future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness.

The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government and who are now coming at last into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with the initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbours and of their former masters, and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 53, November 9, 1918–January 11, 1919* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 35–43.

174. Thomas Hardy, “And There Was a Great Calm”

In November 1918 England’s most revered man of letters was Thomas Hardy (1840–1930), novelist, playwright, and poet. Two years later, on the second anniversary of the armistice, he published a poem reflecting on the event.

(On the Signing of the Armistice, 11 Nov. 1918)

There had been years of Passion-scorching, cold,
And much Despair, and anger heaving high,
Care whitely watching. Sorrow manifold,
Among the young, among the weak and old,
And the pensive Spirit of Pity whispered, “Why?”
Men had not paused to answer. Foes distraught
Pierced the thinned peoples in a brute-like blindness,
Philosophies that sages long had thought,
And Selflessness, were as an unknown thought
And “Hell!” and “Shell!” were yapped at Lovingkindness.

The feeble folk at home had grown full-used
To “dug-outs,” “snipers,” “Huns,” from the war-adept
In the morning heard, and at evetides perused;
To day-dreamt men in millions, when they mused—
To nightmare-men in millions when they slept.
Walking to wish existence timeless, null,
Sirius they watched above where armies fell;

He seemed to check his flapping when, in the lull
Of night a boom came thence wise, like the dull
Plunge of a stone dropped into some deep well.

So, when old hopes that earth was bettering slowly
Were dear and damned, there sounded "War is done!"
On morrow. Said the bereft, and meek, and lowly,
"Will men some day be given to grace? yea, wholly,
And in good sooth, as our dreams used to run?"
Breathless they paused. Out there men raised their glance
To where had stood those poplars lank and lopped,
As they had raised it through the four years' dance
Of Death in the now familiar flats of France:
And murmured, "Strange, this! How? All firing stopped?"

Aye; all was hushed. The about-to-fire fired not,
The aimed-at moved away in trance-lipped song.
One checkless regiment slung a clinching shot
And turning. The Spirit of Irony smirked out, "What?
Spoiled peradventures woven of Rage and Wrong?"
Thenceforth no flying fires inflamed the gray,
No hurtlings shook the dewdrop from the thorn,

No moan perplexed the mute bird on the spray;
Worn horses mused: "We are not whipped to-day";
No weft-winged engines blurred the moon's thin horn.

Calm fell. From Heaven distilled a clemency;
There was peace on earth, and silence in the sky;
Some could, some could not, shake off misery:

(1582)

The Sinister Spirit sneered: "It had to be!"

And again the Spirit of Pity whispered, "Why?"

Source: James Gibson, ed., *The Complete Poems of Thomas Hardy* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 588–590. Reprinted with the permission of Scribner, an imprint of Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, from *The Complete Poems of Thomas Hardy* by James Gibson. Copyright © 1978 by Macmillan London Ltd.

175. Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary, Abdication Proclamation, 11 November 1918

As the German armistice agreement was signed and his own empire crumbled into its separate national components, the young Austrian emperor announced his abdication and went into exile.

Since my accession I have incessantly tried to rescue my peoples from this tremendous war. I have not delayed the re-establishment of constitutional rights or the opening of a way for the people to substantial national development. Filled with an unalterable love for my peoples I will not, with my person, be a hindrance to their free development. I acknowledge the decision taken by German Austria to form a separate State. The people has by its deputies taken charge of the Government. I relinquish every participation in the administration of the State. Likewise I have released the members of the Austrian Government from their offices. May the German Austrian people realize harmony from the new adjustment. The happiness of my peoples was my aim from the beginning. My warmest wishes are that an internal peace will be able to heal the wounds of this war.

Source: Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *Great Events of the Great War*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: National Alumni, 1920), 6:385.

176. Li Dazhao, "The Victory of Bolshevism," November 1918

Li Dazhao, a professor of philosophy and chief librarian at Peking University, China's leading university, became one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. As the Allies—China among them—declared victory over Germany in November 1918, he published an article, "The Victory of Bolshevism," hailing the Russian Bolshevik Revolution as a movement that should serve as an inspiration for Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries. Li also ascribed the Allied victory to socialist revolution in Germany rather than Allied military prowess. His attitude exemplified the manner in which the victory of communism in Russia caught the imagination of leftists around the world and would serve as a model for their future aspirations.

"Victory! Victory! Victory to the Allies! Surrender! Surrender! The Germans have surrendered!" On the doors of homes everywhere hang national flags and people all over are crying out "Wansui" [long live]. Voices and the colors all seem to be expressions of these words. Men and women from the Allied countries run back and forth on the streets celebrating their victory; soldiers of the Allied countries loudly sing their victory songs in the cities. Suddenly there is the sound of broken glass as the store windows of German merchants are broken and of a crash as the monument to [Clemens] Von Ketteler [German minister to Beijing killed during the Boxer Rebellion] is pulled down. And these sounds mix together with the noise of happy celebration. It goes without saying that foreign nationals of the Allied powers resident in our country are exceedingly happy. Even people in our country who had little to do with the changing situation in the world have felt obliged to engage in obsequious displays of happiness as they take the joy and glory of others as their own. In academic circles there are lantern parades, politicians hold celebratory meetings, and generals who never led a single soldier in the year or so that China participated in the war, review parades of troops and are awe-inspiringly martial. Political hacks who once wrote histories of the European war which argued that Germany must inevitably win and who then turned around to declare war on Germany now claim all merit for themselves and print articles in newspapers that advertise their own activities and declaim those of others. Little people like us in the world can only follow along and join in the commotion, celebrating the victory and shouting wansui. This is the situation as the Allied victory has been celebrated recently in Peking.

However, let us carefully consider all of this from our standpoint as members of the world's human race: In the final analysis, whose victory is this and who has really surrendered? Who has accomplished this task and who are we

celebrating for? If we consider these questions, our generals who never led troops and yet flaunt their martial prowess and the shameless politicians who claim all merit for themselves, are truly disgraceful. It is also meaningless for the people of Allied countries to say that the war was a victory of Allied arms over the military forces of Germany. Their boasts and celebrations are totally meaningless for it is probable that their political hacks will soon share the same fate as German militarism.

In fact, the victory of Allied military strength over German military strength was not the true cause of the conclusion of this war; the real cause for victory was German socialism's defeat of German militarism. The German people were not obliged to surrender by Allied armed force; in actuality, Germany's emperor, warlords, and militarism were forced to surrender by the tide of world affairs. It was not the Allies who defeated German militarism but rather the spirit of the awakened people of Germany. The failure of German militarism was the failure of Germany's Hohenzollern family [the German (1583)imperial family] and not the failure of the German people. As for the victory over German militarism, it was not the victory of the Allies and it was certainly not the victory of either the military men in our country who are scrabbling to claim merit for their participation or the politicians who are opportunistically and cunningly promoting themselves. This was the victory of humanitarianism, pacifism, justice, freedom, democracy, and socialism. This was the victory of Bolshevism, the red flag, the working class of the world, and the victory of the new tide of the twentieth century. This accomplishment belongs not so much to Wilson and others as to Lenin, Kollontai, Liebknecht, Scheidemann, and Marx. This should not be a celebration merely for one country or a group within a certain country; rather, it should be a celebration of a new dawn for world mankind. It should be a celebration not of the victory of one side's military forces over the other but a celebration of democracy and socialism's triumph over monarchy and militarism. . . .

From the facts of what the "Bolsheviki" are doing, it is possible to see that their doctrine is revolutionary socialism and their party is a revolutionary socialist party. They honor the German socialist economist Marx as the founder of their doctrine. Their goal is to break down the national boundaries which today are the obstacle blocking socialism. They seek to destroy the monopoly capitalist system of production. The true cause of the war was the destruction of national boundaries because the expanded productive force of capitalism could not be contained by the national boundaries of today. The territories enclosed by national boundaries are too constricted to permit the development of productive force. Therefore, the capitalists depend on war to break down these boundaries

and they want to create a global economic organization that will tie together all parts. Socialists agree with capitalists that international borders should be broken down, but the hope of capitalist governments is to give benefits to the middle classes of their countries. These governments depend on the global economic development of the capitalist class of the victorious countries of the world. They do not rely upon the humanistic and rational coordination and mutual help of the producers of the world. The victorious countries of this kind will because of this war advance and change in the future from powerful countries to imperialistic countries. The “Bolsheviki” observed this and cried out and announced that this war was the Czar’s war, the Kaiser’s war, a war of kings, a war of emperors, a war of capitalist governments, but not their war. Their war is class war. It is a war of the proletariat of the entire world against the capitalists of the world. Although they oppose war, they are not afraid of war. They believe that everyone, male or female, should work and that all workers should belong to a union. Every union should have a central governing council and such a council should be the basic organization for all the governments of the world. There will be no congresses, no parliaments, no presidents, no premiers, no cabinets, no legislative branches, and no rulers. Only councils of labor unions will exist and they will decide everything. All industries will belong to the people working there; there will be no private ownership. The Bolsheviki will unite the proletariat of the entire world and use to the utmost their power and force of resistance to create a land of freedom and they will first create a democratic federation in Europe as the basis of a world federation. These are the new beliefs of the Bolsheviki and the new doctrine of world revolution in the twentieth century. . . .

Up to now, . . . there have been revolutions in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Bavaria, and there are rumors that revolutionary socialist parties are launching uprisings in Holland, Sweden, and Spain. The revolutionary situation in these countries is basically similar to that of Russia. Red flags are flying everywhere. Labor unions are being established one after another. It can be said that this is a Russian-style revolution or it can be said that this is a twentieth-century-style revolution. The crashing waves of revolution cannot be halted by today’s capitalist government because the mass movements of the twentieth century have brought together world humankind into one great mass. Each person within this great mass unconsciously follows the motion of the mass and all are pulled together into a great, irresistible social force. When this global force begins to rumble, the wind roars throughout the whole world, clouds surge, there is a pounding in the mountains, and valleys echo with the sound. In the face of this global, mass movement, historical remnants—such as emperors, noblemen, warlords, bureaucrats, militarism, capitalism—and all other things

that obstruct the advance of this new movement will be crushed by the thunderous force. When confronted by this irresistible tide, these remnants of the past are like withered leaves facing the bitter autumn wind; one by one they will drop to the ground. On all sides one sees the victorious banner of Bolshevism and everywhere one hears the victorious songs of Bolshevism. Everyone says that the bells are ringing! The dawn of freedom is breaking! Just take a look at the world of the future, it is sure to be a world of red flags!

I said once: "History is the general psychological record of people. People's lives are closely connected and linked with one another like parts of a big mechanism. The future of an individual corresponds to the future of all of mankind. The portents revealed by one event are interrelated with portents of the entire world situation. The French Revolution of 1789 was not merely a sign of the changed mentality of the French. It was actually a sign of the general changing mentality of 19th century man. The Russian Revolution of 1917 is not only an (1584) obvious omen of the changing mentality of 20th century man." The Russian Revolution is the first fallen leaf that warns the world of the coming of autumn. Although the word Bolshevism was coined by Russians, its spirit is a spirit of enlightenment that every member of mankind can share. Therefore, the victory of Bolshevism is the victory of the new spirit of enlightenment that all mankind can share in the twentieth century.

Source: Pei-Kai Cheng and Michael Lestz with Jonathan D. Spence, eds., *The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection* (New York: Norton, 1999), 238–241. Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

**177. The Chinese Government Demands an End to Foreign Dominance:
Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge
Long, Washington, 27 November 1918**

When the war ended, the assorted nations involved, especially those that had supported the winning side, pinned their hopes on the impending peace conference. President Woodrow Wilson's eloquent statement of the liberal principles that he believed should govern international relations made the United States a magnet for all countries seeking to redress their perceived grievances or injustices. In November 1918 V. K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister to the United States, called the State Department in Washington and expounded to Breckinridge Long, third assistant secretary of state, the Chinese government's conviction that in order to restore his country's independence of action, the special territorial and other privileges granted to various foreign nations should be rescinded.

The Chinese Minister called today and discussed China's program for the Peace Conference, which included the following:

The establishment and revision of the full territorial integrity.

Her political sovereignty and its full realization.

Her physical and economic independence.

Program was further developed as follows:

Territorial Integrity

Their concessions and settlements; their abrogations. He said that the original reason for their establishment had ceased to exist; that they had been created to give occidental merchants some place of safety and security in the days when China was not conversant with Western ways and Western people, and that they had been found and developed in the settlements with political rights and that they each were an infraction upon the territorial integrity of China.

Leased Territories and Their Relinquishment.

He said that they had been taken by force or by threat under various pretext and that they served to create a balance of power in China, but a balance of power not between China and other Governments but between different Governments who had interests in China. He felt that the abrogation of them all would leave

the same balance of power between the other Governments and would reestablish general political integrity. He further stated that they were in many instances strategically situated and constituted a hindrance to the development of China and to the free exercise of her sovereignty, because by reason of their situation and the political activities possible there which impeded or could be used to interfere with the exercise of China's free will. He felt that they were separate and distinct territorial sub-divisions with political attributes used by foreign powers for purposes other than those which were entirely consistent with China's ambitions; that they were really, as he expressed it, Imperia Imperium [imperia in imperia, or a state within a state].

Sovereignty

The abrogation of Articles 7 and 9 of the Protocol of September [in reality December] 22d, 1900 and the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, pertains to the Legation guards and private communications between Peking and the sea.

Extraterritoriality; Its Abolition As Regards China.

He argued that China was different from Egypt, Turkey and Persia in that the extraterritoriality in those countries was imposed by military and political situations which existed in the countries or in other countries near them and that had grown up and developed from mediaeval times but that in China extraterritoriality was a recent development and had not been imposed upon China by treaty. He felt that the same reasons did not exist and that it was also a hindrance to the free and full development of China.

Physical Economic Independence

Freedom of Tariff and Administration.

He feels that the tariff is limited to a five per cent duty and based upon a valuation which was small enough many years ago at the time the population remained stationary. During a period of years in which the crisis generally has arisen and the revenue derivable from that source is not only totally inadequate to China's needs but wholly inconsistent with the prices of dutiable goods and with the revenues which other countries derive from the tariff.

Spheres of Influence; Their Renunciation.

He feels that it is quite anomalous for spheres of influence to exist in China and says that China has never consented to it; (1585) that they do not now but they

have simply grown up by an agreement between other Governments as to what part of China they might set aside for themselves and in which each of them was to have special rights, both economic and industrial in this sphere which that power claimed for itself. I told him that we did not recognize that spheres of influences existed and that we were thoroughly sympathetic to his nation's ambitions in that respect.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference*, 13 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 2:507–509.

**178. Marcus Garvey, “Advice of the Negro to Peace Conference,”
Editorial, The Negro World, 30 November 1918**

World War I fueled nationalist sentiment among Africans and African Americans. In 1917 Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican immigrant, came to the United States. He settled in New York and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). This organization’s most prominent goals were the ending of white colonialism in Africa and the establishment there of independent African-ruled states, to which African Americans and other descendants of enslaved Africans in the Caribbean, Latin America, and elsewhere could return.

Now that the statesmen of the various nations are preparing to meet at the Peace Conference, to discuss the future government of the peoples of the world, we take it as our bounden duty to warn them to be very just to all those people who may happen to come under their legislative control. If they, representing the classes, as they once did, were alive to the real feeling of their respective masses four and one-half years ago, today Germany would have been intact, Austria-Hungary would have been intact, Russia would have been intact, the spirit of revolution never would have swept Europe, and mankind at large would have been satisfied. But through graft, greed and selfishness, the classes they represented then, as some of them represent now, were determined to rob and exploit the masses, thinking that the masses would have remained careless of their own condition for everlasting.

It is a truism that you “fool half of the people for half of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people for all of the time”; and now that the masses of the whole world have risen as one man to demand true equity and justice from the ‘powers that be,’ then let the delegates at the Peace Conference realize, just now, that the Negro, who forms an integral part of the masses of the world, is determined to get no less than what other men are to get. The oppressed races of Europe are to get their freedom, which freedom will be guaranteed them. The Asiatic races are to get their rights and a larger modicum of self-government.

We trust that the delegates to the Peace Conference will not continue to believe that Negroes have no ambition, no aspiration. There are no more timid, cringing Negroes; let us say that those Negroes have now been relegated to the limbo of the past, to the region of forgetfulness, and that the new Negro is on the stage, and he is going to play his part good and well. He, like the other

heretofore oppressed peoples of the world, is determined to get restored to him his ancestral rights.

When we look at the map of Africa today we see Great Britain with fully five million square miles of our territory, we see France with fully three million five hundred thousand square miles, we see that Belgium has under her control the Congo, Portugal has her sway over Southeast Africa, Italy has under her control Tripoli, Italian Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden and Erythria on the Red Sea. Germany had clamored for a place in the sun simply because she has only one million square miles, with which she was not satisfied, in that England had five millions and France three millions five hundred thousand. It can be easily seen that the war of 1914 was the outcome of African aggrandizement, that Africa, to which the white man has absolutely no claim, has been raped, has been left bleeding for hundreds of years, but within the last thirty years the European powers have concentrated more than ever on the cleaning up of the great continent so as to make it a white man's country. Among those whom they have killed are millions of our people, but the age of killing for naught is passed and the age of killing for something has come. If black men have to die in Africa or anywhere else, then they might as well die for the best of things, and that is liberty, true freedom and true democracy. If the delegates to the Peace Conference would like to see no more wars we would advise them to satisfy the yellow man's claims, the black man's claims and the white man's claims, and let all three be satisfied so that there can be indeed a brotherhood of men. But if one section of the human race is to arrogate to itself all that God gave for the benefit of mankind at large, then let us say human nature has in no way changed, and even at the Peace Conference where from the highest principles of humanity are supposed to emanate there will come no message of peace.

There will be no peace in the world until the white man confines himself politically to Europe, the yellow man to Asia and the black man to Africa. The original division of the earth among mankind must stand, and any one who dares to interfere with this division creates only trouble for himself. This division was made by the Almighty Power that rules, and therefore there can be no interference with the plans Divine.

Cowardice has disappeared from the world. Men have died in this world war so quickly and so easily that those who desire liberty today do not stop to think of death, for it is regarded as the price which people in all ages will have to pay to be free; (1586) that is the price the weaker people of Europe have paid; that is the price the Negro must pay some day. Let the Peace Conference, we suggest,

be just in its deliberations and in its findings, so that there can be a true brotherhood in the future with no more wars.

Source: African-American History, About.com,
http://afroamhistory.about.com/library/blmarcus_garvey_advice.htm.

179. The Spartacist Uprising, Germany, “Manifesto of the Spartacist Group,” Signed by Klara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Franz Mehring, December 1918

After the German collapse of November 1918, left-wing socialists led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg attempted to seize power from the moderate socialist government that had succeeded the Wilhelmine monarchy. In December 1918 they published the following manifesto, and in January 1919 an uprising followed. The German government successfully suppressed the Spartacist revolt, and both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were captured and killed.

Proletarians! Men and Women of Labor! Comrades!

The revolution has made its entry into Germany. The masses of the soldiers, who for four years were driven to the slaughterhouse for the sake of capitalistic profits, the masses of workers, who for four years were exploited, crushed, and starved, have revolted. That fearful tool of oppression—Prussian militarism, that scourge of humanity—lies broken on the ground. Its most noticeable representatives, and therewith the most noticeable of those guilty of this war, the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, have fled from the country. Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils have been formed everywhere.

Proletarians of all countries, we do not say that in Germany all the power has really been lodged in the hands of the working people, that the complete triumph of the proletarian revolution has already been attained. There still sit in the government of all those Socialists who in August, 1914, abandoned our most precious possession, the International, who for four years betrayed the German working class and at the same time the International.

But, proletarians of all countries, now the German proletarian himself is speaking to you. We believe we have the right to appear before your forum in his name. From the first day of this war we endeavored to do our international duty by fighting that criminal government with all our power and branding it as the one really guilty of the war. . . .

We know that also in your countries the proletariat made the most fearful sacrifices of flesh and blood, that it is weary of the dreadful butchery, that the proletarian is now returning to his home, and is finding want and misery there, while fortunes amounting to billions are heaped up in the hands of a few capitalists. He has recognized, and will continue to recognize, that your

governments, too, have carried on the war for the sake of the big money bags. And he will further perceive that your governments, when they spoke of “justice and civilization” and the “protection of small nations,” meant the profits of capital just as did ours when it talked about the “defense of the home”; and that the peace of “justice” and of the “League of Nations” amounts to the same base brigandage as the peace of Brest-Litovsk. Here, as well as there, the same shameless lust for booty, the same desire for oppression, the same determination to exploit to the limit the brutal preponderance of murderous steel.

The imperialism of all countries knows no “understanding,” it knows only one right—capital’s profits; it knows only one language—the sword; it knows only one method—violence. And if it is now talking in all countries, in yours as well as in ours, about the “League of Nations,” “disarmament,” “rights of small nations,” “self-determination of the peoples,” it is merely using the customary lying phrases of the rulers for the purpose of lulling to sleep the watchfulness of the proletariat.

Proletarians of all countries! This must be the last war! We owe that to the 12,000,000 murdered victims, we owe that to our children, we owe that to humanity. . . .

Socialism alone is in a position to complete the great work of permanent peace, to heal the thousand wounds from which humanity is bleeding, to transform the plains of Europe, trampled down by the passage of the apocryphal horseman of war, into blooming gardens, to conjure up ten productive forces for every one destroyed, to awaken all the physical and moral energies of humanity, and to replace hatred and dissension with fraternal solidarity, harmony, and respect for every human being.

If representatives of the proletarians of all countries stretch out their hands to each other under the banner of socialism for the purpose of making peace, then peace will be concluded in a few hours. . . .

The proletariat of Germany is looking toward you in this hour. Germany is pregnant with the social revolution, but socialism can only be realized by the proletariat of the world.

And therefore we call to you: “Arise for the struggle! Arise for action! The time for empty manifestos, platonic resolutions, (1587) and high-sounding words has gone by! The hour of action has struck for the International!” We ask you

to elect Workers' and Soldiers' Councils everywhere that will seize political power and, together with us, will restore peace.

Not [British Prime Minister David] Lloyd George and [French Prime Minister Raymond] Poincaré, not [Italian Foreign Minister Sidney] Sonnino, [U.S. President Woodrow] Wilson, and [German Catholic Center Party leader Matthias] Erzberger or [head of the German provisional government Philip] Scheidemann must be allowed to make peace. Peace is to be concluded under the waving banner of the socialist world revolution.

Proletarians of all countries! We call upon you to complete the work of socialist liberation, to give a human aspect to the disfigured world, and to make true the words with which we often greeted each other in the old days and which we sang as we parted: "And the International shall be the human race."

Source: "Manifesto of the Spartacist Group," *New York Times*, 24 January 1919, reprinted in Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse*, 3rd ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 22–24. Used by permission of University Press of New England.

180. Reflections on War on the Western Front: Sir Douglas Haig, Final Dispatch, 21 March 1919

Sir Douglas Haig's eighth and final dispatch on the war gave a reflective overview of its entire course on the Western Front from the time of the summer 1916 Somme offensive. Much of it was drafted by John Buchan, the novelist and war historian, then serving on Haig's staff. The dispatch summarized many of the characteristics and problems of warfare waged on the scale characteristic of the First World War.

A Single Great Battle

In this my final Despatch, I think it desirable to comment briefly upon certain general features which concern the whole series of operations carried out under my command. I am urged thereto by the conviction that neither the course of the war itself nor the military lessons to be drawn therefrom can properly be comprehended, unless the long succession of battles commenced on the Somme in 1916 and ended in November of last year on the Sambre are viewed as forming part of one great and continuous engagement.

To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and incessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our success, to the exclusion or neglect of other phases possibly less striking in their immediate or obvious consequences, is in my opinion to risk the formation of unsound doctrines regarding the character and requirements of modern war.

If the operations of the past four and half years are regarded as a single continuous campaign, there can be recognised in them the same general features and the same necessary stages which between forces of approximately equal strength have marked all the conclusive battles of history.

There is in the first instance the preliminary stage of the campaign in which the opposing forces seek to deploy and manoeuvre for position, endeavouring while doing so to gain some early advantage which might be pushed home to quick decision. This phase came to an end in the present war with the creation of continuous trench lines from the Swiss frontier to the sea.

Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real struggle in which the main forces of the two belligerent armies are pitted against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and to pin him to his position, while preserving or accumulating in his own hands a powerful reserve force which he can

manoeuvre, and, when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically weakened are observed, deliver the decisive attack.

The greatest possible pressure against the enemy's whole front must be maintained, especially when the crisis of the battle approaches. Then every man, horse and gun is required to co-operate, so as to complete the enemy's overthrow and exploit success.

In every stage of the wearing-out struggle losses will necessarily be heavy on both sides, for in it the price of victory is paid. If the opposing forces are approximately equal in numbers, in courage, in moral and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of the price or of eliminating this phase of the struggle.

In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great Empires behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from the general perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles. To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917 which wore down the strength of the German Armies.

Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and leadership of one of the belligerents, as the result of greater resources (1588) or tenacity, or by reason of higher moral, or from a combination of all these causes, the time will come when the other side will begin to weaken and the climax of the battle is reached.

Then the commander of the weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engagement, if he can, while there is yet time, or stake on a supreme effort what reserves remain to him. The launching and destruction of Napoleon's last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this World War the great sortie of the beleaguered German Armies, commenced on March 21, 1918, lasted for four months, yet it represents a corresponding stage in a single colossal battle.

The breaking down of such a supreme effort will be the signal for the commander of the successful side to develop his greatest strength, and seek to turn to immediate account the loss in material and moral which their failure must inevitably produce among his opponent's troops.

In a battle joined and decided in the course of a few days or hours, there is no risk that the lay observer will seek to distinguish the culminating operations by which victory is seized and exploited from the preceding stages by which it has been made possible and determined. If the whole operations of the present war are regarded in correct perspective, the victories of the summer and autumn of 1918 will be seen to be directly dependant upon the two years of stubborn fighting that preceded them.

The Length of the War

If the causes which determined the length of the recent contest are examined in the light of the accepted principles of war, it will be seen that the duration of the struggle was governed by and bore a direct relation to certain definite factors which are enumerated below.

In the first place, we were unprepared for war, or at any rate for a war of such magnitude. We were deficient in both trained men and military material, and, what was more important, had no machinery ready by which either men or material could be produced in anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences were twofold.

Firstly, the necessary machinery had to be improvised hurriedly, and improvisation is never economical and seldom satisfactory. In this case the high-water mark of our fighting strength in infantry was only reached after two and a half years of conflict, by which time heavy casualties had already been incurred. In consequence, the full man-power of the Empire was never developed in the field at any period of the war.

As regards material, it was not until midsummer 1916 that the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the conduct of major operations. Throughout the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery ammunition had to be watched with the greatest care. During the battles of 1917, ammunition was plentiful, but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918 was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any limiting considerations other than that of transport.

The second consequence of our unpreparedness was that our armies were unable to intervene, either at the outset of the war or until nearly two years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately to assist our Allies. The enemy was able to gain a notable initial advantage by establishing himself in Belgium and

Northern France, and throughout the early stages of the war was free to concentrate an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Russia.

The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant Army of France during this period caused them losses the effect of which has been felt all through the war and directly influenced its length. Just as at no time were we as an Empire able to put our full strength into the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man-power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on a larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was actually achieved by our original Expeditionary Force.

It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which has been fully prepared for war has almost invariably gained a rapid and complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1866 and 1870, Austria and then France were overwhelmed at the outset by means of superior preparation.

The initial advantages derived therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action, regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the first stunning blows. The German plan of campaign in the present war was undoubtedly based on similar principles. The margin by which the German onrush in 1914 was stemmed was so narrow, and the subsequent struggle so severe, that the word 'miraculous' is hardly too strong a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory of the Allies.

A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war on the Western Front during its later stages, and one following indirectly from that just stated, was the situation in other theatres. The military strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical period when, had she been able to carry out her military engagements, the war might have been shortened by a year.

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At a later date, the military situation in Italy in the autumn of 1917 necessitated the transfer of five British divisions from France to Italy at a time when their presence in France might have had far reaching effects.

Thirdly, the Allies were handicapped in their task and the war thereby lengthened by the inherent difficulties always associated with the combined action of armies of separate nationalities, differing in speech and temperament, and, not least important, in military organisation, equipment and supply.

Finally, as indicated in the opening paragraph of this part of my Despatch, the huge numbers of men engaged on either side, whereby a continuous battle front was rapidly established from Switzerland to the sea, outflanking was made impossible and manoeuvre very difficult, necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks.

This factor, combined with the strength of the defensive under modern conditions, rendered a protracted wearing-out battle unavoidable before the enemy's power of resistance could be overcome. So long as the opposing forces are at the outset approximately equal in numbers and moral[e] and there are no flanks to turn, a long struggle for supremacy is inevitable.

The Extent of Our Casualties

Obviously, the greater the length of a war the higher is likely to be the number of casualties in it on either side. The same causes, therefore, which served to protract the recent struggle are largely responsible for the extent of our casualties. There can be no question that to our general unpreparedness must be attributed the loss of many thousands of brave men whose sacrifice we deeply deplore, while we regard their splendid gallantry and self-devotion with unstinted admiration and gratitude.

Given, however, the military situation existing in August 1914, our total losses in the war have been no larger than were to be expected. Neither do they compare unfavourably with those of any other of the belligerent nations, so far as figures are available from which comparison can be made.

The total British casualties in all theatres of war—killed, wounded, missing and prisoners, including native troops—are approximately three millions (3,076,388). Of this total, some two and a half millions (2,568,388) were incurred on the Western Front. The total French losses—killed, missing and prisoners, but exclusive of wounded—have been given as approximately 1,831,000.

If an estimate for wounded is added, the total can scarcely be less than 4,800,000, and of this total it is fair to assume that over four millions were incurred on the Western Front. The published figures for Italy—killed and wounded only, exclusive of prisoners—amounted to 1,400,000 of which practically the whole were incurred in the western theatre of war.

Figures have also been published for Germany and Austria. The total German casualties—killed, wounded, missing and prisoners—are given at

approximately six and a half millions (6,485,000), of which the vastly greater proportion must have been incurred on the Western Front, where the bulk of the German forces were concentrated and the hardest fighting took place.

In view of the fact, however, that the number of German prisoners is definitely known to be considerably understated, these figures must be accepted with reserve. The losses of Austria-Hungary in killed, missing and prisoners are given as approximately two and three-quarter millions (2,772,000). An estimate of wounded would give us a total of over four and a half millions.

The extent of our casualties, like the duration of the war, was dependant on certain definite factors which can be stated shortly.

In the first place, the military situation compelled us, particularly during the first portion of the war, to make great efforts before we had developed our full strength in the field or properly equipped and trained our armies. These efforts were wasteful of men, but in the circumstances they could not be avoided. The only alternative was to do nothing and see our French Allies overwhelmed by the enemy's superior numbers.

During the second half of the war, and that part embracing the critical and costly period of the wearing-out battle, the losses previously suffered by our Allies laid upon the British Armies in France an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of the Somme battle in 1916 to the termination of hostilities the British Armies were subjected to a strain of the utmost severity which never ceased, and consequently had little or no opportunity for the rest and training they so greatly needed.

In addition to these particular considerations, certain general factors peculiar to modern war made for the inflation of losses. The great strength of modern field defences and the power and precision of modern weapons, the multiplication of machine guns, trench mortars, and artillery of all natures, the employment of gas and the rapid development of the aeroplane as a formidable agent of destruction against both men and material, all combined to increase the price to be paid for victory.

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If only for these reasons, no comparisons can usefully be made between the relative losses incurred in this war and any previous war. There is, however, the further consideration that the issues involved in this stupendous struggle were far greater than those concerned in any other war in recent history. Our

existence as Empire and civilisation itself, as it is understood by free Western nations, were at stake. Men fought as they have never fought before in masses.

Despite our own particular handicaps and the foregoing general considerations, it is satisfactory to note that, as the result of the courage and determination of our troops, and the high level of leadership generally maintained, our losses even in attack over the whole period of the battle compare favourably with those inflicted on our opponents.

The approximate total of our battle casualties in all arms, and including Overseas troops, from the commencement of the Somme battle in 1916 to the conclusion of the Armistice is 2,140,000. The calculation of German losses is obviously a matter of great difficulty.

It is estimated, however, that the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by British troops during the above period exceeds two and a half millions. It is of interest, moreover, in the light of the paragraph next following, that more than half the total casualties incurred by us in the fighting of 1918 were occasioned during the five months March–July, when our armies were on the defensive.

Why We Attacked Whenever Possible

Closely connected with the question of casualties is that of the relative values of attack and defence. It is a view often expressed that the attack is more expensive than defence. This is only a half statement of the truth.

Unquestionably, unsuccessful attack is generally more expensive than defence, particularly if the attack is pressed home with courage and resolution. On the other hand, attack so pressed home, if skilfully conducted, is rarely unsuccessful, whereas, in its later stages especially, unsuccessful defence is far more costly than attack.

Moreover, the object of all war is victory, and a purely defensive attitude can never bring about a successful decision, either in a battle or in a campaign. The idea that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory.

It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated had long been recognised as being fundamental, and is based on the universal teaching of military history in all ages. The course of the present war has proved it to be correct.

To pass for a moment from the general to the particular, and consider in the light of the present war the facts upon which this axiom is based.

A defensive role sooner or later brings about a distinct lowering of the moral[e] of the troops, who imagine that the enemy must be the better man, or at least more numerous, better equipped with and better served by artillery and other mechanical aids to victory. Once the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas, the battle is as good as lost.

An army fighting on enemy soil, especially if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful defence for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be gained elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolution and accept a compromise. The resistance of the German Armies was undoubtedly prolonged in this fashion, but in the end the persistence of our troops had its natural effect.

Further, a defensive policy involves the loss of the initiative, with all the consequent disadvantages to the defender. The enemy is able to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his attacks. Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from his opponent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening his front in some places can concentrate an overwhelming force elsewhere with which to attack.

The defender, on the other hand, becomes almost entirely ignorant of the dispositions and plans of his opponent, who is thus in a position to effect a surprise. This was clearly exemplified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy was attacking, he obtained fairly full information regarding our dispositions. Captured documents show that, as soon as he was thrown once more on the defensive and the initiative returned to the Allies, he was kept in comparative ignorance of our plans and dispositions. The consequence was that the Allies were able to effect many surprises, both strategic and tactical.

As a further effect of the loss of the initiative and ignorance of his opponent's intentions, the defender finds it difficult to avoid a certain dispersal of his forces. Though for a variety of reasons, including the fact that we had lately been on the offensive, we were by no means entirely ignorant of the enemy's intentions in the spring of 1918, the unavoidable uncertainty resulting from a temporary loss of the initiative did have the effect of preventing a complete concentration of our reserves behind the point of the enemy's attack.

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An additional reason, peculiar to the circumstances of the present war, which in itself compelled me to refuse to adopt a purely defensive attitude so long as any other was open to me, is found in the geographical position of our armies. For reasons stated by me in my Despatch of July 20, 1918, we could not afford to give much ground on any part of our front. The experience of the war has shown that if the defence is to be maintained successfully, even for a limited time, it must be flexible.

The End of the War

If the views set out by me in the preceding paragraphs are accepted, it will be recognised that the war did not follow any unprecedented course, and that its end was neither sudden nor should it have been unexpected. The rapid collapse of Germany's military powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fighting of the previous two years.

Source: Firstworldwar.com: The War to End All Wars,
<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/haiglastdespatch.htm>.

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World War I Documents (1919)

181. Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc), The Rightful Demands of the Annamite (Vietnamese) People, Declaration Submitted to the Paris Peace Conference, Early 1919

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183. U.S. Department of State, Announcement of Recognition of Poland, 29 January 1919

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185. Japan Demands Racial Equality: Extract from Minutes of Plenary Session of the Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 5, Paris, 28 April 1919

186. Thomas W. Lamont to Woodrow Wilson, and Enclosed Memorandum, 15 May 1919

187. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and Protocol (Incorporating the Covenant of the League of Nations, Part I, and the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Part XIII), Signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919

188. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the U.S. Senate, 10 July 1919

189. Reservations Drawn up by Republican Senators to the Treaty of Peace with Germany, November 1919

190. Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board, to President Woodrow Wilson, 24 December 1919

181. Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc), The Rightful Demands of the Annamite (Vietnamese) People, Declaration Submitted to the Paris Peace Conference, Early 1919

President Woodrow Wilson's championing of democracy and national self-determination inspired those seeking independence within, as well as outside, the Allied empires. Nguyen Ai Quoc, a young Vietnamese nationalist working as a waiter in Paris, and several like-minded friends organized themselves into what he termed the Group of Annamite Patriots. This body submitted a petition to the authorities at the Paris Peace Conference requesting autonomy for Vietnam, then a French colony. The various delegations at the conference and the French government ignored this request, but under the name Ho Chi Minh its author would later become the founder of the independent Vietnamese state.

Ever since the Allied victory, all the subject peoples have been trembling with hope at the prospect of the era of right and justice which must be opening for them, given the formal and solemn promises which the various Entente Powers have made before the entire world during the struggle of Civilization against Barbarism.

While waiting for the principle of Nationalism to pass from the land of the ideal into that of reality through the effective recognition of the sacred right of peoples to decide upon their own governments, the People of the Former Empire of Annam, known today as French Indochina, present to the Noble Governments of the Allies in general and to the French Government in particular the following humble rightful demands:

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1. A general amnesty for all indigenous political prisoners.
2. The reform of the Indochinese judicial system by the extension to the Indigenous people of the same judicial guarantees that Europeans enjoy, and the complete and final suppression of the special Tribunals which have been the instruments of the terrorization and oppression of the best and most honest groups among the Annamite people.
3. Freedom of the Press and of Speech.
4. Freedom of association and meeting.
5. Freedom of emigration and of foreign travel.
6. Freedom of education and the establishment in every province of schools of technical and professional education for the use of the indigenous people.

7. The replacement of a government by decree by a government by law.
8. A permanent delegation of indigenous representatives to be elected to the French parliament so that it may be kept apprised of indigenous wishes.

The Annamite people, in presenting the aforesaid rightful demands, have faith in the international spirit of justice of all the Powers, and trust themselves especially to the goodwill of the Noble French People in whose hands they now are and who, since France is a Republic, may be said to have taken the Annamite people under their own protection. In thus appealing to the protection of the French people, the Annamite people, far from humiliating themselves, are honoring themselves: for they know that the French people represent liberty and justice, and will never renounce the sublime ideal of universal Fraternity. Therefore, in listening to the voice of the oppressed, the French people will simply be carrying out its duty to both France and Humanity.

Source: Translated from Alain Ruscio, ed., *Ho Chi Minh: Textes, 1914–1969* (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1990), 22–23.

182. President Woodrow Wilson, Prinkipo Proposal to the Paris Peace Conference, 22 January 1919

Seeking to resolve the impasse with some of his Allies over Russia, President Woodrow Wilson suggested that all interested parties to the Russian civil war be invited to a special Russian conference on the island of Prinkipo. He asked all parties to state whether they would attend and to give some indication of those peace terms they would find acceptable.

The single object the representatives of the Associated Powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends, not their enemies, and are willing to help them in any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and the more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labor, trade, and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognize the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit, or make use of Russia in any way. They recognize the revolution without reservation, and will in no way and in no circumstances aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose to favor or assist any one of the organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The Associated Powers are now engaged in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe, and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognize and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this great matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, and ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes' Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the Associated Powers, provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the Associated Powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian (1595) people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all the parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representatives will be expected at the place appointed by the fifteenth of February, 1919.

The proposal will be sent to-night by wireless to the interested parties.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 297–298.

183. U.S. Department of State, Announcement of Recognition of Poland, 29 January 1919

As deliberations at the Paris Peace Conference got under way, the United States finally accorded Poland full recognition. Even though the state's borders had yet to be fixed, this act amounted to a pledge that a country that had not existed since the late eighteenth century would be reconstituted from territories that had been under Austrian, German, or Russian rule.

The Provisional Government is accorded complete recognition in a telegram which Secretary Lansing has sent to Ignace Paderewski by direction of President Wilson. The message extending this full recognition follows:

The President of the United States directs me to extend to you as Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Polish Government his sincere wishes for your success in the high office which you have assumed, and his earnest hope that the Government of which you are a part will bring prosperity to the Republic of Poland.

It is my privilege to extend to you at this time my personal greetings, and officially assure you that it will be a source of gratification to enter into official relations with you at the earliest possible opportunity. To render your country such aid as is possible at this time as it enters upon a new cycle of independent life, will be in full accord with that spirit of friendliness which has in the past animated the American people in their relations with your country.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 306.

184. “Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletarians of the World,” March 1919

In March 1919, while the Paris Peace Conference was in session, the Soviet government established a group of foreign socialist sympathizers in Moscow and announced the foundation of the Third International, an international communist grouping aimed at facilitating revolution throughout the world, overthrowing both capitalism and imperialism. Leon Trotsky wrote the organization’s first manifesto, and despite its supposedly transnational character, between the two world wars the organization remained firmly under Soviet control.

The moment of the last decisive battle came later than the apostles of social revolution had expected and hoped for. Yet it has come. We, the communists of today, representing the revolutionary proletariat of various countries in Europe, America and Asia, and assembled in “soviet-governed” Moscow, feel it incumbent upon us to continue and bring to completion the task outlined in the programme of seventy-two years ago. It is our object to summarize the revolutionary experience of the working classes, to purge the movement from the decomposing admixtures of opportunism and “social-patriotism,” to unite the efforts of all truly revolutionary parties of the world’s proletariat, thus facilitating and hastening the victory of the communistic revolution throughout the world. . . .

The state control over economic life, which elicited the strongest protection from capitalistic liberalism, has now become an accomplished fact. At present, there is no going back not only to free competition, but even to the oligarchy of trusts, syndicates and other economic octopuses. The issue lies between the imperialistic state and the state of the victorious proletariat, as to which of them shall henceforth be the steward of state-controlled production.

In other words: shall all labouring humanity become tributary slaves to the triumphant clique which, under the firm of “The League of Nations” and assisted by an “international” army and an “international” navy, will plunder and oppress some, throw tasty morsels to others and everywhere and on all occasions, forge fetters for the proletariat, with the sole aim of maintaining and perpetuating its own supremacy? Or shall the working classes of Europe and of other advanced countries take possession of the dilapidated, tottering structure of the world’s economy and ensure its regeneration on socialist principles?

Nothing short of a dictatorship of the proletariat can reduce the duration of the present crisis. That dictatorship should (1596) not look back upon the past, nor take into account any hereditary privileges or rights of ownership, being solely guided by the necessity to succour the starving masses; it should, for that purpose, mobilize all forces and use all available means, introduce compulsory labour and labour discipline, thus to cure, within a few years, the gaping wounds inflicted by the war, and lift mankind to a new, hitherto unprecedented height. . . .

While they wrong and oppress small and weak nations in consigning them to hunger and humiliation, the allied imperialists talk a great deal (just as much, in fact, as the imperialists of the central empires did some time ago) of the nations' right of self-determination, a right which has now been trodden under foot in Europe and in all other parts of the world.

The proletarian revolution alone is capable of ensuring to the small peoples a free and independent existence. It will liberate the productive forces of all countries from the clutches of national states; it will unite the nations in the closest possible economic cooperation based on a common economic scheme, it will enable even the smallest and least numerous of nations to direct the affairs of its own national culture without the interference of any other state, and without any prejudice to the united and centralized economic body of Europe and of the world. . . .

No emancipation of the colonies is possible unless the working classes of the mother-country are emancipated. The workmen and peasants not only in Annam, Algiers, Bengal, but also in Persia and Armenia, will achieve their independence only in the hour when the working men of England and France throw over [British Prime Minister David] Lloyd-George and [French President Georges] Clemenceau and take power into their own hands. In more advanced colonies, the struggle is not only being conducted under the banner of national emancipation, but it assumes, to a smaller or greater extent, the character of a purely social struggle. If capitalistic Europe forcibly involved the most backward parts of the world into the Maelstrom of capitalist interrelations, socialistic Europe is prepared to assist the emancipated colonies by its technics, by its organization, by its moral and intellectual influence, so as to facilitate their transition to properly-organized socialistic economy.

Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia! When the hour of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Europe strikes, the hour of your liberation shall have come.

The whole of the bourgeois world accuses the communists of having destroyed freedom and political democracy. This is not true. In acceding to power, the proletariat merely recognizes the utter impossibility of applying the methods of bourgeois democracy, and creates the conditions and forms of a new and a higher democracy, that of the working classes. The whole course of capitalistic development, particularly in its last imperialistic period, had been sapping at the roots of political democracy; not only did it divide the nations into two hostile classes, but it also doomed to economic vegetation and political impotency the numerous proletarian and petty-bourgeois strata, as well as the most hapless lower strata of the proletariat itself. . . .

In this realm of destruction, where not only the means of production and of transport, but the very institutions of political democracy are but a heap of bloodstained ruins, the proletariat is called upon to create its own apparatus for maintaining the cohesion of the working masses and ensuring the possibility of their revolutionary interference in the subsequent development of mankind. That apparatus is provided by workers' councils (Soviets). The old parties, the old professional organizations (trade unions), as represented by their governing bodies, have proved utterly incapable not only of solving, but even of understanding, the problems set before them by the new era. The proletariat has created a new type of political organization, an apparatus wide enough to embrace the working masses irrespective of profession, and of their degree of political maturity, an apparatus pliant enough and capable of constant renovation and expansion to such an extent as to draw within its sphere new strata of the population and gather within its fold those of the urban and rural workers as are most akin to the proletariat. This unique organization of labor, having for its object the self-government, the social struggle and the ultimate accession to power of the working classes, has been tried in a number of countries and is the most essential achievement and the most powerful weapon of the proletariat in modern times. . . .

Civil war is being foisted upon the working classes by their deadly foes. The working classes cannot refrain from returning blow for blow, unless they forego their own interests and sacrifice their future—which is the future of mankind.

While they never artificially foster civil war, the communist parties strive to shorten its duration whenever it inexorably breaks out; they endeavour to reduce the number of its victims and, first of all, to ensure the victory of the proletariat. Hence the necessity of the timely disarmament of the middle classes, the arming of the working classes, the creation of a communistic army

to defend the rule of the proletariat and the unhindered carrying out of the constructive programme of socialism. Thus the Red Army of Soviet Russia came into being. It is a bulwark for the conquests of the working classes against any assaults both from without and from within. The Soviet army is an integral part of the Soviet state. . . .

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Bourgeois order has been sufficiently castigated by socialist critics. The object of the international communist party is to overthrow that organization and to replace it by the socialist state. We call upon all the working men and women of all countries to rally round the communist banner already floating over many a victorious battlefield.

Proletarians of all countries! In the struggle against imperialistic barbarism, against monarchy, against the privileged classes, against the bourgeois state and bourgeois property, against national oppression and the tyranny of classes in any shape or form—unite!

Proletarians of all classes, round the banner of workmen's councils, round the banner of the revolutionary struggle for power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, round the banner of the Third International—unite!

Source: Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse*, 3rd ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 24–27. Used by Permission of University Press of New England.

185. Japan Demands Racial Equality: Extract from Minutes of Plenary Session of the Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 5, Paris, 28 April 1919

During World War I Japan had been a somewhat uneasy partner of the Allied coalition, and at the Paris Peace Conference it was recognized as a Great Power. The Japanese government had instructed its delegation to demand that a clause mandating racial equality among all League of Nations members be included in that organization's covenant. On 28 April 1919 Makino Nobuaki, a former Japanese minister of foreign affairs and a member of the Japanese delegation attending the conference, rather eloquently stated his country's case. Both the United States and the "white" Dominions of the British Empire strongly opposed the Japanese request, fearing that it would permit unrestricted Japanese immigration into their territory, and the clause was not included in the League of Nations Covenant. The episode nonetheless demonstrated the growing international impact of nationalist and anti-imperialist thinking.

Baron Makino (Japan) explains the grounds for the amendment proposed by the Japanese Delegation to the Commission with a view to secure recognition in the Covenant for the equality of all nations and of their subjects:

I had first on the 13th of February an opportunity of submitting to the Commission of the League of Nations our amendment to the Covenant, embodying the principle of equal and just treatment to be accorded to all aliens who happen to be the nationals of the States which are deemed advanced enough and fully qualified to become Nationals of the League, making no distinction on account of race or nationality.

On that occasion I called the attention of the Commission to the fact that the race question being a standing grievance which might become acute and dangerous at any moment, it was desirable that a provision dealing with the subject should be made in this Covenant. We did not lose sight of the many and varied difficulties standing in the way of a full realization of this principle. But they were not insurmountable, I said, if sufficient importance were attached to the consideration of serious misunderstandings between different peoples which might grow to an uncontrollable degree, and it was hoped that the matter would be taken in hand on such opportunity as the present, when what was deemed impossible before was about to be accomplished. Further, I made it unmistakably clear that, the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature, involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization

of the ideal equality was not proposed, but that the clause presented enunciated the principle only, and left the actual working of it in the hands of the different Governments concerned; that, in other words, the clause was intended as an invitation to the Governments and peoples concerned to examine the question more closely and seriously, and to devise in a fair and accommodating spirit means to meet it.

Attention was also called to the fact that the League being, as it were, a world organization of insurance against war; that in cases of aggression nations suitably placed must be prepared to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a fellow member; that this meant that a national of a State Member must be ready to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if needs be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties, I remarked, arising before him as a result of his country entering the League, each national would naturally feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertakes to defend even with his own life. The proposed amendment, however, was not adopted by the Commission.

On the next day, that is, on the 14th February, when the draft Covenant was reported at a plenary session of the Conference without the insertion of our amendment, I had the privilege of expressing our whole-hearted sympathy and readiness to contribute our utmost to any and every attempt to found and secure an enduring peace of the world. At the same time, I made a reservation that we would again submit our proposal for the consideration of the Conference at an early opportunity.

At the meeting of the Commission on the 11th of April, I proposed the insertion, in the Preamble of the Covenant, of a phrase endorsing the principles of the equality of nations and (1598) the just treatment of their nationals. But this proposal again failed to be adopted by unanimity, although it obtained, may I be permitted to say, a clear majority in its favor.

This modified form of amendment did not, as I had occasion already to state at the Commission, fully meet our wishes, but it was the outcome of an attempt to conciliate the view points of different nations.

Now that it has been decided by the Commission that our amendment, even in its modified form, would not be included in the draft Covenant, I feel constrained to revert to our original proposal and to avail myself of this occasion to declare clearly our position in regard to this matter.

The principle which we desire to see acted upon in the future relationship between nations was set forth in our original amendment as follows:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens nationals of States Members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It is our firm conviction that the enduring success of this great undertaking will depend much more on the hearty espousal and loyal adherence that the various peoples concerned would give to the noble ideals underlying the organization, than on the acts of the respective governments that may change from time to time. In an age of democracy, peoples themselves must feel that they are the trustees of this work, and to feel so, they must first have a sure basis of close harmony and mutual confidence.

If just and equal treatment is denied to certain nationals, it would have the significance of a certain reflection on their quality and status. Their faith in the justice and righteousness which are to be the guiding spirit of the future international intercourse between the Members of the League may be shaken, and such a frame of mind, I am afraid, would be most detrimental to that harmony and co-operation, upon which foundation alone can the League now contemplated be securely built. It was solely and purely from our desire to see the League established on a sound and firm basis of good-will, justice, and reason that we have been compelled to make our proposal. We will not, however, press for the adoption of our proposal at this moment.

In closing, I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long standing grievance, a demand that is based upon a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in future.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference*, 13 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 3:289–291.

186. Thomas W. Lamont to Woodrow Wilson, and Enclosed Memorandum, 15 May 1919

As the war ended, many businessmen believed that by far the most pressing task facing the Allies was the provision of funding for European economic recovery. Most of this finance would have to come from the United States, the only remaining large reservoir of international capital. Thomas W. Lamont, a partner with the leading New York investment bank J. P. Morgan and Company, served as one of President Woodrow Wilson's economic advisors at the Paris Peace Conference. Together with Norman H. Davis, assistant secretary of the Treasury, he devised a plan whereby Europe would receive both private and government funding. The president was friendly to the idea, as he was to several later such plans, aspects of which anticipated the Marshall Plan that would help to revive Europe after the Second World War, but they foundered in the subsequent U.S. political battle over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

Financial Conditions in Europe

Dear Mr. President:

Attached to this note is the brief report which, some little time ago, you suggested that we make to you. Mr. McCormick, Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hoover have gone over this and I believe them to be in substantial accord with Mr. Davis and myself in this presentation.

We have not attempted to lay out a complete financial plan; but rather to analyze the solution with sufficient clearness to make certain solutions fairly manifest. If, for instance, our British and French friends were to agree with this analysis of ours, we are inclined to believe that they might think it wise to make certain fresh proposals far more reasonable than the original Keynes' suggestion [an earlier scheme put forth by the noted economist John Maynard Keynes, a British economic advisor at Paris]. We should prefer to have the British and French make these new suggestions, as the matter is of even greater concern to them than to America.

You may not deem it wise to hand a copy of this report to Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau, for the reason that it is drawn (1599) up for your own private consideration and embodies certain suggestions with reference to possible Congressional action. We can, however, readily revise the text on these points.

If you were to find time before tomorrow to glance through this draft report, we should then be in a position, if you can see us tomorrow, to go over a few principal points in it upon which we desire to secure your personal views. . . .

Enclosure: Memorandum re Financial and Economic Conditions in Europe

Aside from food requirements for Europe up to the next crop, which have been substantially provided for:

There are certain situations which require immediate consideration, to-wit:

1. Credits for the newly constituted, or lesser, nations, such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Greater Serbia, Roumania and the Baltic States.
2. Credits for raw materials for France, Belgium and Italy.
3. Credits to France and possibly Belgium for reconstruction.
4. Working capital for the enemy states.

AS TO:

(1) Credits for Poland, Czecho-slovakia, Greater Serbia, Roumania and the Baltic States are essential for:

1. The purchase of raw materials, railway stocks and agricultural implements required for the resumption of their industrial and agricultural productivity;
2. The establishment of a reserve sufficient to enable these countries to establish a stable circulating medium. At present they have no gold reserve and it will be necessary either to obtain gold or to make special credit arrangements to take the place of gold as a reserve against notes to be issued.

Any credits established for (a) and (b) would, of course, be under special arrangements, fixing conditions as to the note issues and supervision regarding this and the purchases. It is estimated that \$500,000,000 would be sufficient to meet the above requirements of those newly constituted or lesser nations.

AS TO:

(2) Raw materials for France, Belgium and Italy. \$500,000,000 to \$600,000,000 would be sufficient to purchase the raw materials necessary to restock the requirements of the factories in these countries. It is our opinion, however, that credits for this purpose can and should be obtained by the

nationals of these respective countries through private channels in the United States and elsewhere, and that it is unnecessary and inadvisable to obtain such funds through governmental loans.

AS TO:

(3) Credits for reconstruction of France and possibly Belgium. There is considerable exaggeration as to the purchases to be made outside of France and Belgium for this purpose. The greater portion of reconstruction will represent labor and materials to be supplied in France and Belgium. At any rate, it will take considerable time to get this work going, and France should have sufficient dollars available to cover all purchases to be made in the United States for reconstruction purposes during the next eight months.

AS TO:

(4) Working capital for Germany and enemy states. Germany requires working capital; without it she will be unable to restart her industrial life, and thus to make any substantial progress in the way of reparation. But the provisions of the reparation clauses of the proposed Treaty demand that Germany shall deliver over at once all her working capital, being practically the total of her liquid assets. The only logical manner of meeting Germany's requirements for working capital is obviously to leave Germany with sufficient of her present working capital to enable her to restore her industries. It is for the Governments which expect to receive reparation to consider this situation with respect to the enemy's working capital. America has no further suggestion to make on this point.

General Remarks

Credits to Europe, especially for raw materials, should, so far as possible, be extended through the normal channels of private enterprise and commercial banking credits. For the moment, however, while the situation is still unsettled and while, therefore, private credits may not be available in sufficient amount, some further government aid on a limited scale may be necessary. So far as the United States Government is concerned, the War Finance Corporation, through recent legislation, may be able to give considerable immediate assistance.

Moreover, the extension of both private and public credits should, for the present, be conditioned upon the guaranty of the several governments in each instance where credit is granted. The situation in Europe financially is closely interwoven and should be considered as a whole, even though the action taken

may be independent. Both governmental and private commercial and banking interests in Europe should understand the necessity for cooperation among themselves.

In the same way, so far as America is concerned, if it is able in the long run, to extend sufficient credits through private (1600) channels, then it is essential that American investment resources should be mobilized so as to obtain unity of action. Further, the European countries, in order to be justified in looking for outside credit, must at once address themselves to arrange their international situation as to currency, taxes, &c., in a way to command the confidence of the investing public. In the granting of credits, the active cooperation of the United States, England, France, and neutral countries as well should be enlisted. In this connection, the countries furnishing raw materials should be prepared to extend the credits required to cover the sales of such materials.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 59, May 10–May 31, 1919* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 175–178.

187. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and Protocol (Incorporating the Covenant of the League of Nations, Part I, and the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Part XIII), Signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919

At the end of June 1919 Allied and German delegates finally signed the Treaty of Versailles, the first of the peace treaties between the Allies and the various Central Powers. Each peace treaty also incorporated the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Constitution of the new International Labour Organisation. Even though the defeated Central Powers were not initially permitted to join the League of Nations, they had to accept its authority. The Treaty of Versailles detailed the territorial penalties, including the loss both of territory previously incorporated in the state itself and of colonies, together with overseas rights and privileges in such countries as China, consequent upon Germany's loss of the war. The treaty also limited German military, naval, and aviation forces and made Germany liable to pay substantial reparations to the Allied Powers. With appropriate modifications, the Treaty of Versailles served as a model for the subsequent Allied treaties with Austria (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye), Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine), Hungary (Treaty of Trianon), and Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres) negotiated during 1919–1920. Revision of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles immediately became a major objective of every German political party.

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN, these Powers being described in the present Treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, CUBA, ECUADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, THE HEDJAZ, HONDURAS, LIBERIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PERU, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROUMANIA, THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE, SIAM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND URUGUAY, these Powers constituting with the Principal Powers mentioned above the Allied and Associated Powers, of the one part;

And GERMANY of the other part;

BEARING IN MIND that on the request of the Imperial German Government an armistice was granted on 11 November 1918 to Germany by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded with her, and

THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS being equally desirous that the war in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on 28 July 1914 against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on 1 August 1914, and against France on 3 August 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm and durable peace,

. . . [H]ave agreed as follows:

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the state of war will terminate. From that moment and subject to the provisions of this Treaty official relations with Germany, and (1601) with any of the German States, will be resumed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Part I

The Covenant of the League of Nations

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

IN ORDER TO PROMOTE international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

AGREE to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1

The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article 2

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3

The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the Members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives.

Article 4

The Council shall consist of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative.

Article 5

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting (1602) of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. . . .

Article 8

The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council

shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. . . .

Article 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 12

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13

The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which (1603) complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article 14

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice

of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article 16

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above (1604) measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

Article 17

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. . . .

Article 19

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article 22

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training (1605) of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of

territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

1. will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;
2. undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;
3. will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
4. will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

5. will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914–1918 shall be borne in mind;
6. will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24

There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. . . .

Article 25

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article 26

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

Annex [to Part I]

I. Original Members of the League of Nations

Signatories of the Treaty of Peace

United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, Uruguay.

States Invited to Accede to the Covenant

Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

II. First Secretary General of the League of Nations

The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond KCMG, CB.

Part II

Boundaries of Germany

Article 27

The boundaries of Germany will be determined as follows:

(1606)

1. With Belgium:

From the point common to the three frontiers of Belgium, Holland and Germany and in a southerly direction:

the north-eastern boundary of the former territory of *neutral Moresnet* then the eastern boundary of the *Kreis* of Eupen, then the frontier between Belgium and the *Kreis* of Montjoie, then the north-eastern and eastern boundary of the *Kreis* of Malmédy to its junction with the frontier of Luxemburg.

2. With Luxemburg:

The frontier of 3 August 1914 to its junction with the frontier of France of 18 July 1870.

3. With France:

The frontier of 18 July 1870 from Luxemburg to Switzerland with the reservations made in Article 48 of Section IV (Saar Basin) of Part III.

4. With Switzerland:

The present frontier.

5. With Austria:

The frontier of 3 August 1914 from Switzerland to Czechoslovakia as hereinafter defined.

6. With Czechoslovakia:

The frontier of 3 August 1914 between Germany and Austria from its junction with the old administrative boundary separating Bohemia and the province of Upper Austria to the point north of the salient of the old province of Austrian Silesia situated at about 8 kilometres east of Neustadt.

7. With Poland: [details omitted] . . .

8. With Denmark:

The frontier as it will be fixed in accordance with Articles 109 to 111 of Part III, Section XII (Schleswig).

Article 28

The boundaries of East Prussia, with the reservations made in Section IX (East Prussia) of Part III, will be determined as follows: [details omitted] . . .

Part III Political Clauses for Europe

Section III

Left Bank of the Rhine

Article 42

Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44

In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

Section IV

Saar Basin

Article 45

As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal mines situated in the Saar Basin as defined in Article 48.

Article 46

In order to assure the rights and welfare of the population and to guarantee to France complete freedom in working the mines, Germany agrees to the provisions of Chapters I and II of the Annex hereto.

Article 47

In order to make in due time permanent provision for the government of the Saar Basin in accordance with the wishes of the population, France and Germany agree to the provisions of Chapter III of the Annex hereto. . . .

Article 49

Germany renounces in favour of the League of Nations, in the capacity of trustee, the government of the territory defined above.

At the end of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the inhabitants of the said territory shall be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed.

Article 50

The stipulations under which the cession of the mines in the Saar Basin shall be carried out, together with the measures (1607) intended to guarantee the rights and the well-being of the inhabitants and the government of the territory, as well as the conditions in accordance with which the plebiscite hereinbefore provided for is to be made, are laid down in the Annex hereto. This Annex shall be considered as an integral part of the present Treaty, and Germany declares her adherence to it.

Annex [to Part III, Section IV]

Chapter II

Government of the Territory of the Saar Basin

16. The Government of the territory of the Saar Basin shall be entrusted to a Commission representing the League of Nations. The Commission shall sit in the territory of the Saar Basin. . . .

Chapter III

Plebiscite

34. At the termination of a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the population of the territory of the Saar Basin will be called upon to indicate their desires in the following manner:

A vote will take place by communes or districts, on the three following alternatives:

1. maintenance of the regime established by the present Treaty and by this Annex;
2. union with France;
3. union with Germany.

All persons without distinction of sex, more than twenty years old at the date of the voting, resident in the territory at the date of the signature of the present Treaty, will have the right to vote.

The other conditions, methods and the date of the voting shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations in such a way as to secure the freedom, secrecy and trustworthiness of the voting. . . .

Section V

Alsace-Lorraine

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, recognizing the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux,

AGREE upon the following Articles:

Article 51

The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on 26 February 1871 and the Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871 are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the Armistice of 11 November 1918.

The provisions of the Treaties establishing the delimitation of the frontiers before 1871 shall be restored. . . .

Article 55

The territories referred to in Article 51 shall return to France, free and quit of all public debts, under the conditions laid down in Article 255 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the present Treaty.

Article 56

In conformity with the provisions of Article 256 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the present Treaty, France shall enter into possession of all property and estate within the territories referred to in Article 51, which belong to the German Empire or German States, without any payment or credit on this account to any of the States ceding the territories. . . .

Section VI

Austria

Article 80

Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Section VII

Czecho-Slovak State

Article 81

Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence of the Czecho-Slovak State which will include the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this State as determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the other interested States.

Article 82

The old frontier as it existed on 3 August 1914 between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire will constitute the frontier between Germany and the Czecho-Slovak State.

Article 83

Germany renounces in favour of the Czecho-Slovak State all rights and title over the portion of Silesian territory defined as follows: . . . [details omitted]

(1608)

Article 86

The Czecho-Slovak State accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. . . .

Section VIII

Poland

Article 87

Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence of Poland, and renounces in her favour all rights and title over the territory bounded by the Baltic Sea, the eastern frontier of Germany as laid down in Article 27 of Part II (Boundaries of Germany) of the present Treaty up to a point situated about 2 kilometres to the east of Lorzendorf, then a line to the acute angle which the northern boundary of Upper Silesia makes about 3 kilometres north-west of Simmenau, then the boundary of Upper Silesia to its meeting point with the old frontier between Germany and Russia, then this frontier to the point where it crosses the course of the Niemen, and then the northern frontier of East Prussia as laid down in Article 28 of Part II aforesaid.

The provisions of this Article do not, however, apply to the territories of East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig, as defined in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of Germany) and in Article 100 of Section XI (Danzig) of this Part.

The boundaries of Poland not laid down in the present Treaty will be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. . . .

Article 88

In the portion of Upper Silesia included within the boundaries described below, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote whether they wish to be attached to Germany or to Poland: . . .

Germany hereby renounces in favour of Poland all rights and title over the portion of Upper Silesia lying beyond the frontier line fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as the result of the plebiscite. . . .

Section IX

East Prussia

Article 94

In the area between the southern frontier of East Prussia, as described in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of Germany) of the present Treaty, and the line described below, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote the State to which they wish to belong:

the western and northern boundary of *Regierungsbezirk* Allenstein to its junction with the boundary between the *Kreise* of Oletsko and Angerburg; thence, the northern boundary of the *Kreis* of Oletsko to its junction with the old frontier of East Prussia. . . .

Article 96

In the area comprising the *Kreise* of Stuhm and Rosenberg and the portion of the *Kreis* of Marienburg which is situated east of the Nogat and that of Marienwerder east of the Vistula, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote, to be taken in each commune (*Gemeinde*), whether they desire the various communes situated in this territory to belong to Poland or to East Prussia. . . .

Section X

Memel

Article 99

Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories included between the Baltic, the north-eastern frontier of East Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of Germany) of the present Treaty and the former frontier between Germany and Russia.

Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.

Section XI

Free City of Danzig

Article 100

Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territory comprised within the following limits: . . .
[details omitted]

Article 102

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 100, as a Free City. It will be placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Article 103

A constitution for the Free City of Danzig shall be drawn up by the duly appointed representatives of the Free City in agreement with a High Commissioner to be appointed by the (1609) League of Nations. This constitution shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. . . .

Article 104

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to negotiate a Treaty between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig, which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of the said Free City, with the following objects:

- (1) To effect the inclusion of the Free City of Danzig within the Polish Customs frontiers, and to establish a free area in the port;
- (2) To ensure to Poland without any restriction the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves and other works within the territory of the Free City necessary for Polish imports and exports;
- (3) To ensure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway system within the Free City, except such street and other railways as serve primarily the needs of the Free City, and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and the port of Danzig;
- (4) To ensure to Poland the right to develop and improve the waterways, docks, basins, wharves, railways and other works and means of communication mentioned in this Article, as well as to lease or purchase through appropriate processes such land and other property as may be necessary for these purposes;

(5) To provide against any discrimination within the Free City of Danzig to the detriment of citizens of Poland and other persons of Polish origin or speech;

(6) To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad. . . . [Provisions on Schleswig and Heligoland omitted.]

Section XIV

Russia and Russian States

Article 116

Germany acknowledges and agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on 1 August 1914.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 259 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) and Article 292 of Part X (Economic Clauses) Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and of all other treaties, conventions and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia.

The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.

Article 117

Germany undertakes to recognize the full force of all treaties or agreements which may be entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with States now existing or coming into existence in future in the whole or part of the former Empire of Russia as it existed on 1 August 1914, and to recognize the frontiers of any such States as determined therein.

Part IV

German Rights and Interests Outside Germany

Article 118

In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany hereby undertakes to recognize and to conform to the measures which may be taken now or in the future by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in agreement where necessary with third Powers, in order to carry the above stipulation into effect.

In particular Germany declares her acceptance of the following Articles relating to certain special subjects.

Section I

German Colonies

Article 119

Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.

Section II

China

Article 128

Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on 7 September 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise (1610) renounces in favour of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to 14 March 1917. . . .

Article 131

Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900–1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.

Article 132

Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held.

China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.

Section V

Morocco

Article 141

Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges conferred on her by the General Act of Algeciras of 7 April 1906, and by the Franco-German Agreements of 9 February 1909 and 4 November 1911. All treaties, agreements, arrangements and contracts concluded by her with the Sherifian Empire are regarded as abrogated as from 3 August 1914.

In no case can Germany take advantage of these instruments and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and the other Powers.

Article 142

Germany having recognized the French Protectorate in Morocco, hereby accepts all the consequences of its establishment, and she renounces the regime of the capitulations therein.

This renunciation shall take effect as from 3 August 1914. . . .

Section VI

Egypt

Article 147

Germany declares that she recognizes the Protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on 18 December 1914, and that she renounces the regime of the Capitulations in Egypt.

This renunciation shall take effect as from 4 August 1914.

Article 148

All treaties, agreements, arrangements and contracts concluded by Germany with Egypt are regarded as abrogated as from 4 August 1914.

In no case can Germany avail herself of these instruments and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Egypt which may take place between Great Britain and the other Powers. . . .

Section VII

Turkey and Bulgaria

Article 155

Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present Treaty.

Section VIII

Shantung

Article 156

Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables—which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her

with China on 6 March 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. . . .

Part V

Military, Naval and Air Clauses

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

Section I Military Clauses

Chapter I Effectives and Cadres of the German Army

Article 159

The German military forces shall be demobilized and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.

Article 160

1. By a date which must not be later than 31 March 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

(1611)

After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.

The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed four thousand.

2. Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs shall be organized in accordance with Table No. 1 annexed to this Section.

The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in the aforesaid Table constitute maxima which must not be exceeded.

The following units may each have their own depot:

An Infantry regiment;

A Cavalry regiment;

A regiment of Field Artillery;

A battalion of Pioneers.

3. The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organizations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The Great German General Staff and all similar organizations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.

The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the Administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength of four thousand laid down in the third sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 161

Army administrative services consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives prescribed by the present Treaty will have such personnel reduced in each class to one-tenth of that laid down in the Budget of 1913.

Article 162

The number of employees or officials of the German States such as customs officers, forest guards and coastguards, shall not exceed that of the employees or officials functioning in these capacities in 1913.

The number of gendarmes and employees or officials of the local or municipal police may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed.

These employees and officials may not be assembled for military training.

Article 163

The reduction of the strength of the German military forces as provided for in Article 160 may be effected gradually in the following manner:

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the total number of effectives must be reduced to 200,000 and the number of units must not exceed twice the number of those laid down in Article 160.

At the expiration of this period, and at the end of each subsequent period of three months, a Conference of military experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will fix the reductions to be made in the ensuing three months, so that by 31 March 1920 at the latest the total number of German effectives does not exceed the maximum number of 100,000 men laid down in Article 160. In these successive reductions the same ratio between the number of officers and of men, and between the various kinds of units, shall be maintained as is laid down in that Article.

Chapter II

Armament, Munitions and Material

Article 164

Up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations the German Army must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table No. II annexed to this Section. . . .

Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the League of Nations the armaments fixed in the said Table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore she hereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.

Article 165

The maximum number of guns, machine guns, trench-mortars, rifles and the amount of ammunition and equipment which Germany is allowed to maintain during the period between the coming into force of the present Treaty and the date of 31 March 1920 referred to in Article 160, shall bear the (1612) (1613) same proportion to the amount authorized in Table No. III [omitted] annexed to this Section as the strength of the German Army as reduced from time to time in accordance with Article 163 bears to the strength permitted under Article 160.

Article 166

At the date of 31 March 1920, the stock of munitions which the German Army may have at its disposal shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table No. III annexed to this Section.

Within the same period the German Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The German Government is forbidden to establish any other stocks, depots or reserves of munitions. . . .

Article 168

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material, shall only be carried out in factories or works the location of which shall be communicated to and approved by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which they retain the right to restrict. . . .

Article 169

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty German arms, munitions and war material, including (1614) anti-aircraft material, existing in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed, must be surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless. This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognized as necessary for equipping the authorized strength of the German Army.

The surrender in question will be effected at such points in German territory as may be selected by the said Governments.

Within the same period arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material, of origin other than German, in whatever state they may be, will be delivered to the said Governments, who will decide as to their disposal.

Arms and munitions which on account of the successive reductions in the strength of the German army become in excess of the amounts authorized by Tables II and III annexed to this Section must be handed over in the manner laid down above within such periods as may be decided by the Conferences referred to in Article 163.

Article 170

Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited.

The same applies to the manufacture for, and export to, foreign countries of arms, munitions and war material of every kind.

Article 171

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.

The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited. . . .

Chapter III

Recruiting and Military Training

Article 173

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany.

The German Army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

Article 174

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be twelve consecutive years.

The number of men discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of enlistment must not exceed in any year five percent of the total effectives fixed by the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 160 of the present Treaty.

Article 175

The officers who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of forty-five years at least.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for twenty-five consecutive years at least.

Officers who have previously belonged to any formations whatever of the Army, and who are not retained in the units allowed to be maintained, must not take part in any military exercise whether theoretical or practical, and will not be under any military obligations whatever. . . .

Article 176

On the expiration of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty there must only exist in Germany the number of military schools which is absolutely indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed. These schools will be exclusively intended for the recruitment of officers of each arm, in the proportion of one school per arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by the second and third subparagraphs of paragraph 1 of Article 160 of the present Treaty. . . .

Article 177

Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every

description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.

In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms.

These societies, associations, educational establishments and universities must have no connection with the Ministries of War or any other military authority. . . .

(1615)

Chapter IV

Fortifications

Article 180

All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled. . . .

Section II

Naval Clauses

Article 181

After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the German naval forces in commission must not exceed:

6 battleships of the *Deutschland* or *Lothringen* type,

6 light cruisers,

12 destroyers,

12 torpedo boats,

or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 190.

No submarines are to be included. . . .

Article 183

After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the total personnel of the German Navy, including the manning of the fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, must not exceed fifteen thousand, including officers and men of all grades and corps.

The total strength of officers and warrant officers must not exceed fifteen hundred.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel in excess of the above strength shall be demobilized.

No naval or military corps or reserve force in connection with the Navy may be organized in Germany without being included in the above strength.

Article 185

Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the German surface warships enumerated below [omitted] will be surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in such Allied ports as the said Powers may direct. . . .

Article 190

Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the units in commission provided for in Article 181 of the present Treaty.

The warships intended for replacement purposes as above shall not exceed the following displacement:

Armoured ships 10,000 tons

Light cruisers 6,000 tons

Destroyers 800 tons

Torpedo boats 200 tons

Except where a ship has been lost, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of a period of twenty years in the case of battleships and cruisers, and fifteen years in the case of destroyers and torpedo boats, counting from the launching of the ship.

Article 191

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany. . . .

Section III

Air Clauses

Article 198

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. . . .

Article 199

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilized. . . .

Part VIII

Reparation

Section I

General Provisions

Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Article 232

The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation (1616) for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto. . . .

Article 233

The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto. . . .

The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from 1 May 1921. If, however, within the period mentioned, Germany fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Part of the present Treaty, shall determine.

. . . [Articles 234–240 omitted.]

Article 241

Germany undertakes to pass, issue and maintain in force any legislation, orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these provisions. . . . [Provisions relating to International Labour Organisation omitted.]

Part XIV
Guarantees

Section I
Western Europe

Article 428

As a guarantee for the execution of the present Treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article 429

If the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany, the occupation referred to in Article 428 will be successively restricted [at five-year intervals]. . . .

Article 430

In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.

Article 431

If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the present Treaty, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

Article 432

All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements, which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.

Source: Lt.-Col. Lawrence Martin, ed., *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923*, 2 vols. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), 1:3–263.

188. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the U.S. Senate, 10 July 1919

On returning to the United States, President Woodrow Wilson formally presented the Treaty of Versailles before the Senate for ratification. He argued forcefully that the United States could not avoid future involvement in international affairs and should not turn back from the path now open to it. In order for the United States to ratify the treaty, it was necessary that the Senate vote in favor of ratification by a two-thirds majority. It was therefore essential that Wilson persuade the Senate to support ratification. In this speech Wilson also gave full rein to his belief that the United States had entered the war in pursuit of high ideals that the European Allies did not share.

Gentlemen of the Senate: The treaty of peace with Germany was signed at Versailles on the twenty-eighth of June. I avail myself of the earliest opportunity to lay the treaty before you for ratification and to inform you with regard to the work of the Conference by which that treaty was formulated.

The treaty constitutes nothing less than a world settlement. It would not be possible for me either to summarize or to construe its manifold provisions in an address which must of necessity be something less than a treatise. My services and all the information I possess will be at your disposal and at the disposal of your Committee on Foreign Relations at any time, either informally or in session, as you may prefer, and I hope that you will not hesitate to make use of them. I shall (1617) at this time, prior to your own study of the document, attempt only a general characterization of its scope and purpose.

. . . I shall attempt something . . . clearly suggested by my duty to report to the Congress the part it seemed necessary for my colleagues and me to play as the representatives of the Government of the United States.

That part was dictated by the role America has played in the war, and by the expectations that had been created in the minds of the peoples with whom we had associated ourselves in that great struggle.

The United States entered the war upon a different footing from every other nation except our associates on this side of the sea. We entered it, not because our material interests were directly threatened or because any special treaty obligations to which we were parties had been violated, but only because we saw the supremacy, and even the validity, of right everywhere imperiled by the intolerable aggression of a power which respected neither right nor obligation and whose very system of government flouted the rights of the citizens as

against the autocratic authority of his governors. And in the settlements of the peace we have sought no special reparation for ourselves, but only the restoration of right and the assurance of liberty everywhere that the effects of the settlement were to be felt. We entered the war as the disinterested champions of right and we interested ourselves in the terms of the peace in no other capacity.

The hopes of the nations allied against the central powers were at a very low ebb when our soldiers began to pour across the sea. There was everywhere amongst them, except in their stoutest spirits, a somber foreboding of disaster. The war ended in November, eight months ago, but you have only to recall what was feared in midsummer last, four short months before the armistice, to realize what it was that our timely aid accomplished alike for their morale and their physical safety. That first, never-to-be-forgotten action at Château-Thierry had already taken place. Our redoubtable soldiers and marines had already closed the gap the enemy had succeeded in opening for their advance upon Paris,—had already turned the tide of battle back towards the frontiers of France and begun the rout that was to save Europe and the world. Thereafter the Germans were to be always forced back, back, were never to thrust successfully forward again. And yet there was no confident hope. Anxious men and women, leading spirits of France, attended the celebration of the fourth of July last year in Paris out of generous courtesy,—with no heart for festivity, little zest for hope. But they came away with something new at their hearts: they have themselves told us so. The mere sight of our men,—of their vigour, of the confidence that showed itself in every movement of their stalwart figures and every turn of their swinging march, in their steady comprehending eyes and easy discipline, in the indomitable air that added spirit to everything they did,—made everyone who saw them that memorable day realize that something had happened that was much more than a mere incident in the fighting, something very different from the mere arrival of fresh troops. A great moral force had flung itself into the struggle. The fine physical force of those spirited men spoke of something more than bodily vigour. They carried the great ideals of a free people at their hearts and with that vision they were unconquerable. Their very presence brought reassurance; their fighting made victory certain.

They were recognized as crusaders, and as their thousands swelled to millions their strength was seen to mean salvation. And they were fit men to carry such a hope and make good the assurance it forecast. Finer men never went into battle; and their officers were worthy of them. This is not the occasion upon which to utter a eulogy of the armies America sent to France, but perhaps, since I am speaking of their mission, I may speak also of the pride I shared with

every American who saw or dealt with them there. They were the sort of men American would wish to be represented by, the sort of men every American would wish to claim as fellow countrymen and comrades in a great cause. They were terrible in battle, and gentle and helpful out of it, remembering the mothers and the sisters, the wives and the little children at home. They were free men under arms, not forgetting their ideals of duty in the midst of tasks of violence. I am proud to have had the privilege of being associated with them and of calling myself their leader.

But I speak now of what they meant to the men by whose sides they fought and to the people with whom they mingled with such utter simplicity; as friends who asked only to be of service. They were for all the visible embodiment of America. What they did made America and all that she stood for a living reality in the thoughts not only of the people of France but also of tens of millions of men and women throughout all the toiling nations of a world standing everywhere in peril of its freedom and of the loss of everything it held dear; in deadly fear that its bonds were never to be loosed, its hopes forever to be mocked and disappointed.

And the compulsion of what they stood for was upon us who represented America at the peace table. It was our duty to see to it that every decision we took part in contributed, so far as we were able to influence it, to quiet the fears and realize the hopes of the peoples who had been living in that shadow, the (1618) nations that had come by our assistance to their freedom. It was our duty to do everything that it was within our power to do to make the triumph of freedom and of right a lasting triumph in the assurance of which men might everywhere live without fear.

Old entanglements of every kind stood in the way,—promises which Governments had made to one another in the days when might and right were confused and the power of the victor was without restraint. Engagements which contemplated any dispositions of territory, any extensions of sovereignty that might seem to be to the interest of those who had the power to insist upon them, had been entered into without thought of what the peoples concerned might wish or profit by; and these could not always be honourably brushed aside. It was not easy to graft the new order of ideas on the old, and some of the fruits of the grafting may, I fear, for a time be bitter. But, with very few exceptions, the men who sat with us at the peace table desired as sincerely as we did to get away from the bad influences, the illegitimate purposes, the demoralizing ambitions, the international counsels and expedients out of which the sinister designs of Germany had sprung as a natural growth.

It had been our privilege to formulate the principles which were accepted as the basis of peace, but they had been accepted, not because we had come in to hasten and assure the victory and insisted upon them, but because they were readily acceded to as the principles to which honourable and enlightened minds everywhere had been bred. . . .

The atmosphere in which the Conference worked seemed created, not by the ambitions of strong governments, but by the hopes and aspirations of small nations and of peoples hitherto under bondage to the power that victory had shattered and destroyed. Two great empires had been forced into political bankruptcy, and we were the receivers. Our task was not only to make peace with the central empires and remedy the wrongs their armies had done. The central empires had lived in open violation of many of the very rights for which the war had been fought, dominating alien peoples over whom they had no natural right to rule, enforcing, not obedience, but veritable bondage, exploiting those who were weak for the benefit of those who were masters and overlords only by force of arms. There could be no peace until the whole order of central Europe was set right.

That meant that new nations were to be created,—Poland, Czech-Slovakia, Hungary itself. . . . It was the imperative task of those who would make peace and make it intelligently to establish a new order which would rest upon the free choice of peoples rather than upon the arbitrary authority of Hapsburgs or Hohenzollerns.

More than that, great populations bound by sympathy and actual kin to Rumania were also linked against their will to the conglomerate Austro-Hungarian monarchy or to other alien sovereignties, and it was part of the task of peace to make a new Rumania as well as a new Slavic state clustering about Serbia.

And no natural frontiers could be found to these new fields of adjustment and redemption. It was necessary to look constantly forward to other related tasks. The German colonies were to be disposed of. They had not been governed; they had been exploited merely, without thought of the interest or even the ordinary human rights of their inhabitants.

The Turkish Empire, moreover, had fallen apart, as the Austro-Hungarian had. It had never had any real unity. It had been held together only by pitiless, inhuman force. Its people cried aloud for release, for succor from unspeakable distress, for all that the new day of hope seemed at last to bring within its dawn.

Peoples hitherto in utter darkness were to be led out into the same light and given at last a helping hand. Undeveloped peoples and peoples ready for recognition but not yet ready to assume the full responsibilities of statehood were to be given adequate guarantees of friendly protection, guidance, and assistance.

And out of the execution of these great enterprises of liberty sprang opportunities to attempt what statesmen had never found the way to do before; an opportunity to throw safeguards about the rights of racial, national, and religious minorities by solemn international covenant; an opportunity to limit and regulate military establishments where they were most likely to be mischievous; an opportunity to effect a complete and systematic internationalization of waterways and railways which were necessary to the free economic life of more than one nation and to clear away of the normal channels of commerce of unfair obstructions of law or privilege; and the very welcome opportunity to secure for labour the concerted protection of definite international pledges of principle and practice.

These were not tasks which the Conference looked about it to find and went out of its way to perform. They were thrust upon it by circumstances which could not be overlooked. The war had created them. In all quarters of the world old established relationships had been disturbed or broken and affairs were at loose ends, needing to be mended or united again, but could not be made what they were before. They had to be set right by applying some uniform principle of justice or enlightened expediency. And they could not be adjusted by merely prescribing in a treaty what should be done. New states were first to be set up which could not hope to live through their first period of weakness without assured support by the great (1619) nations that had consented to their creation and won for them their independence. Ill governed colonies could not be put in the hands of governments which were to act as trustees for their people and not as their masters if there was to be no common authority among the nations to which they were to be responsible in the execution of their trust. Future international conventions with regard to the control of waterways, with regard to illicit traffic of many kinds, in arms or in deadly drugs, or with regard to the adjustment of many varying international administrative arrangements could not be assured if the treaty were to provide no permanent common international agency, if its execution in such matters was to be left to the slow and uncertain processes of cooperation by ordinary methods of negotiation. If the Peace Conference itself was to be the end of cooperative authority and common counsel among the governments to which the world was looking to enforce justice and give pledges of an enduring settlement, regions like the Saar basin

could not be put under a temporary administrative regime which did not involve a transfer of political sovereignty and which contemplated a final determination of its political connections by popular vote to be taken at a distant date; no free city like Danzig could be created which was, under elaborate international guarantees, to accept exceptional obligations with regard to the use of its port and exceptional relations with a State of which it was not to form a part; properly safeguarded plebiscites could not be provided for where populations were at some future date to make choice what sovereignty they were to live under; no certain and uniform method of arbitration could be secured for the settlement of anticipated difficulties of final decision with regard to many matters dealt with in the treaty itself; the long-continued supervision of the task of reparation which Germany was to undertake to complete within the next generation might entirely break down; the reconsideration and revision of administrative arrangements and restrictions which the treaty prescribed but which it was recognized might not prove of lasting advantage or entirely fair if too long enforced would prove impracticable. The promises governments were making to one another about the way in which labour was to be dealt with, by law not only but in fact as well, would remain a mere humane thesis if there was to be no common tribunal of opinion and judgment to which liberal statesmen could resort for the influences which alone might secure their redemption. A league of free nations had become a practical necessity. Examine the treaty of peace and you will find that everywhere throughout its manifold provisions its framers have felt obliged to turn to the League of Nations as an indispensable instrumentality for the maintenance of the new order it has been their purpose to set up in the world,—the world of civilized men.

That there should be a league of nations to steady the counsels and maintain the peaceful understanding of the world, to make, not treaties alone, but the accepted principles of international law as well, the actual rule of conduct among the governments of the world, had been one of the agreements accepted from the first as the basis of peace with the central powers. The statesmen of all the belligerent countries were agreed that such a league must be created to sustain the settlements that were to be effected. But at first I think there was a feeling among some of them that, while it must be attempted, the formulation of such a league was perhaps a counsel of perfection which practical men, long experienced in the world of affairs, must agree to very cautiously and with many misgivings. It was only as the difficult work of arranging an all but universal adjustment of the world's affairs advanced from day to day from one stage of conference to another that it became evident to them that what they were seeking would be little more than something written upon paper, to be

interpreted and applied by such methods as the chances of politics might make available if they did not provide a means of common counsel which all were obliged to accept, a common authority whose decisions would be recognized as decisions which all must respect.

And so the most practical, the most skeptical among them turned more and more to the League as the authority through which international action was to be secured, the authority without which, as they had come to see it, it would be difficult to give assured effect either to this treaty or to any other international understanding upon which they were to depend for the maintenance of peace. The fact that the Covenant of the League was the first substantive part of the treaty to be worked out and agreed upon, while all else was in solution, helped to make the formulation of the rest easier. The Conference was, after all, not to be ephemeral. The concert of nations was to continue, under a definite Covenant which had been agreed upon and which all were convinced was workable. They could go forward with confidence to make arrangements intended to be permanent. The most practical of the conferees were at last the most ready to refer to the League of Nations the superintendence of all interests which did not admit of immediate determination, of all administrative problems which were to require a continuing oversight. What had seemed a counsel of perfection had come to seem a plain counsel of necessity. The League of Nations was the practical statesman's hope of success in many of the most difficult things he was attempting.

And it had validated itself in the thought of every member of the Conference as something much bigger, much greater every way, than a mere instrument for carrying out the provisions of a particular treaty. It was universally recognized that all the peoples of the world demanded of the Conference that it should create such a continuing concert of free nations (1620) as would make wars of aggression and spoliation such as this that has just ended forever impossible. A cry had gone out from every home in every stricken land from which sons and brothers and fathers had gone forth to the great sacrifice that such a sacrifice should never again be exacted. It was manifest why it had been exacted. It had been exacted because one nation desired dominion and other nations had known no means of defence except armaments and alliances. War had lain at the heart of every arrangement of the Europe,—of every arrangement of the world,—that preceded the war. Restive peoples had been told that the fleets and armies, which they toiled to sustain, meant peace; and they now knew that they had been lied to: that fleets and armies had been maintained to promote national ambitions and meant war. They knew that no old policy meant anything else but force, force—always force. And they knew that it was

intolerable. Every true heart in the world, and every enlightened judgment demanded that, at whatever cost of independent action, every government that took thought for its people or for justice or for ordered freedom should lend itself to a new purpose and utterly destroy the old order of international politics. Statesmen might see difficulties, but the people could see none and could brook no denial. A war in which they had been bled white to beat the terror that lay concealed in every Balance of Power must not end in a mere victory of arms and a new balance. The monster that had resorted to arms must be put in chains that could not be broken. The united power of free nations must put a stop to aggression, and the world must be given peace. If there was not the will or the intelligence to accomplish that now, there must be another and a final war and the world must be swept clean of every power that could renew the terror. The League of Nations was not merely an instrument to adjust and remedy old wrongs under a new treaty of peace; it was the only hope for mankind. Again and again had the demon of war been cast out by a treaty of peace; only to prepare a time when he would enter in again with spirits worse than himself. The house must now be given a tenant who could hold it against all such. Convenient, indeed indispensable, as statesmen found the newly planned League of Nations to be for the execution of present plans of peace and reparation, they saw it in a new aspect before their work was finished. They saw it as the main object of the peace, as the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they did not dare to disappoint. Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Shall we dare reject it and break the heart of the world?

And so the result of the Conference of Peace, so far as Germany is concerned, stands complete. The difficulties encountered were very many. Sometimes they seemed insuperable. It was impossible to accommodate the interests of so great a body of nations,—interests which directly or indirectly affected almost every nation in the world,—without many minor compromises. The treaty, as a result, is not exactly what we would have written. It is probably not what any of the national delegations would have written. But results were worked out which on the whole bear test. I think that it will be found that the compromises which were accepted as inevitable nowhere cut to the heart of any principle. The work of the Conference squares, as a whole, with the principles agreed upon as the basis of the peace as well as with the practical possibilities of the international situations which had to be faced and dealt with as facts. . . .

The role which America was to play in the Conference seemed determined, as I have said, before my colleagues and I got to Paris,—determined by the universal expectations of the nations whose representatives, drawn from all

quarters of the globe, we were to deal with. It was universally recognized that America had entered the war to promote no private or peculiar interest of her own but only as the champion of rights which she was glad to share with free men and lovers of justice everywhere. We had formulated the principles upon which the settlement was to be made,—the principles upon which the armistice had been agreed to and the parleys of peace undertaken,—and desired nothing else. We were welcomed as disinterested friends. We were resorted to as arbiters in many a difficult matter. It was recognized that our material aid would be indispensable in the days to come, when industry and credit would have to be brought back to their normal operation again and communities beaten to the ground assisted to their feet once more, and it was taken for granted. I am proud to say, that we would play the helpful friend in these things as in all others without prejudice or favour. We were generously accepted as the unaffected champions of what was right. It was a very responsible role to play; but I am happy to report that the fine group of Americans who helped with their expert advice in each part of the varied settlements sought in every translation to justify the high confidence reposed in them.

And that confidence, it seems to me, is the measure of our opportunity and of our duty in the days to come, in which the new hope of the peoples of the world is to be fulfilled or disappointed. The fact that America is the friend of the nations, whether they be rivals or associates, is no new fact: it is only the discovery of it by the rest of the world that is new.

America may be said to have just reached her majority as a world power. It was almost exactly twenty-one years ago that the results of the war with Spain put us unexpectedly in possession of rich islands on the other side of the world and brought us into association with other governments in the control of the West Indies. It was regarded as a sinister and ominous (1621) thing by the statesmen of more than one European chancellery that we should have extended our power beyond the confines of our continental dominions. They were accustomed to think of new neighbours as a new menace, of rivals as watchful enemies. There were persons amongst us who looked with deep disapproval and avowed anxiety on such extensions of our national authority over distant islands and over peoples whom they feared we might exploit, not serve and assist. But we have not exploited them. And our dominion has been a menace to no other nation. We redeemed our honour to the utmost in our dealings with Cuba. She is weak but absolutely free; and it is her trust in us that makes her free. Weak peoples everywhere stand ready to give us any authority among them that will assure them a like friendly oversight and direction. They know that there is no ground for fear in receiving us as their mentors and guides. Our

isolation was ended twenty years ago; and now fear of us is ended also, our counsel and association sought after and desired. There can be no question of our ceasing to be a world power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world.

The war and the Conference of Peace now sitting in Paris seem to me to have answered that question. Our participation in the war established our position among the nations and nothing but our own mistaken action can alter it. It was not an accident or a matter of sudden choice that we are no longer isolated and devoted to a policy which has only our own interest and advantage for its object. It was our duty to go in, if we were indeed the champions of liberty and of right. We answered the call of duty in a way so spirited, so utterly without thought of what we spent of blood or treasure, so effective, so worthy of the admiration of true men everywhere, so wrought out of the stuff of all that was heroic, that the whole world saw at last, in the flesh, in noble action, a great ideal asserted and vindicated, by a nation they had deemed material and now found to be compact of the spiritual forces that must free men of every nation from every unworthy bondage. It is thus that a new role and a new responsibility have come to this great nation that we honour and which we would all wish to lift to yet higher levels of service and achievement.

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.

Source: Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. 61, June 18–July 25, 1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 426–436.

189. Reservations Drawn up by Republican Senators to the Treaty of Peace with Germany, November 1919

Many U.S. politicians felt serious misgivings as to whether the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was included in the treaty of peace with Germany, committed the United States to obligations that were not in its national interest. In November 1919, the Republican majority in the Senate, where a two-thirds majority was necessary to ratify any treaty, including this one, put forward a set of reservations to the Treaty of Versailles. President Woodrow Wilson, who had suffered a major stroke in September, refused to accept these, and neither the treaty as negotiated by him nor any other version obtained the necessary votes in the Senate.

1. The United States so understands and construes Article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said Article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the aforesaid Covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.
2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the Treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorise the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.
3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22 Part 1, or any other provision of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.
4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction, and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labour, coast-wise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic of women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this Treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the (1622) League of

Nations or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other Power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations provided for in said Treaty of Peace any questions which in the judgement of the United States depend upon or relate to its long established policy commonly known as the Monroe doctrine; said doctrine to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany. . . .

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations.

8. . . . and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives so defined, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the Treaty of Peace with Germany or be authorised to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder. . . .

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organised under the League of Nations or under the Treaty, or for the purpose of carrying out the Treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a Covenant-breaking State, as defined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States. . . .

12. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387–427 inclusive) [ILO provisions] unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the Organisation established by said Part XIII, and in such event participation of the United States will be governed by and conditional on the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

13. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of the Empire in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

Source: History of the League of Nations,
<http://www.unog.ch/library/archives/lon/library/Docs/usres.html>.

190. Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board, to President Woodrow Wilson, 24 December 1919

The War Industries Board, which administered the voluntary controls imposed on American industrial production during the war, was dissolved immediately after the war ended. One year later Bernard M. Baruch, its chairman, submitted his report. In a covering letter to the president, he recommended the establishment of a permanent "peacetime skeleton organization" to facilitate wartime industrial mobilization and maintain productive capacity in vital war industries. He effectively envisaged the creation of the "military-industrial complex" that would later become so marked a feature of the U.S. political economy.

My dear Mr. President: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the activities of the United States War Industries Board. . . .

In measuring our victory the importance of the battle line at home must ever be a great factor. The mobilization of America's industrial forces and their conversion from peace and construction to war and destruction was a gigantic task and responded to in gigantic manner. Its value in the final outcome rates second only to the mobilization of the nation's man power and in that enterprise the War Industries Board, which commanded, under you, the forces of industry, was likewise of aid by indicating those trades from which the workers could be more readily spared than from others, the continuation of which were essential to the war's development.

The problem confronting the War Industries Board was vast and complex and the difficulties were added to in that it was (1623) not possible to set a program of fixed limitations which could be worked up to, and having been achieved, the task completed. The needs of the Army and Navy and the other war agencies of our country and our associates changed and expanded over night. It was no part of our work to make the program; our duty was to help execute it by supplying the materials that made success attainable. To be able to do this; to know what we had to do and then to plan to do it; to coordinate and synchronize the multiplicity of national and international efforts and make them effective in supplying the war demands so that our armies and navies could discharge their duty of fighting and winning, the War Industries Board evolved a general formula, which is herewith appended because it contains its theory, organization, and policy of procedure—because it shows what the Board was and what it tried to do. It read:

Wars are fought and won—or lost—on the land, on the water, in the air, and on those battle lines behind the front where the civilian forces stand.

It is not enough to mobilize the Nation's military strength. There must be a mobilization of her full economic resources—industrial, agricultural, and financial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed with the same strategy that governs the operations of the purely military arms of service.

The prodigious strain upon the world's productive capacity must be met and balanced to provide the means of warfare and to maintain the civilian population as well as to preserve the economic fabric.

America to-day is the chief source of strength to the forces engaged in the conflict against German world domination. That strength is expressed in terms of man power and material—the one military, and the second industrial.

To control and regulate industry in all its direct and indirect relations to the war and to the Nation, the President has created the War Industries Board and placed the responsibility for its operation in the hands of its chairman. . . .

The War Industries Board is charged with the duty of procuring an adequate flow of materials for the two great war-making agencies of the Government—the War and Navy Departments—and for the two agencies in immediate affiliation with these military arms—the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Railroad Administration.

Also, the Board provides supplies necessary to the military needs of our association in the war, and those commodities required by neutrals in exchange for materials essential to us.

Finally, and of paramount importance, the Board, in alliance with the Food, Fuel, and Labor Administrations, provides for the country's civilian needs, the protection of which is a particular duty of the organization.

It is not only the duty of the War Industries Board to stimulate and expand production in those industries making war essentials, it is equally the Board's duty to protect, as far as may be, those industries not immediately essential to the war program.

It is the policy of the Board, where retrenchment and curtailment are necessary, to keep alive, even though it be necessary to skeletonize, the enterprises in this group, and not to destroy them.

Whenever possible, conversion of industries from a nonwar production to an essential output is effected.

The War Industries Board is a method of control devised by the President to equalize the strain placed upon the American industrial structure by the war.

It stimulates and expands the production of those materials essential to the war program and at the same time it depresses and curtails the production of those things not of a necessitous nature. This is done by regulation, in consonance with other executive branches, of the basic economic elements: (a) Facilities, (b) materials, (c) fuel, (d) transportation, (e) labor, and (f) capital.

The method of control is through a preference list, on which are placed those industries whose output is essential to the war's progress. The priority indicated by the preference list is the master key to the six elements named.

Further, the Board regulates all and controls certain other industries of first-rate war importance, it fixes prices through the price-fixing committee, it creates new and converts old facilities, it clears the national business requirements, and it leads to conservation, which is needed to bridge the gap between the extraordinary demand and the available supply—a gap which exists in almost all the great commercial staples.

The War Industries Board embraces all and each of the Nation. Food and fuel are separately administered, (1624) but with every other article of military need and of ordinary life the Board has a direct connection, and it has a basic relationship with food and fuel, too, for both require in production and distribution the materials that the War Industries Board provides. Its strength lies in the full and patriotic cooperation that American business, including both the employers and the employees, gives in working out the problems common to us all.

The abnormal conditions of the war demand sacrifices. It is the price of victory.

Only actual needs, not fancied wants, should and can be satisfied.

To save heavy and long privation, temporary deprivation must be the rule.

America's willingness to accept these conditions marks her ability to quicken the end of the conflict.

It is not within the province of the writer to render judgment upon the success achieved by the organization of which he was the head, but it is not amiss for him to say not one default was recorded on any demand made by the military establishments. They were given all they asked in measure so full and so quick as to be noteworthy, especially when it is remembered that most of the years of our existence had been given over to life and thought of peace with small inclination or opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the arts and needs of war. If the love of country shows itself in the readiness of men to fight it is equally proven in the willingness of capital and labor—of the men and women workers—to serve.

There will be submitted later a detailed exposition and study of the Board's origin, function, and organization. Further, there will also follow the reports of the members of the Board and the divisional chiefs in whose hands fell the authority you delegated to me, decentralized according to an attached chart. Finally, in addition to general comments, I am submitting certain conclusions as to the lessons taught us by the war, expressed in the form of recommendations which, if translated into practice, will bring us a greater readiness for the worst that the future may hold and which can be enacted without violence to our traditional predisposition to peace and the pursuits thereof. . . .

It would be impossible in any statement of the activities of the War Industries Board, or any story of the mobilization of the industries of the country, not to conclude with definite recommendations based upon the lessons learned. A similar emergency may arise in the future and it can more easily be coped with if the experiences of the last two years are profited by. The writer believes:

First. There should be created a peace-time skeleton organization based on the experience of the war-making agencies. It should be headed by a chairman, who, when the emergency arises, should be granted the powers necessary to coordinate and synchronize the economic resources of the country. With him should be associated the representatives of the Army and the Navy or any other department vitally interested, as the Shipping Board, who should have centralized under them the various purchasing branches of their departments. There also should be in the skeletonized organization a vice chairman, a secretary, a counsel, and members in charge of raw materials, finished products, facilities, prices, labor, planning and statistics (during peace under the Department of Commerce), priority and conservation. Under these there should be also the various section or commodity heads. The peace-time organization would meet at least once a year to discuss and outline plans and to keep in

touch with the general world situation and with one another. Each sectional head would name committees in each industry in order that, in the event of an impending crisis, it would be possible within a few days to create an organization which immediately would mobilize all of the industries of the nation and quickly make available for the Government all of its resources. These men, with the exception of the Secretary, who would keep the records, would serve without compensation and the actual expense of maintaining such an organization would be small. I would recommend that all priorities, including those of shipping, should be centralized in the chairman.

Second. Through a system of stimulation by a protective tariff, a bonus, an exemption from taxation for a limited period, licensing, or any other effective means, every possible effort should be made to develop production of manganese, chrome, tungsten, dyestuff, by-products of coal, and all such raw materials usually imported but which can be produced in quantity in this country. Above all, immediate and persistent effort must be made to develop production of nitrogen and its substitutes, not alone for war but for agricultural purposes.

Third. Under the supervision of the proper departments of the Government some industries must be given encouragement to maintain a skeleton organization through which can be developed the rapid manufacture of guns, munitions, airplanes, etc. Some facilities already developed might be kept alive through outright purchase or by small orders for munitions and airplanes while at all times there must be kept on hand the necessary dies, jigs, fixtures, etc., needed for the manufacture of munitions. The expert personnel of the War and Navy Departments in addition to keeping abreast of the times in new war-making agencies should keep the industries of the Nation attuned in a skeleton form to meet immediately that enlarged demand which would come through war.

Source: Bernard M. Baruch, *American Industry in the War: A Report of the War Industries Board (March 1921)* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1941), 3–8.

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World War I Documents (1920 Onward)

191. Excerpt from Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (1924), Describing the “Stab in the Back”

192. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Statement and Note to the Japanese Government regarding the Withdrawal of American Military Forces from Siberia, 17 January 1920

193. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, Signed at Sèvres, 10 August 1920

194. Treaty of Peace between Germany and the United States of America, 25 August 1921

195. Robert Graves, “Recalling War,” 1938

191. Excerpt from Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (1924), Describing the “Stab in the Back”

Among those German soldiers who enjoyed the experience of war was the young Adolf Hitler. He enlisted immediately when the war began and rose to the rank of corporal. Army life seems to have provided him with a sense of community and purpose that had previously been missing from his life, while he was able to romanticize the objectives of the war itself and identify himself with a great national cause. When the armistice came, many German soldiers believed that although their army had fought successfully to the end, in their eagerness to make peace the Social Democratic leaders of the new German republic had betrayed the troops and made unnecessary concessions to the enemy. This perspective was fueled, probably deliberately, by the conspicuous absence of the top military leader, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, from the German cabinet meetings that reached the decision to accept the armistice terms and by the resignation of General Erich von Ludendorff shortly before. Hitler was one of those who accepted this interpretation. As leader of the new National Socialist Party, he would appeal to many other disappointed former soldiers who were eager to reverse the outcome of the conflict.

Toward the end of 1917, the low point of the army's dejection seemed to have passed. The whole army took fresh hope and fresh courage after the Russian collapse. The conviction that the War would end with the victory of Germany, after all, began to seize the troops more and more. Again singing could be heard and the Calamity Janes became rarer. Again people believed in the future of the fatherland.

Especially the Italian collapse of autumn, 1917, had had the most wonderful effect; in this victory we saw a proof of the possibility of breaking through the front, even aside from the Russian theater of war. A glorious faith flowed again into the hearts of the millions, enabling them to await spring, 1918, with relief and confidence. The foe was visibly depressed. In this winter he remained quieter than usual. This was the lull before the storm.

But, while those at the front were undertaking the last preparations for the final conclusion of the eternal struggle, while endless transports of men and materiel were rolling toward the West Front, and the troops were being trained for the great attack—the biggest piece of chicanery in the whole war broke out in Germany.

Germany must not be victorious; in the last hour, with victory already threatening to be with the German banners, a means was chosen which seemed suited to stifle the German spring attack in the germ with one blow, to make victory impossible:

The munitions strike was organized[.]

(1628)

If it succeeded, the German front was bound to collapse, and the [Socialist newspaper] *Vorwärts*' desire that this time victory should not be with the German banners would inevitably be fulfilled. Owing to the lack of munitions, the front would inevitably be pierced in a few weeks; thus the offensive was thwarted, the Entente saved, international capital was made master of Germany, and the hidden objective of the Marxist swindle of nations achieved.

To smash the national economy and establish the rule of international capital a goal which actually was achieved, thanks to the stupidity and credulity of the one side and the bottomless cowardice of the other.

To be sure, the munitions strike did not have all the hoped-for success with regard to starving the front of arms; it collapsed too soon for the lack of munitions as such—as the plan had been—to doom the army to destruction.

But how much more terrible was the moral damage that had been done!

In the first place: What was the army fighting for if the homeland itself no longer wanted victory? For whom the immense sacrifices and privations? The soldier is expected to fight for victory and the homeland goes on strike against it!

And in the second place: What was the effect on the enemy?

In the winter of 1917 to 1918, dark clouds appeared for the first time in the firmament of the Allied world. For nearly four years they had been assailing the German warrior and had been unable to encompass his downfall; and all this while the German had only his shield arm free for defense, while his sword was obliged to strike, now in the East, now in the South. But now at last the giant's back was free. Streams of blood had flown before he administered final defeat to one of his foes. Now in the West his shield was going to be joined by his sword; up till then the enemy had been unable to break his defense, and now he himself was facing attack.

The enemy feared him and trembled for their victory.

In London and Paris one deliberation followed another, but at the front sleepy silence prevailed. Suddenly their high mightinesses lost their effrontery. Even enemy propaganda was having a hard time of it; it was no longer so easy to prove the hopelessness of German victory.

But this also applied to the Allied troops at the fronts. A ghastly light began to dawn slowly even on them. Their inner attitude toward the German soldier had changed. Until then he may have seemed to them a fool destined to defeat; but now it was the destroyer of the Russian ally that stood before them. The limitation of the German offensives to the East, though born of necessity, now seemed to them brilliant tactics. For three years these Germans had stormed the Russian front, at first it seemed without the slightest success. The Allies almost laughed over this aimless undertaking; for in the end the Russian giant with his overwhelming number of men was sure to remain the victor while Germany would inevitably collapse from loss of blood. Reality seemed to confirm this hope.

Since the September days of 1914, when for the first time the endless hordes of Russian prisoners from the Battle of Tannenberg began moving into Germany over the roads and railways, this stream was almost without end—but for every defeated and destroyed army a new one arose. Inexhaustibly the gigantic Empire gave the Tsar more and more new soldiers and the War its new victims. How long could Germany keep up this race? Would not the day inevitably come when the Germans would win their last victory and still the Russian armies would not be marching to their last battle? And then what? In all human probability the victory of Russia could be postponed, but it was bound to come.

Now all these hopes were at an end: the ally who had laid the greatest blood sacrifices on the altar of common interests was at the end of his strength, and lay prone at the feet of the inexorable assailant. Fear and horror crept into the hearts of the soldiers who had hitherto believed so blindly. They feared the coming spring. For if up until then they had not succeeded in defeating the German when he was able to place only part of his forces on the Western Front, how could they count on victory now that the entire power of this incredible heroic state seemed to be concentrating for an attack on the West?

The shadows of the South Tyrolean Mountains lay oppressive on the fantasy; as far as the mists of Flanders, the defeated armies of [Italian General Luigi]

Cadorna conjured up gloomy faces, and faith in victory ceded to fear of coming defeat.

Then—when out of the cool nights the Allied soldiers already seemed to hear the dull rumble of the advancing storm units of the German army, and with eyes fixed in fear and trepidation awaited the approaching judgment, suddenly a flaming red light arose in Germany, casting its glow into the last shell-hole of the enemy front: at the very moment when the German divisions were receiving their last instructions for the great attack, the general strike broke out in Germany.

At first the world was speechless. But then enemy propaganda hurled itself with a sigh of relief on this help that came (1629) in the eleventh hour. At one stroke the means was found to restore the sinking confidence of the Allied soldiers, once again to represent the probability of victory as certain, and transform dread anxiety in the face of coming events into determined confidence. Now the regiments awaiting the German attack could be sent into the greatest battle of all time with the conviction that, not the boldness of the German assault would decide the end of this war but the perseverance of the defense. Let the Germans achieve as many victories as they pleased; at home the revolution was before the door, and not the victorious army. . . .

English, French, and American newspapers began to implant this faith in the hearts of their readers while an infinitely shrewd propaganda raised the spirits of the troops at the front.

‘Germany facing revolution! Victory of the Allies inevitable! This was the best medicine to help the wavering poilu and Tommy back on their feet. Now rifles and machine guns could again be made to fire, and a headlong flight in panic fear was replaced by hopeful resistance.

This was the result of the munitions strike. . . .

I had the good fortune to fight in the first two offensives and in the last.

These became the most tremendous impressions of my life; tremendous because now for the last time, as in 1914, the fight lost the character of defense and assumed that of attack. A sigh of relief passed through the trenches and the dugouts of the German army when at length, after more than three years’ endurance in the enemy hell, the day of retribution came. Once again the victorious battalions cheered and hung the last wreaths of immortal laurel on

their banners rent by the storm of victory. Once again the songs of the fatherland roared to the heavens along the endless marching columns, and for the last time the Lord's grace smiled on His ungrateful children.

In midsummer of 1918, oppressive sultriness lay over the front. At home there was fighting. For what? In the different detachments of the field army all sorts of things were being said: that the war was now hopeless and only fools could believe in victory; that not the people but only capital and the monarchy had an interest in holding out any longer—all this came from the homeland and was discussed even at the front.

At first the front reacted very little. What did we care about universal suffrage? Had we fought four years for that? It was vile banditry to steal the war aim of the dead heroes from their very graves. The young regiments had not gone to their death in Flanders crying: 'Long live universal suffrage and the secret ballot,' but crying: 'Deutschland uber Alles in der Welt.' . . .

My personal attitude was established from the very start. I hated the whole gang of miserable party scoundrels and betrayers of the people in the extreme. It had long been clear to me that this whole gang was not really concerned with the welfare of the nation, but with filling empty pockets. . . .

And the great majority of the embattled army still thought the same. Only the reinforcements coming from home rapidly grew worse and worse, so that their arrival meant, not a reinforcement but a weakening of our fighting strength. Especially the young reinforcements were mostly worthless. It was often hard to believe that these were sons of the same nation which had once sent its youth out to the battle for Ypres.

In August and September, the symptoms of disorganization increased more and more rapidly, although the effect of the enemy attack was not to be compared with the terror of our former defensive battles. The past Battle of Flanders and the Battle of the Somme had been awesome by comparison.

At the end of September, my division arrived for the third time at the positions which as young volunteer regiments we had once stormed.

What a memory!

In October and November of 1914, we had there received our baptism of fire. Fatherland love in our heart and songs on our lips, our young regiments had gone into the battle as to a dance[.] The most precious blood there sacrificed

itself joyfully, in the faith that it was preserving the independence and freedom of the fatherland.

In July, 1917, we set foot for the second time on the ground that was sacred to all of us. For in it the best comrades slumbered still almost children, who had run to their death with gleaming eyes for the one true fatherland.

We old soldiers, who had then marched out with the regiment stood in respectful emotion at this shrine of 'loyalty and obedience to the death.'

Now in a hard defensive battle the regiment was to defend this soil which it had stormed three years earlier.

With three weeks of drumfire the Englishman prepared the great Flanders offensive. The spirits of the dead seemed to quicken; the regiment clawed its way into the filthy mud, bit (1630) into the various holes and craters, and neither gave ground nor wavered. As once before in this place, it grew steadily smaller and thinner, until the British attack finally broke loose on July 13, 1917.

In the first days of August we were relieved.

The regiment had turned into a few companies: crusted with mud they tottered back, more like ghosts than men. But aside from a few hundred meters of shell holes, the Englishman had found nothing but death.

Now, in the fall of 1918, we stood for the third time on the storm site of 1914.

The little city of Comines where we then rested had now become our battlefield.

Yet, though the battlefield was the same, the men had changed: for now political discussions went on even among the troops. As everywhere, the poison of the hinterland began, here too, to be effective. And the younger recruit fell down completely for he came from home.

In the night of October 13, the English gas attack on the southern front before Ypres burst loose; they used yellow-cross gas, whose effects were still unknown to us as far as personal experience was concerned. In this same night I myself was to become acquainted with it. On a hill south of Wervick, we came on the evening of October 13 into several hours of drumfire with gas shells which continued all night more or less violently. As early as midnight, a

number of us passed out, a few of our comrades forever. Toward morning I, too, was seized with pain which grew worse with every quarter hour, and at seven in the morning I stumbled and tottered back with burning eyes; taking with me my last report of the War.

A few hours later, my eyes had turned into glowing coals; it had grown dark around me.

Thus I came to the hospital at Pasewalk in Pomerania, and there I was fated to experience—the greatest villainy of the century.

For a long time there had been something indefinite but repulsive in the air. People were telling each other that in the next few weeks it would ‘start in’—but I was unable to imagine what was meant by this. First I thought of a strike like that of the spring. Unfavorable rumors were constantly coming from the navy, which was said to be in a state of ferment. But this, too, seemed to me more the product of the imagination of individual scoundrels than an affair involving real masses.

Even in the hospital, people were discussing the end of the War which they hoped would come soon, but no one counted on anything immediate. I was unable to read the papers.

In November the general tension increased.

And then one day, suddenly and unexpectedly, the calamity descended. Sailors arrived in trucks and proclaimed the revolution. . . .

My first hope was still that this high treason might still be a more or less local affair. . . .

The next few days came and with them the most terrible certainty of my life. The rumors became more and more oppressive. What I had taken for a local affair was now said to be a general revolution. To this was added the disgraceful news from the front. They wanted to capitulate. Was such a thing really possible?

On November 10, the pastor came to the hospital for a short address: now we learned everything.

In extreme agitation, I, too, was present at the short speech. The dignified old gentleman seemed all a-tremble as he informed us that the House of

Hollenzollern should no longer bear the German imperial crown; that the fatherland had become a 'republic'; that we must pray to the Almighty not to refuse His blessing to this change and not to abandon our people in the times to come. . . . But when the old gentleman tried to go on, and began to tell us that we must now end the long War, yes, that now that it was lost and we were throwing ourselves upon the mercy of the victors, our fatherland would for the future be exposed to dire oppression, that the armistice should be accepted with confidence in the magnanimity of our previous enemies—I could stand it no longer. It became impossible for me to sit still one minute more. Again everything went black before my eyes; I tottered and groped my way back to the dormitory, threw myself on my bunk, and dug my burning head into my blanket and pillow.

Since the day when I had stood at my mother's grave, I had not wept. . . . But now I could not help it. Only now did I see how all personal suffering vanishes in comparison with the misfortune of the fatherland.

And so it had all been in vain. In vain all the sacrifices and privations; in vain the hunger and thirst of months which were often endless; in vain the hours in which, with mortal fear clutching at our hearts, we nevertheless did our duty; and in vain the death of two millions who died. Would not the graves of all the hundreds of thousands open, the graves of those who with faith in the fatherland had marched forth never to (1631) return? Would they not open and send the silent mud- and blood-covered heroes back as spirits of vengeance to the homeland which had cheated them with such mockery of the highest sacrifice which a man can make to his people in this world? Had they died for this, the soldiers of August and September, 1914? Was it for this that in the autumn of the same year the volunteer regiments marched after their old comrades? Was it for this that these boys of seventeen sank into the earth of Flanders? Was this the meaning of the sacrifice which the German mother made to the fatherland when with sore heart she let her best-loved boys march off, never to see them again? Did all this happen only so that a gang of wretched criminals could lay hands on the fatherland?

Was it for this that the German soldier had stood host in the sun's heat—and in snowstorms, hungry, thirsty, and freezing, weary from sleepless nights and endless marches? Was it for this that he had lain in the hell of the drumfire and in the fever of gas attacks without wavering, always thoughtful of his one duty to preserve the fatherland from the enemy peril?

Verily these heroes deserved a headstone: ‘Thou Wanderer who comest to Germany, tell those at home that we lie here, true to the fatherland and obedient to duty.’ . . .

I, for my part, decided to go into politics.

Source: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 194–206. Excerpt from *Mein Kampf* by Adolf Hitler, translated by Ralph Manhern. Copyright © 1943, renewed 1971 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All Rights Reserved.

192. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Statement and Note to the Japanese Government regarding the Withdrawal of American Military Forces from Siberia, 17 January 1920

At the beginning of 1920, the United States decided to withdraw all its troops from Russia. Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed the Japanese government of this decision, arguing that the Allied forces in Russia had failed to accomplish anything substantial and that their impact in alleviating the prevailing Russian disorder had been negligible.

Decision of the United States Government to withdraw its troops from Eastern Siberia was announced by the Department of State to-day. Under instructions from his Government, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, on December 8 [1919], invited the attention of the Secretary of State to the recent unfavorable development of the situation in Siberia, and inquired whether the United States proposed to maintain the status quo or to proceed to entire or partial withdrawal of its troops, or whether it was ready to send reinforcements in case of need.

The Secretary of State has communicated to the Japanese Government the decision of this Government. The full text of the communication follows:

The Government of the United States has given the most careful consideration to the subject of the communication from the Japanese Government which was read to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on the 8th day of December, and which concerns the recent unfavorable development of the military situation with which Admiral Kolchak's forces have been confronted, and which proposes three alternative courses for the allied and associated powers to take.

The Government of the United States agrees that for it to send a reinforcement of sufficient strength and to act on the offensive in co-operation with anti-Bolshevik forces is impracticable.

The Government of the United States believes that for it to continue to participate in guarding the districts now under allied military protection is also, under present conditions, impracticable, for the reason that an agreement to send reinforcements to such extent as may be required, with a view to maintain the status quo, might involve the Government of the United States in an undertaking of such indefinite character as to be inadvisable. The amount of reinforcement, which might become necessary for the execution of such an

agreement might be so great that the Government of the United States would not feel justified in carrying it out.

Consideration has been given, therefore, to the alternative presented by the Government of Japan of entire or partial withdrawal. It will be recalled that the purposes of the expedition, as originally conceived by the United States and expressed in an aide memoire handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, July 17, 1918, were, first, to help the Czechoslovak troops, which had during their retirement along the Siberian railway been attacked by the Bolsheviki and enemy prisoners of war in Siberia, to consolidate their forces and effect their repatriation by way of Vladivostok, and, second, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense, in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance.

Not only are the Czechoslovak troops now successfully advancing into Eastern Siberia, but an agreement has been effected between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States providing for their repatriation from Vladivostok. American vessels will begin to arrive at that port by February 1 and a contingent of more than 10,000 Czechoslovak (1632) troops can be immediately embarked. It is expected that evacuation will proceed rapidly thereafter and from that date the first purpose for which American soldiers were sent to Siberia may be regarded as accomplished.

With respect to the second purpose, namely, the steadying of efforts at self-government or self-defense on the part of the Russians, the Government of the United States is impressed with the political instability and grave uncertainties of the present situation in Eastern Siberia as described in the aide memoire of the Japanese Ambassador, December 8, and is disposed to the view that further military effort to assist the Russians in the struggle toward self-government may, in the present situation, lead to complications which would have exactly the opposite effect, prolonging possibly the period of readjustment and involving Japan and the United States in ineffective and needless sacrifices. It is felt accordingly to be unlikely that the second purpose for which American troops were sent to Siberia will be longer served by their presence there.

In view, then, of the fact that the main purposes for which American troops were sent to Siberia are now at an end, and of the considerations set forth in the communication of the Japanese Government of 8 December, which subsequent events in Eastern Siberia have strengthened, the Government of the United States has decided at once to begin arrangements for the concentration of the American forces at Vladivostok with a view to their embarkation and departure

immediately after the leaving of the first important contingent of Czechoslovak troops, that is to say, about February 1.

Careful consideration has also been given to the possibility of continuing, after the departure of the American troops, the assistance of American railway experts in the operation of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. It will be recalled that it is expressly stipulated in the plan for the supervision of these railways, which was submitted by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, January 15, 1919, that the arrangement should cease upon the withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia, and that all foreign railway experts appointed under the arrangement should then be recalled forthwith.

The experience of recent months in the operation of the railways under conditions of unstable civil authority and frequent local military interference furnishes a strong reason for abiding by the terms of the original agreement. Arrangements will be made accordingly for the withdrawal of the American railway experts under the same conditions and simultaneously with the departure of the American military forces.

The Government of the United States desires the Japanese Government to know that it regrets the necessity for this decision, but it seems to mark the end, for the time being at least, of a co-operative effort by Japan and the United States to assist the Russian people, which had of late begun to bear important results and seemed to give promise for the future. The Government of the United States is most appreciative of the friendly spirit which has animated the Government of Japan in this undertaking, and is convinced that the basis of understanding which has been established will serve in the future to facilitate the common efforts of the two countries to deal with the problems which confront them in Siberia. The Government of the United States does not in the least relinquish the deep interest which it feels in the political and economic fate of the people of Siberia nor its purpose to co-operate with Japan in the most frank and friendly way in all practical plans which may be worked out for the political and economic rehabilitation of that region.

It is suggested that the Government of Japan may desire to communicate to the other principal allied and associated Governments the substance of the aide memoire of December 8th. This Government will likewise make known to them the substance of the present communication.

Source: C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., *Russian-American Relations, March 1917–March 1920: Documents and Papers*, reprint ed. (1920; repr., Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1977), 355–358.

193. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, Signed at Sèvres, 10 August 1920

The Treaty of Sèvres supposedly ended the war and settled outstanding questions between Turkey and the Allied Powers. Greece obtained Eastern Thrace and the administration of the Anatolian city of Smyrna, with the possibility of annexation in five years' time. The treaty called for the establishment of independent Armenian and Kurdistan states and placed the Dardanelles Straits under international administration. It also placed tight restrictions on the size of Turkish military forces. Turkey renounced all rights to rule Egypt, Cyprus, Morocco, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and the Arab Peninsula, and even Turkey proper seemed vulnerable to future partition by the Allies. Although Turkey was not required to pay reparations, this was merely because the Ottoman Empire's foreign debt was already so substantial that Turkey's revenues would hardly suffice even to pay off its existing foreign obligations. Within Turkey, the treaty served to rally nationalists who were determined to reverse their country's humiliation. Under the leadership of the army officer Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), proclaimed head of a provisional Turkish government in April (1633) 1920, as early as May 1919 Turkish troops began forcibly to oppose the Greek occupation of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. Two years after and at least partly because he signed the Sèvres agreement, nationalists deposed Sultan Mehmed VI, the last Ottoman ruler. War between Turkey and the Allies effectively continued until early 1923, in the process of which Turkish forces drove Greece out of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN,

These Powers being described in the present Treaty as the Principal Allied Powers;

ARMENIA, BELGIUM, GREECE, THE HEDJAZ, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROUMANIA, THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE AND CZECHO-SLOVAKIA,

These Powers constituting, with the Principal Powers mentioned above, the Allied Powers, of the one part;

AND TURKEY,

on the other part;

. . . have AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the state of war will terminate.

From that moment and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, official relations will exist between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

Part I. The Covenant of the League of Nations. Articles 1 to 26 and Annex.

. . . [Omitted.]

Part II. Frontiers of Turkey.

Article 27

I. In Europe, the frontiers of Turkey will be laid down as follows:

1. The Black Sea: from the entrance of the Bosphorus to the point described below.
2. With Greece: From a point to be chosen on the Black Sea near the mouth of the Biyuk Dere, situated about 7 kilometres north-west of Podima, south-westwards to the most north-westerly point of the limit of the basin of the Istranja Dere (about 8 kilometres northwest of Istranja), a line to be fixed on the ground passing through Kapilja Dag and Uchbunar Tepe; thence south-south-eastwards to a point to be chosen on the railway from Chorlu to Chatalja about 1 kilometre west of the railway station of Sinekli, a line following as far as possible the western limit of the basin of the Istranja Dere; thence south-eastwards to a point to be chosen between Fener and Kurfali on the watershed between the basins of those rivers which flow into Biyuk Chekmeje Geul, on the north-east, and the basin of those rivers which flow direct into the Sea of Marmora on the south-west, a line to be fixed on the ground passing south of Sinekli; thence south-eastwards to a point to be chosen on the Sea of Marmora about 1 kilometre south-west of Kalikratia, a line following as far as possible this watershed.
3. The Sea of Marmora: from the point defined above to the entrance of the Bosphorus.

II. In Asia, the frontiers of Turkey will be laid down as follows:

1. On the West and South: From the entrance of the Bosphorus into the Sea of Marmora to a point described below, situated in the eastern Mediterranean Sea

in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Alexandretta near Karatash Burun the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea; the islands of the Sea of Marmora, and those which are situated within a distance of 3 miles from the coast, remaining Turkish, subject to the provisions of Section IV and Articles 84 and 122, Part III (Political Clauses).

2. With Syria: From a point to be chosen on the eastern bank of the outlet of the Hassan Dede, about 3 kilometres north-west of Karatash Burun, north-eastwards to a point to be chosen on the Djaihun Irmak about 1 kilometre north of Babeli, a line to be fixed on the ground passing north of Karatash; thence to Kesik Kale, the course of the Djaihun Irmak upstream; thence north-eastwards to a point to be chosen on the Djaihun Irmak about 15 kilometres east-southeast of Karsbazar, a line to be fixed on the ground passing north of Kara Tepe; thence to the bend in the Djaihun Irmak situated west of Duldul Dag, the course of the Djaihun Irmak upstream; thence in a general south-easterly direction to a point to be chosen on Emir Musi Dag about 15 kilometres south-south-west of Giaour Geul a line to be fixed on the ground at a distance of about 18 kilometres from the railway, and leaving Duldul Dag to Syria; thence eastwards to a point to be chosen about 5 kilometres north of Urfa a generally straight line from west to east to be fixed on the ground passing north of the roads connecting the towns of Baghche, Aintab, Biridjik, and Urfa and leaving the last three named towns to Syria; thence eastwards to the south-western extremity of the bend in the Tigris about 6 kilometres north of Azekh (27 kilometres west of Djezire-ibn-Omar), a generally (1634) straight line from west to east to be fixed on the ground leaving the town of Mardin to Syria; thence to a point to be chosen on the Tigris between the point of confluence of the Khabur Su with the Tigris and the bend in the Tigris situated about 10 kilometres north of this point, the course of the Tigris downstream, leaving the island on which is situated the town of Djezire-ibn-Omar to Syria.

3. With Mesopotamia: Thence in a general easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, a line to be fixed on the ground; thence eastwards to the point where it meets the frontier between Turkey and Persia, the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, modified, however, so as to pass south of Amadia.

4. On the East and the North East: From the point above defined to the Black Sea, the existing frontier between Turkey and Persia, then the former frontier between Turkey and Russia, subject to the provisions of Article 89. . . .

Part III.

Political Clauses.

Section I.

Constantinople.

Article 36

Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and to maintain there the capital of the Turkish State.

Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty, or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connection.

Section II.

Straits.

Article 37

The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.

These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 38

The Turkish Government recognises that it is necessary to take further measures to ensure the freedom of navigation provided for in Article 37, and accordingly delegates, so far as it is concerned, to a Commission to be called the "Commission of the Straits," and hereinafter referred to as "the Commission," the control of the waters specified in Article 39.

The Greek Government, so far as it is concerned, delegates to the Commission the same powers and undertakes to give it in all respects the same facilities.

Such control shall be exercised in the name of the Turkish and Greek Governments respectively, and in the manner provided in this Section.

Article 39

The authority of the Commission will extend to all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters within three miles of each of these mouths.

This authority may be exercised on shore to such extent as may be necessary for the execution of the provisions of this Section.

Article 40

The Commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively by the United States of America (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter States become members of the League of Nations). Each Power shall appoint one representative. The representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey shall each have one vote. Each Commissioner shall be removable only by the Government which appointed him. . . .

Article 42

The Commission will exercise the powers conferred on it by the present Treaty in complete independence of the local authority. It will have its own flag, its own budget and its separate organisation.

Article 43

Within the limits of its jurisdiction as laid down in Article 39 the Commission will be charged with the following duties:

(1635)

the execution of any works considered necessary for the improvement of the channels or the approaches to harbours;

the lighting and buoying of the channels;

the control of pilotage and towage;

the control of anchorages;

the control necessary to assure the application in the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha of the regime prescribed in Articles 335 to 344, Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the present Treaty;

the control of all matters relating to wrecks and salvage;

the control of lighterage;

Article 44

In the event of the Commission finding that the liberty of passage is being interfered with, it will inform the representatives at Constantinople of the Allied Powers providing the occupying forces provided for in Article 178. These representatives will thereupon concert with the naval and military commanders of the said forces such measures as may be deemed necessary to preserve the freedom of the Straits. Similar action shall be taken by the said representatives in the event of any external action threatening the liberty of passage of the Straits. . . .

Article 56

Ships of war in transit through the waters specified in Article 39 shall conform in all respects to the regulations issued by the Commission for the observance of the ordinary rules of navigation and of sanitary requirements.

Article 57

(1) Belligerent warships shall not revictual nor take in stores except so far as may be strictly necessary to enable them to complete the passage of the Straits and to reach the nearest port where they can call, nor shall they replenish or increase their supplies of war material or their armament or complete their crews, within the waters under the control of the Commission. Only such

repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy shall be carried out, and they shall not add in any manner whatever to their fighting force.

The Commission shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried out with the least possible delay.

(2) The passage of belligerent warships through the waters under the control of the Commission shall be effected with the least possible delay, and without any other interruption than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

(3) The stay of such warships at ports within the jurisdiction of the Commission shall not exceed twenty-four hours except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of at least twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from the waters under the control of the Commission and the departure of a ship belonging to an opposing belligerent.

(4) Any further regulations affecting in time of war the waters under the control of the Commission, and relating in particular to the passage of war material and contraband destined for the enemies of Turkey, or revictualling, taking in stores or carrying out repairs in the said waters, will be laid down by the League of Nations. . . .

Article 59

No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war or warlike materials in the waters under the control of the Commission, except in case of accidental hindrance of the passage, and in such cases the passage shall be resumed with all possible despatch. . . .

Section III. Kurdistan.

Article 62

A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any

question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.

Article 63

The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their communication to the said Government.

Article 64

If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League (1636) of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. . . .

Section IV. Smyrna.

Article 65

The provisions of this Section will apply to the city of Smyrna and the adjacent territory defined in Article 66, until the determination of their final status in accordance with Article 83. . . .

Article 68

Subject to the provisions of this Section, the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 will be assimilated, in the application of the present Treaty, to territory detached from Turkey.

Article 69

The city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 remain under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey, however, transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty over the city of Smyrna and the said territory. In witness of such sovereignty the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort in the town of Smyrna. The fort will be designated by the Principal Allied Powers.

Article 70

The Greek Government will be responsible for the administration of the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66, and will effect this administration by means of a body of officials which it will appoint specially for the purpose.

Article 71

The Greek Government shall be entitled to maintain in the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 the military forces required for the maintenance of order and public security.

Article 72

A local parliament shall be set up with an electoral system calculated to ensure proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities. Within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Greek Government shall submit to the Council of the League of Nations a scheme for an electoral system complying with the above requirements; this scheme shall not come into force until approved by a majority of the Council.

The Greek Government shall be entitled to postpone the elections for so long as may be required for the return of the inhabitants who have been banished or deported by the Turkish authorities, but such postponement shall not exceed a period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty. . . .

Article 83

When a period of five years shall have elapsed after the coming into force of the present Treaty the local parliament referred to in Article 72 may, by a majority of votes, ask the Council of the League of Nations for the definitive incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece of the city of Smyrna and the territory

defined in Article 66. The Council may require, as a preliminary, a plebiscite under conditions which it will lay down.

In the event of such incorporation as a result of the application of the foregoing paragraph, the Turkish sovereignty referred to in Article 69 shall cease. Turkey hereby renounces in that event in favour of Greece all rights and title over the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66.

Section V. Greece.

Article 84

Without prejudice to the frontiers of Bulgaria laid down by the Treaty of Peace signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27, 1919, Turkey renounces in favour of Greece all rights and title over the territories of the former Turkish Empire in Europe situated outside the frontiers of Turkey as laid down by the present Treaty.

The islands of the Sea of Marmora are not included in the transfer of sovereignty effected by the above paragraph.

Turkey further renounces in favour of Greece all her rights and title over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The decision taken by the Conference of Ambassadors at London in execution of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of May 17–30, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of November 1–14, 1913, and notified to the Greek Government on February 13, 1914, relating to the sovereignty of Greece over the other islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, without prejudice to the provisions of the present Treaty relating to the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy and referred to in Article 122, and to the islands lying less than three miles from the coast of Asia. . . .

Section VI. Armenia.

Article 88

Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognises Armenia as a free and independent State.

(1637)

Article 89

Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.

Article 90

In the event of the determination of the frontier under Article 89 involving the transfer of the whole or any part of the territory of the said Vilayets to Armenia, Turkey hereby renounces as from the date of such decision all rights and title over the territory so transferred. The provisions of the present Treaty applicable to territory detached from Turkey shall thereupon become applicable to the said territory. . . .

Section VII.
Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine.

Article 94

The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognised as independent States subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. . . .

Article 95

The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The Mandatory undertakes to appoint as soon as possible a special Commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this Commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The Chairman of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 96

The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

Article 97

Turkey hereby undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 132, to accept any decisions which may be taken in relation to the questions dealt with in this Section.

**Section VIII.
Hedjaz**

Article 98

Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognises the Hedjaz as a free and independent State, and renounces in favour of the Hedjaz all rights and titles over the territories of the former Turkish Empire situated outside the frontiers of Turkey as laid down by the present Treaty, and comprised within the boundaries which may ultimately be fixed.

Article 99

In view of the sacred character attributed by Moslems of all countries to the cities and the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz undertakes to assure free and easy access thereto to Moslems of every country who desire to go there on pilgrimage or for any other religious object, and to respect and ensure respect for the pious foundations which are or may be established there by Moslems of any countries in accordance with the precepts of the law of the Koran. . . .

**Section IX.
Egypt, Soudan, Cyprus.**

I. Egypt.

Article 101

Turkey renounces all rights and title in or over Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from November 5, 1914. Turkey declares that in conformity with the action taken by the Allied Powers she recognises the Protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on December 18, 1914. . . .

Article 109

Turkey renounces in favour of Great Britain the powers conferred upon His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal. . . .

2. Soudan.

Article 113

The High Contracting Parties declare and place on record that they have taken note of the Convention between the British (1638) Government and the Egyptian Government defining the status and regulating the administration of the Soudan, signed on January 19, 1899, as amended by the supplementary Convention relating to the town of Suakin signed on July 10, 1899. . . .

3. Cyprus

Article 115

The High Contracting Parties recognise the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on November 5, 1914. . . .

Section X.
Morocco, Tunis.

Article 118

Turkey recognises the French Protectorate in Morocco, and accepts all the consequences thereof. This recognition shall take effect as from March 30, 1912. . . .

Article 120

Turkey recognises the French Protectorate over Tunis and accepts all the consequences thereof. This recognition shall take effect as from May 12, 1881. . . .

Section XI.

Libya, Aegean Islands.

Article 121

Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges which under the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912, were left to the Sultan in Libya.

Article 122

Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands of the Aegean Sea; Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso) Pscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calymnos (Kalymnos) Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Sini (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

Section XII

Nationality.

Article 123

Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such territory is transferred.

Article 124

Persons over eighteen years of age losing their Turkish nationality and obtaining ipso facto a new nationality under Article 123 shall be entitled within a period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty to opt for Turkish nationality.

Article 125

Persons over eighteen years of age habitually resident in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty and differing in race from

the majority of the population of such territory shall within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty be entitled to opt for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, the Hedjaz, Mesopotamia, Syria, Bulgaria or Turkey, if the majority of the population of the State selected is of the same race as the person exercising the right to opt. . . .

Article 129

Jews of other than Turkish nationality who are habitually resident, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, within the boundaries of Palestine, as determined in accordance with Article 95 will ipso facto become citizens of Palestine to the exclusion of any other nationality. . . .

**Section XIII.
General Provisions.**

Article 136

A Commission composed of four members, appointed by the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan respectively, shall be set up within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, Allied or neutral, who with this object will each be invited to appoint an expert, a scheme of judicial reform to replace the present capitulatory system in judicial matters in Turkey. This Commission may recommend, after consultation with the Turkish Government, the adoption of either a mixed or an unified judicial system.

The scheme prepared by the Commission will be submitted to the Governments of the Allied and neutral Powers concerned. As soon as the Principal Allied Powers have approved the scheme they will inform the Turkish Government, which hereby agrees to accept the new system. . . .

Part IV.

Protection of Minorities.

Article 140

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 141, 145 and 147 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no civil or military law or regulation, no Imperial Iradeh nor official action shall conflict or interfere with

these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, Imperial Iradeh nor official action prevail over them.

(1639)

Article 141

Turkey undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief.

The penalties for any interference with the free exercise of the right referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be the same whatever may be the creed concerned. . . .

Article 145

All Turkish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Turkish Government will submit to the Allied Powers a scheme for the organisation of an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation of racial minorities.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts. . . .

Article 147

Turkish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and

control at their own expense, and independently of and without interference by the Turkish authorities, any charitable, religious and social institutions, schools for primary, secondary and higher instruction and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. . . .

Article 151

The Principal Allied Powers, in consultation with the Council of the League of Nations, will decide what measures are necessary to guarantee the execution of the provisions of this Part. The Turkish Government hereby accepts all decisions which may be taken on this subject. . . .

Part XIII.

Miscellaneous Provisions.

. . . [Military, Naval and Air Clauses; Provisions regarding Prisoners of War; Financial Clauses; and Provisions for Enforcement omitted.]

Article 431

Subject to any special provisions of the present Treaty, at the expiration of a period of six months from its coming into force, the Turkish laws must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Turkish Government in conformity with the present Treaty.

Within the same period, all the administrative and other measures relating to the execution of the present Treaty must have been taken by the Turkish Government. . . .

Source: Lt.-Col. Lawrence Martin, ed., *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923*, 2 vols. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), 2:789–931.

194. Treaty of Peace between Germany and the United States of America, 25 August 1921

The new Republican administration of President Warren G. Harding, which assumed power in the United States in April 1921, sought to conclude a formal peace with Germany as soon as possible. In August, therefore, German and U.S. representatives signed the following brief agreement that gave the United States all the benefits of the Treaty of Versailles but no obligation the U.S. government was reluctant to assume. Almost simultaneously, on 24 and 29 August respectively, U.S. representatives signed similar agreements with Austria and Hungary.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GERMANY,

CONSIDERING that the United States, acting in conjunction with its co-belligerents, entered into an armistice with Germany on 11 November 1918 in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded;

CONSIDERING that the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919 and came into force according to the terms of its Article 440, but has not been ratified by the United States;

CONSIDERING that the Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution, approved by the President on 2 July 1921, which reads in part as follows:

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the (1640) state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by the joint resolution of Congress approved 6 April 1917, is hereby declared at an end.

“Sec. 2. That in making this declaration, and as a part of it, there are expressly reserved to the United States of America and its nationals any and all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages, together with the right to enforce the same, to which it or they have become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed 11 November 1918, or any extensions or modifications thereof; or which were acquired by or are in the possession of the United States of America by reason of its participation in the war or to which its nationals have thereby become rightfully entitled; or which, under the Treaty of Versailles, have been stipulated for its or their benefit; or to which it is entitled

as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; or to which it is entitled by virtue of any Act or Acts of Congress; or otherwise.

...

“Section 5. All property of the Imperial German Government, or its successor or successors, and of all German nationals, which was, on 6 April 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of, or has been the subject of a demand by the United States of America or of any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, and all property of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its successor or successors, and of all Austro-Hungarian nationals which was on 7 December 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of, or has been the subject of a demand by the United States of America or any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States of America and no disposition thereof made, except as shall have been heretofore or specifically hereafter shall be provided by law until such time as the Imperial German Government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively made suitable provision for the satisfaction of all claims against said Governments respectively, of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States of America and who have suffered, through the acts of the Imperial German Government, or its agents, or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its agents, since 31 July 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, whether through the ownership of shares of stock in German, Austro-Hungarian, American, or other corporations, or in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war, or otherwise, and also shall have granted to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America most-favoured-nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce and industrial property rights, and until the Imperial German Government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively confirmed to the United States of America all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States of America during the war, whether in respect to the property of the Imperial German Government or German nationals or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government or Austro-Hungarian nationals, and shall have waived any and all pecuniary claims against the United States of America.”

BEING DESIROUS of restoring the friendly relations existing between the two nations prior to the outbreak of war:

Have for that purpose appointed their Plenipotentiaries . . . [names omitted]—

Who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due from, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the aforesaid joint resolution of the Congress of the United States of 2 July 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.

Article II

With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under the foregoing Article with respect to certain provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties—

1. That the rights and advantages stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Section 1 of Part IV, and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV and XV.

The United States in availing itself of the rights and advantage stipulated in the provisions of that Treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner consistent with the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions.

(1641)

2. That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty, including those mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its consent to such action.

3. That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect to the provisions of Part II, Part III, Sections 2 to 8, inclusive, of Part IV, and Part XIII of that Treaty.
4. That, while the United States is privileged to participate in the Reparation Commission, according to the terms of Part VIII of that Treaty, and in any other Commission established under the Treaty or under any Agreement supplemental thereto, the United States is not bound to participate in any such Commission unless it shall elect to do so.
5. That the periods of time to which reference is made in Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles shall run, with respect to any act or election on the part of the United States, from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article III

The present Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional forms of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect immediately on the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place as soon as possible at Berlin.

Source: Lt.-Col. Lawrence Martin, ed., *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923*, 2 vols. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), 2:945–948.

195. Robert Graves, "Recalling War," 1938

Approximately two decades after the armistice, when war once again threatened in Europe, Robert Graves wrote nostalgically and sardonically of his memories of the previous conflict. He captured not only the waste and horror but also the exhilaration and camaraderie of the experience.

Entrance and exit wounds are silvered clean,

The track aches only when the rain reminds.

The one-legged man forgets his leg of wood,

The one-armed man his joined wooden arm.

The blinded man sees with his ears and hands

As much or more than once with both his eyes.

Their war was fought these twenty years ago

And now assumes the nature-look of time,

As when the morning traveller turns and views

His wild night-stumbling carved into a hill.

What, then, was war? No mere discord of flags

But an infection of the common sky

That sagged ominously upon the earth

Even when the season was the airiest May.

Down pressed the sky, and we, oppressed, thrust out

Boastful tongue, clenched fist and valiant yard.

Natural infirmities were out of mode,

For Death was young again: patron alone
Of healthy dying, premature fate-spasm.
Fear made fine bed-fellows. Sick with delight
At life's discovered transitoriness,
Our youth became all-flesh and waived the mind.

Never was such antiqueness of romance,
Such tasty honey oozing from the heart.
And old importances came swimming back—
Wine, meat, log-fires, a roof over the head,
A weapon at the thigh, surgeons at call.
Even there was a use again for God—
A word of rage in lack of meat, wine, fire,
In ache of wounds beyond all surgeoning.

War was return of earth to ugly earth,
War was foundering of sublimities,
Extinction of each happy art and faith
By which the world had still kept head in air,
Protesting logic or protesting love,
Until the unendurable moment struck—
The inward scream, the duty to run mad.

And we recall the merry ways of guns—
Nibbling the walls of factory and church
Like a child, piecrust; felling groves of trees
Like a child, dandelions with a switch.
Machine-guns rattle toy-like from a hill,
Down in a row the brave tin-soldiers fall:
A sight to be recalled in elder days
When learnedly the future we devote
To yet more boastful visions of despair.

Source: Beryl Graves and Dunstan Ward, eds., *Robert Graves: Complete Poems*, 3 vols. (Manchester: Carcanet, 1997), 91. Reprinted from Robert Graves, *Complete Poems*, Carcanet Press Limited, 1991.

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Chicago Manual of Style

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Roberts, P. M., S. C. Tucker (2005). World War I Documents (1920 Onward). In *The Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History* (pp.). Retrieved from <http://legacy.abc-clio.com.eproxy.lib.hku.hk/reader.aspx?isbn=9781851094257&id=WW1E.2148>