

**ALLIANCE PLANNING
AND COALITION WARFARE:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
APPROACHES**

Edited by

DR. HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR.



Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
"Strengthening Democracies Through Knowledge"



ALLIANCE PLANNING AND COALITION WARFARE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

Edited with an Introduction by
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Institute for Strategic Research
Belgrade, 2019

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Layout and Graphics:

EtnoStil - Belgrade

ISBN 978 - 86 - 81121 - 24 - 5

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CONTENTS

Introduction	7
Challenges in Coalition Warfare: The Case of the Netherlands, by <i>Jan Hoffenaar</i>	x
Romania and the Entente: The Uncertainties of an Alliance, by <i>Daniela Șișcanu</i>	x
Scandinavian Military Coalition and Volunteers in the Baltic States, 1919, by <i>Mikkel Kikkerbaek</i>	x
Defending the Åland Islands: Swedish-Finnish Joint Operational Planning in the Late 1930s, by <i>Fredrik Eriksson</i>	x
Logistical Problems of Joint Operations from the Point of View of An Ally, in Historical Perspectives: Eastern Front, 1941, by <i>Viktor Andahazi Szeghy</i>	x
Informal Yet Close Allies: Greek-British Cooperation and the Creation of the First Greek Motorized Division in the Second World War, by <i>Dēmētrios N. Christodoulou</i>	x
The Organization of Multilateral Warsaw Pact Military Intelligence Coordination (1964-1990), by <i>Jordan Baev</i>	x
The Role of Diplomacy in Alliance Making between Israel and Jordan during Two Decades of Eruptions, by <i>Orit Miller Katav</i>	x
Diplomatic and Military Aspects of Czechoslovakia in the Gulf War Coalition, 1990-1991, by <i>Petr Janoušek</i>	x

The Balkan Pact as an Example of Coalition Planning, by <i>Tatjana Milošević</i>	x
NATO and the Second Conflict on Cyprus, 1964: The (Failed) Plan to Establish a NATO Peacekeeping Force, by <i>Stefan Maximilian Brenner</i>	x
The Role of Slovakia in Alliance Warfare throughout the 20th Century, by <i>Miloslav Čaplovič</i> and <i>Matej Medvecký</i>	x
Georgian Armed Forces in Contemporary Coalition Warfare, by <i>Lana Mamphoria</i>	x
Polish Armed Forces in NATO Multinational Operations: Strategic Threats or Chances? by <i>Dariusz Kozerawski</i>	x
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Its Role in Russia's Foreign Policy, by <i>Vladlena. Tikhova</i>	x
Slovenia in NATO: A Defense Alliance between the Political Elite and the People, by <i>Vladimir Prebilič</i> and <i>Damijan Guštin</i>	x
The Impact of Neutrality on National Doctrine Development, by <i>Veljko Blagojevic</i>	x

Introduction

Sir Winston Churchill, from the level of a British Army subaltern fighting dervishes in the Sudan, to service as an Infantry battalion commander in the trenches during the Great War, and finally as British Prime Minister during the world-wide conflagration of the Second World War (and later), had unparalleled experience as a practitioner of war. Near the end of World War II, after Great Britain had fought its adversaries veritably alone in 1940 and was then a partner in a massive coalition, exclaimed that, “There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is to fight without them.”¹

The papers in this anthology, all presented at the 18th annual conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group, held 16-20 April 2018 in Belgrade, Serbia, highlight national and international challenges and concerns in building and operating with allies in a coalition environment. They were written in response to the conference theme, “Alliance Planning and Coalition Warfare: Historical and Contemporary Approaches.”

The first essay, “Challenges in Coalition Warfare: The Case of the Netherlands,” was written by Dr. Jan Hoffenaar, the Head of the Research Division at the Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague, and Professor of Military History at Utrecht University. In this essay, the author distinguishes historical “alliances according to the level of agreement among the alliance members and the degree of distribution of capabilities within the alliance,” and provides a diagram illustrating these relationships. He then analyzes the Netherlands’ historical experience with coalitions, suggesting that more recently,

¹ Winston Churchill, *The Irrepressible Churchill: Stories, Sayings and Impressions of Sir Winston Churchill* (London: Robson Books, 1987), n.p.

these alliances have been more in the nature of “capability-aggregating” alliances. Indeed, the Netherlands continues to be “highly dependent on the explicit and implicit support of allies for its defense and existence as an independent state.”

Dr. Daniela Siscanu of Romania has contributed the interesting essay “Romania and the Entente: The Uncertainties of an Alliance,” to this collection of scholarly papers. She examines Romania’s participation in World War I, attributing the country’s motivation to accomplishing the historical goal of national reunification. In doing so, she further analyzes why Romania joined the Entente and addresses the challenging negotiation process between Bucharest and the Entente powers, focusing on Romania’s efforts to manage complicated diplomatic arrangements, to find ways of compensating for its weakness, and to fulfill its own national goals. An additional factor was Romania’s need to counterbalance Russia’s ambitions in Southeast Europe and force Russia to respect the Alliance’s commitments towards Romania. “Ultimately,” the author concludes, “Bucharest’s decision to fight alongside the Entente Allies resulted in the achievement of its national unity in 1918.”

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania gained their independence from Russia after World War I. The specter of Russian domination lingered, as the Russian Revolution and the subsequent Bolshevik assumption of power had thrown the nation into chaos and civil war between Red and White Russian forces. German troops occupied a significant portion of the Baltics at the end of the war, but with their withdrawal, a power vacuum followed. The victorious Allies wanted to contain the spread of Bolshevism by filling the power void, and a proposal to have an allied Scandinavian military force occupy the region arose. This paper, written by Dr. Mikkel Kikkerbaek of Denmark, examines the various plans, mainly advocated by the British, to deploy a

volunteer Scandinavian military force in the Baltic states in 1919. Numerous disagreements ensued, particularly over force funding, with the result that the “Scandinavian effort in the Baltic States was subsequently small and fragmented.”

The Åland Islands, located between Sweden and Finland, dominate the Baltic Sea and control entry into the northern port of the Baltic, the Bottenhavet. Dr. Fredrik Eriksson, Department of Military Studies, Swedish Defence University, discusses in his paper “Defending the Åland Islands: Swedish-Finnish Joint Operational Planning in the Late 1930s,” the defense of Åland from a historical perspective, focusing on the joint operational planning prior to the outbreak of World War II. He also examines the defense plans, highlighting anticipated operational problems and strategic/ operational limitations of the plan. The plans of the 1930s should be seen in the light not only of rearmament, but also as part of the general revision of the defense plans in Sweden and Finland leading up to Second World War.

Hungarian Maj. Dr. Viktor Andahazi Szeghy identifies examples of the supply problems that the Royal Hungarian Army, as a subordinate military ally, faced during the 1941 Eastern Campaign in his study “Logistical Problems of Joint Operations from the Point of View of An Ally,in Historical Perspectives: Eastern Front, 1941.” The Axis powers on the Eastern Front were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia, all fighting under German command. The Germans and the Hungarians were responsible for various aspects of their respective military sustainment. Cash, food, horse fodder, fuel, and German-made ammunition were the responsibility of the German supply service, while the Hungarian logistical services provided the Hungarian “cultural” foods (e.g., bacon and spices), uniforms, and Hungarian-manufactured weapons and ammunition. The vast distances on the Eastern Front, coupled with a grossly inadequate road and rail infrastructure subject to

weather extremes, made logistical sustainment an especially challenging component of coalition military operations on the Eastern Front.

Greek historian Dr. Dēmētrios N. Christodoulou examines the establishment, force structure, and tactical employment of the 19th Greek Motorized Division during combat operations against the Germans in 1941, through the aid of the British in the first half of 1941. In “Informal Yet Close Allies: Greek-British Cooperation and the Creation of the First Greek Motorized Division in the Second World War,” he highlights the early discussions about the type of heavy weapons and vehicles for the unit, comparing motorized, mechanized, and mixed horse cavalry formations. Details of weaponry and vehicle are also provided. The author concludes, “Despite the crushing superiority of their opponents, on both the Albanian and Bulgarian fronts, the Greek Army managed in various ways to overcome their technological weakness, sometimes by despoiling their opponents and sometimes improvising – and this despite their inexperience in the creation and use of motorized units.”

Dr. Jordan Baev of Romania, an eminent historian of the Cold War, has conducted extensive research in the archives of many former Warsaw Pact nations. Most recently, his research has revealed more than 50,000 pages of previously unknown documents from Bulgarian Military Intelligence records, including protocols, correspondence, and confidential reports about the multilateral Warsaw Pact military intelligence coordination. Dr. Baev has used this important cache of documents in his superb essay “The Organization of Multilateral Warsaw Pact Military Intelligence Coordination (1964-1990)” to initially trace the Bulgarian, then the Warsaw Pact and NATO intelligence systems. He then chronicles in rich detail the proceedings of the first Warsaw Pact multilateral intelligence conference (held in Moscow in March 1955, and organized by the KGB), with the participation of eight

East European delegations of foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence services, to the last Warsaw Pact intelligence in 1990, only some six months before the Pact's dissolution. This paper also makes a superb contribution to one's understanding of the activities and effectiveness of opposing blocs during the Cold War.

In "The Role of Diplomacy in Alliance Making between Israel and Jordan during Two Decades of Eruptions," Dr. Orit Miller Katav provides a nationalistic Israeli perspective on the role of Jordan during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Using mainly published Israeli sources and mixed unclassified U.S. intelligence reports, she highlights Jordan's difficult neutral stance during the Gulf War, and how covert negotiations with Israel at that time led to a formalized peace treaty between the two former adversaries in October 1994. "The role of diplomacy," she concludes, "had proven itself to be the main resource for preventing and ending wars.

Ironically, the Warsaw Pact had not even been dissolved when Czechoslovakia decided to join the coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990. This interesting paper, written by Dr. Petr Janousek of the Czech Republic, examines Czechoslovakia's participation in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm coalition that liberated Kuwait in 1990-1991. His paper is entitled "Diplomatic and Military Aspects of Czechoslovakia in the Gulf War Coalition, 1990-1991." It focuses on the reasons why Prague participated in the international effort aimed at driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and describes why it was advantageous for Czechoslovakia to engage in this multinational coalition effort. Based on archival evidence and observations of soldiers who deployed to the Persian Gulf, this paper analyzes the transformation of Czechoslovak relations with former enemies from NATO, especially the United States. Against the backdrop of the operations of the coalition aimed to topple Saddam Hussein, the paper explores

whether Czechoslovak soldiers experienced a transformation of values during their deployment in the Persian Gulf, and how challenging it was for them to discard the history of their country's membership in the Warsaw Pact and participate in a newly-formed international coalition.

Dr. Tatjana Milošević of Serbia has mined the Diplomatic Archives, the Military Archives, and the Archives of Yugoslavia, as well as by using the relevant and contemporary literature, in her paper, "The Balkan Pact as an Example of Coalition Planning." In this study, she examines internal and external determining factors of the political and military alliance of the three Balkan states – Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey – in the early 1950s. It also analyzes the various reactions of the three countries to the changes in international relations that affected the degree and intensity of their military, political, economic, and cultural cooperation. The paper also defines the main differences – mostly ideological and political – which proved to be insurmountable in the way they affected the ultimate reach of the alliance and its role on the international stage.

"NATO and the Second Conflict on Cyprus, 1964: The (Failed) Plan to Establish a NATO Peacekeeping Force" is the subject of the paper by German Army Major Dr. Stefan Maximilian Brenner. Cyprus had been placed under the administration of the United Kingdom (UK) in 1878 and was formally annexed in 1914 (at the beginning of World War I). It gained its independence from the UK in 1960, with the northern part of the island being administered by Turkish-Cypriots, and the southern region by the Greek-Cypriots. They were not in agreement over political power sharing formulas, causing intercommunal violence to break out in late 1963. The Cypriot independence treaty had designated the UK, Greece, and Turkey as "guarantor powers," with the right to intervene with armed force in the event of a civil war. Of these three nations, the UK was the only relatively neutral country, but was unwilling to

shoulder the burden alone and therefore urged its U.S. partner and NATO to set up a NATO peacekeeping force for this purpose. The author chronicles and assesses the behind-the-scenes negotiations to encourage the UK to form this peacekeeping force, and later for NATO to establish such a force for Cyprus. "The French," according to the author, "claimed to understand the NATO treaty had been signed exclusively for the purpose of a collective defense against a Soviet aggression." This paper highlights, using the 1964 Cyprus paradigm, the challenges of establishing coalitions.

Colonel Dr. Miloslav Čaplovič, Director, and Mgr, Matej Medvecký, (Institute of Military History, Bratislava, Slovakia), have contributed "The Role of Slovakia in Alliance Warfare throughout the 20th Century" to this conference anthology. In this study, the authors trace Slovakia's participation in and support of coalition warfare from the period preceding the Great War to 1993, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact when Czechoslovakia split, to the Slovak Republic's admission to NATO in 2004. In order to isolate and identify Slovakian actions during the period of the existence of Czechoslovakia, a difficult challenge in this context, the authors used extensive military records and other contemporary and historical sources.

The Georgian Armed Forces have been the subject of European and worldwide attention, particularly since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Lana Mamphoria, M.A., who is currently employed at the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, examines in "Georgian Armed Forces in

Contemporary Coalition Warfare," Georgia's contribution to international missions, as part of coalition forces, to promote stability worldwide and bolster its international position as a participant in the global security system. Georgia's decision to fight a possible war alongside Euro-Atlantic partners is seen by the author as a strategic objective and cornerstone of foreign policy to balance Russia's influence

in the region and enhance the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. This paper highlights the benefits that Georgia receives from coalition partnership and how it promotes defense the transformation process and institutional reforms. This fine paper makes a valuable addition to the study of historical and contemporary coalition warfare.

The Polish Armed Forces have been a consistent and stalwart contributor, even while a member of the Warsaw Pact, to United Nations and other coalition peace enforcement, stabilization, and even combat operations. This extensive history is outlined in "Polish Armed Forces in NATO Multinational Operations: Strategic Threats or Chances?" by retired Polish Army Colonel Dr. Dariusz Kozerawski. Poland was the first Eastern Bloc country which sent military contingents to UN peace operations (first in 1973, UNEF II). The issues of international political aspects of Polish participation and close cooperation with foreign partners (NATO, American military contingents, etc.) are based on unique results of archival research conducted by the author. Moreover, the article also presents the role and tasks of Polish Military Contingents' participation in peace and stabilization operations regarding strategic threats and chances of Polish security policy. This paper is based on unpublished archival documents and unique field research conducted in zones of NATO multinational operations, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Russian Federation's Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed on 15 May 1992. It was joined by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Later, in 1993, this treaty was also signed by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia. In 2002, the CST obtained the status of an international organization and CST turned into the CSTO. This is the subject of Dr. Vladlena Tikhova's interesting study, "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Its Role in Russia's Foreign Policy." This alliance, as noted by the Russian author, is of

“special importance for Russia is the Central Asian region, which is why it seeks to maintain stability in Central Asia and is determined to place special emphasis on cooperative efforts within the CSTO.”

“Slovenia in NATO: A Defense Alliance between the Political Elite and the People,” is the title of the paper contributed by Dr. Vladimir Prebilič (Professor in the Defense Studies Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) and Dr. Damijan Guštin (Director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Ljubljana). In this study, the authors examine the evolution of the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) from the early 1990s, when it served as a territorial defense organization, to its transformation as a regular armed service in 1994. As Slovenia sought NATO membership, the SAF was reorganized and consisted of an all-volunteer forces with 7,600 professional officers and other ranks. In 2005, the transformation of the SAF was introduced with the main goal of specialization. However, the economic crisis beginning in 2009 caused the entire defense system to be greatly underfinanced. The consequence was the stagnation of further development that left the SAF unprepared when required to execute its defense tasks. The authors adroitly use public opinion polls and surveys when analyzing public opinion towards gaining NATO membership, and which enhances the value of this study.

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Veljko Blagojevic, Serbian Army, examines the key theory and practice of doctrinal development and achievements in the field of defense and security policy of the neutral states in “The Impact of Neutrality on National Doctrine Development.” Every neutral state, according to the author, has adopted its own concept of neutrality, concerning its unique tradition, geopolitical position, and national interests. Nevertheless, there are certain levels of similarity in doctrinal solutions of contemporary neutral countries, such as total defense, conscript army, reliance on national defense industry, and engaging in

international crisis management. There are “successful” examples of neutrality concepts, such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, but also different ones, such as Belgium and Nederland before 1949, etc. This paper also analyzes the key experiences of European neutral states in the field of foreign policy, as well as security and defense doctrine and policy.

Uniformed and civilian military historians, from the Balkans to the Baltics, and from the United States and Western Europe to Georgia, have examined in the papers in this anthology historical and contemporary paradigms of alliance planning and coalition warfare. Their scholarly efforts have made an important contribution to the academic study and practical application of future defense analyses and studies.

Challenges in Coalition Warfare: The Case of the Netherlands

by

Jan Hoffenaar


ABSTRACT: *This article starts with a few general observations on the phenomenon of military alliances and on the connection between these alliances and actual military operations. Then these observations will be briefly linked to experiences of the Netherlands regarding coalition warfare.*

In very general terms, an alliance is a formal contingent commitment by two or more states to some future action. One must bear in mind that, in addition to open alliances, there are secret alliances and alliances that are never formalized by a treaty. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, alliances, in principle sanctioned by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, have tended to be ad hoc in nature (e.g., “coalitions of the willing and able”).

Alliances can translate themselves into the course of events on the ground through different levels. At the strategic level, each country takes part in an alliance on the basis of its own interests, perceptions, assessments, and capabilities. These aspects determine the agreements made regarding the number and type of troops that the allies are required to contribute in different circumstances. Practical experience has shown that these aspects also determine the extent to which the agreements referred to are complied with. At the operational level, the

specific course of a war is strongly influenced by the command relationships in place, since these relationships are decisive in the preparation and execution of operation plans. At the tactical level, the course of an engagement can be determined by differences in doctrine, regulations, and communication. All of these aspects played a part in early modern and modern history, and they continue to play a part today.

Not all alliances are the same. The specific nature of military cooperation can therefore differ. One can distinguish alliances according to the level of agreement among the alliance members and the degree of distribution of capabilities within the alliance.² Doing so results in the following diagram.



The clearest example of a category A alliance – that is, of an extended deterrence alliance – is NATO. There is general agreement among member states in terms of security and defence policies, while

² Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008* (Washington, D.C., 2009), liii-liv.

the United States has by far the most military and other capabilities. This means that the alliance's political and military strategy, and therefore the military action that the alliance takes, is to a large extent determined by the U.S., the *primus inter pares* of the alliance. The Warsaw Pact can be classified as having been a category B alliance – in other words, an imposed alliance – certainly in terms of military planning. The alliances formed by Napoleon at the height of his power can likewise be said to have been category B alliances. These alliances were imposed by a powerful state that had the most capabilities and that used its power to secure its own interests at military strategic and operational levels without really taking the smaller alliance members into account. It should of course be noted in this regard that realities and dynamics in the two empires referred to were often complex and far from black and white. Category C alliances, namely capability-aggregating alliances, are formed by states that have more or less the same interests and capabilities for the purpose of achieving a common objective. A good example of such an alliance is the Convention of Alliance between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed in Belgrade on 14 August 1920. The convention was aimed against a Habsburg restoration and the growing influence of Hungary in the region. Fortunately, one never discovered what strategic and operational complications, in military terms, this convention would have led to in practice. We could also place the most recent international missions in category C. Category D alliances are single-issue alliances. As such, the allies share only one aim and differ strongly from each other in other respects. Furthermore, capabilities are more or less evenly distributed in these alliances. The best-known example is the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939.


In addition to the level of agreement among alliance members and distribution of capabilities within the alliance, one can distinguish

alliances according to the nature of the agreements made between the alliance members. In this context, a distinction is usually made between defence pacts, neutrality and non-aggression pacts, and ententes. Defence pacts oblige signatories to intervene militarily on the side of any alliance member state that is attacked. Other than NATO, the Treaty of Brussels signed in 1948 is one of the many examples of such an alliance. Article IV of this treaty states that, "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."³ Defence pacts are stronger if, in peacetime, signatories conclude specific agreements regarding the strategy to be pursued, and operation plans and command in the event of a crisis; in other words, if such agreements are in place prior to the unfolding of any crisis. Neutrality and non-aggression pacts specify that parties remain militarily neutral if any cosignatory is attacked or attacks. Basically, the signatories promise that they will not engage in military action against each other. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact is a good example of this alliance type, which is less relevant in this conference. In ententes, the third alliance type, the signatories pledge consultation or cooperation, or both, in the event of a crisis. Many treaties of friendship fall within this category. Indeed, the United Nations operates according to entente principles. Recent international missions, each of which can be seen as an ad hoc entente, resulted from this *modus operandi*.

The experiences of the Netherlands regarding military operations in a coalition context show the great diversity of these kinds of operation in practice, and also how challenging they often are. When it

³ Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (17 March 1948), Article IV.

officially gained independence from the Spanish Empire in 1648 following an eighty-year struggle, the Netherlands was a geographically small but strategically located and economically wealthy country. Territorial expansion in Europe was never one of its aims. The only thing that mattered was the protection of its leading position in world trade and the fishing industry of the time. In 1672, a coalition that consisted of England, France, and a few German rulers came close to militarily wiping the young state off the map. Because of this experience and the aggressive political course of King Louis XIV of France, the Dutch government concluded that allies were essential to the territorial defence of the Netherlands.



In keeping with this conclusion, a defensive alliance was concluded with England in 1678 (category C/D). Until after the Second World War, Dutch security and defense policy was based on the idea that England/Great Britain would come to the aid of the Netherlands if

the latter was attacked. The Netherlands and England operated as allies in the Nine Years' War (1688-1697), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The Southern Netherlands, an area more or less commensurate with modern-day Belgium, was the main theater of war. In practice, Anglo-Dutch cooperation was seldom a happy marriage. Both countries were constantly at odds about the strategy that should be pursued and the generals were always arguing about the operation plans. This had in part to do with the fact that, to the Dutch, these wars concerned the continued existence of the Netherlands. These wars were therefore more of an existential matter to the Dutch than they were to the English/British. In proportional terms, the Dutch made a greater effort, while the English/British, whose country became relatively more powerful over the years, claimed the key positions of command. Moreover, the English/British seemed to focus primarily on maintaining the option of exiting the war, and this influenced the operational decisions of Marlborough and all the other British generals.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Netherlands became a powerless ally of Britain and Prussia. From 1795, it very rapidly came under the wing of revolutionary France. British troops did indeed come to the aid of the Netherlands when the country was invaded by French troops in 1793 and 1794, but they had departed prematurely, while Prussian troops had withdrawn in connection with the war in Poland. The support of allies was therefore not unconditional. In 1795, France forced the Netherlands to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance (category C). In practice, this meant that France assisted the Netherlands militarily whenever and however doing so was convenient to France, such as in response to the Anglo-Russian invasion of 1799. It also meant that France demanded so many Dutch troops for its own wars that the Netherlands was unable to defend its own

territory. In 1806, the Netherlands became a kingdom with a brother of Napoleon on the throne. In 1810, it became part of the First French Empire. The Netherlands no longer had any say regarding strategy or where and how its troops were deployed.

At the Congress of Vienna, which was held from 1814 to 1815, the great powers placed the Netherlands back on the map. It was even given the Southern Netherlands, although it had to cede this territory following the secession of Belgium in 1830. From that time, security policies of the Netherlands were again based on the assumption that Great Britain, and later also France, would assist the Netherlands if it was attacked. The country itself maintained a neutral course, at least in Europe, because in the East Indies (the present-day Republic of Indonesia) the Netherlands – with the tacit approval of Great Britain – shifted in the nineteenth century to an aggressive, imperialist policy of occupation. When German troops invaded the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 as part of their Westfeldzug against France, the hope of allied assistance proved to be largely based on an illusion (category D). Resistance to the invasion was neutralized far more rapidly than had been expected: the Netherlands capitulated after just five days. Partly because of the rapidity with which Dutch military resistance collapsed, French troops could not arrive in time to assist. The British were hardly involved in the Battle of the Netherlands. It is relevant to note that the French only entered the southwestern part of the Netherlands with the intention of preparing a forward defensive position for France. It was never their intention to assist in the defence of the Netherlands as a whole. Operational cooperation, to the extent there was any at all, was extremely limited.

The Netherlands had another disappointing experience at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, when Japanese forces rapidly overran the rest of Southeast Asia, including the Dutch East Indies. On

28 December 1941, a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor, American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces in East Asia were placed under the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) for the purpose of protecting British and Dutch interests in the region. However, following the fall of the supposedly impregnable British stronghold of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the British and Americans were no longer willing to pull out all the stops for the joint defence of the Dutch East Indies. They remained only because they did not wish to openly abandon the Netherlands. They did not send reinforcements, however. The result was a half-hearted joint defense during the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942 that ended in a crushing defeat for the Allies. Although tactical and communication problems certainly played a part, divergent strategic considerations and, to a lesser extent, debatable operational decisions within the coalition determined the outcome of the battle. This coalition therefore also belongs in category D.

The centuries-old narrative of the Netherlands being highly dependent on the explicit and implicit support of allies for its defense and existence as an independent state continued with the liberation of the country in 1944 to 1945. Dutch politicians and military personnel had no say in the matter. The course of the liberation campaign was entirely in Allied hands. There was certainly friction at the strategic level – for instance about the question as to whether the port of Antwerp should first be secured or, alternatively, an immediate dash should be made for Germany's industrial heartland – and this friction affected the direction of the advance and the speed with which parts of the Netherlands were liberated. At the lower level, the Canadians or the smaller nations were at times unhappy about the British, who were in command. Nevertheless, there was general agreement among the Allies. This was therefore an example of a category C coalition.

The Second World War had made two things clear: first, the Netherlands could never again hope that a subsequent war in Europe would bypass its territory and, second, preparations for the expected total war had to be made in peacetime with future allies. The Netherlands therefore fully committed itself to NATO. Although the Netherlands, like every member state, enjoyed national autonomy within certain margins, it complied with NATO's strategies, operation plans, doctrines, exercise and training requirements, and requirements regarding materiel. NATO would consequently filter through all levels into the operations of the Netherlands armed forces. It is therefore a good example of a category C coalition.

Following the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands, like many other countries, participated in ad hoc "coalitions of the willing and able" that were in principle approved by a resolution of the Security Council. It soon became apparent that coalition operations were by no means straightforward. In 1993, for example, the Netherlands made troops available for the six safe areas in Bosnia that were to be managed by UNPROFOR. The Dutch battalion ended up in a hopeless situation in the Srebrenica enclave. The controversy concerning the absence of allied air support in July 1995 continues to this day. Coalition cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan was also not without its challenges. Examples in this regard include the sluggish decision-making procedures, the many caveats of the member states, the difficulties in formulating clear strategies and more concrete short-term objectives that were appropriate in terms of achieving longer-term objectives, as a result of which member states each chose their own way, and differences in attitudes, doctrines, and so on. Most international missions can therefore be classified as category C alliances, but the level of agreement is usually somewhat lower than is the case regarding

NATO's main task and preparations associated with performing that task.

This article provided a conceptual introduction to the theme "Alliance Planning and Coalition Warfare: Historical and Contemporary Approaches." The few examples taken from the history of the Netherlands show the tremendous diversity of this theme.

Romania and the Entente: The Uncertainties of an Alliance

by

Daniela Şişcanu

ABSTRACT: *Romania's participation in the First World War was perceived as a chance to accomplish the historical goal of national reunification. During the neutrality period, Romania sought to negotiate a better deal with the Entente powers aiming at securing an approval for Bucharest's territorial demands. This paper will analyze how Romania started her gravitation towards the Entente and the rationale behind this strategic decision. The analysis aims to address the negotiation process between Bucharest and the Entente powers, focusing on Romania's efforts to manage complicated diplomatic arrangements, to find ways of compensating her weakness, and to fulfilling her national goals. At the same time, it is important to underline that the proximity to Russia marked Romania's history in a negative manner. As a result, the Romanian-Russian relations were brimming with reluctance, suspicion, and distrust as regards the potential Russian intentions. In this logic, joining the Western powers was also seen as a way to counterbalance Russia's ambitions and force her to respect the alliance commitments towards Romania.*

Romania's participation in the First World War was perceived as a chance to accomplish the historical goal of its national unification with the provinces inhabited by Romanians: Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. This generated a major dilemma: an alliance with Austria-

Hungary would have meant the loss of Transylvania and Bukovina while an alliance with Russia would have prevented the reunification of Bessarabia. For the Romanian political elite, the decision to enter the global conflagration was subordinated to a series of geopolitical and economic rationales. The geopolitical rationalities that shaped the political deliberations in Bucharest were dominated both by fear of Russia's expansion to the south and the creation of a greater Slavic state in the Balkan Peninsula.

A compromise was reached on 3 August 1914, when Bucharest declared its neutrality in the nascent world war. During neutrality, Romania sought to negotiate a better deal aiming at securing approval for Bucharest's demands.

The decision makers from Bucharest agreed as undisputable fact that this global conflict was the expression of a competition for a new balance of power in Europe and that Russia's main war goal was to reach Constantinople.⁴ In this context, it was considered that Romania would have to face two major dangers. On the one hand, there was the danger of being transformed into a satellite state by the Russian Empire, since the only way to connect Russia with Constantinople was through Romania and this would bring Bucharest under heavy political control.⁵ On the other hand, from an economic point of view, Russia gaining control over the Black Sea – the control over the maritime commercial routes – would also mean an economic subordination for Romania. At the same time, an eventual victory of the Entente would allow Russia to fulfill its strategic goals. It would also mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, according to Bucharest's calculations, it would represent a chance to bring Transylvania back home. Following

⁴ Mihail E. Ionescu, *Românii în Marele Război. Anul 1916* (București: Editura militară, 2017), 13.

⁵ Constantin Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României* (Ploiești: Karta Graphic, 2014), I: 129.

the thread of these calculations, a victory of the Central Powers might have been beneficial to Romania⁶ (resulting in a reunification with Bessarabia), but it would have also involved the risk of creating a great Slavic state in the Balkans (Bulgaria).

First, Bucharest calculated its options and reached the conclusion that Transylvania was both a more important and a less challenging strategic target. In fact, Bucharest acknowledged the risk of confronting Russia by taking Bessarabia and, given past experiences, Russia's comeback could not be ruled out, despite the war's outcome. Second, the prospects of fighting alongside the Austro-Hungarians against the Western Powers provoked very strong opposition within the political class. It was decided that Transylvania must join the homeland after centuries of imperial domination and the public opinion overwhelmingly supported the alliance with the Western Powers perceived as the country's natural allies.⁷

In this context, neutrality was used by Romania to negotiate a better deal with the Entente Powers, aiming primary at recognizing Bucharest's territorial demands. Through well-articulated diplomatic maneuvers, Romania reached a secret agreement with Russia (Sazonov-Diamandy Agreement, signed on 18 September/1 October 1914) that recognized, in exchange for Romanian neutrality, the unification of the territories of Transylvania and Bukovina at the end of the war. It is worth mentioning that, despite the fact that Romania was in favor of an alliance with the Entente Powers, Bucharest, while reinforced by this agreement, hesitated to make a final decision. The negotiations were carried out by Russia, as the representative of the Entente proved to be very difficult. For instance, when the Russian Army was suffering defeat,

⁶ Gheorghe Cazan and Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță, 1878-1914* (București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979).

⁷ Dumitru Preda, *România și Antanta: avatururile unei mici puteri într-un război de coaliție: 1916-1917* (IASI: Institutul European, 1998).

Petrograd was insisting on Romania's entering the war, but when the Russian Army was successful, their position was completely the opposite.⁸

At the political level, joining the Western Powers was also seen as a way to counterbalance Russia's ambitions and force her to respect the treaty commitments towards Romania. Thus, the breaking out of the First World War found Romania in a favorable strategic position that allowed it, despite a weak military potential, to manage complicated diplomatic schemes and choose according to her preferences and national interests. It is no less true that Romania sought to join the war at a decisive moment when it could have a major effect on the outcome as to negotiate on more favorable grounds with the great powers and find ways of compensating its weakness and fulfilling its national goals.

The Romanian historiography emphasizes the fact that Romania was urged to enter the war by the Allies, using the imperative – now or never.⁹ The Entente was determined to prevent the disintegration of the Eastern Front due to the situation in Russia. Therefore, it was considered that Romania's entry into the war could provide some improvement in the situation on the front and most desired victories in order to raise the morale and enhance public opinion in Russia.

The situation on the Eastern Front, however, was not the main reason why Romania was urged to entry the war. The Verdun offensive lunched in the spring of 1916 quickly drained French and British resources and only a large diversion on the Eastern Front would have diverted major German forces from the West and restored the overall strategic balance. Since the Brusilov Offensive, after major successes in early summer, was stagnating at the end of July 1916, the need to avoid the collapse of the Russian domestic front and the continuation of the

⁸ Petre Otu, *Românii în Marele Război. Anul 1916* (București: Editura militară, 2017), 56.

⁹ Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României*, 174.

oriental strategic diversion had activated the diplomatic pressure on Bucharest that eventually ended in placing an ultimatum.

Bucharest could no longer postpone the decision to enter the war and focused on acquiring the documents that would recognize as legitimate Romania's territorial demands, namely the alliance treaty with the Entente, signed in Bucharest on 4/17 August 1916.¹⁰ As a result, Romania was pressured by the Allies to enter the war, but at the same time, recognized this unique opportunity to fulfil its national aspirations. On 14/27 August 1916, Romania declared war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Aside from its political aspects, Romania's decision to enter the war was also influenced by military factors. Russian military forces under Gen. Brusilov's command were able to penetrate the Hungarian Plain without encountering strong resistance, taking into account the fact that the German troops were having difficulties in helping their ally because of the situation on the Western Front – the preparation of a new offensive by the Entente. At the same time, on the Salonika Front the Allied forces under the command of French General Maurice Sarrail were preparing for an attack. Under these circumstances, the Romanian political elite agreed that it would be a mistake to let the Russians enter Hungary by themselves. It is worth mentioning that Bucharest feared that Russia might annex Transylvania.¹¹

It is also important to emphasize that Bucharest's decision to enter the war was also connected to the Austro-Hungarian intentions to initiate peace negotiations with the Entente. A separate peace with Austria-Hungary would put an end to Bucharest's plans concerning Transylvania and Bukovina.

¹⁰ Sergiu Iosipescu, *Regatul României de la neutralitate la cobeligeranță în Marele Război*, in *100 de ani de la deschiderea Frontului Românesc în Primul Războiul Mondial* (București: Editura Militară, 2016), 53.

¹¹ Ionescu, *Românii în Marele Război. Anul 1916*, 12.

On the other side, Russia was somewhat cautious in accepting Romania's entry into the war. The main concern of Russian military commanders was related to the length of the new front, which was almost 1,600 kilometers long. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to defend, without affecting the social and political situation in Russia and not provoking a decisive offensive of the enemy, given the shortage of military equipment.

Indeed, from the military point of view the moment when Romania entered the war was not a favorable one. The Brusilov Offensive had ended, the Germans gave up their offensive on the Western Front and managed to block the French-British offensive on River Somme, while the Allied Army of the Orient was not capable of initiating military offensive operations.

The events that were taking place in Russia, moreover, were destabilizing the situation on the Eastern Front, not only on the military level. For instance, the replacement of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Sazonov with Boris Strumer was a sign that Russia might start negotiations for a separate peace with the Central Powers. Sazonov himself considered that the pro-German party from Russia insisted that Romania should enter the war because a major military failure would have justified a separate peace with Germany – the defeat of Romanian military forces was expected and therefore used to urge the peace negotiations.

As predicted, the expectations concerning the military operations launched by the Romanian Army were too ambitious. While the Romanian troops were advancing in Transylvania, Field Marshal August von Mackensen, the commander of a multinational force consisting of Bulgarian, German, and Ottoman troops, launched a counterattack at Turtucaia. The severe defeat of the Romanian troops forced the Romanian War Council to suspend the Transylvania offensive and to

concentrate on the Mackensen army group instead. The events that took place on the Romanian Front in the autumn of 1916 are an example of how the dynamics and the divergent interests within an alliance can negatively affect the fate of a less important or less powerful actor. Even at the beginning of the military operations, the Romanian government realized that the Allies had failed to fulfill obligations they had assumed through the military convention. For instance, Gen. Sarraill did not launch an offensive on the Salonika Front and the Russians deployed insufficient troops on the battlefield in southeast Romania.¹² These factors meant that the Romanian forces became too strained to put up effective resistance against the enemy advance. So, after a promising beginning, Romanian military forces were defeated and Romania lost an important part of its territory.

Under these circumstances, Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Bratianu had resumed his efforts to convince Paris to deploy a French military mission to Romania. The arrival of the French mission in October 1916, led by Gen. Henri Berthelot, helped rebuild the Romanian defense capacity, reorganize the armed forces, and train them with new and modern military techniques.¹³ The French military presence was also perceived as an important deterrent to counterbalance the Russian troops deployed on Romanian territory. The impact of the French support was soon felt at both psychological and military levels, the Romanian troops being able to recover and stop the German offensive in summer 1917.

The presence of the French Military Mission in Romania shows as well the dynamics between the two great powers of the Entente, Russia and France. The Russian command was insisting on the evacuation of the Romanian Army, Romanian authorities, and the Romanian Royal

¹² Ion M. Oprea, *Romania si Imperiul rus, 1900-1924* (Bucuresti, Albatros, 1998), I: 111.

¹³ Constantin I. Stan, *Generalul Henri M. Berthelot si romanii* (Bucuresti: Paideia, 2008), 9.

family to southern Russia. The total evacuation of the Romanian Army was not justified, though Stavka had advanced several reasons in this respect, such as the collapse of the Romanian economy, the lack of logistics that were necessary in order to start the rebuilding process of the armed forces, the necessity of an efficient defense of the frontline in the Carpathians, etc. However, the French political and military authorities in Romania immediately noticed that the issue of the evacuation of the Romanian Army to Russia was closely linked to the presence of the French Military Mission in Romania. Russia was determined to undermine French intentions to transform Romania into a loyal member of a French military system in Eastern Europe. Moreover, according to some assumptions and speculation that circulated in diplomatic and political circles, Russia's perseverance concerning the Romanian evacuation was a result of the secret negotiations between Germany and the Russian pro-German party for a separate peace which would have granted Russia the right to annex the territory between Prut and the Eastern Carpathians.¹⁴

The year 1916 proved to be disastrous for Romania. Bucharest entered the war at a time when the Entente was facing strong difficulties. The Romanian Army had to fight against numerous enemy forces, on a very long battlefield and was forced to change its initial campaign plan permanently.

From a military point of view, Romania's war strategy proved to be at least uninspired. By choosing Transylvania as a priority objective, the Romanian Army failed to acknowledge the importance of the Bulgarian Army's positions. When the offensive in the mountains failed, the Romanian high command did not take into account the principle of economy of forces by creating a mobile reserve, with which they could

¹⁴ Otu, *Românii în Marele Război. Anul 1916*, 424-425.

reject Falkenhayn's advance. The Romanians did not respect the principle of concentration of the forces, and in no way did a proper concentration of forces lead to the proper concentration of the fighting power.¹⁵

However, despite heavy losses, the Romanian military managed to reorganize and to resist to further attacks. The Romanian government, royal court and public authorities, which relocated to Iasi, guaranteed that Romania would continue to exercise the power of an independent and sovereign state, allied to the Entente Powers.

By summer 1917, the Romanian Army, reorganized and better equipped under the guidance of the French Military Mission, was able to hold its ground. Three battles, decisive for Romania, were fought at Marasti, Marasesti, and Oituz. These battles were fought where the front had become stabilized in early 1917 (which the conflicting sides had thoroughly consolidated for half a year) and represented a turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. The battles of Marasesti in July 1917 and of nearby Oituz in August are considered significant victories in which the Romanian Army established and held the front against the German, Austrian, and Hungarian forces.

The events that took place in Russia in October 1917, however, undermined these successes. These events effectively ended Russian involvement in the war and left Romania isolated and surrounded by the Central Powers, since the Russian troops were quickly and chaotically abandoning their positions. An armistice was called between Romania and Germany and troops were demilitarized, though King Ferdinand refused to sign the treaty imposed by Germany. On 10 November 1918, Romania reentered the war. French armies crossed the Danube. The

¹⁵ M. Zidaru, "Political, Diplomatic and Military Aspects of Romania's Participation in the First World War," *Bulletin of Naval Academy*, https://www.anmb.ro/buletinstiintific/buletine/2018_Issue2/04_FAR/60.pdf

German troops abandoned Bucharest. The King entered the city on 1 December 1918, alongside British and French troops. On the same day, the representatives of Transylvanian Romanians gathered at Alba Iulia and proclaimed the union of Transylvania with Romania.

In conclusion, it is important to underline that Romania's decision to enter the war was a result of its desire to fulfill its historical goal of national reunification. According to Bucharest's calculations, an alliance with the Entente could secure Romania's aspirations.

In spite of all the uncertainties and fears concerning the outcome of the war and the secret negotiations and agreements between the great powers, both Romanian political elite and public opinion overwhelmingly supported the alliance with the Western Powers. It is important to underline that the proximity to Russia marked Romania's history in a negative manner. As a result, the Romanian-Russian relations were brimming with reluctance, suspicion, and distrust as regards the potential Russian intentions. Consequently, joining the Western Powers was also seen as a way to counterbalance Russia's ambitions and force her to respect the alliance commitments towards Romania. Ultimately, Bucharest's decision to fight alongside the Entente Allies resulted in the achievement of its national unity in 1918.

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Scandinavian Military Coalition and Volunteers in the Baltic States, 1919

by

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ABSTRACT: *This article addresses a topic which has previously been sparsely examined: The attempt to create an army of volunteer Scandinavian troops in the Baltic States in 1919.*

The Situation in the Baltic at the End of 1918

Towards the end of the First World War, it became clear to the victorious Allies that important political and military problems would not be solved by the conclusion of peace. That the conclusion of war is often one of the most difficult aspects of warfare became evident to the former Russian Empire. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent Bolshevik assumption of power had thrown the nation into chaos and civil war between Red and White Russian forces. In addition, a range of border states had declared independence, eventually causing a number of civil wars and wars of independence in the region – particularly in the Baltic States. At the end of the war, a significant part of Baltic territory was occupied by German troops, which ensured a fragile peace. But with the withdrawal of German troops, a power vacuum followed.

The new, self-proclaimed states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had neither the time nor the capabilities to build military capacity on their own, which led to a fear of the Bolsheviks using the German

withdrawal as an opportunity to recapture lost territories in the Baltic States. The Allies pursued a number of short-term as well as long-term objectives for the region, including the prevention of the further spread of Bolshevism, and – if possible – toppling the Russian Bolsheviks. To meet this objective, the power vacuum had to be filled as quickly as possible. As a consequence, the idea of having an allied Scandinavian military force occupy the region arose. At the end of 1918, there was an intense diplomatic pressure on the Scandinavian countries to ensure that they would send a joint Scandinavian force to the Baltic States.

The British Plan A

The new Baltic states wished, unsurprisingly, for their German occupiers to leave. But they were also aware that a likely outcome of this would be that the Bolsheviks would try to gain control of the region. The Baltic States were completely reliant on external support. One obvious possibility would be for the Allies to deploy troops there themselves. They had both the military and the political power to carry out such an operation successfully.

So why did the British want a Scandinavian coalition force to occupy the Baltic States when they, from a military point of view, could have carried the task out more efficiently themselves?

After the ceasefire of the Great War, the allied armies shared a desire for laying down their arms and returning to peace. The last thing the British desired was to begin mobilizing economic resources and troops for a dubious crusade into an eastern region which had been left in political and military chaos after the fall of the Russian Empire. As a result, the notion of the intervention of a united Scandinavian military force was born. To achieve success in the Baltic region, it was important for the intervention forces to be able to act as neutrals in a field of

tension between both local and international politics, and not be seen to be holding any imperialist motives. The Scandinavian countries seemed perfectly suited for this task. They had been neutral in the World War, had no ambitions of being great powers, and contrary to many other nations, they were not exhausted from the war, because they had generally managed to avoid sustained combat. Also, historically the Scandinavian countries had strong ties to the Baltic region and would likely also see a benefit in the removal of the Germans from the north, as well as keeping the Bolsheviks away from their own back yard. Furthermore, many observers outside Scandinavia felt that since the Scandinavians had gotten through the World War relatively unscathed, they had a moral obligation to help secure a stable environment in the region.

On the basis of these considerations, the notion arose to deploy troops from the armies of the Scandinavian countries to the Baltic. The idea originated from the Balts themselves, but the Allies were very quick to adopt it.

But how would the Scandinavians react to being approached by the British? In early October 1918, the Foreign Office received a report from the British Military Attaché in Copenhagen, analyzing the situation after a conversation with Swedish politicians. In extension, he remarked:

The Esthonian [*sic*] delegates tell us that they have sounded Mr. Branting [of the Socialist Democratic Party, a labor party] and one of the Swedish Ministers and have received encouraging replies. They did not, they tell us, approach the Danes, assuring – no doubt correctly – that the habitual timidity of the Danish Government in matters of foreign policy would render such a request futile. On the other hand they consider that the Swedes, with their more aggressive and self-assertive temperament, would not shrink from the enterprise provided that the Allies gave it

their countenance and that the Germans did not actually protest – which they would apparently have no grounds for doing."¹⁶

Furthermore, the military attaché inferred that Scandinavian solidarity, having been significantly strengthened during the World War, would mean that if the Swedes could be convinced to take part in the operation, both Norway and Denmark would follow suit.

However, a military intervention in the Baltic region would be far from unproblematic. The Scandinavians rightly feared the consequences of an intervention in the Baltics, where one might risk – or, rather, expect – a military confrontation with the neighboring powers of Russia and Germany. The repercussions would be incalculable. At the same time, they expected a strong domestic resistance towards any thought of taking up arms against the Russians, because of the strong positions held by the labor parties in Scandinavia.

On the other hand, it would be difficult for the Scandinavian countries to flat out reject the allies, who would be coming out of the World War as the undisputed victors in Europe. The Scandinavian countries were inclined to refuse the task, but they thought it most advantageous to not reject the Allies. Thus, at the end of the World War, Scandinavia reacted hesitantly towards the British enquiries.

By the end of October 1918, a document was received from the British representative in Stockholm, Mr. Clive, who had been meeting with the Swedish Foreign Secretary Mr. Hellner. Personally, Mr. Hellner said, he was in favor of Scandinavian intervention, but he predicted that it would be very difficult to convince his four socialist colleagues in the Swedish government to accept this. And regardless, Sweden would not, according to Hellner, act alone but only in full accordance with Denmark and Norway. In short, the message from the Swedes was that, despite

¹⁶ Report dated 12 October 1918, FO 371/3344, National Archive, UK (NA).

their good intentions, they would most likely have to decline the task. A similar message was received from the Danes. The Norwegian reply resembled that of the other two Nordic countries, although the English viewed it somewhat more favorably, as the Foreign Office concluded: "As usual the Norwegians are the most inclined to oblige, but they will probably be both unable and unwilling to act effectively without the cooperation of the Swedes and the Danes, from whom we seem unlikely to get anything more than general sympathy."¹⁷

Ultimately, the Scandinavians declined to send troops to the Baltics. The Scandinavian attitude was a considerable annoyance to the British, who felt that it would be in the interests of the Scandinavians themselves to prevent the spreading of Bolshevism to the neighboring countries. But for the Scandinavian countries, their survival in the World War had not been secured through united fighting, but through united neutrality. The policy of neutrality had vast political and public backing. For obvious reasons, the small countries also feared that a military conflict with the Russian or German troops in the Baltics would pose a threat equal to that of the spreading of Bolshevism.

The Danes and Swedes in particular felt obliged to offer the allies an acceptable alternative in the Baltic question. The Swedes had something to prove after their partially German-friendly attitude during the war, and the Danes wanted to regain the territory of Schleswig, having lost it to the Germans in 1864. And every Scandinavian country had an interest in stopping Bolshevism.

There was, therefore, a willingness to accommodate the wishes of the British, as long as they did not include sending regular army units to the Baltics. Could a solution be found, where the Scandinavian countries remained neutral, but were still helping to fight Bolshevism in the Baltics?

¹⁷ Internal writing, Foreign Office, 1 November 1918, FO 371/3344, NA.

The British Plan B

In fact, the Swedes were the ones to suggest a Plan B: The recruitment of Scandinavian volunteer forces without officially involving the Scandinavian governments. This solution was quickly adopted by the British. In a report from the British representative in Denmark in early January 1919 to the Foreign Office, he wrote: "It seems to me that many objections which lie in the way of our sending regular military expedition against Bolsheviks might be obviated if it were possible to create special voluntary force for service with Finnish and Esthonian [sic] Governments."¹⁸

The idea of an army of volunteer Scandinavians began a whole new discourse to the solution of the Baltic questions, which from 1919 came to be exclusively about the prospect of sending volunteer troops. An army of volunteers posed several advantages for the Scandinavian countries. The British request for Scandinavian troops in the region could be met, thus gaining goodwill from the Allies. Towards the Russians and the Germans, however, they could claim to have nothing to do with the matter officially, since the troops in question were all volunteers. Also, it would be of no financial cost to the Scandinavians, as the money for the recruited troops would be found elsewhere.

The Swedish government even allowed troops from the regular Swedish Army to enlist. The Danes did not go that far, but they did allow a secret export of a large number of Danish "Madsen machine guns" to Britain, knowing that the weapons were sent directly to the Balts, and a portion was allocated to the volunteer Scandinavian troops. The Danish government also agreed to close its eyes to the recruitment of volunteers, as long as it was done covertly.

¹⁸ Kilmarlock to Foreign Office, 2 January 1919, FO 371/3954, NA.

However, it was an urgent matter to deploy the troops to the Baltics. Everywhere in the Baltics, small national units were stretched to the limit. By the end of 1918, Communist Red forces were only 30 kilometers from Reval. When it became obvious that action had to be taken quickly, the Fins sent some 2,000 volunteer soldiers to Estonia. That was an overwhelming military success. Within months, the Fins had succeeded in pushing almost all Red forces out of Estonia. The conclusion was that significant results could be achieved with relatively few recruited troops. This only strengthened the belief that Scandinavian volunteer troops would be the solution to the problems in the Baltic region.

It was hoped that 4,000 Swedish and 2,000 Danish troops could be recruited. There are no known numbers for the Norwegian volunteers, but it appears that the Norwegians kept to the sidelines in this matter.

In Denmark and Sweden recruitment offices – or “information offices” as they were referred to – opened, and recruitment of volunteers began. A surprising number of Scandinavians wanted to join the fighting in the Baltics, and the target number of recruits in Denmark was reached in a matter of months. A Scandinavian army of 8,000 men, including the Fins, was not unrealistic, according to the organizers.

By the beginning of 1919 the troops were available, and the Scandinavian governments had approved of the recruitment. But there was a “tiny” problem: Who would pay?

The British had originally hoped that the Scandinavians would pay for the military intervention in the Baltics. With the transition from conventional, national forces to unofficial volunteer forces, however, it became clear that the funds had to come from somewhere else. The Baltic countries had very limited funds at their disposal, and so the financing problem was left for the British to solve.

At this point, it makes sense to take a closer look at the British policy towards Russia. It was not crystal clear. The British policy in the region had some short-term and some long-term goals. Their short-term goal was to stop the spreading of Bolshevism. In this respect, funding the Scandinavian volunteers made perfect sense. But the British long-term goals were more unclear and pointed to a complete rebuilding of the Russian Empire. It might not be wise to support the Baltic separatist tendencies, if Russia was to be resurrected under one of the White Russian generals, who most certainly did not want Baltic independence.

The dilemma, then, was that supporting the Balts would be money down the drain if the solution to the Russian question was to be found in British cooperation with the White Russian forces.

It seems there was a great deal of internal disagreement and uncertainty within the British Government about which course to follow. In the Foreign Office, in particular, several leading characters advocated for giving the Balts a loan to pay for the recruitment of Scandinavian troops. But other parts of the British power apparatus opposed this. The British Foreign Secretary, Balfour, was among those who favored more support to the Balts. He had tried to persuade Lord Curzon to pressure the Treasury through his acquaintances to provide greater British economic support for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

But Curzon felt that loans to the Estonian and Latvian governments could not be given until the Allies had established a policy in some key areas. Specifically, Curzon listed several questions demanding answers: Was it Allied policy to establish a belt of border states under Allied protection, as a safeguard against Bolshevism spreading to the West? Was it Allied policy to recognize the full independence of the Baltic States *de jure*? Was it Allied policy to fully support these states with financing and equipment, when the Allies had not been willing to send British forces to protect them? Would the Allies

be willing to accept a deal between the Bolsheviks and the Baltic countries, ensuring the full integrity and independence of the latter? And Curzon added:

- Until definite and authoritative statements on these points are forthcoming –
- and the Paris Conference is alone competent to pronounce them – I do not see
- how it is possible for me to take any action, either on behalf of the Foreign
- Office, or by way of recommendation to the other Government Departments to
- act individually in affording assistance, financial or otherwise, to these States.
- Finally, I desire to point out, with reference to the suggestion in the note from
- the French Government of 22nd March, that assistance should be afforded
- simultaneously to General Yudenitch, that such a course would apparently
- conflict with the policy of supporting the Baltic States. General Yudenitch
- represents a form of Russian Imperialism which runs directly counter to the
- aspirations of these States, and aims at their ultimate reabsorption in Russia.¹⁹

It is quite apparent from Curzon's document that a number of significant, unresolved questions were obstructing an effective and results-oriented British policy in the Baltic region. For this reason, British support was only half-hearted. In December 1918, the British provided limited military aid to the Balts in the form of weapons and

¹⁹ Curzon to Balfour, 28 March 1919, FO 608/184, NA.

equipment. Furthermore, the British had promised to equip the Scandinavian volunteers with weapons and uniforms. But the biggest financial burden of pay, insurance, etc., for the recruited troops was left to the Balts themselves.

They were neither economically nor organizationally capable of this task, so only a small number of Scandinavians were dispatched, partly financed by right-wing Danes or Swedes who had an ideological or economic interest in stopping Bolshevism. But the number of Scandinavian volunteers never reached the size and impact originally intended. In all, only about 500 Danish and Swedish volunteers were dispatched in small units without proper leadership and funding. It was far from the actual potential which the recruitment of Scandinavians offered.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be said that the British favored in the Baltic region in the months of late 1918 and early 1919 an anti-Bolshevist fight, which was in alignment with their own short-term goals of containing Bolshevism in Russia. But with more unclear long-term goals, the potential came to nothing. The British wanted a volunteer Scandinavian military force deployed in the Baltic States in 1919, but at the same time, they could not agree on how to invest the necessary means and the necessary involvement in its formation, particularly concerning funding. The creation of a Scandinavian volunteer coalition was therefore left to the Balts, who did not have the money, power, or organization to be equal to the task, and the Scandinavian effort in the Baltic States was subsequently small and fragmented.²⁰

²⁰ This article is based on a yet unpublished research project on Danish voluntary forces in the Baltics during 1919. The project is set for completion in fall 2019.

Defending the Åland Islands: Swedish-Finnish Joint Operational Planning in the Late 1930s

by

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Introduction

The Åland Islands dominate the Baltic Sea, and from its archipelago, it is possible to control entry into the northern part of the Baltic, the Bottenhavet. The position also allows control of the inlet to the Gulf of Finland. Consequently, the islands were of vital strategic

importance for all Baltic powers, particularly for Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Åland had been a part of the Swedish realm until 1809 and was ceded together with Finland to Russia. Although the population was Swedish, the islands became part of Finland in 1917 when Finland liberated itself from Russia.

Many states in northern Europe, for example Sweden and Norway, disarmed considerably during the 1920s, due



to a strong belief in the potential effectiveness of the League of Nations. Although the Nordic countries did not take part in the Great War, pacifist sentiments were strong. In the 1930s, the strategic situation in Europe deteriorated as did the League of Nations. From a Swedish standpoint, rearmament started in 1936 with a General Defense Plan in 1937, preceded by lengthy consecutive Defense Commissions from 1930 to 1936. From the early 1930s, Sweden and Finland jointly planned for the defense of Åland, as well as for a possible Swedish intervention in Finland.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the defense of Åland from a historical perspective focusing on the joint operational planning in the late 1930s. It will examine the defense plans, looking at anticipated operational problems and strategic/operational limitations of the plan. The plans of the 1930s should be seen in the light of rearmament but also as part of the general revision of the defense plans in Sweden and Finland leading up to Second World War.

The Defense of Åland in History

The islands, as mentioned, hold the key strategic position in the Balti and control the inlet to Bottenhavet and the Gulf of Finland. The islands are located close to both Stockholm and to Åbo (Turku). It is an archipelago of almost 7,000 islands and today has a population of approximately 30,000 people.

From a Swedish strategic point of view, the importance of Åland has shifted throughout history. The islands were part of the early medieval kingdom with its powerbase in the central parts of Sweden. Sweden expanded to Finland, and in the thirteenth century reached the innermost parts of the Gulf of Finland. Åland was extremely important during this period and the king had a fortress built at Kastellholm.

Control over the seaways was of course important for the Hanseatic League and other trade states. Åland was thus of utmost importance as it controlled the trading north and south in the Baltic. In 1570, Sweden also controlled parts of western Estonia, and after the 1617 peace in Stolbova, the innermost areas of the Gulf of Finland. From a Swedish point of view, the main enemy in the seventeenth century was Denmark and the Danish fleet. After Swedish victories during the 1650s and 1670s, the strategic situation changed to Sweden's advantage. The navy concentrated in the newly-established naval city of Karlskrona in 1680. The aim was to shut the Danish fleet in the south Baltic, making the northern part safe for shipping. Åland was still fortified, but from the mid-1650s the islands were in a military backwater. In 1700, the Great Northern War started and in 1702, Sweden lost the fortress of Nöteborg (Schlüsselburg) in the innermost portion of the Gulf of Finland. Czar Peter founded Saint Petersburg in 1704 in the same place and initiated the construction of two Russian Baltic fleets, one for the archipelago and one for the open sea.²¹ In 1719, the Russian galley fleet raided the Finnish and Swedish coasts including Åland. In 1719, the Russians burned most of the Stockholm and Åland archipelagos, as a part of a campaign to force Sweden to make peace.²²

The construction of a Russian fleet combined with the threat of the Danish fleet in the south and Russian galleys in the Gulf of Finland changed the strategic situation for the Swedish Navy. First, it had the task of rapidly beating the Danish fleet in the south and then turning north to face the Russians – something that rarely succeeded. The solution was a fortress in the Gulf of Finland – Sveaborg, outside present

²¹ Lars Ericson Wolke, *Sjöslag och rysshärjningar: Kampen om Östersjön under stora nordiska kriget 1700-1721* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2011), 94-124.

²² Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration, 1521-1721: Resource Flow and Organisational Capabilities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 114-134.

day Helsingfors – and a Swedish galley fleet for amphibious warfare in the archipelagos.²³

With Åland in Russian hands after 1809, the islands became a major threat to Sweden not least through the proximity to Stockholm. Russia fortified Åland with a large new fortress at Bomarsund, and reinforced Kastellholm. During the Crimean War in the 1850s, a British-French squadron based on the Swedish island of Gotland destroyed Bomarsund and made incursions into the Gulf of Finland. In the 1856 Peace Treaty in Paris, the allies forced Russia to demilitarise Åland and demolish all fortifications. Only in 1914 did France and Great Britain allow Russia to fortify the islands again. In 1915, the construction began of “Czar Peter’s Sea Bastion,” based on plans from 1907. The plans came after the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The purpose was to protect the entry into the Gulf of Finland with consecutive defensive lines. The outermost line incorporated six coastal artillery batteries on Åland. The Russian garrison on the islands initially consisted of 7,000 troops but decreased gradually during the war. The strong Russian presence on Åland naturally alarmed Sweden. Nothing serious happened on Åland during World War I until the Russian Revolution broke out in November 1917. On Åland, Russian soldiers gathered in Soviets as revolutionary sentiments soared. The situation for the population worsened gradually during the war, peaking in 1917. The Swedish government anticipated violent outbursts on Åland.²⁴

²³ Jan Glete “Sails and Oars: Warships and Navies of the Baltic during the 18th Century (1700-1815),” in *Les Marines de Guerre Européennes XVII-XVIIIe Siècles*, ed. Martine Acerra, José Merino, and Jean Meyer (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1985).

²⁴ Thomas Roth, “Den svenska Ålandsexpeditionen 1918” in *Sverigeochförstavärldskriget: maritimaperspektiv. Sjöhistoriskårsbok 2016–2017* (Lund: Historiska media, 2017), 270.

The Swedish Åland Expedition

In January 1918, a delegation from Åland approached the Swedish King with a petition to reunite Åland with Sweden. The Swedish government was concerned that the civil war would break out on the islands as well, particularly when a Finnish White detachment of around 600 militiamen approached Åland. A few minor skirmishes between Whites and Reds occurred and soon after a Finnish Red detachment reached the islands. On 13 February 1918, the Swedish government sent an expedition of several warships together with infantry. The task was to protect the population and disarm all sides in the war. The Russian soldiers were interned and the disarmed Finnish militias were returned to Finland. The Finnish White government saw the Swedish actions as a “colonial” attempt to reincorporate Åland in Sweden, something that was not really far-fetched.

In late February 1918, a German force arrived on Åland to use it as a steppingstone for reinforcing the Finnish government in the Civil war. For a time, there were Russian, Swedish, and German troops on the islands as well as both sides in the Finnish Civil War. Shortly after the German arrival, the Swedish contingent returned home. After the end of the Finnish Civil War, Sweden, Germany, and Finland agreed to dismantle the Russian fortifications and return Åland to its demilitarised state. The islands’ future was however undecided.

Sweden and Finland disagreed over Åland’s status and to what state Åland should belong. Sweden petitioned the League of Nations to resolve the matter. The Swedish standpoint was that should become Swedish as it was of the utmost strategic importance for Sweden, the population was Swedish, and they had also petitioned Sweden to incorporate Åland. According to the Åland petition, 96 percent of the population supported becoming part of Sweden. The conflict over Åland

affected Swedish-Finnish relations throughout the early 1920s. The Finnish standpoint was that the Swedish expedition in 1918 was an attempt to take over the islands, while Finland fought Communism in the east.²⁵ The League of Nations decided in June 1921 to let Åland remain part of Finland with guarantees for cultural autonomy, self-government, and demilitarisation. The Åland Convention of 1921 is still in place, and was ratified by ten guarantors not including the Russia still embroiled in civil war.²⁶

Åland in Swedish Operational Planning, 1921-1930

Åland in the hands of a hostile power, for example the Soviet Union or Germany, would be a perilous threat to both Sweden and Finland. In May 1921, Commander Lybeck and Major Holmquist presented the Swedish perspective before the League of Nations. The primary point was that an enemy on Åland could stop all sea traffic north and south in the northern Baltic, severing sea communications between southern and northern Sweden with mines, coastal artillery and submarines. Further, an enemy could use the Åland archipelago as a staging point for an attack on Sweden. The distance to the unprotected Swedish coast was short, and an enemy could land close to Stockholm. Finally, hostile airplanes could use Åland as an airbase. The flying time between Åland and Stockholm was only 40-50 minutes.²⁷

²⁵ In the 1920s and 1930s, the language question affected Swedish-Finnish relations as Fennomans, i.e. Finnish nationalists, fought a continuing struggle to marginalise the Swedish minority in Finland.

²⁶ Roth, "Den svenska Ålands expeditionen," and Bertil Stjernfeldt, *Ålandshavochöar – bryggaellerbarriär? Svensk-finskförsvarsfråga, 1915-1945* (Stockholm: Marinlitteraturföreningen, 1991), 15–43. See also Olavi Hovi, *The Baltic in British Policy, 1918-1921* (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1980), 174–177.

²⁷ Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 45-46.

The dominating fact of Swedish defense planning in the 1920s and 1930s was the 1925 defense cuts and the subsequent 1927 General Defense Plan. The defense cuts came at a time of peace optimism and the belief that the League of Nations would make war improbable, if not impossible. The defense commission preceding the 1927 General Defense Plan had discussed intervention in Finland as part of a League of Nations sanction force in the event of a Soviet attack on Finland.

The 1925 decision halved the army to four divisions and a few reduced-strength brigades. The Navy remained intact, although it postponed the replacement of older ships. An independent air force was also founded as a result of the decision. The 1927 defense plan, revised during the 1930s, built on specific cases. In 1927, there were two main cases – A and B combined and different versions – A1 and 2, and B 1 and 2. There was also a case C war plan between Sweden and the Western powers, but was not regarded as a likely scenario. In case A, however Soviet forces had invaded Finland but not reached the coast nor occupied the country. In case B, Soviet forces had occupied both Finland and Åland. For case A, Sweden established the Ålandsdetachmentet – the Åland Detachment – to go to the islands in the event of war. The purpose was to deny the Russians the use of the archipelago for an attack on Sweden. In the planning process Finland was not informed.²⁸

Swedish and Finnish Staff Talks, 1933-1937

In 1930, a new Defense Commission began its work. It was reorganised in 1932 and continued until 1936. As a result, the major

²⁸ Wilhelm Agrell, *Fred och fruktan: Sverigessäkerhetspolitiskahistoria, 1918-2000* (Lund, Historiska Media, 2000), 35–37; Bertil Åhlund, *Svenskmaritimsäkerhetspolitik, 1905-1939* (Stockholm: Marinlitteraturföreningen, 1992), 152-153. The Åland Detachment consisted of a staff from the 2nd Army Corps, two infantry regiments (I 1 and I 14), and one artillery battalion from A 5.

rearmament decision was taken the same year. In 1930, Major Helge Jung wrote the book *Antingen – Eller (Either – Or)*. He put forward the case that Sweden, as a member of the League of Nations, was obliged to intervene in Finland. In this case, Åland had to be held, to allow the transport of an expeditionary force to Finland.²⁹ Jung would later become the secretary of the Defense Commission and later still Commander-in-Chief in 1944.

The Defense Commission updated the various scenarios and planned for Swedish intervention in Finland. In the autumn of 1933, Swedish-Finnish discussions started. The military attaché in Helsingfors, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz, initiated talks with Finnish Generals Österman (Chief of Staff of the Finnish Armed Forces) and Oesch (Chief of the Finnish General Staff). He put forward the plans of General Nyman (Chief of the Swedish General Staff) to defend Åland jointly. The problem was that the Åland Convention of 1921 restricted military preparations in peacetime. According to the Convention, Finland was obliged to defend the islands in the event of war, but could not fortify the islands or station troops there in peace. Sweden wanted to maintain the Åland Convention intact, and still be able to defend Åland jointly with Finland if necessary. Finland persisted that a credible defense of the islands had to be prepared in peacetime and allow for fortifications. Neither side budged from their respective positions on the matter.³⁰

In March 1934, secret talks continued on a general Swedish mandated intervention in Finland in the event of war. In the talks,

²⁹ Helge Jung, *Antingen -- Eller: Freds-ochförsvarsproblemetisakligbelysning* (Stockholm: Nymilitärtidskriftsbokförlag, 1930).

³⁰ Carlos Adlercreutzarkiv, "Hemligpromemoriaangående förhandlingar om tryggande av Åland" odaterad and "VPM II angående tryggande av Åland," December 1933, Krigsarkivet (KrA), and Kenneth Gustavsson, *Ålandssöarna – ensäkerhetsrisk? Spelet om den demilitariserade zonen, 1919-1939* (Mariehamn: PQR, 2012), 141-142.

Sweden and Finland exchanged information concerning communications, signals, and control of units. Logistics and support was of the utmost importance. The Swedish Army wanted to investigate whether Finland could support Swedish forces or if they should provide their own transports. Another question was whether Sweden could requisition supplies for the forces on Åland. One of the major points of discussion was logistics and how the organizations needed to allow mutual support. Sweden was also interested in information on Finland's import needs in wartime, particularly how imports could continue in a period of conflict. To allow combined operations, Sweden and Finland had to exchange information on the deployment, concentration, chain of command, composition, numbers, and quality of troops after mobilization. Further, both sides required information on the respective command systems and organization from the supreme command down to corps and division.³¹

There was, of course, need for closer staff coordination and Finnish Army Colonels Grandell and Svensson travelled to Stockholm to continue the exchange of information with Major Ehrensvärd from the Swedish General Staff. The more general issues concerning information, communications, and logistics were concluded, and there was also an agreement on a command structure for a Swedish intervention. There should not be a joint command, but rather two separate headquarters with strong liaison detachments. Concerning Åland, discussions did not go smoothly. The governments differed over how to deal with the Åland Convention.³² The Swedish standpoint remained that any defense of Åland must be in line with the Convention. Finland maintained that detailed planning and preparations must be made in peacetime. The

³¹ Carlos Adlercreutzarkiv, "P.M. angående vissadiskussioner mellan officerare ur svenska och finska generalstaberna" mars 1934, KrA.

³² Martti Turtola, *Från Torne älv till Systerbäck: Hemligt försvarssamarbetet mellan Finland och Sverige 1923-1940* (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska förlaget, 1987), 158-159.

Swedish General staff (supported by the government) believed that the only way out of the disagreement was to solve the entire intervention question and include the Åland issue.³³

Finnish Defense Plans

The intervention in Finland meant that the Swedish Army had to understand the Finnish defense plans. From 1920-1922, the Finnish plans focused on two distinct cases – V.K. 1 and 2 – both focusing on meeting the Soviets on the Karelian Isthmus. V.K. stood for *Venäjän Keskitys* – Concentration against a Russian attack. In V.K. 1, Finland had already mobilized, and in V.K. 2, mobilization had to take place under attack. In 1926, the Finnish Defense Committee, supported by the British general Kirke, concluded that Finland needed thirteen divisions as opposed to the three in existence. Kirke also emphasized the need to defend Åland. Following the committee, a new case emerged – V.K. 1927. The approach was more offensive and the Finnish Army plan was to prepare a favorable defensive position to halt the Soviet advance and then counterattack. The invading force would be defeated by the counterattacks, followed by an advance to the most beneficial defense line. The cases were updated as V.K. 1-1934 and V.K. 2-1934. V.K.1-1934 retained the offensive plans from V.K. 1927, while V.K. 2-1934 instead focused on delaying the Soviet advance.³⁴

The defense of Åland in V.K. 27 stipulated transferring coastal artillery from Åbo together with one reinforced infantry battalion. In 1930, the Finnish Navy created the *Ahvenanmaanlohko* – Åland islands

³³ Turtola, *Från Torne älv till Systerbäck*, 164.

³⁴ Jarl Kronlund "Finlandsförsvarsväsen mellan världskrigen," in *Finland i krig: förstadeln, 1939-1940*, ed. Henrik Ekberg (Esbo: Schildtsförlag, 2001), 56-71, and Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 138.

coastal defense district – to prepare the minefields to protect the islands.³⁵

The Swedish intervention plan was agreed upon in 1934. Any intervention force would have to be part of the Finnish defense plan. As a result, the Swedish General Staff planned for different contingencies, depending on how far the Soviet advance had reached. For example, in case 7, after around 30 days, the Soviets had reached the line Virojoki-Luumäki-Villmanstrand-Punkaharju. The Swedish intervention force of two reinforced infantry divisions would counterattack the Russians from the area around Pieksimäki. There were approximately ten of these courses of action.³⁶

The 1934 staff talks and plans fed directly into the Swedish Defense Commission and was included in the 1937 General Defense Plan with four cases (Case I, II, III, and IV). Case I was a Soviet attack on Finland and a Swedish intervention after a League of Nations mandate, i.e., the basic operational plans from 1934. Sweden would transport the 1st Army Corps,³⁷ mostly on keel from ports in northern Sweden. To be feasible, Åland had to be held to ensure safe transports to Finland. The Åland Detachment of 1927 still had the task to defend the islands. In the event the Soviets already captured Åland, the task was to recapture the islands together with the Finnish Army. The Swedish Navy should prevent all Soviet incursions north of Åland.³⁸

Cases II and III both planned for direct Soviet attacks on Sweden and Finland. In case II, the general staff anticipated a direct Soviet amphibious assault on the Stockholm area. Case III was a combination of an amphibious assault on the Stockholm area, a land invasion over the Finnish-Swedish border, and naval attacks from the Finnish coast. The

³⁵ Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 126-127.

³⁶ Turtola, *Från Torne älv till Systerbäck*, 160-161.

³⁷ III. and IV. Divisions, the Cavalry Brigade, and the Heavy Artillery Regiment - A 6.

³⁸ Turtola, *Från Torne älv till Systerbäck*, 119.

latter case was the most plausible and required the most planning. In case II, the Åland Detachment had the same tasks as in case I. In case III, the Åland Detachment was in reserve. Case IV was a German attack on Sweden from the south, with the army concentrated in Scania. The Åland Detachment remained in reserve, to be sent to Åland if need be.³⁹

Navy versus Army

To understand the discourses on the defense of Åland, it is important to understand that the services had different opinions on defense matters and the ensuing interservice rivalries. The key was for each service to secure important tasks and obtain the means for funding and expansion. An interpretation is that the cases in the General Defense Plans of the 1920s and 1930s were parts of a service struggle for resources. Each case meant different considerations between army and navy. The case where the Russians attacked over land in the north gave a more important role to the army. An amphibious assault on Stockholm benefitted the navy.

Another factor was that many in military circles favored an alliance between Sweden and Finland. By 1923, Colonel Axel Rappe had argued for a Swedish-Finnish alliance in the book *Sverigesläge (Sweden's Position)*. Rappe served in the Finnish Civil War and was responsible for the first Finnish defense plan in 1918. In 1930 came the aforementioned *Antingen – Eller*, in which Jung used a hypothetical League of Nations intervention as leverage in the conflicts with the Navy. In 1936, Commander Helge Strömbäck (later Commander of the Navy) wrote the book *Sverigeoch Östersjön (Sweden and the Baltic)*, focusing particularly

³⁹ The cases are based on Arvid Cronenberg, "Kapplöpning med tiden: svensk krigsorganisation och krigsplanering," in *Stormvarning: Sverigeinförändravärlds kriget*, ed. Bo Hugemark (Hallstavik: Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek, 2002), 99-108.

on the defense of Åland. Strömbäck maintained that the defense of Åland demanded a strong navy. He argued for increased shipbuilding to strengthen the fleet. Major Valtanen published *Vårtkustförsvar (Our Coastal Defense)* the same year, maintaining that the demilitarization of Åland was outdated and that the League of Nations could not guarantee Åland's security. The solution was that Sweden and Finland together would defend Åland with fortifications, coastal artillery, and naval forces.⁴⁰

In Sweden, the Marinen (the Marines) consisted of Kungliga Flottan (Royal Navy) and Kustartilleriet (Coastal Artillery). The 1925 defense decision had benefitted the Navy. In the discussions preceding the defense commission in 1930, the Army and Air Force demanded increased funding and modern equipment while the Navy demanded modern ships. The rivalry between the services affected defense planning. The Navy's position was that they would have to meet the enemy at an early stage in a conflict, while the Army would face them only after the invasion of Finland had taken place and the Navy had been defeated. It was in this debate the Army, supported by the Air Force, promoted the concept of intervention in Finland. Both the Navy and Army demanded an increased budget and supported their arguments with the different interpretations of the same defense plans. One group around Helge Jung was instrumental in promoting the Air Force to take over tasks from the Navy.⁴¹ The defense decision in 1936, as opposed to 1925, benefitted the Army, Air Force, and Coastal Artillery at the expense of the Navy. One of the reasons was that the naval experts in the committees had proposed the building of outdated coastal battleships, instead of proposing modern craft. The reason was the belief of high-

⁴⁰ Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 56-57.

⁴¹ Arvid Cronenberg, *Militärintressegruppolitik: KretsenkringNymilitärtidskrift-ochdessvåg till inflytande i 1930 årsförsvarskommission* (Stockholm: Militärhistoriskaavdelningen, 1977), 111.

ranking naval officers that they could obtain political support for ships of this specific type. They, as experts, invested their entire credibility in the project. The concept misfired.⁴²

The Coordination Plan, 1939

The increased tensions in Europe and particularly in the Baltic after 1933 did not immediately change the general defense plans as the intense planning and rearmament in 1936-1937 superseded the slow start of the early 1930s. In Sweden, the slow start led to the inception of the 1937 General Defense Plan. In Finland, increased tensions led to the revision of the V.K. 1-1934. Neither plan solved the Åland issue. As the war clouds became more ominous, Finland searched for possible allies. Finland had done the same in the 1920s, searching for an alliance with the Baltic States and Poland. The alliance plans failed and Finland proclaimed neutrality in 1935 with a Nordic orientation.⁴³ One of reasons behind the intensified Swedish-Finnish planning of the late 1930s was a Swedish will to maintain that Nordic orientation.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Thörnell, pressed the issue, but met with political approval only after the German *Anschluss* of Austria in March 1938. In the middle of May, Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers concluded on the outer frames of a joint operation to defend Åland. The Finnish position remained the same regarding the Åland convention: abolish it and make a separate League of Nations deal with Sweden. The Swedish position also remained the same – maintain the convention.

⁴² Anders Berge, *Sakkunskap och politisk rationalitet: Den svenska flottan och pansarfartygsfrågan 1918-1939* (Stockholm: Sjöhistoriska samfundet, 1987).

⁴³ Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 144. See also Marko Lehti, *A Baltic League as a Construct of the New Europe: Envisioning a Baltic Region and Small State Sovereignty in the Aftermath of the First World War* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1999).

In September 1938, international discussions in the League of Nations concerning Åland, started over the so-called *Coordination Plan*. The process was lengthy and in March 1939, after the annexation of Czechoslovakia, Swedish and Finnish general staffs started intensive discussions on transferring Swedish troops to Åland. On 15 April 1939, the commanders of the respective general staffs, Thörnell and Oesch, signed the applied secret version of the *Coordination Plan*, building strongly on the preparations made already in 1934.

The plan divided Åland into three operational areas: *Ålandshav*, closest to Sweden, where Sweden should prevent passage north and all enemy landings on Åland; *Ålandsområdet*, the islands themselves where Sweden and Finland together should prevent passage north and defend the islands against invasion; and *Åbolandsskärgård*, closest to Finland, where Finland should prevent passage north and all landings on Åland.



Sea mines were of the utmost importance to defend all areas and blocking all major straits.⁴⁴ The Swedish Navy planned for the minelaying and the positioning of coastal artillery already in 1935, defining both the need for at least double lines of mines and ships to lay the minefields.⁴⁵

In *Ålandshav*, Sweden allocated *Ålandshavs Squadron*

⁴⁴ Åke Holmquist, *Flottansberedskap, 1938-1940* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1972), 261. The Coordination Plan is discussed in Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 77-83.

⁴⁵ Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 145.

– *Ålandshavseskadern*⁴⁶ based either in the northern Stockholm archipelago or on six prepared war bases on Åland. Reinforcements were the Coastal Fleet⁴⁷ and Stockholm Squadron – *Stockholmseskadern*.⁴⁸ Coastal Artillery consisted of *Battalion Söderarm*⁴⁹ on the Swedish coast, one battery on Långskär⁵⁰ and one battery on Signildsskär,⁵¹ both mobile batteries in the Åland archipelago. The Air Force allocated a few reconnaissance aeroplanes for naval cooperation.

In *Ålandsområdet*, there were no naval forces, but the defense relied on coastal artillery consisting of one battery on Eckerö,⁵² one battery on Hammarudda,⁵³ *Battalion Korsö*,⁵⁴ battery Björkör,⁵⁵ *Battalion Ledsund*,⁵⁶ and one battery on Kökar.⁵⁷ The Swedish Army allocated four infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, antiaircraft

⁴⁶ Two older coastal battleships (*Äran* and *Tapperheten*), 2 older destroyers (*Hugin* and *Munin*), 4 patrol boats (*Castor*, *Pollux*, Nr 35, and Nr 36) and support ships.

⁴⁷ Three coastal Battleships (*Sverige*, *Gustaf V*, and *Drottning Victoria*), 1 aeroplane cruiser (*Gotland*), 1 seaplane tender (*Dristigheten*), 6 destroyers (*Klas Horn*, *Klas Uggla*, *Stockholm*, *Göteborg*, *Nordenskjöld* and *Ehrens kjöld*), 1 mine cruiser (*Clas Fleming*), 1 submarine depot ship (*Svea*), 8 submarines (*Draken*, *Gripen*, *Ulven*, *Sjölejonet*, *Sjöbjörnen*, *Delfinen*, *Springarenoch*, *Nordkaparen*) and support ships. There were also a minelaying squadron of requisitioned civilian ships.

⁴⁸ One gunboat (*Svensksund*), 2 older destroyers (*Vidar* and *Wale*), 5 patrol boats (*Regulus*, *Rigel*, *Perseus*, *Vega*, *Vesta*, and *Polaris*), 2 mine sweepers (*Nr 1* and *Nr 2*) and 1 ice breaker (*Atle*).

⁴⁹ *Battalion Söderarm* consisted of 2 batteries, 1 battery of 2x210mm howitzers on *Yttre Hamnskär* and 1 battery 2x152mm coastal guns on *Söderarm*, both built in 1935. Combined with sea mines.

⁵⁰ One Swedish battery 4x105mm coastal guns and 1 Swedish battery 4x8cm coastal guns.

⁵¹ One Swedish battery 4x150mm coastal howitzers and 1 Swedish battery 4x8cm coastal guns.

⁵² One Finnish battery 2x152mm coastal guns.

⁵³ One Finnish battery 2x152mm coastal guns.

⁵⁴ One Swedish battery 4x105mm howitzers and 1 Finnish battery 2x57mm guns, both on Korsö, combined with sea mines.

⁵⁵ One Swedish battery 4x105mm howitzers.

⁵⁶ One Swedish battery 4x105mm howitzers and 1 Finnish battery 2x152mm guns, both on Herrö, combined with sea mines.

⁵⁷ One Finnish battery 4x152mm guns.

artillery, and support units to defend western Åland (Eckerö and Hammarland). The Finnish Army allocated three infantry battalions, one bicycle infantry battalion, one field artillery battalion, and support units to defend Mariehamn, particularly the airfield and the southernmost island Lemland. There was a joint reserve of two infantry battalions (Finnish and Swedish). Åland was a separate air defense sector with an air defense central. Liaison officers would be in Åbo and Stockholm, respectively, with eight air defense detection stations. The plan did not subordinate air forces to the operation, but made preparations for fighter squadrons based on Åland.

In *Åbolandsskärgård*, the Finnish Navy allocated a small naval squadron, but the majority of the Finnish fleet was based close to Åbo.⁵⁸ The coastal artillery defenses had been prepared in 1932 with guns destined for Åland stored in Åbo. Finland planned for artillery forts on Kökar, Herrö, Kungsö, EckeröBorgö, and later also on Dånö.⁵⁹

The minefields had to be laid within 72 hours after the order was given to allow the initial transports to start on time. The northern minefield on the Swedish side should prevent hostile forces entering Bottenhavet and consisted of around 200 sea mines completed with a Finnish minefield of equal extent. The southern minefield on the Swedish side should protect Åland from attack from the south and protect troop transports from Sweden. It consisted of around 1,000 sea

⁵⁸ Two coastal battleships (*Väinämöinen* and *Ilmarinen*), 4 gunboats (*Uusimaa*, *Hämeenmaa*, *Turunmaa*, and *Karjala*), 5 submarines (*Vetehinen*, *Vesihäisi*, *Iku-Turso*, *Saukko*, and *Vesikko*), 3 mineships (*Louhi*, *Rautu*, and *Vilppula*), several smaller minelayers, 1 patrol boat (S5) and 6 minesweepers (*Ahven*, *Kiiski*, *Muikko*, *Sarku*, *Kuore*, and *Lahna*).

⁵⁹ Each fort would have 2x152mm guns of different origin. Most were former Russian guns of either Russian, British, or French design left in Finland at the revolution. The guns were refurbished in the 1930s. Some were mobile and other static. In the Åbo archipelago, there were several other forts at Berghamn, Pensar, Öro, Finska, Utö, and Lypertö. The largest was Öro with 2x305mm guns. There were 234mm guns, 152mm, and 75mm guns. Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 172, 176-177.

mines, completed with a smaller Finnish minefield of 300 mines. These major minefields all consisted of uncontrollable mines. The smaller inshore minefield blocking straits on Åland consisted of a combination of controllable and uncontrollable mines. The Swedish inshore minefields around Korsö, Björkör, and Ledsund consisted of around 120 mines, completed by larger Finnish minefields around Kökar and Finska Utö.⁶⁰ To illustrate the importance of the Åland operation is the 1936 *special* orders for the Swedish Coastal Fleet, stipulating, Operation 1) blocking and mining the sea around Åland, Operation; 2) blocking and mining passage to Gotland; Operation 3) protect troop transports to Gotland,\; and Operation 4) support the occupation of Åland.⁶¹

Command and Control

The commanders of the Swedish and Finnish navies had to agree upon a cooperation draft. Tactical cooperation also brought the need for detailed instructions, including principles for conduct before and in battle, general cooperation, orders, and the tactical use of mines. The instructions also included operational requirements for naval and air reconnaissance, the establishment of a Swedish auxiliary submarine base on Finska Utö, escort of convoys, and sharing the detailed naval war charts over the Åland islands.

The commander of naval operations in Ålandshav was to be the Swedish commanding admiral of *Ålandshavseskadern* in charge of all vessels in Ålandshav. The Swedish Navy should conduct reconnaissance missions south of Ålandshav, daily surveillance of the minefields, minesweeping, and anti-submarine warfare with subordinate Finnish units. The Swedish Navy would also conduct escort missions in the

⁶⁰ Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 85-86.

⁶¹ Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarnas*, 194.

entire Åland area. The Finnish Navy would initially conduct surveillance in protection of neutrality before the Swedish Navy arrived. In essence, the Swedish Navy had the major responsibility for all naval operations in the Coordination Plan. The Finnish Navy only had responsibility for the areas closest to Finland and reconnaissance towards the inlet of the Gulf of Finland.⁶²

On land, the commander was Finnish, with a combined Swedish-Finnish staff. Finnish land forces came from IR 22, a Swedish-speaking regiment, thus minimizing any feared language problems. The detailed instructions guided transport and unloading of ground forces and coastal artillery, signals, and supply. The Swedish ground forces would bring provisions for between 20 and 30 days, ammunition for at least three days of fighting, fuel for 20 days, and engineering materials for 1,500 men for 20 days. Transports would rely on locally requisitioned boats.⁶³

Testing the Plan

In April 1939, a Swedish staff exercise gamed the plan to test its feasibility. The exercise encompassed minelaying, transporting coastal artillery, and transport of the Åland Detachment. The conclusions were not positive or encouraging. The staff anticipated that the transport would take seven days from Stockholm and Gävle to Åland in six round trips. It was difficult for the navy to lay the minefields in time with the few ships available. The desingated ships were few, there was no time to mobilize other ships and muster war crews if the timetable for mine laying should be kept. The commander of Stockholm's coastal artillery defences concluded that an enemy would interpret any Swedish

⁶² Holmquist, *Flottansberedskap*, 258-262.

⁶³ Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 82-84.

minefields blocking Bottenhavet as a hostile act. Consequently, the coastal defences in Stockholm had to be mobilized in advance to any minelaying, to meet potential aggression. The minelaying and transport of troops to Åland would claim a large portion of all available naval resources. Troop transports rested on auxiliary civilian ships already designated in advance, but there was no guarantee that the ships were available with very short notice. The general staff reached the conclusion that the Åland expedition had to start in peacetime to be at all feasible. Crews and troops had to be mobilized well in advance of any operation.⁶⁴ To give an insight into the transport of troops – the Finnish contingent would leave from Åboland archipelago in five round trips over three days. The Finnish contingent was smaller and could use the archipelago for protection.⁶⁵ Neither Finnish nor Swedish plans accounted for ship losses.

There was also lack of air support for the operation. On the plus side, the closest Soviet air bases were around Leningrad. To be able to hinder an Åland operation, Soviet airplanes had to use the narrow passage in international airspace over the Gulf of Finland, flanked by Finland and Estonia. With Estonia in Soviet hands from the autumn of 1939, Soviet bases came closer to Åland and could impede troop transports. Soviet air units based in Estonia could severely impact logistics and support transports to the islands. The biggest threat, however, came from Soviet submarines, but the Swedish and Finnish

⁶⁴ Stjernfeldt, *Ålandsöar*, 87-90.

⁶⁵ The first round trip would transport the reinforced bicycle battalion on the ships *Per Brahe*, *Åland Express*, *Åland II*, and *von Konow*. The second group was the staff of IR 22 and the mortar company on *Vellamo*. The third group was the I and II battalions of IR 22 on *Oinonen*, *Bore I*, *Per Brahe*, *Aranda*, and *Nordstjernan*. The fourth group consisted of the staff and 1st artillery battery on *Vellamo*. The final group consisted of the 2nd artillery battery and III battalion IR 22 on *Oinonen*, *Bore I*, *Per Brahe*, *Aranda* and *Nordstjernan*. Gustavsson, *Ålandsöarna*, 186-187.

minefields aimed at preventing submarine incursions into Åland waters. Again, the key factor was the speed of the minelaying.

At a political level, Sweden requested that the signatories of the Åland Convention ratify the plan and submitted it to the League of Nations council. All signatories – France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland – approved the plan in early May. The Soviet Union, not being a signatory, gave an answer in late May 1939, when Molotov proclaimed before the Supreme Soviet that fortifying Åland was an unfriendly act and a direct threat to the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Union, Sweden should not interfere with Åland at all. The Soviet response came as a surprise to the Swedish government. Following the negative Soviet response discussions still ensued on whether it was naïve to think that the Soviet Union would have accepted the militarization of Åland at all.⁶⁶

Åland during World War II and After

The Soviet disapproval of the plan did not mean that the planning for Åland ceased. The general staff amended the plan as late as June 1939. Then the general staff added air transport of almost 1,000 men with equipment to be flown to Åland in ten hours. The reason for air transport was that sea transport took too long and there was fear of a surprise attack. The adding of air transport also points to the importance of Åland in Swedish strategic planning. The transport of 1,000 troops and equipment would in fact have used all air transports available – both military and civilian. The great urgency also came from a lack of ships to lay mines. The air transport would be undertaken before the navy could initiate minelaying.

⁶⁶ Gunnar Åselius, "Tukholmalainenperspektiivi," in *Historian Kosto Suomen Talvisota Kehyksissään*, ed. Henrik Meinander (Helsinki: Siltala, 2015), 177-198.

In October 1939, before the Winter War, the Finnish government asked, in light of Soviet territorial demands, whether Sweden: 1) had anything against Finnish forces on Åland; 2) could help with munitions; and 3) would send military forces to Åland. The Swedish government replied that Finland was free to garrison troops on Åland, but Sweden would not contribute land forces. Sweden would instead send ammunition to Finland. Nonetheless, the government ordered the preparation for sending troops to Åland several times during the war.

In early December 1939, after the Winter War had broken out, the question of the minefields arose. Finland had laid their minefields and Sweden decided to lay the northern minefield on Swedish water, protecting the entry into Bottenhavet. The purpose was to close Bottenhavet while not enraging the Soviet Union with the large southern minefield. Another example of increased readiness was adding a new coastal artillery battery to *Battalion Söderarm*.⁶⁷ Construction started late in 1940 and was ready the year after. At two specific instances during the war, the Åland plan resurfaced. In late April 1940, German troop transports and icebreakers had been spotted around Bornholm. Germany had occupied Denmark and the war raged on in Norway. The Swedish General Staff anticipated that the transport fleet could be a German attempt to occupy Åland. Sweden approached Finland to initiate the Åland plan, but this time Finland refused as they already had troops on the islands and defenses had been prepared. Several additional coastal batteries were under construction.⁶⁸

The Swedish plans were updated again in 1941, adding more troops and bringing the total to 8,400 men. The *X-Operation* was the new name of the plan. The first wave of 2,200 fully-equipped soldiers should

⁶⁷ The battery consisted of 4x152mm coastal guns and 3x57mm coastal guns, combined with anti-aircraft artillery and mines.

⁶⁸ Stjernfeldt, *Ålands öar*, 101-120.

be transported on Auxiliary Cruisers *Warun*, *Waria*, and seven destroyers. The second wave of 2,600 men would be flown in simultaneously as 3,600 artillerymen were transported on drafted civilian ships. After the initial waves, a motorized cavalry battalion and coastal artillery would follow. The navy together with one air wing would protect the transports. Around the same time, Finland fortified Åland after the war with the Soviet Union broke out. In *Operation Sailing Race*, Finland sent 5,000 men with artillery to Mariehamn on 23 June 1941. Later most of the infantry was withdrawn, after the Soviet base at Hangö was taken in December 1941. The Hangö base was a Soviet demand from the peace treaty after the Winter War to protect the inlet to the Gulf of Finland.⁶⁹

Another instance when the X-Operation was considered occurred in September 1944 when Germany attacked the Finnish island of Hogland. The German plans had several different versions: *Tanne Ost* was the occupation of Hogland and *Tanne West* was the occupation of Åland. The reason was that Finland had made peace with the Soviet Union, and Germany wanted to keep the Gulf of Finland closed. Occupying Hogland and Åland would enable Germany to keep the remains of the Soviet Navy trapped in the Gulf of Finland.⁷⁰ Germany, however, did not initiate *Tanne West*, but the Swedish Navy nonetheless increased preparedness during September 1944 as the war between Finland and Germany broke out. Swedish indications were that Åland was not really the target of the German operation. The operation *Tanne Ost* failed miserably as the Finnish Army retook the island. The Finnish defenses on Åland were also strong at the time.

Plans for defending Åland must also have existed during the Cold War – as the dilemmas for both Sweden and Finland remained the same,

⁶⁹ Åhlund, *Svensk maritim säkerhetspolitik*, 106.

⁷⁰ Niilo Lappalainen, *Kriget om Finska viken: Hangö och Hogland under andra världskriget* (Esbo: Schildts förlag, 2005), 379-420.

but no specific plans are known nor public. The Swedish post-war defense plans built on the same possible contingencies as before the war, except with no planned Swedish general intervention in Finland. In the 1945/46 General Defense Plan, Case II C (against Stockholm) focused on facing a Soviet combined amphibious landing and airborne assault, against Gävle to the north as well as south of Stockholm. This would have included a Soviet occupation of Åland, but the plan does not mention Swedish or Finnish forces. The 1962 General Defense plan did not mention anything specific concerning Åland, but the commander of central Sweden should prevent and obstruct the use of the waters surrounding Åland and the archipelagos. Another possibility was to base Swedish naval units in the Åland archipelago, for a potential flank attack on a Soviet transport fleet. Both the 1972 and 1979 General Defense Plans mentioned the same task.⁷¹ One possible interpretation is that the general defense plans only concern the defense of Sweden proper, and not operations that perhaps would have occurred before war broke out. The concept of a Soviet surprise attack, however, grew stronger in Swedish defense planning, perhaps not giving time for sending troops to Åland. In any case, the geographic and strategic situation remained and deteriorated by the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. This increased the possibility for the Soviets to base units in the Baltic area making a potential attack on Åland, easier. From this point of view, it is not likely that Sweden and Finland discontinued discussing the defense of Åland. A recently published Finnish book mentions Swedish intelligence operations on Åland, to prepare for a potential intervention, with a Finnish blessing.⁷²

⁷¹ Bengt Wallerfelt, *Den hemliga svenska krigsplanen* (Stockholm: Medströms bokförlag, 2016), 81, 94-95, 157, 205, and 234.

⁷² Sten Ekman, *PohjolanSalainenLiitto: Ruotsi ja Sumoikylmässäsodassa* (Helsinki: Docendo, 2018).

Logistical Problems of Joint Operations from the Point of View of An Ally,in Historical Perspectives: Eastern Front, 1941

by

Viktor Andahazi Szeghy

ABSTRACT: *This paper highlights examples of the supply problems that the Royal Hungarian Army, as a subordinate military ally, faced during the 1941 Eastern Campaign and the specific reactions to those.*

The Alliance

Hungary was the first nation to join the Japanese, German, and Italian Tripartite Pact, first formed in November 1940. The Axis ally evolved during military operations, including the attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, and during the attack against the Soviet Union beginning in June 1941.



1. After the signing of the Tripartite Act, 20

November 1941. Vienna, Belvedere Palace (L-R: Hitler; Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy; Saburo Kurusu, Ambassador of Japan; Paul Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary).


The Axis powers of the Alliance on the Eastern Front (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Slovakia) fought under German command.⁷³ To achieve military success, the fighting troops had to be supplied with food, weapons, ammunition, fuel, vehicles, and spare parts. The ability to move the troops was also essential. The difficulty of these tasks was that the allied army, which had its own logistical system in its own country, was obliged to operate in a foreign theatre as a subordinate element. The Army's transportation capacity became restricted as operations advanced, and the throughput of the stretched supply lines decreased. In the food sector there were problems due to the different gastronomic cultures and standards.

During the combined operations of the Second World War, the Hungarian Army primarily fought subordinate to the Germans. When one assesses the situation, one needs to consider that Hungary's military doctrine and the reorganization of the Hungarian Army was influenced by its First World War experiences, and military innovations and theoretical discussions of the 1920s and 1930s.⁷⁴ The Hungarian military leadership tried to secure optimal material and organizational conditions for the successful fighting of battles with the use of available resources. At the same time, as a result of revisionist ambitions, the Hungarian Army was prepared for deployment inside the Carpathian Basin, which radically differed from the subsequent demands of the Germany ally.

⁷³ The dates of joining were 23 November 1940, Romania; 24 November 1940, Slovakia; 1 March 1941, Bulgaria; and 15 June 1941, Croatia. Dénes Halmosy, *Nemzetközi szerződések 1918-1945 (International Treaties 1918-1945.)* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1966), 490-492.

⁷⁴ Cf. Lóránd Dombrády, "Amagyar katonai gondolkodás néhány jellemzője a második világháború előtt" (Some features of the Hungarian military thinking before the WW II) in *A magyar katonai gondolkodás története (The History of the Hungarian Military Thinking)*, ed. Ács Tibor (Budapest: Zrínyi, 1995), 126-145.

The Operation⁷⁵



Map © 2014 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN
Operation Barbarossa, 1941

Hungary joined the attack against the Soviet Union after the bombardment of Kassa. The Hungarian government declared that bombardment was committed by Soviet airplanes.

The attack of the Carpathian Group of the Royal Hungarian Army included VIIIth Corps from Kassa, and the most modern 1st Mobile

⁷⁵ Cf. Viktor Andaházi Szeghy, *A magyar királyi honvédség részvétele a Szovjetunió elleni támadásban (1941. június-december). (The Participation of the Royal Hungarian Army in the Attack against the Soviet Union, June-December 1941)* (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2016), 212.

Corps. The tasks of the Group were until 9 July 1941 to track the Russian troops withdrawn from the Hungarian border and to seize the crossing points on the river Dniester.

The 1st Mobile Corps was detached from the Carpathian Group on 9 July 1941 and subordinated to the German Army Group South. The Carpathian Group itself remained under Hungarian command. The tasks of the Group were to establish the military administration, restart the economy, and subdue the enemy in the hinterland. The additional tasks of the 1st Mobile Corps were to logistically sustain the advance of Operation Barbarossa and to cut the withdrawal of the Soviet Armies and help surround them. The Carpathian Group and the 1st Mobile Corps were relieved in October-November 1941, during the attack against Moscow (Operation Typhoon).

Logistical Framework

Continuous transport was needed to provide food, weapons, fuel,



and spare parts to the Royal Hungarian Army, because of the manoeuvring attack. Sustainment required time to procure, store, and transport the goods to the combatant troops.

3. Distributing fuel from a German train, in the Eastern Front, 1941

The operational supply level of the Hungarian troops was based on a kind of special dualism regarding the Eastern Front:⁷⁶

- Based on the agreement between Hungary and Germany, cash, food, horse fodder, fuel, and German-made ammunition were the responsibility of the German supply service. The take over was provided by the German logistical services on their own bases.
- The Hungarian logistical services provided the Hungarian cultural foods (bacon, spices), uniforms, and Hungarian-manufactured weapons and ammunition. Transport to the combat troops was provided by the railway – until the last station behind the frontline.

Supply at the tactical level was provided by so-called exchange points. The goods were transported to the brigades and were distributed to the troops by their own unit-level supply organizations. Troops were also allowed to satisfy their needs from local sources. Wholesale requisition was the responsibility of the unit.



4. Local requisition somewhere in Ukraine

⁷⁶ Sándor Nagy, et al., *A magyar katonai ellátó (hadtáp) szolgálat története (The History of the Hungarian Supply Service)*(Budapest: Zrínyi, 1984), 470, 494.

During the 1941 Eastern Front operations of 1941, neither geographic nor climatic conditions were favorable for the attacking forces. The poor rail and road network, which was mostly demolished by the retreating Soviets, made movement and transportation very difficult.⁷⁷ The weather also made conditions for the attacking alliance difficult. Due to the heavy summer rains, the gravel roads became inaccessible and the flooded rivers difficult to cross. Early autumn rains caused a *Schlammperiod* (“mud period”) which was followed by frosts in October. Winter also arrived earlier than was expected.



5. A typical road in October

- Traffic

Organizing the traffic control system was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht Transport Commandature. The weak Russian railway system was overloaded by the German transports to the frontline, causing Hungarian transports to be delayed regularly. The long distance

⁷⁷ The average railway system in the Soviet Union at that time was 400 m/100 km². Sp, *Katonai földrajz, VII, fejezet Oroszország. (Military Geography, Chapter VII -- Russia* (Kassa: n.p., 1943), 6. 17.

of the unloading stations from the frontline made the situation more difficult for resupply operations.

Repairing the transportation routes demolished by the Soviet forces was the primary task of the Carpathian Group. The secondary task was to transport and secure the main supply routes (*Rollbahn Süd* and *Rollbahn Mitte*) to the frontline. The railways troops reset the rails from the wide Russian gauge into the European standard when repairing damaged rail lines. First class, solid motorways connected the important cities only. There were only 2nd and 3rd class routes in the direction of attack of the 1st Mobile Corps.⁷⁸ Those one-lane dirt roads – so-called “Stalin-concrete” – were solid during the summer, but even a short rain made them very slippery.

Problems II

- Logistical Cooperation

Problems associated with the improperly regulated dual (German-Hungarian) logistical system emerged during the first month of the attack. The transport of the German provided materials was strictly administrated. A major problem was that the German fuel depots were some 100-300 km behind the lines, and they could not give barrels for transportation closer to the frontlines. Tires for the vehicles, provided from German and Hungarian warehouses, was another concern. The Hungarian military forces wanted the Germans to provide these replacement tires. The 1st Mobile Corps required 10,000 tires until October, but the Hungarian support element provided only 150 tires,

⁷⁸ In that time there were only six 1st class solid motorways (at least 4 m wide, solid way, suitable for two directions); 2nd class routes (at least 3 m wide, suitable for two directions with by-pass, with 6-8 t capacity bridges); and 3rd class routes (1.6 m wide dirt road, with gravel basement, with maximum 2 t capacity bridges) between the Black and Baltic Seas. Ibid., 23-24.

and the Germans allocated 7,000 tires from their warehouse in Berditschev – 500 kms behind the frontline.

- The Operational Tempo

The attack against the Soviet Union was delayed reportedly because of the German intervention on the Balkan Peninsula. That was why the German High Command increased the pace of the attack to the East. Because of the slow advance of the German-Romanian flank of the Army Group South, the Royal Hungarian 1st Mobile Corps was tasked to support encirclement maneuver of the 1st Tank Group. That was why Army Group South was unwilling to order an operational pause for the resupply of its forces and repair of its vehicles and equipment.

The delay of an operational pause caused a decrease of combat readiness. The first pause of the Mobile Corps was between 19-29 August, after forty-five movement and combat days. By the end of the Battle of Nikolayev in mid-August 1941, the supplies of the fighting troops had been totally consumed. There was no possibility to resupply the soldiers and repair of worn-out vehicles and weapons, because of the length of logistical lines.

The failure to resupply and permit the exhausted troops to rest also caused problems later. The 1st Mobile Corps could execute on the next day an order to attack on 9 October, given by the German 17th Army, because they had fought more than thirty-five days until 5 October along the river Dnieper.

The logistical tasks of the occupation troops, also operating under German command behind the attacking troops, certainly were strongly related to those of the frontline forces. Transportation and the repairing of transportation routes were their primary tasks. In addition, as a special logistical task, especially during the first months of the occupation, they also participated in requisitioning various military and

economic goods as war booty. They were especial hard-worked in that field. By the German-Hungarian agreement the Oberkommando des Heeres possessed the occupied area's stocks.⁷⁹ Although the Royal Hungarian Army was permitted to supply only its own needs, the Carpathian Group tried to gather and transport everything from the occupied Ukraine into the hinterland. The German Governor of Reichskommissariat Ukraine had protested against that activity.⁸⁰

Lessons

Due to conflicting interests within the international alliance, it proved to be a challenging logistical and military-diplomatic task for the responsible leaders to ensure the operation of the forces fighting in subordination far away from home. The supplying and moving of the relatively small Royal Hungarian units; the logistical difficulties of the air and land forces; and the handling of situations that often surpassed the capabilities of the Hungarian Armed Forces were problems that any military alliance can face, regardless of historical period or ideology.

- The improperly regulated subordinate logistical system continuously challenged sustainment operations.
- The wide diversity and lack of standardization of the weapons and vehicles in one Alliance made ammunition and spare parts resupply difficult.
- At the operational level, problems can be handled with good personal contacts of the liaison officers, and on the tactical level by comradeship.

⁷⁹ See the agreement in József Bálint, *A Szovjetunió gazdasági kifizetése dokumentumokban elbeszélve, 1941-1944 (The Economical Plunder of the Soviet Union in Documents, 1941-1944)* (Budapest, Russica Pannonicana, 2001), 254-256.

⁸⁰ Hadtörténelmi Levéltár VKF 1. osztály, napi helyzetjelentések, mikrofilm, General Staff 1st Department, daily situation reports 1941), box B/243, sheet 2326, 422.

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Informal Yet Close Allies: Greek-British Cooperation and the Creation of the First Greek Motorized Division in the Second World War

by

Dēmētrios N. Christodoulou

The paper presents a brief history of the Greek Motorized forces during the interwar period and the first two years of the Second World War, focusing on the creation of the 19th Greek Motorized Division, through the aid of the British in the first half of 1941.

The origins of the division lie in the first attempts of the Hellenic Army to introduce mechanization in the interwar period. Initially, the Greek Army came to know the tanks only theoretically and that only in 1925, when the French Military Educational Mission arrived in Greece to train the army. The French translated into Greek their own regulations concerning their tanks and their tactical handling,⁸¹ in which the French were considered pioneers because of their experience in the use of armor during the First World War. However, the political and economic instability that followed the Asia Minor catastrophe did not allow for the establishment of armored units in the Greek Army, except for the acquisition of a few (about ten) *Peerless* armored trucks used for internal policing.⁸² In 1931, Greece acquired its first tanks – two Vickers

⁸¹ "The Tanks," *Kanonismostou Hippikou*, 93-94..

⁸² For a most thorough investigation of the Greek attempts at the creation of an armored and/or motorized force see Vlassēs, *Ta Tethōrakismena*, espially 142-93.

6-ton light tanks, one each of Type A and Type B, and two Carden Lloyd tankettes. Initially used for training, they were formed into a tank battalion in 1935, with the expectation that they would be supplemented with further light tanks ordered in Britain and France. Meanwhile, various proposals at creating motorized units and formations existed, including:

- ♦ A light mechanized brigade (modeled on the French BLM⁸³)
- ♦ A mixed horse/motorized cavalry division (modeled on the French DLC⁸⁴)
- ♦ A (semi-independent) motorized regiment, first established in 1937

Eventually, of all these units, only one motorized cavalry regiment was actually formed, in 1939, but was still incomplete when the war broke, because no light tanks, motorcycles, anti-aircraft, or anti-tank artillery could be purchased and provided to it in time.⁸⁵ Obviously, the greatest problem was that the main arms suppliers of Greece were France and Germany, and these were both unavailable (for different reasons) when Italy attacked Greece on 28 October 1940.⁸⁶

The motorized cavalry regiment was subordinated to the Greek Army's single Cavalry Division, in an apparent effort to further imitate the contemporary French *Division Légère de Cavalerie* model of a mixed horse-and-motorized formation. The regiment contained 180 vehicles (30 Mercedes-Benz W 152 [4x4 reconnaissance cars], 46 Mercedes-Benz LG 2500 [6x6 troop carrying trucks], 30 other trucks or cars, 27

⁸³ Vauviller, *Cavaleriemécanique*, 8-9 and 50.

⁸⁴ Vauviller, *Cavalerie à cheval*, 9-18.

⁸⁵ Vlassēs, *Ta Tethōrakismena*, esp. 193-206 and 397-437.

⁸⁶ *History of the Hellenic Army*, 183, ad Papagos, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos*, 148ff.

motorcycle combinations, and 47 single motorcycles), but no armored cars or tanks.⁸⁷

It consisted of the following units:

- Regimental HQ and HQ troop (including the Colonel's squad and one signals squad);

- HQ of the I Battalion/Squadron Group (I *Epilarchia*); 1 Light Squadron (*Elaphrailē*), with 1 motorcycle troop (*Oulamostrikyklōn kai diikyklōn*) and 3 reconnaissance troops (*Oulamoihamaxōnnagnōriseōs*); -1 Tank Squadron (that was not formed because of lack of tanks)

- HQ of the II Battalion/Squadron Group (II *Epilarchia*); 3 Battle Squadrons (*Ilaimachēs*), each with 2 Half-squadrons (*Hēmilarchiai*) of 2 truck-borne troops (*Metapheromenoioulamoi*). Each Battle Squadron (4 troops) had an effective combat strength of 120 men, armed with 6,5 Mannlicher rifles, 8 VB rifle grenade dischargers, and 12 LMGs;

(Directly under the Regimental Commander):

- 1 MG Squadron (*Ilēpolybolōn*) with 3 MG troops (a total of 12 MGs, therefore 4 MGs per troop);

- 1 Weapons Squadron (*Ilēmēchanēmatōn*) with 2 mortar troops (a total of 4 x 81 mm. Brandt mortars, therefore 2 mortar per troop); and an antitank (a/t) rifle troop (with 18 a/t rifles) that had not been formed before the hostilities started.

Also, corps transport (*Metagōgikasōmatos*) including two mobile workshops (*Kinētasynergeia*) for repairs.

The Regiment consisted of 42 officers and 1096 other ranks⁸⁸.

⁸⁷ See the S8-1 official TOE (combat footing) from the HAGS/AHD archives.

⁸⁸ S8-1 TOE, 11-12, HAGS/AHD Archives.

After the war started additions were made to complete the original organization. On 15 November 1940, a troop of antitank rifles (*Oulamosantiarmatikōntyphekiōn*) was added. It consisted of 20 Boys A/Tk rifles.⁸⁹ On 15 December 1940, a tank squadron (*Ilēharmatōn*), consisting of about 20 ex-Italian L3s, was added. These had been picked from among the 45 abandoned Italian tankettes left on the field of battle after their failed attack on the Elaia-Kalamas position in Epirus, in the first days of November 1940. On 30 December 1940, an Italian mortar troop (*Oulamositalikōnholmōn*) was added. It consisted of a number (probably eight) of 45 mm. ex-Italian mortars.

With the outbreak of war on 28 October 1940, the Motorized Cavalry Regiment mobilized and fought as part of the Cavalry Division and later of the VIII Infantry Division. Its Light Squadron was detached most of the time and fought independently, sometimes in combination with other ad hoc motorized units that had been created by dismounting horsed cavalry squadrons and mounting them on impressed civilian buses.⁹⁰ After the initial mobile phase of the campaign, the Regiment did not see much action and remained in reserve most of the time.

The more or less successful employment of the Regiment led to the creation of the 19th Motorized Division (*19ēMēchanokinētos Merarchia*) on 19 January 1941 from two elements: The aforementioned Motorized Cavalry Regiment and the materiel sent through the British aid to Greece.⁹¹ This last consisted of, among others, 10 Mk IIIB

⁸⁹ These were among the twenty-two similar antitank rifles that had been sent by the British to the Greeks on 2 November 1940, just three days after the start of the Italian invasion. See Higham, *Diary of a Disaster*, 27-28.

⁹⁰ Christodoulou, "A Greek Cavalry Battalion."

⁹¹ The British decision to aid Greece, initially in a covert way, in opposition to the Italian and German plans has been thoroughly investigated since the end of the war. Among many see Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy*, 27-65 and 154-66, *id.*, "Prelude to Disaster", Higham, *Diary of a Disaster*, *passim*, and Stockings and Hancock, *Swastika over the Acropolis*, 17-146.

“Dutchmen” light tanks,⁹² 100 Universal (or Bren) Carriers, over 200 Austin 8HP 4-seater cars, and hundreds of two-seat Norton 16H motorcycles. All these had been actually given to the Greek Army by the British, but much promised materiel had either been lost at sea or else never dispatched. The 19th Division was in fact a “mobile” brigade-sized unit eventually consisting of the ex-Motorized Regiment units along with 10 British-made Light tanks, 88 Bren-Carriers, about 205 Austin cars, over 400 new motorcycles, and some (very modest) field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft artillery support.

The 19th Division was finally organized as follows:⁹³

- ◆ Divisional Headquarters, Staff, and HQ Company⁹⁴
- ◆ 191st Motorized Regiment
- ◆ 192nd Motorized Regiment
- ◆ 193rd Motorized Regiment
- ◆ 19th Reconnaissance Group⁹⁵
 - Light Company: three troops in light cars and one troop on 10 side-car combinations;
 - Bren Open Tank Company: 11 Universal Carriers
- ◆ 19th Motorized Artillery Group (= Battalion)⁹⁶

⁹² Tarnstrom, *Balkan Battles*, 216.

⁹³ According to the S8-33, S8-34 and S8-35 official TOEs, HAGS/AHD archives.

⁹⁴ The Divisional HQ and HQ Company had a total strength of 20 officers, 81 other ranks, and 26 vehicles (1 universal carrier, 2 Mercedes-Benz [4x4] cars, 3 Austin 8HP cars, 5 other cars, 9 M/C, 1 M/C combination, and 5 light trucks).

⁹⁵ The total strength of the 19th Reconnaissance Group was 20 officers, 284 other ranks, and 92 vehicles (12 universal carriers, 4 Austin cars, 26 M/C, 19 M/C combinations, 16 Mercedes-Benz [4x4] cars, 1 Mercedes-Benz [6x6] truck, 11 other trucks, and 3 other cars).

⁹⁶ The strength of the 19th Motorized Artillery Group (excluding its 1st [Skontaportée] Battery) numbered 19 officers, 240 other ranks, 4 field guns and 4 limbers, and 62 vehicles (4 M/C, 11 M/C combinations, 3 Mercedes-Benz [4x4] cars, 3 Austin cars, 5 tractors, and 36 other trucks). The portée battery added to the above numbers some 5 officers, 140 other ranks, 4 mountain guns, and about 30 assorted vehicles.

- 1st Skontaportée battery (carried on trucks): 4 Škoda 75 mm Model 15 guns
- 2nd “English” 75 mm battery: 4 Ordnance QF 18-pounders modified during World War I by the U.S. to the caliber of 75 mm (designated M1917), handed over to the British through Lend-Lease; towed by Quads
- ♦ 19th Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group (= Battalion)
 - 1st Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery: four 3.7 cm Flak 36/37 guns
 - 2nd Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery: four 2 cm Flak 30 guns
- ♦ 19th Signals Company⁹⁷
- ♦ 19th Medical Detachment
- ♦ 19th Supply Detachment
- ♦ 1st-4th Motorized 47mm Anti-Tank Troop: of two Cannone da 47/32 M35 guns, captured from the Italians, each⁹⁸
- ♦ 1st-2nd Motorized 20mm Anti-Tank Troop: of two Solothurn S-18/100 anti-tank rifles, captured from the Italians, each
- ♦ 1st-2nd Automobile Platoon
- ♦ 927 Postal Sector

The core of the Division were the three Motorized Regiments, which had a unique composition:

- ♦ 191st Motorized Regiment (with HQ and HQ Company)⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Total strength of the company amounted to 5 officers, 112 other ranks, and 15 vehicles (1 car, 2 M/C, and 12 trucks).

⁹⁸ These were among the captured Italian weapons that had been sent by the British to the Greeks from Libya. See Higham, *Diary of a Disaster*, 156-57.

⁹⁹ Total regimental strength amounted to 52 officers, 843 other ranks, and 292 vehicles (10 light tanks, 25 universal carriers, 65 Austin cars, 132 M/C, 3 M/C combinations, 4 Mercedes-Benz [4x4] cars, 16 Mercedes-Benz [6x6] trucks, 33 other trucks, and 4 other cars).

- Closed Tank Company: ten Light Tank Mk IIIB tanks and one Universal Carrier
- 1st Dismounted Battalion (with HQ Group)
 - Combat Squadron (four truck-borne Troops): 120 men with Mannlicher-Schönauer rifles, eight Lebel rifles with VB rifle grenade cups, and twelve Hotchkiss 6.5 mm light machine guns
 - MG Troop: four 7.92 mm Hotchkiss machine guns
 - Mortar Troop: four 81 mm mortars
 - Austin-mounted MG Company: 44 Austin 8HP cars with 12 7.7 mm (= 0.303 in.) Hotchkiss machine guns, organized in three equal platoons
- 2nd Bren Tank Battalion (with HQ troop)
 - 1st Open Bren Tank Company: 11 Universal Carriers with two Boys 14 mm anti-tank rifles and three 2-inch mortars, 1 Austin car, 17 M/C, and 3 lt trucks
 - 2nd Open Bren Tank Company: as above
 - Motorcycle Company: 52 two-seat Norton 16H M/C, 9 Austin cars, of which 6 were MG-armed, and 4 lt trucks
- Regimental Trains: 13 trucks, 1 car and 2 M/C
- ♦ 192nd Motorized Regiment
 - as with the 191st, except that the Closed Tank Company contained seven L3/35 tankettes and one Universal Carrier
- ♦ 193rd Motorized Regiment
 - as with the 191st, except that the Closed Tank Company contained L3/35 tankettes and one Universal Carrier

It is obvious that the original Motorized Regiment was not fully integrated with the three new regiments, which basically consisted of its

subunits (minus the Light Squadron) plus 75 Bren-Carriers, 400 Norton motorcycles, and 185 MG armed Austin cars. This is also obvious from the terminology used, with some terms originating from the cavalry branch (squadron, troop, etc.) and others from the infantry branch (battalion, company, etc.). The officers and men of the 19th Division originated from the cavalry: those that did not come from the Motorized Regiment came from surplus personnel from other cavalry units from the Albanian front. No infantry officers were sent to the Division (despite many applications). The Division, including attached units, came to control just 24 light tanks¹⁰⁰ and about 8,000 men.¹⁰¹

The military record of the newly-constituted Division was not as good as that of its parent Motorized Cavalry Regiment. Initially the Division was subordinated to the Central Macedonia Field Army Section and covered the right flank of the Allied “W Force” in front of Mt Olympus. On 28 March 1941, it was transferred to the Eastern Macedonia Field Army Section and posted as a reserve behind its left (western) flank. One of the motorized regiments (the 191st) was detached and sent to the East, as a reserve to the “Group of Divisions” subordinate to the EMFAS. When the Germans attacked, on 6 April 1941, the 19th Division was ordered to reinforce the crumbling left flank of the Belles position by taking under command the “Krouisia Detachment.”¹⁰² Essentially it was ordered to hold a front of nearly thirty kilometers with the equivalent of four infantry battalions and fourteen field guns against the German XVIII Mountain Corps. As if this was not enough, it was again ordered to extend its left flank to cover the width of the Axios Valley, because the Yugoslav defenses to the north had crumbled and

¹⁰⁰ Ten “Dutchmen” and fourteen L3s. This is corroborated by Higham, *Diary of a Disaster*, 157.

¹⁰¹ *The Campaign in Greece and Crete*, 16.

¹⁰² The “Krouisia Detachment” consisted of the 2nd (Horse) Cavalry Regiment, an internal security battalion and two-and-a-half artillery batteries (ten field guns).

the 2nd German Panzer Division was advancing along the left bank of the river towards Salonica.¹⁰³ The new front extended to over fifty kilometers and was patently impossible to defend against the Germans. It was pierced on 8 April 1941 and the remnants of the Division pushed back to the southeast where they were forced to surrender on 10 April 1941, along with the rest of the EMFAS units.¹⁰⁴

Some comments on the operations of the units of the 19th Division against the Germans, between 6 and 9 April 1941 paint a vivid picture of the chaotic situation after the Germans invaded.¹⁰⁵

Colonel Asēmakopoulos (ex-commander Motorized Cavalry Regiment, and commander of the 192nd Motorized Regiment), noted: “The Italian closed tanks (the L3s) were useless and had been abandoned near Thessalonikē (without seeing any action).” “The effective combat strength of the 192nd Mot. Rgt. was (only) 295 men (114 in the Bren Tank Battalion and 181 in the Dismounted Battalion).”¹⁰⁶

The commander of the 19th Reconnaissance Group observed: “I organized the Group into three columns (1st, 2nd and 3rd), each consisting of 1 Bren-Carrier troop, 1 sidecar-combination squad (consisting of 3 motorcycle combinations) and 1 troop from the Light Squadron... The (Boys) anti-tank rifles of the Group immobilized 2 German tanks.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ For this task it was reinforced with a border battalion, a second internal security battalion and an anti-aircraft artillery battery (three 3.7 cm guns).

¹⁰⁴ For an overview of the operations of the 19th Division, see *An Abridged History*, 168-200; *SK 900-23*, 57-63; and Carr, *Defence and Fall of Greece*, 203-216.

¹⁰⁵ For a photographic survey of the divisional vehicles, as depicted by their German captors, see Christodoulou, “Ellēnikesmēchanokinētesdynamēis,” *passim*, and Plowman, *Camouflage & Markings*, 47-48.

¹⁰⁶ File no. 713/A/3, HAGS/AHD Archives.

¹⁰⁷ HAGS/AHD archives, file no. 713/A/2.

Epilogue

The participation of the Greek motorized forces in the Greek-Italian and Greek-German war ended as described. Despite the crushing superiority of their opponents, on both the Albanian and Bulgarian fronts, the Greek Army managed in various ways to overcome their technological weakness, sometimes by despoiling their opponents and sometimes improvising – and this despite their inexperience in the creation and use of motorized units.

For sure, the Motorized Cavalry Regiment and, subsequently, the 19th Motorized Division exhausted their scarce potential during the fight. But they did so in a comparable and at times much more efficient way than the motorized units of many other powerful armies of the time, such as the French, British,¹⁰⁸ Italian, Soviets, and others.

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¹⁰⁸ And this despite the initial British evaluation of the Division, before the beginning of the operations, that it is still being uncritically repeated even today, as, for example, in Stockings and Hancock, *Swastika over the Acropolis*, 121-22.

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The Organization of Multilateral Warsaw Pact Military Intelligence Coordination (1964-1990)

by
Jordan Baev

Abstract: *The aim of the proposed paper is to present to professional military history audience a summarized review of our new findings on the organization of Multilateral Warsaw Pact Military Intelligence Coordination (1964-1990)*

The establishment of postwar military and political alliances marked a new era in the multilateral foreign policy, defense, and security cooperation in Europe during the Cold War years. In the first 21st century decade within the framework of the international Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact¹⁰⁹ (located at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich), many important issues were discussed, particularly about the diplomatic and government instruments of coalition interactions and decision making in the bipolar international relations model. However, the history of military cooperation within the two blocs was limited to research on Military Committees sessions and largest joint exercises.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Since 2006 renamed to *Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security*, located at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich - www.php.isn.ethz.ch.

¹¹⁰ In January 2011, a new documentary intelligence history collection was published at the website of the project: Jordan Baev, "Spying on the West: Soviet-Bulgarian Scientific Intelligence Cooperation."

The declassification of almost entire document collections of Bulgarian Military Intelligence services documents for the Cold War era (1944-1991) provides a unique opportunity to disclose the authentic history of the establishment of close contacts and coordination in quite sensitive area like the military intelligence (MI) activity. A study about Warsaw Pact intelligence interaction on reconnaissance of some larger NATO exercises like FALLEX/WINTEX or AUTUMN FORGE was presented in 2013 during the 39th international congress of military history in Torino.¹¹¹ Working on the “History of Bulgarian Military Intelligence services (1878-2018),”¹¹² in the last six years has revealed more than 50,000 pages of previously unknown documents from Bulgarian Military Intelligence records, including protocols, correspondence, and confidential reports about the multilateral Warsaw Pact MI coordination. The aim of the proposed paper is to present for the first time to our professional military history audience a summarized review of our new findings on the subject.

Introduction

The establishment of the first Intelligence section within the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in 1908 coincided with the preparation of the first war plans against the Ottoman Empire. Though the Balkan War in 1912-1913 was characterized by coalition warfare,

¹¹¹ Jordan Baev, “Warsaw Pact Multilateral Military Intelligence Estimates on NATO’s War Plans and Military Exercises,” in: *ACTA. Joined and Combined Operations in the History of Warfare* (Roma: Ministerio de la difesa, 2014), 1: 624-634.

¹¹² The first volume for the period 1878-1955 was published in Sofia in December 2017, while the second volume for the period 1955-2018 will be released in 2019.

each one of the allied Christian forces pursued its own national aims competing with the others. In the First World War, the Bulgarian Army was under the coalition command of Field Marshal August von Mackensen; however, during the military campaigns in the Macedonian front and in Dobrudja, some differences appeared between the allied and Bulgarian commanders. In those circumstances, a close effective interaction between the Central Powers military intelligence units obviously was not possible.

During the Second World War, the Bulgarian Army was dominated by its leading ally Nazi Germany, both in the occupied territories of Greece and Yugoslavia, and inside Bulgaria. The chief of the Abwehr Bureau in Sofia, Col. Otto Wagner (aka Dr. Delius) maintained close contacts with the chiefs of the Intelligence Department of the Bulgarian General Staff, while an alternative competitive Abwehr office in Sofia, led by Major Richard Kauder (aka Klatt) collaborated mostly with the chiefs of Bulgarian State Security political police.¹¹³ With the technical support of the Abwehr Bureau in Sofia, the first Bulgarian radio intelligence battalion was established at the end of 1943 under the command of the Military Intelligence Department. In 1943 as well, the first Bulgarian parachute battalion was formed after three months training in Braunschweig Parachute School in Germany.

¹¹³ More about Kauder's group activity against the Soviet Union, subordinated to Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, can be found in Winfried Meyer, *KLATT. Hitlers jüdischer Meisteragent gegen Stalin: Überlebenskunst in Holocaust und Geheimdienstkrieg* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2015)

At the time of the political coup on 9 September 1944, Bulgaria was technically in war with all great powers.¹¹⁴ Just a few days later, four Bulgarian armies, subordinated to the Third Ukrainian Front of Marshal Fedor Tolbukhin, attacked the Wehrmacht troops of Army Group "E" on Yugoslav territory. Led by their own aims after the Stalin-Churchill "percentage agreement" in October, the Soviet authorities tried immediately to preserve the fighting efficiency of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. It was not quite usual for the behavior of an "occupation power," which was commented on even in the confidential reports of the U.S., British, and French representatives in Sofia.¹¹⁵ When the First Bulgarian Army continued its offensive against Nazi Germany on Hungarian territory, in mid-January 1945 Marshal Tolbukhin ordered an urgent training course to be organized by the 57th Soviet Army's Intelligence Department for Bulgarian military intelligence officers.¹¹⁶ That was the first practical interaction of the Bulgarian military intelligence service with the military intelligence services of the new dominant power in Bulgaria – the USSR.

In the first postwar years, all East European armies in the "Soviet sphere of influence" fell under direct control and subordination by

¹¹⁴ A so-called "symbolic" war against the USA and Great Britain was declared by the pro-Nazi government on 13 December 1941. On 5 September 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria (in fact that war lasted less than five days without any hostility), while on 8 September 1944 a new Bulgarian government declared war on the Third Reich.

¹¹⁵ For example, (OSS), R/A, L 45284, L 47437, RG 226, U.S. National Archives & Record Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, and Affaires Politiques, Serie Z (Europe), 1944-1955, Carton 65, Dossier 1, V. 8, Nr. 1006, V. 9, Nr. 670, Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE), Paris.

¹¹⁶ Veliko Tarnovo, Fond 49, Opis 1, A.E. 222, p. 11-12, State Military History Archive (DVIA).

Moscow in the process of “Stalinization” of their countries. With the establishment of a system of bilateral treaties among the Soviet bloc countries in 1947-1949, and the reorganization and rearmament of their armed forces on a “Soviet pattern” in 1950-1954, the first stage of creation of the East European political and military alliance was fulfilled. It continued further with the next step of signing of the Warsaw Treaty on 14 May 1955.

Western Multilateral Military Intelligence Cooperation

The first issue to be discussed is to have a comparative view on the parallel process of multilateral intelligence cooperation within NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Each of the two adversarial alliances was actually a nucleus of the interdependent Cold War reactor, which produced the “fragile balance of powers” of the bipolar postwar world. Working on the Parallel History Project about twenty years ago a provocative hypothesis about the impact of the Western Alliance was discussed each as a primary challenge and an effective model for an international military institution – over the Soviet bloc leadership.¹¹⁷

Unlike Eastern Europe, where during the first “Stalinist” postwar decade a total control by Moscow was imposed, the West European countries tried to establish more flexible and effective mechanism of management despite the fact that in the first seven years of NATO’s existence (1949-1956), a strong decision-making “triumvirate” between

¹¹⁷ See Vojtech Mastny, *Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact* (Zurich: FSK, 2001).

Washington, London, and Paris acted unofficially. The institutional transatlantic military intelligence cooperation started in the Second World War in the spirit of the “Atlantic Charter.” On 17 May 1943, a secret agreement for intelligence exchange (*BRUSA*) was signed between the governments of Great Britain and the USA. After the war the “special US-British partnership” became a solid base for a further multilateral cooperation with the signing of several agreements between February and July 1946 in the field of the technical signal and communication intelligence (SIGINT and COMINT) between the secret services of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (*UKUSA*). US-British electronic intelligence interaction was developed especially after the creation at the end of 1952 of the most powerful military intelligence organization – the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States of America.¹¹⁸

The first North Atlantic multilateral tools for intelligence exchange and coordination were proposed soon after the creation of the first military structures of the Alliance in the height of the Korean War. Just a few months after the appointment of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower as the first NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and the establishment of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), in April 1951 the Standing Group of NATO Military Committee approved a proposal for the establishment of joint intelligence units. Their task was to be the preparation of summarized analytical reports and reviews

¹¹⁸ Richard Aldrich, *GCHQ. The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: Harper Books, 2010), 90-104. The first *UKUSA* agreement of March 1946 (revised in 1948) was declassified only in 2010.

about the state, defense capabilities, and probable intentions of the adversary East European armed forces. The instructive documents foresee the creation of an *Intelligence Committee* within the Standing Group (SG), located in Washington, D.C., where representatives of the intelligence agencies only of the three leading allies (USA, Great Britain, and France) should be invited. However, another temporary expert unit (*Ad Hoc Intelligence Working Group* – AHIWG) was agreed to be formed, where representatives of the three regional commands were also invited.¹¹⁹ The summarized intelligence reports were to be delivered later to the military representatives of all NATO member states and their national military commands. Separately, in December 1952, a top-secret *Special Committee* (with a code name AC/46) was established within the North Atlantic Council. Its task was to deliver summarized intelligence information for the state and government leaders.

In October 1951, the first summarized intelligence report about the state of the Soviet bloc armed forces was distributed within the NATO military structures. In 1952, the preparation of 300-350 page annual analyses (*Intelligence Estimate*) started, while from 1953 on three times in the year in April, July, and October transitional reports (*Periodic Intelligence Report*) were distributed.¹²⁰ In the periods of regional crises, AHIWG also prepared thematic reports, such as the three reports from

¹¹⁹ Standing Group Records, SG 2.9, SG 126/2, SG 128, 128/1, 128/2, SG 181/1, NATO Archives, Brussels, Military Committee (MC).

¹²⁰ SG Records, SG 161/1-20, SG 176/1-3, NATO Archives, MC. Some British and U.S. documents noted the existence of differences between the national estimates, which had been overcome after the reaching of a “compromise” between the three leading delegations in the Intelligence Committee.–DEFE 4/58, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London; File 950871, Box 1155-1156, RG 319 (Army Staff), NARA.

December 1956 till August 1958 regarding “Threats for NATO Southern Flank after the Soviet penetration in the Middle East.”¹²¹

During the reorganization of the political and military NATO structures (1962-1967), the instruments of intelligence coordination and exchange were also improved. In that time some leading national intelligence services went through a parallel organizational transformation. For instance, in October 1961 the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara issued an edict for the establishment of a joint *Defense Intelligence Agency* (DIA), while in 1962-1967, the U.S. Army intelligence units were unified in a joint *Military Intelligence*.¹²² In May 1968, a new *Intelligence Division and Situation Centre* (SITCEN) of the NATO Military Committee began to function in Evere, near Brussels.¹²³

Such a relatively effective Military Intelligence system did not exist within the Warsaw Pact in the first decade of its existence. This was a direct reflection of the difficult long-term process of development of the Soviet bloc multilateral military structures until the end of the 1960s. It is not accidental that in March 1968 after an unsuccessful discussion at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC) summit in Sofia, the Bulgarian Communist leader Todor Zhivkov exclaimed: “Obviously, we cannot accept the situation when NATO have established a harmonious organization of its Joint Forces, while we are

¹²¹ SG Records, SG 255/1-3, NATO Archives, MC. Three main threats were underlined: 1. Break of the communication of NATO Southern Flank; 2. Termination of oil deliveries from the Middle East to NATO countries; 3. A perspective for Soviet Union to maintain its military bases in the Mediterranean.

¹²² *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence* (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, May 1973), 105.

¹²³ Project 147, NATO Intelligence System, June 1969, DEFE 48/496, TNA.

debating for years on some issues without reaching a common decision.”¹²⁴

Annual Sessions of MI Chiefs

When in May 1955 the Warsaw Treaty was announced, there was no clear view about the military structures of the established East European organization. In fact, the mechanism of military command and coordination within the Warsaw Pact started to function in 1960-1961 with the first regular joint sessions of the ministers of national defense and chiefs of staffs. The entire military structures of the East European alliance were established in March 1969 – thirteen years after the establishment of the Pact. The changes of the Warsaw Pact management after the first five years of its existence were also evaluated by the Western experts. For instance, a CIA *National Intelligence Estimate* from 26 August 1965 summarized that if in the late 1950s the Warsaw Pact had been qualified as a “paper organization,” from the beginning of the 1960s a new kind of multilateral military cooperation could be observed; thus, the Pact was transformed into a “significant component” of the Soviet European policy and defense planning.¹²⁵

The practice of holding multilateral Soviet bloc meetings started at the time of the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty organization. The

¹²⁴ Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A.E. 7, p. 19, Central State Archive (TsDA), Sofia. In this particular case, Zhivkov hinted at the “special” position of the Romanian leaders against the coordination of a common Warsaw Pact policy.

¹²⁵ Entry 29, Box 16: NIE-11-65 “Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact,” RG 263 (CIA), NARA. More about the changes of the Western evaluation on the Warsaw Pact can be found in Evanthis Hadzivasilliu, *NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc. Alliance Analysis and Reporting 1951-69* (London: Routledge, 2014).

first such multilateral intelligence conference was held in Moscow in March 1955, organized by the KGB with the participation of eight East European delegations of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services. The Soviet representatives raised the question of intelligence information exchange and joint operations against the “main adversary” – the United States of America and Great Britain. The proposed intelligence cooperation was oriented in three directions: 1. Infiltration and recruiting agents within NATO structures with the principal aim of obtaining information regarding NATO secret agreements and directives; 2. Obtaining information on joint military exercises, war plans, and rearmament of the Western armed forces, focusing on nuclear weapons; 3. Obtaining new information concerning disagreements between NATO member states. Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania took up common intelligence measures against Turkey and Greece.¹²⁶ The coordination of the joint information exchange and multilateral cooperation between the military intelligence services followed similar “distribution of goals,” but was organized more regularly from the beginning of the 1960s. In the first years after the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, the delivery of intelligence information was managed almost exclusively through the Joint Armed Forces Staff (SHTOVS) in Moscow with *Special Information* bulletins.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Record Group “M”, Fond 1, Opis 5, A.E. 152, Archive of the State Commission of State Security and Military Intelligence Dossiers (Archive COMDOS), Sofia. More in Jordan Baev, “The Warsaw Pact in the Balkans: The Bulgarian Perspective,” in Svetozar Rajak and Konstantina Botsiou, et al., ed., *The Balkans in the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 132-133.

¹²⁷ Fond 1, Opis 3, A.E. 42, p. 104, 126-128, 140-144, DVIA.

Among the basic issues about the effectiveness of the multilateral intelligence exchange is the question to what extent such reports and references had been used within the coalition command structures. The analysis of the accessible archival collections indicates that during the existence of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers (KMO) from March 1969 until March 1991, as a whole twenty-six joint sessions of that highest military structure have been organized in the capitals of the member states. For the same period, a total of thirty-six sessions of the Warsaw Pact Military Committee (chiefs of general staffs) were carried out, usually twice a year, in April/May and October. According to archival data, chiefs of national military intelligence directorates from four countries delivered their reports about the actual situation at the European War Theater during five sessions of the Committee of Defense Ministers, including Soviet GRU chief Gen. Petr Ivashutin in 11th, 14th, and 17th KMO sessions in 1978, 1981, and 1984; East German MI chiefs Gen. Theo Gregori (9th session in 1976) and Gen. Alfred Krause (19th session in 1986), Hungarian MI chief Gen. Ferenc Szucz (17th session in 1984); and Bulgarian MI chief Gen. Vasil Zikulov (9th and 19th sessions in 1976 and 1986).¹²⁸

There is no available documentary evidence about the existence of a special intelligence department within the structures of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces command (SHTOVS) until the mid-1970s. In 1978, a top secret document mentioned for the first time the existence of Second (Reconnaissance-Information) Directorate, headed by Lt.-Gen.

¹²⁸ *Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv*, Freiburg, DVW 1/71033, 71035, 71039, 71043, 71046. Published online: www.php.isn.ethz.ch

Mikhail Proskurin.¹²⁹ Chief of the Second Directorate Maj.-Gen. A. S. Zaitcev was appointed after him in the mid-1980s. It remains difficult to find out more details about the activity of the SHTOVS Second Directorate due to the lack of access to the Warsaw Pact records in Moscow; however, the relatively low rank of its chiefs is a clear indication that it was rather a secondary unit inside the coalition hierarchy without coordinative functions. The multilateral intelligence cooperation within the Warsaw Pact framework had been maintained essentially through the annual conferences of the chiefs of the national military intelligence services.

The first discussion about the necessity of closer interaction between the Warsaw Pact military intelligence directorates took place during the talks between the Bulgarian MI chief Maj.-Gen. Ilia Krastev with the GRU chief Col.-Gen. Ivan Serov in Moscow in May 1961. General Serov did not respond directly to the Bulgarian proposal for the eventual organization of a common meeting of the chiefs of East European MI services. Instead, he proposed that Bulgarian Defense Minister Gen. Ivan Mihailov address such a proposal to the Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Allied Forces, Marshal Andrei Grechko, which would definitely be supported by Soviet military intelligence command. The proposed approach obviously was a reflection to the intentions for introduction of more flexible mechanisms of multilateral coordination aiming to avoid the former formal directive control from the “Stalinist” times.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Previous positions of Gen. M. V. Proskurin included chief of Intelligence directorates of Middle Asia and Odessa military districts.

¹³⁰ However, the Soviet domination continued almost entirely until the dissolution of the Pact. According to official data, the Soviet representatives within SHTOVS were

The issue was raised for the second time in November 1963 with the new GRU chief, Gen. Petr Ivashutin. The Bulgarian MI delegation was advised once again that Bulgarian Minister of Defense Gen. Dobri Dzhurov must deliver the respective proposal to Marshal Grechko. Gen. Ivashutin also informed the Bulgarians that this step had also been agreed with the chief of Czechoslovak MI service, Col. Oldrich Burda, during his visit to Moscow.¹³¹ Finally, on 13 June 1964, the Bulgarian Minister of Defense proposed in official letters to his East European colleagues to send MI delegations to Sofia in October, and soon he received positive responses from almost all of them. The only objection came from the East German Defense Minister, Gen. Heinz Hoffman, who proposed instead that the MI conference be held not as an independent session, but under the direct auspices of the WP Unified Command.¹³² The East German proposal was not accepted, while after a new round of consultations with Moscow on 28 August, the chief of Bulgarian General Staff Col.-Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev sent to his Soviet counterpart Marshal Sergei Biryuzov the draft program for the intelligence conference, which was scheduled to be held from 6-9 October 1964 in Sofia.¹³³

The first day's discussion of the inaugural conference of the Warsaw Pact military intelligence chiefs included basic statements with

44.5 per cent of the military personnel. In a later testimony, Gen. Wojciech Yaruselski claimed that within the military structures of the Warsaw Pact, only 173 were East European officers and generals, while the other 350 military were from the Soviet armed forces. "Oral History Interviews with Polish Generals," September 2002 – www.php.isn.ethz.ch.

¹³¹ Microfile Records, MF 00811, A.E. 979, p. 44; MF 00818, A.E. 986, p. 269, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

¹³² Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1051, p. 1-19, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

some formal administrative proposals for further common work. The next two days the discussion continued in four separate sections: on strategic and operational-tactical (army) intelligence; information-analytical divisions; and radio-technical (electronic) intelligence. In his welcoming speech, the chief of Bulgarian General Staff, Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev underlined that the meeting was held with a visible delay, particularly if compared with the practice of the annual coordinative meetings of NATO intelligence services. He was supported by the representatives of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Col. Sandor Sarkjozy and Oldrich Burda, respectively, who gave as an indicative example the lack of any intelligence exchange during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. The representatives of Poland and the GDR, Gen. Gzegosc Korcinski and Arthur Franke, respectively, proposed future organized joint information-electronic intelligence expert meetings be organized for the coordination of reconnaissance on NATO joint exercises, such as FALLEX. It is interesting to mention that the chief of the Bulgarian MI directorate, Lt.-Gen. Petar Stoyanov, supported in principle the proposal for intelligence information exchange between the East European defense attaches in the NATO countries, but rejected any sharing of information about the own agent sources. At the final day of the conference, a joint protocol was signed by all delegations, except the chief of Romanian MI service, Col. Dumitru, who declared that he was not authorized by his government to sign the protocol. The document required the establishment of secret joint radio connections between the partner MI services; the issue of joint intelligence bulletins; the initiation of common cooperation for introducing of automatized system

for information analysis; to share information about the political, military and counterintelligence environment of the NATO countries; to organize interaction for common production or exchange of special intelligence technical devices; to coordinate their plans and activity for reconnaissance of the largest NATO exercises, and so on.¹³⁴

At the second MI conference in Budapest in October 1965, Col. Dumitru signed the joint Protocol; however, at the third meeting in East Berlin in November 1966, he refused to do it with the argument that the leadership in Bucharest supported only bilateral but not multilateral intelligence cooperation. Col. Dumitru also declared that the “Romanian side does not agree to follow joint tasks and to discuss any questions in the field of the strategic intelligence,”¹³⁵ Thus, since the end of 1966, the Romanian MI delegations had not been invited to take part in MI expert working group, but only attended formally the official meetings of the MI chiefs without signing the joint protocols.

The next annual conferences of the Warsaw Pact MI chiefs were conducted with similar agendas as the first three meetings (1964-1966) – starting with common plenary sessions, continuing with thematic panels, and with the last common session for signing the joint protocol. For the period 1967-1991, a total of twenty-one multilateral conferences were conducted, while such meetings were not held by different reasons in 1971, 1981, and 1983. In the period 1964-1980, the annual conferences were usually held in September-November, before the KMO annual summits. In the last decade of the Warsaw Pact history,

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 36-84.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-214; A.E. 1054, pp. 1-62, 99-115.

those annual military intelligence meetings were organized in April-June. The change of the season started with a conference in Warsaw. It was scheduled initially for October 1981. However, since the socio-political crisis in Poland at the end of 1981 had led to the introduction of martial law on 13 December 1981, the annual intelligence conference was moved to April 1982.

For the entire period from 1964 until 1991, the chiefs of allied MI services met for annual multilateral conferences four times in Bulgaria, GDR, Hungary, and Poland, and three times in Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Obviously, the specific distanced position of the Romanian military intelligence service was the reason for organizing such multilateral meetings in Bucharest only twice. It was agreed in 1967 that in the next year Romania would host the conference in September. The conference was postponed for one month due to the Warsaw Pact military intervention in Czechoslovakia, but finally was held in October 1968. The second time when Romania was the host was in June 1990 after the fall of the Ceausescu regime in the country. In that last ever military intelligence conference, the Romanian delegation also took part for the first time in the separate thematic and functional panels. Besides the Warsaw Pact countries, during the MI chiefs conference in Sofia in October 1978, for the first time a representative from the Cuban armed forces' MI directorate was invited as an "observer."¹³⁶ During the following years, official Cuban MI delegation attended the annual conferences until their termination in 1991.

¹³⁶ Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 737, pp. 71-99, 102-113, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

In the mid-1970s a new position appeared – “Permanent Secretary” of the annual MI conference with “functional duties” (approved in 1975) to support technically the preparation of the next conference and maintain “working contacts” with the leadership of the East European military intelligence services. The Permanent Secretary was authorized also to render “consultative assistance” on issues of bilateral and multilateral collaboration among the intelligence services. Until the end of the Warsaw Pact, the new position always was appointed a GRU representative, responsible for “coordination of the contacts with the allied military intelligence directorates.” In the time of . . . surprising sharpening” of the international situation or some other “extraordinary circumstances,” the Permanent Secretary was authorized as well to contribute to “establishing of more operational contacts and mutual information exchange on the newly appeared tasks.”¹³⁷

Annual Sessions of the MI Chiefs, 1964-1991

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Dates</i>
1964	Sofia	6-9 October 1964
1965	Budapest	26-29 October 1965
1966	East Berlin	14-18 November 1966
1967	Warsaw	4-9 September 1967
1968	Bucharest	29 October-2 November 1968
1969	Moscow	1-6 September 1969
1970	Prague	21-26 September 1970
1972	Varna	4-8 May 1972
1973	Budapest	30 November-4 December 1973
1974	Berlin	15-17 October 1974
1975	Warsaw	21-24 October 1975
1976	Moscow	11-15 October 1976

¹³⁷ Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1068, pp. 22-23, Record Group “VR,” Archive COMDOS.

1977	Prague	17-22 October 1977
1978	Sofia	16-21October1978
1979	Budapest	16-20October1979
1980	Berlin	27 October-1 November1980
1982	Warsaw	19-21April1982 ¹³⁸
1984	Moscow	1-3February1984
1985	Prague	10-13April1985
1986	Sofia	13-16June 1986 ¹³⁹
1987	Budapest	April 1987
1988	Berlin	May 1988
1989	Warsaw	15-18May1989
1990	Bucharest	18-20June1990

Functional and Thematic Sections

In the joint Protocol, signed in East Berlin on 18 November 1966, separate thematic meetings over the issues of Operational-Tactical (i.e., army) Intelligence departments, Radio-Technical (i.e., Electronic) Intelligence departments, and Information-Analytical departments to be organized the following spring in Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw were proposed for the first time.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, in order to coordinate the multilateral intelligence cooperation in the field of reconnaissance and operational analysis of the NATO larger military exercises over the whole European territory and the Atlantic and Mediterranean basin, it was also proposed that at least twice in a year joint sessions of senior representatives of both operational, electronic, and analytical departments be held. The intelligence directorates of the East European armed forces defined as a primary task the reconnaissance and

¹³⁸ Initially scheduled for 19-21 October 1981.

¹³⁹ Initially scheduled for a 22-25 April 1986, but postponed on the GRU initiative.

¹⁴⁰ Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1054, pp. 51-62, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

examination of the NATO exercises because the most important new strategic and doctrinal views and concepts were tested there. In the work of the proposed periodic functional and thematic sessions between the annual MI chiefs conferences usually deputy chiefs and chiefs of the functional departments took part. Within the structures of the East European Military Intelligence directorates, there were appointed deputy chiefs on Strategic (HUMINT), Operational-Tactical (Army and Special Forces – SPETZNAZ), Radio-Technical (Electronic or OSNAZ, i.e., SIGINT), and Information-Analytical directions. Sometimes at the separate sessions senior experts were invited as well, if necessary. For instance, when the questions of automatization of the intelligence analysis process were discussed, some IT experts attended the meetings.

The establishment of a joint Scientific-Technical Commission (NTK) was proposed at the MI chiefs annual conference in May 1972 in Varna. The first working session of that new multilateral commission was held in November 1972 in Budapest. It discussed the task of production and elaboration of new special technical devices for electronic reconnaissance.¹⁴¹ The next session of the Scientific-Technical Commission in Sofia at the end of April 1974 approved various proposals of each MI service for joint projects and research in the field of producing new electronic intelligence devices for the period 1976-1980.¹⁴² In the period 1972-1986, the chairman of the Commission was a former chief

¹⁴¹ The intelligence history historiography still pays quite a little attention for the elaboration and use of special technical devices. One of the few authentic monographs on the issue was written by a former “CIA technical department” chief: Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, *Spycraft. The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to Al-Qaeda* (New York: A Plume Books, 2009).

¹⁴² Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1068, pp. 24-32, Archive COMDOS, Record Group “VR.”

of the GRU Eleventh Directorate and of the Center for Cosmic Reconnaissance, Lt.-Gen. P.T. Kostin.¹⁴³ After the death of Gen. Kostin in 1986, the NTK chief became Lt.-Gen. N.G. Gladkich.

The protocols and prospective plans of the Scientific-Technical Commission were reported by its chairman at the annual MI chiefs conferences, where they were discussed and approved. During the annual MI chiefs conference in October 1977 in Prague, several participants proposed the extension of the discussed topics and research projects. However, the NTK chairman Lt.-Gen. Petr Kostin warned that there were some aspirations by the leadership of the Military Scientific Committee at the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces Staff (SHTOVS) to bring under their subordination the MI NTK activity, which could not be permitted. This was just one more hint on the delicate issue of eventual pressure from “above” and the resolute attitude of the military intelligence community to defend its relative independence due to its specific tasks and tools. Gen. Kostin clarified as well in his statement that the Scientific-Technical Commission functioned just as a consultative, but not as coordinative, body because the multilateral coordination between the military intelligence services was carried out only at the MI chiefs conferences.¹⁴⁴ The last NTK session was held in Prague in November 1988. Among the issues discussed were the requests for acquiring reliable information about the new U.S. precision weapons, new digital methods for transferring of

¹⁴³ In 1964-1971, Gen. Petr Kostin managed the secret projects Hector and Orion for launching intelligence cosmic satellites, while in 1974 he was appointed as a GRU deputy chief on armament.

¹⁴⁴ Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 737, pp. 29-30, Record Group “VR,” Archive COMDOS.

information, and the introduction of the new automated information system ACCIS¹⁴⁵ inside the NATO armed forces.¹⁴⁶

In general, from 1964 till 1991 several parallel sessions of various military intelligence working groups were summoned each year. The Bulgarian archival records contain data about twenty-five sessions of Operational and Tactical (Army) Intelligence departments, the last one in September 1990 in Moscow; eighteen sessions of MI Information-Analytical departments, the last one in March 1990 in Prague; sixteen sessions of Radio-Technical (Electronic) Intelligence departments, the last one in May 1990 in Prague; while specific working group coordination sessions on reconnaissance of NATO annual military exercises were convoked at least fifteen times. The most important intelligence data was transferred to the Supreme Commander and Staff of the Unified Armed Forces and the summarized information was reported further to the Political Consultative Committee, Committee of Ministers of Defense, and Military Council of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Thus, the Military Intelligence estimates were used in the coalition planning of the East European alliance.

The framework and basic dimensions of the Warsaw Pact MI multilateral coordination in the course of reconnaissance and evaluation of the NATO large-scale joint and combined exercises could be viewed perfectly at the operational plan for "interaction" in regard to the WINTEX-75 exercise, signed during the Information & Radio Technical

¹⁴⁵ Automated Command and Control Information System of Allied Command Europe – ACE ACCIS.

¹⁴⁶ Special Literature, Inventory No. 3019, pp. 1-11, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

Intelligence departments'session in Sofia in January 1975. Bulgaria was assigned the task to reconnoiter NATO armed forces in the Southern European War Theater (excluding Italian AF), Hungary – the same direction (excluding Greek and Turkish AF), Czechoslovakia and the GDR – NATO armed forces at Central European War Theater, Poland – NATO armed forces at Central and Northern European War Theaters, while also observing the USSR-NATO Allied Commands at European, Atlantic, and the English Channel (La Manche) War Theaters. The main NATO communication centers, objectives of Warsaw Pact electronic surveillance, had similar allocation among the East European MI services: Bulgaria – transmitters in Izmir (Turkey) and Kato Souli (Greece); Hungary – Andrews Air Base; the GDR – U.S. base Pirmasens (FRG); Poland – Karup Air Base (Denmark); Czechoslovakia – Brunssum (The Netherlands) and Casteau (SHAPE in Belgium); and the USSR – Torrejón Air Base (Spain) and Siebelbach Air Force Communication Station (Germany). The mutual intelligence exchange envisioned daily and extraordinary summaries, and in three months after the end of the winter exercises a summarized analytical survey with standardized technical data.¹⁴⁷

The pattern of the summarized surveys could be viewed by an Analytical report (of twenty pages) about the activity of Bulgarian MI electronic units on reconnaissance of WINTEX/CIMEX-79 strategic command & staff exercises (6-23 March 1979), For reconnaissance of NATO winter exercises, thirty new electronic stations were deployed by

¹⁴⁷ Microfile Records, MF 01288, A.E. 1069, pp. 106-109, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

special Radio Technical Intelligence brigade and forty-six more stations by the three land forces Radio Technical Intelligence detachments and one Naval Radio Technical Intelligence unit, which meant twice as many stations for radio and radar position-finding of those used in “a regular situation” period. During the WINTEX/CIMEX-79 exercises, the activity of 117 sources of NATO electronic communications were located and followed, 80 of them newly dislocated. In general, 946 messages were recorded, 515 of them were from NATO and U.S. command sources, and the others from Turkish and Greek military stations. About 150 of the recorded messages were sent with open texts, while some of the enciphered messages had used symbols, signals, and commands that were disclosed during the previous WINTEX exercises. The acquired intelligence data permitted to disclose in the preparatory period and during the first phase of WINTEX-79 (transition from peacetime to war with change from Military Vigilance to Reinforcement Alert) the disposition of some NATO wartime control facilities in Southern Europe through the messages sent by the communications centers in Naples, Vicenza, Izmir, and Padua. During the second phase of the exercises (first defensive and counteroffensive operations in the initial war period with/without use of tactical nuclear weapons), multiform extensive data was collected about the participating troops and staffs, areas of disposition, command points, control communications systems, etc.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Microfile Records, MF 01288, A.E. 1119, pp. 196-205, Record Group “VR,” Archive COMDOS. In new information immediately after the end of WINTEX-79, it was noticed that for the first time from 1973 joint communication between the Greek and Turkish armed forces had been launched, which was reliable evidence for return of Greece into

At the time of the last multilateral MI conference in Bucharest in June 1990, first radical changes of the MI leadership in many East European countries had been made, and in the next couple of months some others took place.¹⁴⁹ The last annual conference showed visible signals and warnings for the internal differences among the allied countries after the political changes in 1989. Three months before the meeting in Bucharest, at the Operational-Tactical intelligence departments session in Prague in March 1990, the former chief of Czechoslovak MI service and actual chief of General Staff, Gen. Anton Slimak suggested to stop with the multilateral cooperation and to continue only on a bilateral basis.¹⁵⁰ At the last conference in Bucharest, it was agreed to look for new forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The chief of the Bulgarian MI service, Col.-Gen. Vasil Zikulov, who would be replaced two months later by his deputy, Maj.-Gen. Luben Dobrev, proposed postponement of the fourteenth session of the Scientific-Technical Committee (NTK) in Sofia for the end of the year; in fact, it was never held. At the meeting in Bucharest, the Bulgarian and Hungarian chiefs, Gen. Zikulov and Gen. Janos Kovacz, agreed that the Bulgarian Radio-Intelligence station in Dunaváros and the Hungarian Radio-Intelligence station in Varna should be closed and returned back to their home lands, which happened in November-

NATO military activity after withdrawing during the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974.

¹⁴⁹ Even in July 1987 the longest standing head of a Warsaw Pact military intelligence service, Gen. Petr Ivashutin, was replaced by his deputy Col.-Gen. Vladilen Mikhailov as a chief of GRU.

¹⁵⁰ Microfile Records, MF 01520, A.E. 1690, p. 55, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS.

December 1990.¹⁵¹ During the Bucharest conference the last chief of the East German MI service, Gen. Rotter, proposed to drop out the discussion on mutual intelligence cooperation for the next 1991 from the actual agenda. All participants (including the GRU chief Col.-Gen. Vladlen Mihailov) agreed with the proposal. The last ever joint session (of Operational-Tactical Intelligence departments) was held on 18-20 September 1990 in Moscow, without representatives from the GDR and Hungary, but for the first and last time with delegation from Romania.¹⁵² Thus, the multilateral military intelligence cooperation stopped about half a year before the termination of the Warsaw Pact military structures at the end of March 1991, and nine months before the dissolution of the Pact itself on 1 July 1991 in Prague.

Conclusion

The main historical estimates and an overview about the results of the Warsaw Pact multilateral Military Intelligence cooperation meetings and conferences could be summarized in several basic points:

1. From the decision-making point of view, it is obvious that the dominance of Soviet aims as the leading superpower in the Eastern bloc prevailed during the whole history of the alliance. Though, each one East European country had its own specific goals and intentions, which did not necessarily concur with the interests and goals of the other allies.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80, 88-89.

¹⁵² Microfile Records, MF 01517, A.E. 1687, pp. 40-43, Record Group "VR," Archive COMDOS. The discussion on mutual intelligence cooperation for the next 1991. In Moscow it was agreed also that such multilateral session must be convoked in the future only "in case of emergency."

For instance, Moscow was not so interested to support Bulgarian position on the so-called “Macedonian Question” in the 1960s or “Islamic Minority Issue” at the end of the 1980s, while all allied countries kept silence during the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Transylvania.

2. The multilateral intelligence cooperation could not be evaluated only in a one-sided framework. For Bulgarian military intelligence services, in particular, the multilateral cooperation was of importance and beneficial because of the opportunity to receive much more intelligence information of global patterns and to acquire modern electronic intelligence and deciphering equipment.

3. The received sensitive information due to the established regular intelligence exchange permitted the collection of a huge amount of data on NATO doctrinal views and armed forces development. It was not possible, obviously, to be acquired by a sole intelligence service.

4. The twenty-five years’ experience of joint interaction in a coalition contributed in some way for adopting an alliance culture, even as lessons learned how to defend your own position, when it is not common with the other allies. This option could explain also the more or less easier way of accepting the new PfP and NATO requirements in the late 1990s and the early 2000s in the process of military transformation and integration within the Euro-Atlantic security system.

The Role of Diplomacy in Alliance Making between Israel and Jordan during Two Decades of Eruptions

by

Orit Miller Katav

ABSTRACT: *On 5 May 1948, Israel declared its independence and at the same time the second phase of the War of Independence broke out. Some say it never really ended. Following international diplomatic efforts, ceasefire agreements were signed between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries in 1949. Diplomacy plays a crucial role in alliance making. It is necessary for all sides in every aspect of life. It matters even more when it deals with constant wars. Since wars have been a reality in Israel from the day it was established, so have negotiations and diplomatic efforts. "Sometimes it is necessary to go to war to achieve peace."¹⁵³ It took two wars and twenty-seven years to build the understanding that "no more war, no more bloodshed"¹⁵⁴ applies to both sides of the Jordan River, and not only for the southern part of the Israeli border with Egypt. Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, fifteen years after the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. The role of diplomacy had proven itself to be the main resource for preventing and ending wars.*

¹⁵³ Anwar Sadat.

¹⁵⁴ Menachem Begin.

Introduction

Israel and Jordan were covert partners in talks that were conducted furtively, carefully, and over decades. It was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, however, who stood on the White House lawn in Washington, D.C., in 1979 under U.S. President Jimmy Carter's leadership and signed the peace treaty with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The peace treaty was based on the Camp David Accords that preceded it, which was based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 224 and 338, and which paved the way for mutual agreements. About three decades of terror and conflict, wars and numerous casualties on both sides came to an end. However, peace typically comes at a price. Israel paid for it with the Sinai Peninsula, Taba Beach, and the evacuation of the Yamit settlement. The people of Yamit called Prime Minister Begin a "traitor" as a result of the evacuation. Egypt paid the price by getting the cold shoulder from neighboring Arab states. Sadat paid for it with his life. Peace between Israel and Egypt is stable and has lasted for almost forty years.

Ostensibly this corresponded with the immediate need for Jordan and Israel to move forward and sign a peace treaty as well, since talks between them had been going on for decades and Jordan shares Israel's longest continuous border. It was also known at the time that former negotiations and meetings had taken place between Israeli diplomats and King Faisal at the beginning of the 20th century.¹⁵⁵ These ties had

¹⁵⁵ Correspondence from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 19 January 1979, A-43329/2, and 25 November 1981, A-8193/6, Record Group unknown, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., USA; Y. Nevo, *Jordan*:

lasted long before and after the establishment of the State of Israel. However, additional events took hold of the Middle East and prevented the peace treaty from being signed. The 1980s were characterized by a series of tumultuous violent struggles between Israel and terrorist organizations, which forced the Israeli government to deal with the ongoing problem of violent terrorism.

Although these events were relevant to both the Israeli and Jordanian governments, it was necessary to continue with the covert talks between the two leaders. The questions that are currently being raised deal with the dilemmas of time and circumstances. Why did terror attacks and a bloody war in the Gulf have to be the reason that brought the two countries to the negotiating table, even though a prospective treaty was on it all along? What was the role of diplomacy in alliance making between the neighboring countries and what role did the United States and Europe play? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to describe the previous events that affected the arena. This would include some of the countries in the Middle East. What were the events that had brought the leaders of Israel and Jordan to a new understanding about the future of their countries and people?

The Search for Identity (Raanana: Open University Press, 2005), 210-216; A. Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (Or Yehuda: Kinneret-Bitan, Dvir Publishing House, 2009), 345-347, S. Tuval, "Carter, 1977-1979: The Camp David Agreements and the Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty," in *State Policy Between Hostility and Accords 1948-2008*, Vol. 2 (Raanana: Open University Press, 2008), 653-681; and S. Sofer, "Menachem Begin at the Camp David Summit: A Chapter in New Diplomacy," in *Ibid.*, 682-699.

The Eruptions of the 1980s

The first eruption was Lebanon. In early June 1982, Israel embarked on a short-term military operation to root out the PLO terror cells dotting South Lebanon and neutralize their threat to the towns of Northern Israel. Concurrent to the war that occurred in the North, and even prior to it, a brutal war was being waged far from the local scene, although it did not affect it directly. In 1980, the Iran-Iraq War began, and all eyes were focused on the oil fields. The war ended eight years later, without a conclusive outcome. However, the war took a toll of around one million casualties, as well as several million dollars that were directed from state funds to the war effort.¹⁵⁶ The fiery winds of change also set the West Bank ablaze and toward the end of the decade, in 1987, the Intifada (uprising) broke out. The PLO, the official leading force of the Palestinian people, broke out in a civil uprising against the policies of Israel's military rule and against the Israeli Occupation. The Palestinians demanded rights to national self-determination, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and international recognition.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ "Contingency Papers Package," 22 December 1982, CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100002-8; Ibid., "Summary and Comment," CIA-RDP84B00148R000300790038-7, June 1982; Ibid., "Emerging Issues in Near East and South Asia," CIA-RDP86T01017R000202390001-4, 4 February 1986; all reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., "Israel and the West Bank: Where Is the Occupation Heading?" CIA-RDP86T00587R000300290002-4, June 1985; Ibid., "The Peace Process: A New Opportunity at Last?" CIA-RDP87M00539R001702560005-3, 7 June 1985; Ibid., "Jordan: Does Hussein Believe in a West Bank Option?" CIA-RDP85T01058R000506660001-3, 15 July 1985; and Ibid., "PLO Presence in Jordan," CIA-RDP85T01058R000506760001-2, 9 August 1985; all reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA.

Burning tires and throwing stones at Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) became a daily occurrence throughout the West Bank. The IDF began enforcing order and dealing with disturbances by using water cannons, and shooting rubber bullets, stun grenades, and smoke grenades. Israel feared that the uprising would spill over into internal cities. The PLO incited the heart of the people. The fear of a spreading uprising crossed the Jordanian border into the Hashemite Kingdom. The King of Jordan realized that the PLO was a force in the West Bank and in a somewhat surprising unilateral move, one year later, in the summer of 1988, Jordan declared its unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. The act of severing ties with both banks of the Jordan River led to further unrest in the West Bank, who saw this move as a victory for the policy of terrorism. In the East Bank they breathed a sigh of relief at this move.¹⁵⁸

The Palestinian people sensed that this was the time to demand that the world recognized it as a nation seeking its national self-determination in Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital. Although King Hussein declared that Jordan would always remain on the side of the

¹⁵⁸ "Near East South Asia Review," CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002-0, July 1985; Ibid., "Contingency Papers Package," CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100002-8, 22 December 1982; Ibid., "What If Arafat Accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242?" CIA-RDP85T01058R000406080001-8, 5 April 1985; Ibid., "Requirements for the Security's Trip to Cartagena December 1-2, 1985," CIA-RDP87M00539R003205330014-8, 4 November 1985; Ibid., "Israel Capabilities for Striking PLO Bases," CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5, 20 December 1985; Ibid., "Jordan: Can Hussein Dump The PLO?" CIA-RDP85T01058R000406390001-422, May 1985; Ibid., "King Hussein's Palestinian Strategy," CIA-RDP86T01017R000302780001-0, 22 January 1986; Ibid., "Jordan-Israel Border Controversy," CIA-RDP86T01017R000201230001-2, 29 January 1986; Ibid., "Emerging Issues in Near East and South Asia," CIA-RDP86T01017R000202390001-4, 4 February 1986; Ibid., "Jordan-US: King Hussein's Visit," CIA-RDP86T01017R000302540001-6, 6 April 1986; Ibid., "Near East and South Asia Review," CIA-RDP87T00289R000200830001-6, 11 April, 1986; all reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA.

Palestinian people, he was quick to sever all political and economic ties with the West Bank. While the PLO shot every which way, Israel and Jordan were in the line of fire. This seemingly heralded the right time to establish an agreement and embark on a path to peace.

Terms of Agreement

The reality that Israel and Jordan shared on both sides of the PLO stronghold seemingly heralded the right time to establish an agreement and embark on a path to peace. A meeting between state representatives in London in 1987, known as the London Agreement,¹⁵⁹ was meant to be the right setting to tie up loose ends, but conditions were not quite ripe for a binding bilateral agreement to be signed. The fact that the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Simon Peres met with Jordanian King Hussein in London, mediated by a local contact, Lord Mishcon, was considered true progress. A type of memorandum was drafted but before the ink on the document had dried, the agreement was shoved in a drawer.¹⁶⁰ Each side was suspicious of the other's intentions, and the

¹⁵⁹ E. Halevy, *Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with the Man Who Led the Mossad* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), page unknown; M. Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace* (N.p.:Routledge Publications, 2013), page unknown; Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace: Memories* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), 305-309; CIA-RDP06T00412R000606160001-1, "Status of the Peace Process," 18 September, 1986; reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA; Y. Shamir, *Summing Up: An Autobiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), page unknown; Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 261-273; and M. Zack, *Hussein Makes Peace; Thirty Years of Secret Talks* (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1994), 261-273.

¹⁶⁰ Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, page unknown; Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace*, page unknown; Peres, *Battling for Peace*, 305-309; Near East and Far Review, "Status of the Peace Process," 18 September, 1986, CIA-RDP06T00412R000606160001-1, reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA;

Shultz Plan¹⁶¹ at this stage was too binding. There was also intense mistrust between Shamir and Peres in the National Unity Government in Israel. The latter was suspected of being too eager to promote hasty arrangements at the expense of the Israeli government. The notion of a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan fell by the wayside once again.¹⁶²

The Eruptions of the 1990s

Only a few short years had passed since the longest Middle East war in modern times between Iran and Iraq had ended, and the arena erupted once again. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and held the local government hostage and slaughtered the Kurdish people. The local oil

Shamir, *Summing Up*, page unknown; Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 261-273; and Zack, *Hussein Makes Peace*, 261-273.

¹⁶¹ Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, page unknown; Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace*, page unknown; Peres, *Battling for Peace*, 305-309; Near East and Far Review, "Status of the Peace Process," 18 September 1986, CIA-RDP06T00412R000606160001-1, reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA; A. Susser, "Israel-Jordan Relations, 1948-2004," in *Foreign Policy between Confrontation and Agreements in Israel, 1948-2008*, Part B, ed. B. Neuberger and A. Geronick (Raanana: Open University Press, 2008), 842-861; A. Susser, *Israel, Jordan, and Palestine: The Two-State Imperative* (N.p.: Brandies University Press, 2012); Shamir, *Summing Up*, page unknown; Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 261-273; and Zack, *Hussein Makes Peace*, 261-273. Between 1988 and 1990, there was a national unity government in Israel. Yitzhak Shamir was Prime Minister on rotation with Shimon Peres, who served as his substitute in absence and as Finance Minister. The two had philosophical and political differences that brought the government to an end sooner than planned due to a no-confidence motion in the twenty-second parliament.

¹⁶² Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, page unknown; Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace*, page unknown; Peres, *Battling for Peace*, 305-309; Near East and Far Review, "Status of the Peace Process," 18 September 1986, CIA-RDP06T00412R000606160001-1, reportedly in unknown Record Group, NARA; Susser, "Israel-Jordan Relations," 842-861; Susser, *Israel, Jordan, and Palestine*, page unknown; Shamir, *Summing Up*, page unknown; Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 261-273; and Zack, *Hussein Makes Peace*, 261-273.

fields were at the heart of the conflict and the world could not afford such a loss at the hands of the Iraqi tyrant, Saddam Hussein. An international coalition was established against Iraq's belligerence and in unprecedented military cooperation, attacked Iraq, causing it to withdraw to its original borders while releasing Kuwait from its grip.¹⁶³

Although the war was not along Israel's borders, and did not directly involve the Israeli military, Israel was definitely involved. The Iraqi dictator threatened to harm Israel for the crimes it was allegedly conducting against the Palestinian population in the Territories. The concern in Israel of an attack with non-conventional missiles caused widespread panic among the population. American President George Bush was quick to ensure Israel's safety with an umbrella of security protective measures, including Patriot batteries and additional military aid, as long as Israel promised not to retaliate against Saddam's hostility and provocations.¹⁶⁴ While Iraqi rockets rained down on Israel, Prime Minister Shamir exercised restraint and refrained from retaliating.

Even the King of Jordan expressed his deep concern over Israel's involvement in the war. In such a case, the Kingdom would have become

¹⁶³ In Israel, Desert Storm is called the Gulf War. The war broke out on 17 January 1991 and lasted forty-three days. There was a heavy concern for biological or chemical attacks. According to Israeli Home Front Command instructions, every populated place had to be prepared and safe in case of a chemical/biological attack. The authorities distributed personal safety kits, which every Israeli citizen was ordered to carry at all times. The kit included a gas mask, filter, and an Atropine auto-injector. A quiet radio broadcast warnings concerning missile attacks.

¹⁶⁴ The MIM-104 Patriot is a surface-to-air missile system, the primary missile of its kind used by the United States Army and several allied nations. It is manufactured by the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon and derives its name from the radar component of the weapon system. (Target on Radar to Attacking Army Phased). Patriot batteries were deployed at a number of locations in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

a bloody battlefield and its borders from both directions would have been compromised due to the invasion of Palestinian infiltrators on one side, and Iraqi refugees on the other. The celebration and joy that the Palestinians exhibited on the rooftops of the refugee camps in the West Bank each time an Iraqi missile landed in Israel proved that this reality needed to be addressed. Talks to reach an arrangement were imperative.

When the Gulf War ended, overtures between Israel and the Palestinians led by the PLO began. Since the time for direct negotiations between the parties was not yet ripe, Jordan was chosen to accompany the Palestinians. The talks began in Madrid within the framework of an international conference. Prime Minister Shamir came to the talks in order to put an end to terrorism. It was convenient for the world to identify Jordan as the home of the Palestinian people, but the king was quick to state that Jordan was not Palestine. This statement succinctly expressed the king's position. All ideas about federation, confederation, sponsorship, and partnership were completely unacceptable to the king. He perceived Jordan as the homeland of the Jordanian people alone. Defining his country as the national homeland of the Palestinian people was akin to a death sentence for him and for the Hashemite Kingdom. His grandfather, who was his namesake, was murdered at the foot of the Al-Aqsa Mosque by a Palestinian in the 1950s. Even then, after witnessing the scene, the king made up his mind that he would not share the same fate.

In 1992, the talks moved from Madrid to Oslo, this time without Jordanian representation. At the time, elections took place in Israel and

there was a change of government. Rabin was elected Prime Minister and the pace of the talks led Israel and the PLO to sign the Oslo Accords. An agreement between Arafat and Rabin was signed in 1993 on the lawn of the White House, mediated by U.S. President Bill Clinton. This was the time for the Jordanian king to begin to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel.

The Gulf War, 1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq astounded the entire world by invading Kuwait. The Gulf War began, in U.S. military terminology, as Operation Desert Storm. After the Iraqi Army's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council decided to establish a coalition headed by the United States. Thirty-four countries shared a common goal: Liberate occupied Kuwait from Iraq, apply sanctions to the occupying party, and set an ultimatum: Withdraw from Kuwait within four months. After the four-month period, the coalition launched an offensive. The operation began with comprehensive air strikes followed by a ground strike lasting 100 hours of non-stop fighting, resulting in Kuwait's liberation.

Jordan's role in the war is open for interpretation. According to the American perspective, Jordan sided with Iraq and after years of cooperation and ties with the West, it stood by its neighbor to the east. The fact that Jordan did not head the resistance to the invasion or warn Israel of its leader's aggression was a suspected betrayal. Hussein was also suspected of supporting the Iraqi tyrant and encouraging his

aggression toward Kuwait, advising him how to avoid the sanctions that the UN placed on Iraq. In contrast, Hussein, King of Jordan, denied the allegations and claimed that he knew nothing of Iraq's plans to invade Kuwait and damage the entire Gulf, which would lead to an international coalition against him, and that he definitely did not know about Saddam's plans to bomb Israeli cities.

The reasons for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were mainly economic. Iraqi debts accumulated as a result of the Iran-Iraq War threatened the country's normal state of affairs. The Kuwait oil pricing policy, oil production quotas from the joint fields in Rumaila, and the dispute over borders pushed the Iraqi ruler out of his comfort zone, leading him to the decision to take control of Kuwait and profit from it. Saddam gave the Jordanian king the impression that his intention was not to invade or move in that direction, but the early morning telephone call that the Jordanian king received from the ruler of Saudi Arabia, King Fahd, on the morning of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, gave a different picture. At the time, Hussein was the Chairman of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)¹⁶⁵ and was therefore responsible for managing the event. Saddam, who reached the capital of Kuwait that same afternoon, ignored Hussein's pleas and continued with the invasion.

Despite U.S. President George Bush's desire to stop Saddam immediately, Hussein implored him to enable him to manage the dispute among the Arab states and reach a withdrawal agreement without involving the West. Saddam demanded that Arab countries not condemn his actions and at that stage they avoided a public condemnation.

¹⁶⁵ The other members of the Council were Iraq, Egypt, and Northern Yemen.

Hussein was determined to find a solution “within the Arab family” and prevent damage to the honor and status that other Middle Eastern states get from the West. He enlisted the support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and set out for Baghdad with the goal of ending the crisis immediately. Saddam justified his actions and claimed legal justification for the invasion, yet he agreed to retreat on condition that the other Council members would refrain from condemning his invasion of Kuwait and military actions in the country. The decision was made. While Hussein was on his way back to Jordan, pleased with how quickly the crisis was solved, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak publicly condemned Iraq’s actions due to internal Egyptian pressure. This move put a spike in the wheel of Hussein’s solution and annulled the agreement that was reached several hours earlier.¹⁶⁶

The lack of confidence in Hussein’s ability to solve the crisis, and the United States’ and Egypt’s desire to solve the crisis using escalation, led to the influx of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to allegedly halt the Iraqi invasion to Saudi soil, although this was never Saddam’s intention. But these actions essentially neutralized Hussein’s decision-making authority and ability to lead actions and take the reins. The United States positioned itself as the strongest force in the region. The countries in the military coalition were furious with Iraq’s brazen invasion of Kuwait. The takeover and annexation of a sovereign state were completely unacceptable. The countries’ fury was also directed at Jordan

¹⁶⁶ Avi Shlaim, *King Hussein: A Political Biography* (Or Yehuda: Dvir Publishers, 2009), 411-419.

subsequent to the failed negotiations, which made it appear as if Jordan was secretly advising Iraq and involved in the affair.

While the world turned its eyes to the Gulf, Saddam made the invasion a matter of principle, claiming that as long as Israel did not withdraw from the territories it conquered and Syria did not withdraw from Lebanon, Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait. The parallel between these things sparked the imagination of millions of Arabs worldwide, and in Judea and Samaria in particular. Saddam sounded like the savior of the Palestinian people. The U.S. President avoided making any comparisons between the events and in order to expedite the resolution of the crisis, he claimed that each case would receive the attention and mediation it deserved. However, Iraq was the priority and therefore it would be dealt with first. The American president was determined to manage the crisis and push the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait, while liberating it from the Iraqi puppet regime imposed on it. In order to resume daily life without invasions and annexations, he rejected the Jordanian king's proposal to mediate in the interest of peace. Hussein's attempts to be the conciliatory party were undermined and each party took a different direction.¹⁶⁷

The Jordanian king made three visits to Iraq in order to prevent another war in the Middle East. Despite the refusal of Western and Middle Eastern leaders to let him manage the crisis, the king saw himself as responsible for keeping the regional peace, even if it were to cost him

¹⁶⁷ Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, 53-64; Shlaim, *King Hussein*, 411-419; Hagay Ehrlich, *The Middle East: The Greatest Crisis since Mohammed* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Publishers, Hemed Books, 2017), 244-245.

his crown. The West's suspicions that the King was collaborating with the Iraqi dictator due to Jordanian economic and social considerations led to heated discussions between the leaders and their emissaries with the king. Hussein sensed the hostility. He tried to explain Saddam's actions, but when he realized that the service he was attempting to promote detrimentally affected his status and his country, he ceased his efforts to serve as a "devil's advocate."¹⁶⁸ In a letter that the king sent to Saddam in late September 1990, he praised his strength against the West and the country's achievements under his leadership. Later he addressed the takeover of Kuwait as being a future focal point of justification for Israel's legitimacy in the West Bank.

At the end of November 1990, the UN Security Council came to resolution 678, which permitted the coalition countries to use any force necessary to cause the Iraqi forces to withdraw their troops from Kuwait and to restrain the Iraqi leader's aggression. The dictator and his advisors, intoxicated with power, did not heed the recommendations to voluntarily withdraw. To them, the West was a futile threat, and not recognizing the ability of the Western response, as well as the coalition's determination to end the current saga, was an obstacle. Saddam was ready to go to battle. A moment before the drums of war started beating, the King of Jordan sent a clear message that Jordan would not be part of the war effort. Jordan would not take part in battle, would not support Iraq, and even announced that if Jordan were to be attacked, it would not hesitate to retaliate. The message was received.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

As time passed, American forces poured into the Gulf and assembled mainly in Saudi Arabia. Tensions soared as the deadline approached for the ultimatum of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, while the world watched the oil fields in Kuwait ablaze. There was concern in Israel that the Iraqi dictator would follow through with some of his threats and expand his invasion into Jordan and from there into Israel. Yitzhak Shamir's government was worried about these events and it wasted no time in informing the United States. The importance of acknowledging that relations with the eastern neighbor were stable and reliable and that the King of Jordan was renowned for being reliable established a security foundation among the decision makers in Israel. The understanding that if Iraqi forces penetrate the Jordanian border led to the conclusion that such an event could not be ignored in Jerusalem. If the Jordanian border was breached, it was akin to breaching the Israeli border. The security and integrity of the Kingdom of Jordan was a prerequisite for Israel's peace and security.

The fear of an Iraqi invasion was a shared concern for both Israel and Jordan. Jordan feared that Saddam would exploit the momentum to attack Jordan as part of his megalomaniac plan to exercise his power in the region. Israel felt threatened by an Iraqi invasion of Jordan, which entailed several terrifying scenarios. Jordan's importance as a buffer zone began to gain momentum. Israel began to send supportive and encouraging messages to Amman in order to calm the situation and ensure mutual cooperation based on understanding and respect.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ When the crisis began, Shamir sent a message to President Bush saying that an Iraqi invasion of Jordan would be a "red line" for Israel and that he wanted to maintain the

Shamir concurrently sent messages to President Bush and warned against the Iraqi provocation regarding the invasion. "Israel will not stand idly by but will defend its existence."¹⁷⁰

Four years after the stagnation of any progress in London and both leaders' fear of another refusal, Shamir and Hussein met to discuss the possibility of an Iraqi invasion to their territories. On Friday, 4 January 1991, both delegations met at the Jordanian king's house in Buckhurst Park, London to discuss the details. The king opened with a description of Jordan's status in light of the existing crisis. He exposed the kingdom's weakness subsequent to the United States' unwillingness to continue to fund his activities and the aggression of the Iraqi dictator, who was willing to cross red lines and threaten the neighboring countries.

The king described the trap of condemning these acts because this would lead to great resistance from within, because the Palestinians in Jordan and the Iraqis perceive the tyrant as the great savior of the Arabs, one who rose like a legendary phoenix in the desert and restored Arab honor to its former glory to millions of oppressed Arabs worldwide. Here comes the strong ruler who is not afraid of the West and is willing to fight the Western infidels to the death in order to restore Arab honor to its rightful place, to the pinnacle of world domination. Saddam created a ring of loyalists and henchmen around him who zealously followed every order. Disobeying his orders or

status quo in the region and prevent the infiltration of forces, shifting the battle scene to Jordan and Israel. Shamir, *Summing Up*, accessed August 2017, http://www.yitzhak-shamir.org/bagdad-washington-jerusalem_.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

disagreeing with him were met with a bitter and fatal end, fueling the fear of defiance. His associates were obliged to immediately and blindly obey. These feelings were shared by every person in Iraq and the horror stories of the tyrant's rage spread to every corner of the country. These truths even reached Western ears, who found it difficult to comprehend the enormity of the terror and the power he had over his people.

The king candidly described the delicate situation his kingdom was in and described his deep concern of an Iraqi invasion. Hussein asked Shamir to protect the integrity of the Kingdom by Israel not invading its territory. The Jordanian king's deepest fear was that his kingdom would turn into a battlefield. Saddam did not respond to the king's message regarding Iraq not invading its territory. Such a move would inevitably cause Israel to send forces to fight him and Jordan would become a buffer zone. This was the last thing the king wanted. His kingdom would become a bloodbath with battles being fought between Iraq and Israel in its airspace, aircraft collisions and planes falling out of the sky, and opportunistic Palestinians would take the law into their hands and conduct guerilla battles in the open spaces,¹⁷¹

Hussein detailed to Shamir the delicate position of his kingdom. The Americans had abandoned him, at this stage the Saudis had allied with the United States and were therefore not collaborating with the Kingdom, every day Saddam launched new threats to invade and conquer anyone who stood in his path and demanded the liberation of

¹⁷¹Shamir, *Summing Up*, accessed August 2017, <http://www.yitzhak-shamir.org/bagdad-washington-jerusalem> ; Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, 53-64; and Shlaim, *King Hussein*, 411-419.

the occupied lands in Israel, otherwise he would attack. Jordan was seemingly trapped and hemmed in from all sides. It was both countries' joint interest to protect the status quo and maintain stability. The security of both countries was intertwined. As long as the agreement of mutual support was upheld, a dialog of understanding could be conducted. In a meeting that took place, as stated, between King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir, the leaders came to the required understandings. The mutual concern of the battle spreading dissipated. The king gave his word that Jordan would not allow Iraq to use its territory to launch an attack against Israel.

However, the king could not predict the Iraqi dictator's wishes and prevent a future salvo of ballistic missiles if Saddam decided to launch them at Israel. The desire for another understanding that was brought up in the discussion was that if Israel was attacked, Jordan would allow Israel to use its airspace to launch a defensive attack against Iraq. Shamir stressed to the king that if Jordan's air force were to put on a show of strength against Israeli planes, Israel would not hesitate to return fire and overpower the Jordanian Air Force. Hussein responded that he could not commit to the second clause on the basis of the understandings between the countries. The agreement needed to be covert and not appear as if Jordan and Israel had been collaborating from the start.

The meeting between both leaders led to understandings that manifested during the Gulf War. Israel was hit by rockets, but it refrained from retaliating. Jordan maintained its neutrality and did not get involved in the fighting. During the war, the coalition forces, headed

by the United States, including the Arab states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, defeated Iraq in forty-three days of aerial and ground combat, despite the grim threats prior to the assault. The coalition forces' victory over Iraq was dramatic and the balance of forces was completely unequal, hence the overwhelming victory.

The first missile salvo that landed in Israel was on the night of 18 January 1991. Tel Aviv and Haifa were hit and this sent the country into shock. During the war, thirty-nine Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles landed in Israel. All had conventional warheads. Despite Israel's grave concern that Iraq would launch chemical or biological warheads, Saddam did not send them. Perhaps knowing that if he did, Israel would not stand idly by and would retaliate with extreme force; as a leader he could not take that risk. During the war, numerous homes were damaged, and one person was killed. Israel sustained a harsh psychological blow and damage to its morale. Many Israelis fled the central cities to the south and north of the country for several weeks. The numerous rockets that hit the center caused people to fear that Saddam was intentionally aiming his missiles at the densely populated areas.

In Israel, calls of outrage were heard to retaliate for the Iraqis' gall to fire missiles at the civilian population. U.S. President Bush also implored Shamir to avoid a response and to exercise restraint. This demand carried a reward. In exchange for Israel's restraint, the Americans placed Patriot missile defense batteries in Israel, to protect the country against the Iraqi missiles. Once the dust clouds in the desert settled, the grim reality in the field became apparent. Although the Americans and the coalition forces had indeed pushed Iraq back to its

territory and restored Kuwait's sovereignty, the subsequent price was paid by the Kurdish and Shiite rebels in the Sunni state. Saddam mercilessly massacred them. At this stage, no countries intervened, and the victims were abandoned to their fate.

Of the dozens of member states in the international coalition, Israel and Jordan were left out of combat. While the Gulf burned and Iraqi missiles flew above the heads of the Jordanians and landed on the homes of Israelis in the country's center, two countries remained neutral and avoided an escalation. The honorable agreement that was reached in London between two leaders met the test of reality and proved to both sides that despite previous disagreements, it is possible to reach future agreements, especially when there is mutual respect and cooperation. The neighborly relations and the understanding that the two countries share a common responsibility for the other's fate and integrity became a future milestone.¹⁷²

Summary and Conclusions

Wars are not necessarily the final outcome of a process. They can definitely be an introduction to the next step or a tier to a previous event. Hussein avoided a war with Israel and met covertly with Israeli representatives to promote these initiatives. On the other hand, at the Rabat Conference, the PLO took over the official responsibility to

¹⁷² Shamir, *Summing Up*, accessed August 2017, <http://www.yitzhak-shamir.org/bagdad-washington-jerusalem>; Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, 46, 52, and 53-64; and Shlaim, *King Hussein*, 413-435; Asher Susser, "Jordan's Path to Peace," *Jordan - Selected Articles* (June 1995): 223-228; and Nahum Barnea, "Inside the Head of a Mapainik," Saturday Supplement, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 17 January 2014.

represent the Palestinian people. The PLO's prestige increased as it demonstrated strength and power toward Israel and Jordan. The Palestinians in the West Bank identified themselves as a nation with rights to its own land, and the PLO as its exclusive representative. The king's exclusive representation of the Palestinians in the West Bank was taken from him and never returned.

Ties between Israel and Jordan were conducted under a heavy cloak of secrecy and ambiguity. Each meeting was coordinated and reported to secret partner countries that worked behind the scenes to make the meetings happen. In Israel, only a few were privy and took an active part in the meetings with the Jordanians. This was even more secretive on the Jordanian side, and only a few of the king's close confidants and covert people took part in meetings with the Israelis. In the 1980s, even prior to the outbreak of the conflict in the north, a brutal war was being waged far from the local scene, although it did not affect it directly. The Iran-Iraq War caused all eyes to focus on the oil fields. The population of the West Bank led by the PLO had become another factor to cause the uprising. The Intifada which became the official leading force of the Palestinian people, broke out in a civil uprising against the policies of Israel's military rule and against the Israeli Occupation.

The Middle East experienced two significant wars: the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. It also held the local government hostage and slaughtered the Kurdish people by the orders of the Iraqi tyrant Saddam Hussein. The local oil fields were at the heart of the conflict. An international coalition was established against Iraq's

belligerence and in unprecedented military cooperation, attacked Iraq, causing it to withdraw to its original borders while releasing Kuwait from its grip.

Around nine hundred kilometers separate Israel from Iraq, yet the threat of Saddam Hussein was very palpable to Israeli citizens and panic spread throughout the country. Although the war was not along Israel's borders, and did not directly involve the Israeli military, Israel was definitely involved. When the Iraqi dictator realized that the coalition armies were closing in on him, he threatened to harm Israel for the crimes it was allegedly conducting against the Palestinian population in the Territories. Saddam claimed he was fighting for the liberation of the Palestinian people. The concern in Israel over an attack with non-conventional missiles caused widespread panic among the population. Safety kits were distributed to all citizens, from newborn infants to the elderly. A sealed room was prepared in every home in the event that missiles would fall, and mostly as protection against chemical or biological warfare. U.S. President George Bush was quick to ensure Israel's safety with an umbrella of security protection measures, including Patriot batteries and additional military aid, as long as Israel promised not to retaliate to Saddam's hostility and provocations. Thirty-nine missiles rained down on Israel. None of these were armed with non-conventional warheads. Prime Minister Shamir kept his word, exercised restraint and did not retaliate, despite heavy pressure in the government.

The King of Jordan expressed his concern over Israel's involvement in the war. He was concerned his Kingdom may have

become a two-way battlefield and its borders from both directions would have been compromised due to the invasion of Palestinian infiltrators on one side, and Iraqi refugees on the other. The support that the Palestinians exhibited to the Iraqi missiles, which landed in Israel proved that this reality needed to be addressed. The two leaders realized that talks needed to be held in order to reach an arrangement. Highly covert meetings between Israel and Jordan had become a reality. By the time these talks had begun, it was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who stood on the White House lawn in Washington under U.S. President Carter's leadership and signed the peace treaty with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Each time, diplomacy proved its critical role in a cease-fire, heralding an agreement, and regional peace. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger¹⁷³ used to describe in his book the political sacrifice that leaders are forced to make. The involvement of foreign players in the diplomatic arena influences the situation. Outsiders are more comfortable discussing, proposing, and negotiating than those directly involved in the conflict. But it is the leaders' will, their judgment, personalities, public pressure, and current and future political influence that steers them when they sign an agreement. It is interesting to note that even though wars are an expensive business, or more accurately, the most expensive a state has, it always prefers to spend less on peace.

¹⁷³ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (Jerusalem: Shalem Press, 2007), 232-335.

Diplomatic and Military Aspects of Czechoslovakia in the Gulf War Coalition, 1990-1991

by

Petr Janoušek

ABSTRACT: *The paper deals with Czechoslovakia's involvement in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm coalition that liberated Kuwait in 1990-1991. It focuses on the reasons why Prague participated in the international effort aimed at driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and describes why it was advantageous for Czechoslovakia to engage in this multinational coalition effort. Based on archival evidence and observations of soldiers who deployed to the Persian Gulf, the paper analyzes the transformation of Czechoslovak relations with former enemies from NATO, especially the United States. Against the backdrop of the operations of the coalition aimed to topple Saddam Hussein, the paper explores whether Czechoslovak soldiers experienced a transformation of values during their deployment in the Persian Gulf, and how difficult it was for them to discard the history of their country's membership in the Warsaw Pact and participate in a newly-formed international coalition.*¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ This paper is a shortened version of the following article: Janoušek, Petr. "Chemici s Havlem proti agresorovi. K vojenským i politickým aspektům působení Československého samostatného protichemického praporu v Perském zálivu v letech 1990-1991" ["Chemical Unit and Havel Against the Aggressor. Military and Political Aspects of the Czechoslovak Antichemical Battalion's Activities in the Gulf in the Years 1990-1991"]. *Historie a vojenství* [History and Military] 67, no. 2 (2018): 4-21. The

Czechoslovakia sent a chemical unit to the Persian Gulf in 1991 as a sign that the state wanted to participate in the international effort that was aimed at expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The goal of this paper is not to recapitulate in detail the circumstances of Czechoslovak activities in the Gulf, nor the related political reactions, but to outline the basic features of Czechoslovakia's participation. The paper explores why Czechoslovakia fought against Hussein at all, how much Prague risked by sending soldiers to the Gulf, and to what extent it was important for Czechoslovakia that the coalition struggle against Iraq have the backing of the United Nations Security Council.

Iraq invaded Kuwait in the morning of 2 August 1990 and then quickly occupied the country. In Czechoslovakia, Saddam Hussein's aggressive move attracted great attention. The country's reactions can be traced both at the political and military levels. Immediately, President Vaclav Havel, who was at the time on holiday in Bermuda, began to look for a way for Czechoslovakia to help Kuwait – given the size and possibilities of Czechoslovakia – on a multilateral basis. The tragic experience of the Munich Agreement was one of the main reasons why Prague wanted to help to liberate Kuwait, and it guided Havel's thinking from the very beginning. While still in Bermuda, he and his adviser, Alexander Vondra, telephoned to Prague to instruct the military to prepare Czechoslovakia's response.¹⁷⁵

article is based on research undertaken in various archives, including the Central Military Archive in Prague.

¹⁷⁵ Alexandr Vondra, discussion with the author, May 2017.

The military's response to Havel's appeal is difficult to reconstruct fully and accurately, but it is possible to state that planning to help Kuwait began in military circles maybe even parallel to Havel's reactions. These initiatives were taken by the International Affairs Administration within the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, or more specifically, its third department – the UN Peacekeeping Department. The foundations for this department were laid according to the Austrian model before 1989, and Colonel Ján Valo, later the commander of the Czechoslovak unit in the Persian Gulf, led the department's efforts in this regard.

Concerning Czechoslovakia's reaction to Hussein's aggression, Valo and his colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Jaroslav Kumbera, met during the summer of 1990 with Egyptian military diplomats in Prague and with the U.S. Military Attaché Edward Motyka. According to their testimonies, these meetings resulted in an agreement that the governments of the countries concerned would ask for help from Czechoslovakia as needed.¹⁷⁶

In September 1990, President Havel announced that Czechoslovakia would join the international coalition that aimed to free Kuwait. Military preparations began immediately, but it was not easy to find suitable candidates for service abroad or to prepare the unit materially.¹⁷⁷ For this reason, it was important that coordination take

¹⁷⁶ Jaroslav Kumbera, discussion with the author, October 2017. The author of this paper was not able to verify this testimony with other source, but it is clear that Prague coordinated its reaction with foreign partners from the beginning.

¹⁷⁷ It was also particularly important to find suitable candidates who spoke English or another world language. Šifrovka pro velitele ZVO (Crypted Message for the ZVO

place not only on the political but also on the military level. In the end, the Americans helped to plan the transfer of about 160 members of the Czechoslovak chemical unit to Saudi Arabia, including their equipment. Later the number of Czechoslovak soldiers grew to nearly 200.

For Prague, dispatching the unit to the Persian Gulf area was ultimately very advantageous, giving it an ideal opportunity for demonstrating its new foreign policy orientation. Even more importantly, Prague also profited from the circumstances surrounding the conflict. If the coalition efforts had not been supported by UN resolutions, political and military leaders in Czechoslovakia would have had to undertake a much more difficult decision-making process. Czechoslovakia's history had proven to its people that it was important to stand up for the defense of the weaker nation: the question remains, however, whether Prague could have done so if the response to the occupation of Kuwait was only a U.S. unilateral action or a narrower coalition action. The multilateral nature of the operation suited Prague very well, and Czechoslovakia's participation was in line with the new Czechoslovak security framework.

At that time in Czechoslovakia, the dominant idea was that Europe's security should be built on a new foundation. The possibility of becoming a NATO member came later in the thinking of Czechoslovak/Czech politicians. It should be remembered that Prague was still a member of the Warsaw Pact at that time, even if the Pact's military structures were corroding. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia was

Commander), undated, Folder Zvláštní úkoly – operace Pouštní bouře (Special Tasks - Operation Desert Storm), Central Military Archive, Prague, Czech Republic.

not the only country in the Warsaw Pact to support Desert Shield/Desert Storm – Poland and Hungary were also determined to help free Kuwait.

President Václav Havel strongly supported coalition pressure against Iraq. In addition, it is likely that the overall optimism in Czechoslovakia between 1990 and 1991 – resulting from changes in political affairs – influenced the public's opinion about sending the country's chemical unit to the Persian Gulf.¹⁷⁸ Regardless of the true nature of public opinion, the Czechoslovak chemical unit traveled to Saudi Arabia between 10-14 December 1990. The U.S. Air Force provided transportation using C-5 Galaxy planes.

The first layover was at an American base in Torrejon near the Spanish capital Madrid. This was a historic moment, because after a long period of confrontation during the Cold War, the Czechoslovak unit met with U.S. soldiers as allies. In addition, for the first time in such numbers, the Czech military stood on the soil of a NATO member state.

Upon arriving in Saudi Arabia, the unit assembled in the King Khalid Military City. There it was necessary to fine-tune cooperation with the Saudi Arabian armed forces. The commander of the unit was a subordinate to the Czechoslovak leadership, but from the operational point of view, his activities were coordinated by allied command. However, all orders were consulted in advance with the Czechoslovak leadership. The basic task of the unit was to carry out chemical and radiation detection for the Saudi Arabian military forces. And although

¹⁷⁸ The author of this paper believes that further research concerning public opinion and participation in the Gulf War needs to be carried out.

the unit was to carry out more than humanitarian tasks – its mission was to also participate in the liberation of Kuwait (which could mean direct participation in combat operations) – only the first aspect was emphasized before the Czechoslovak public. There were several aspects to the engagement of the Czechoslovak unit with coalition efforts.

The first aspect was that the Czechoslovak soldiers participating in the Persian Gulf operation felt a stronger need to cooperate with the allies in the region than the army headquarters in Prague. Proof of this was the decision taken by the unit command based in the field to divide the unit into more than the expected number of chemical detachments. The Chief of the Chemical Administration within the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, General Josef Černý, reacted with the words that this was foolishness, because the battalion would not be able to perform the tasks of anti-chemical defense.¹⁷⁹ Another conflict between the unit commander, Colonel Valo, and Prague headquarters arose when it was decided that the Czechoslovaks should support the Saudi Arabian frontline brigades.¹⁸⁰

Valo did not want to disappoint Czechoslovakia's allies in the Persian Gulf and would consider it a betrayal if the chemical unit ceased to provide chemical support in the most important moments of the war.

¹⁷⁹ Jaroslav Kmenta, Peter Želinský and Ján Valo, *Pouštníhorečka: kniha, která neměla vyjít (Zákulisí aféry kolem naměřenísarinu a yperitové válce v Zálivu) [Desert Fever: A Book That Was Not to Be Published (Backdrop to the Scandal Surrounding the Measuring of Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Gulf War)]* (Praha: Želinský 1492, 1999), 59.

¹⁸⁰ Imrich Purdek and Pavol Vitko, *Naši v Perzskom zálive. Slovenskí a českí vojáci v operáciách Púštnýštít a Púštnábúrka 1990-1991. [Our Forces in the Persian Gulf: Slovak and Czech Soldiers in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991]* (Bratislava: Komunikační odbor Ministerstva obrany SR v spolupráci s Vojenským historickým ústavom [Communications Department of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic in collaboration with the Military History Institute], 2014), 150.

The Prague headquarters felt bound by an authorized mandate and had a different opinion. However, support was given to Valo by the Minister of Defense Luboš Dobrovský, who supported the Czechoslovak chemical unit support of the Saudi Arabian brigades. Later, Valo appreciated the role played by Dobrovský and President Havel when he claimed that the generals were still thinking in the old Bolshevik way, while Dobrovský and Havel understood more precisely the importance of the struggle in the Persian Gulf. Valo's negative stance was also related to the fact that the generals sent faulty equipment to the Czechoslovak soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf.¹⁸¹

The second notable aspect of the activities of the Czechoslovak unit was linked to its cooperation with former NATO enemies. The battalion commander did not have any problems establishing cooperation with the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf. Lieutenant Colonel Jaroslav Kumbera was the officer who was responsible for contact with the Americans. Even today he remembers discussions that he led with American officers in the Gulf, for example, about the significance of democracy.¹⁸² The earlier mentioned ideological emptiness of the pre-1989 Czechoslovak Army encouraged great professionalism on the part of many Czechoslovak soldiers (not all!) in the Gulf. They did their best to fulfill their duties without the need to make any significant changes to

¹⁸¹ Ján Valo, discussion with the author, January 2018. The author of this paper believes, however, that it is not useful to simply personify erroneous strategic or logistic decisions. The actions of the unit and the discrepancies between the headquarters and the unit command should be understood as part of the transformation of the whole military. The period before 1989 was ideologically empty and that is the reason why many soldiers did not have any real difficulties in adapting to the new circumstances.

¹⁸² Jaroslav Kumbera, discussion with the author, October 2017.

their vision of the world. There was no need for a big transformation of values. Nevertheless, especially in the beginning, they had to bear sarcastic remarks from their former enemies, which were focused on their outdated equipment or on whether they were all “communists.”

From the point of view of the overall coalition effort, Czechoslovakia’s contribution should not be overestimated, or underestimated: the chemical unit, despite its obsolete equipment, possessed respectable expertise, and the importance of its work on the military side showed up paradoxically sometime after the war in connection with the so-called Gulf War syndrome. The Americans then found out that they could count on Czechoslovak data from the Gulf.

From a diplomatic point of view, Czechoslovakia joined the coalition easily and the country supported pressure on Iraq in the UN, although it was necessary, as already indicated, to overcome distrust of Czechoslovakia’s future NATO allies. To sum up, Czechoslovakia’s participation in the Persian Gulf War was as important at the national level as it was internationally. At the time of the collapsing Warsaw Pact, deploying Czechoslovak soldiers to the Persian Gulf was part of the effort of Czechoslovakia’s new political leadership to bring Czechoslovakia back into the democratic fold, and sending soldiers into war was actually a bold move on the part of the new Czechoslovak leadership (particularly since there was only one accidental casualty). This demonstration of the country’s commitment was needed internally and externally, and it helped pave the way for eventual NATO membership.

The Balkan Pact as an Example of Coalition Planning

by

Tatjana Milošević

ABSTRACT: *Based on the archival material of the Diplomatic Archives, the Military Archives and the Archives of Yugoslavia, as well as by using the relevant literature, this paper examines all the internal and external determining factors of the political and military alliance of the three Balkan states – Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey – in the early 1950s. It also analyzes the various reactions of the three countries to all the changes in international relations that had affected the degree and intensity of their military, political, economic, and cultural cooperation. The paper also defines the main (mostly ideological and political) differences, which proved to be unsurmountable in the way they affected the ultimate reach of the alliance and its role on the international stage.*

Key words: *Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, USA, USSR, NATO, Italy, Balkans Alliance, General Staff, non-aligned countries.*

Yugoslavia Turns to the West

After parting ways with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia found itself in the situation of falling prey to the two Cold War

superpowers. At the same time, it was completely isolated by the international community.¹⁸³ However, Yugoslavia managed to survive in spite of the Soviet threat, which resulted in it moving away from the Eastern Bloc, needing to build completely different relations with the West. Yugoslavia's policy of seeking support was rewarded by it joining the military aid program. This step enabled the country to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its international position. The military support program represented a step forward in the development of Yugoslavia's relations with the West, which was supposed to result in joining NATO. However, Yugoslavia's doctrinarian position did not allow it to automatically become part the opposite camp; hence, the United States, as the absolute leader of the Western military alliance, weighed the degree of utility of different forms of military cooperation with Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁴ In such a balance of power, the Americans found it useful to support the Yugoslav Communists and apply the so-called "Wedge Strategy," an attempt to weaken the USSR's grip on Eastern Europe and cause divisions in the newly-established Socialist bloc, by pulling out Yugoslavia, a potential major regional player, from the Soviet orbit. That meant that the U.S. administration counted on taking advantage of Yugoslavia deserting from the Soviet bloc, which would ultimately result

¹⁸³ Leo Mates, *The International Relations of the Socialist Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), 117.

¹⁸⁴ Ivan Laković, "The West's Military Aid to Yugoslavia as a Prelude to the Creation of the Balkan Pact," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 201-205. The Bilateral Military Aid Agreement between the USA and Yugoslavia was signed on 14 November 1951. For more about that segment of the military cooperation between the US. and Yugoslavia, see Tatjana Milošević, "Renewal of the USA-SFRY Military Cooperation 1970-1974," *Military History Review* 2(2017): 257-282.

in creating a strong bulwark against the Soviet Union, the pillars of which would be Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Joining or at least getting closer to the North Atlantic Alliance became a priority for Yugoslavia in that period. However, there were certain limiting factors hindering and slowing down the rapprochement with NATO, one of which was the unresolved and increasingly escalating problem of Trieste.¹⁸⁵

In accordance with such a policy, Yugoslavia was forced to start with a gradual normalization of relations with its pro-Western entourage, first with Greece, which in the meantime became a member of NATO. The normalization of the relations between the two countries took place as soon as January 1951, with the signature of various agreements pertaining to railway, postal, telephone, and telegraph services. However, the main problem in the relations between the two countries remained the issue of the Macedonian minority. Due to Greece's aspirations to join the Atlantic Treaty as a "full-fledged partner," the question of organizing the Middle East Command emerged.¹⁸⁶ Spring 1952 saw the intensification of the cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia, when the relations between the two countries were raised to embassy level. This cooperation was also boosted by the visit of a Yugoslav delegation to Greece, with the aim of strengthening economic cooperation. Meanwhile, articles appeared in

¹⁸⁵ Cabinet of the Marshall of Yugoslavia (CMY), I-3-b/804, the Archives of Yugoslavia (AY).

¹⁸⁶ *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Documents*, ed. Milan Terzić, Mihajlo Basara, Nemanja Milošević, Miljan Milkić, Dmtar Tasić, and Tatjana Lečić (Belgrade: Military History Institute, 2005), 9-10.

the Western press describing Yugoslavia as a country that managed to overcome the consequences of Cominform thanks to establishing relations with the West. Yugoslavia was also branded “a renown[ed] and respectable member of the United Nations, which provided a major contribution to the West’s collective security system.”¹⁸⁷

In addition to Greece, the Yugoslav diplomats also strove to establish parliamentary cooperation with Turkey. The Yugoslav diplomats continued to closely monitor and participate in myriad Balkan military and political talks with Greece and Turkey in 1951 and 1952. After joining NATO in February 1952, the Greek and Turkish governments became aware of the necessity of cooperating with Yugoslavia for the sake of their countries’ security.¹⁸⁸

The emergence of the idea to establish a regional military alliance, between countries with different political systems and social order, belonging to different camps in the bipolar world, represented a historical precedent. Generally speaking, the idea to connect three Balkan states emerged from the sense of vulnerability of these countries and a potential aggression from the East, by the Soviets and their satellites. The interest of the Yugoslav leadership in the formation of the Balkan Pact resulted from the need to preserve economic cooperation with the West and to strengthen Yugoslavia’s negotiating position versus Italy, with the aim of settling the Trieste dispute. As opposed to Yugoslavia, the interests of Greece and Turkey in that arrangement

¹⁸⁷ Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War* (Belgrade: BMG, 2003), 160.

¹⁸⁸ *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 18.

resulted from the need to strengthen and expand the influence of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Balkans and thwart Soviet penetration in the region. However, it is important to emphasize that Greece and Turkey were motivated to militarily cooperate with Yugoslavia primarily by their own interests, which aimed at strengthening their position and prestige in NATO itself.¹⁸⁹

While Greece and Turkey saw the Balkans Alliance as an interim phase aiming to enable the collective accession of the three members to NATO, the Yugoslav leadership persistently tried to avoid committing to any obligation that would bind the country directly to NATO. However, the increasingly ostensible cooperation with the West threatened to undermine the existing political system and social order, as well as the authority of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav politicians, therefore, kept weighing, depending on international and national developments, the degree of rapprochement or distancing in relation to the West and its requests. They pursued such a policy in the course of cooperation both with Greece and Turkey.¹⁹⁰

The Early Beginnings of the Balkan Alliance

In the beginning of 1952, the relations and cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia intensified, with the active participation of NATO, the United States, and other Western countries. It is important

¹⁸⁹ Dragan Bogetić, "Incentives and Restricting Factors on the Path to the Alliance Between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey 1952-1954," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 64-65.

¹⁹⁰ Bogetić, "Incentives and Restricting Factors," 66.

to note that, from the very beginning, the British establishment opposed the formation of any (and even a formal) agreement between the aforementioned countries, if outside of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Italian government also feared the potential favoring of Yugoslavia in arms deliveries, as well as over the unresolved Trieste issue. Meanwhile, the U.S. establishment supported, almost to the fullest extent, the establishment of defense cooperation between these countries, noting that the formation of such a pact needed not be rushed. Greece and Turkey were completely aware that a new type of cooperation among Balkan states still needed NATO's formal approval.¹⁹¹

According to Yugoslavia's plans, in addition to facilitating a military and political rapprochement, the newly-established Balkan Pact was supposed to open up the Greek and Turkey market for Yugoslav industrial products bartered for wheat and other raw materials. Before the first tripartite military talks in early 1953, as a prelude to concrete negotiations on the cooperation between the three states, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü visited Yugoslavia on 21 January 1953. During his visit, the two sides "agreed in principle that it was in the interest of both countries to continue their cooperation by entering into an agreement that would enable military cooperation too, taking account of Turkey's obligations towards NATO."¹⁹²

After Köprülü's visit, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos also visited Belgrade on 3 February 1953. By the end of this visit, a "joint platform was set for the future agreement between the three Balkan

¹⁹¹ Military Archives, G. Staff of the YPA, Seventh Department, k. 374, f. 1, 208.

¹⁹² *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 31.

states that was supposed to be a friendship and non-aggression pact, which, in turn, meant diverging from the then all-pervasive aspirations of Greece and Turkey to enter into a military alliance against the potential threat of aggression by East European states.¹⁹³ All three countries believed that they needed to cooperate at the level of a political agreement in order to ensure their security and peace. Reports started appearing in the Western press hinting at the necessity to set up an alliance of Balkan states, in order to reinforce the Western European defense system, which alliance would also benefit NATO. It seemed that the Yugoslav leadership itself saw in the Balkan Pact an additional element to their own military and political security. The only ones that feared such an alliance were the Italians, due to NATO's support to Yugoslavia, which could prove key for resolving the Trieste crisis.¹⁹⁴

For that reason, on the eve of the signature of the Ankara Agreement, the first tripartite talks between the military delegations of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey were held in Ankara on 17-20 February 1953. The conference was also to review the possibility of establishing cooperation of the three countries and potential joint defense against the Soviets and their satellites in the Balkans. The delegations agreed that any aggression against one or several of their countries, simul-

¹⁹³ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 35.

¹⁹⁴ Dejan Ristić, "The Balkan Pact in Western European and US Press," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 404.

taneously or separately, would threaten the defense of and be considered as an aggression against the remaining states.”¹⁹⁵

The conference adopted an agenda, the first item of which required the delegations to exchange data about the armed forces of the USSR. The second item on the agenda concerned the possibility of defense of all three countries according to the actual forces of the enemy, while the third item pertained to reviewing the defense plans of the three states. During the conference, the Turkish representative pointed to the existence of four fronts in Turkey, namely: the Thracian front, the Black Sea front, the Eastern front from the direction of the Caucasus, and the Southern front. The goal of enemy operations on the Thracian and Black Sea fronts was to sieze the Straits and Thrace, while the aim on the Eastern and Southern fronts was to put boots on the Mediterranean. For that reason, the bulk of the Turkish forces were stationed in Thrace and in the Straits. In view of the importance of the Straits not only for the Balkan allies, but for the Mediterranean as a whole, it had to be defended by joining forces. Yugoslavia’s representatives even proposed joint cooperation on that matter, regardless of the fact that Greece and Turkey were members of NATO. The Turkish defense minister pushed for the development of plans for the stationing of forces, joint operations, and command and cooperation with NATO. Contrary to his Turkish colleague, the Greek representative pointed to two fronts in Greece – the first towards Albania and the

¹⁹⁵ Nemanja Milošević, “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact,” in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 185.

second towards Bulgaria. He advocated for the formation of the so-called strong forces, with an emphasis on mountaineering units, owing to the depth of the terrain in the country. He informed the Yugoslav and Turkish representatives that the Greek forces stood up in active defense of the line towards both Albania and Bulgaria with offensive actions. The Greek side believed that areas of joint interest ought to be defended with sufficiently strong forces, in line with the allied countries' possibilities. The Yugoslav representative on the conference also spoke about the existence of three fronts in Yugoslavia: the Western, Central, and Southern Fronts. He emphasized that military forces of equal strength and number should be stationed on all three aforementioned fronts. The Yugoslavs believed that any attack against Yugoslavia would merely be a prelude to a new war. They also emphasized the importance of the Zagreb-Ljubljana route, as well as of the Central and Nis-Skopje routes.¹⁹⁶

As a result of the Ankara talks, a memorandum was issued, where the three countries stated they accepted the existing friendship and the need to realize a military agreement, in order to defend their countries from a common enemy and repel a potential aggression in the Balkans. The delegations agreed that any aggression aimed against any of their respective countries threatened the defense of the two other states. The conclusion was that the mutual assistance between the three countries through military cooperation would result not only in defending their territories, but also ensuring peace in the world.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 39-42.

¹⁹⁷ GS-2, k.15. f.1. no.1/1, VA.

The Ankara Agreement(the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the FNRY, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey) was signed on 28 February, which represented, in its form and content, a wide base for developing and strengthening of cooperation at the political, military, cultural, and economic level between the three countries.¹⁹⁸ Some of the big powers expressed their reservations against a stronger alliance with the Balkan states. The Italian government, for example, saw in the grouping of Balkan countries an obstacle to its own plans. The British establishment was not thrilled with the Ankara Agreement, fearing it might restrict their influence and interference in the Balkans. France shared Britain's views, but remained passive. The United States had the least reservations. However, in spite of all negative remarks, the Agreement was interpreted as a major contribution to the security and independence of the Balkans and considered a necessary link in the chain of collective security.¹⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the three countries continued to reinforce and develop their political and military cooperation, which entailed a continuation of their talks and military negotiations in particular. Many challenges emerged on that path of cooperation between the three Balkan states. One of these challenges was the desire of the Turkish establishment to bind the Balkan alliance to NATO. Meanwhile, Western countries discussed the modalities of connecting the alliance to NATO. This process also included the visit of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Ankara and Athens in late May 1953, with the principal goal of

¹⁹⁸ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 42.

¹⁹⁹ Cabinet of the President of the Republic (CPR), I-5-c/Balkan Alliance, AJ.

elaborating on the relations of NATO towards the Balkans Peninsula. "The Americans believed Yugoslavia should be looked upon as a military factor enabling an interrupted front towards the Eastern Bloc, while the British underscored Yugoslavia's role in detaching satellite countries from the USSR. The majority of members in NATO's political committee believed Yugoslavia should join the Alliance and that the Tripartite Agreement represented merely an indirect path towards that end."²⁰⁰

Soon after signing the Ankara Agreement, the military representatives of the three countries met in Athens on 3-12 June 1953. The basis of the talks on the Second Tripartite Conference was the principle under which an aggression against one member was to be considered an attack on all three countries. The conference participants discussed matters pertaining to areas of key interest for all three countries – the Straits and the Greek-Yugoslav region. The discussions were divided into separate activities of several committees. The General Committee analyzed the Balkans battlefield and its importance for the defense of the three allied countries, Europe, and the Middle East. The General Committee also saw a detailed analysis of the Macedonian and Thracian battlefields, as well as of the one around the Straits, along with the planned lines of defense, the expected forces, and courses of action. The subject of the deliberations of the Intelligence Committee was to assess the enemy forces, their battle plans, of which the occupation of Northern Italy, Northern Yugoslavia, Turkey, and the Middle East were singled out as priorities. The Subcommittee for analyzing allied forces dealt with the forces of the countries in war and peace time, the

²⁰⁰ Milošević, "Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact", 187.

duration of military service of their respective armies, recruitment and training of conscripts, composition of the infantry division, matters related to assistance provided by foreign armies and corps to divisions in terms of transportation, replenishing of forces on joint fronts.²⁰¹ The Air Force Subcommittee analyzed the air forces of the enemies and allies and dealt with the coordination of actions of the three allied air forces. The Communications Subcommittee aimed at establishing the state, quality, potential, resources, and organization of communications in the civilian and military sector and proposed an agreement on the issues of frequencies, calls, encryption and system of operation. The Supply Subcommittee was tasked with investigating a number of questions in relation to these matters. It involved the regulation of matters related to the provision of supplies to Yugoslav and Greek bases, the state of traffic and the control thereof, cooperation in Greek ports, the provision of supplies to Yugoslav forces via the Thessaloniki harbor or through alternative routes, if the city is occupied, considering alternative supply routes via the Albanian ports of Durrës or Vlorë. The tripartite talks in Athens resulted in the signing of memoranda with annexes (A, B, C, D, and E) and a short joint communiqué.²⁰²

Aggression by the USSR and its satellites was considered unlikely during this period, the conference still very much focused on the Balkans battlefield. If the USSR attacked the Western flank of the Balkans front, the Soviets could very well become masters of the entire Balkans. Therefore, the allies were forced to coordinate their air force

²⁰¹ GS, k.15, f.1, 2, VA.

²⁰² *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 51-53.

and ground plans both mutually and with NATO forces, in order to thwart such an attack. As to Yugoslavia, indirect cooperation would take place, through Greece and Turkey.²⁰³ The participants in the conference agreed that it was necessary to draft coordinated defense plans for land and air forces of Greece and Yugoslavia on the territories of the two countries, for the purpose of their joint defense. Potential attacks by the USSR and its satellites made the West change its position towards the Balkan Alliance, especially in terms of military cooperation. Namely, by including West Germany in the Western defense system, the complete line of defense towards the Soviet Union was practically closed. With Yugoslavia in the Balkan Alliance and West Germany in NATO, with "specific military arrangements, the European defense would prove capable of countering any aggression along the entire European frontline."²⁰⁴

The Second Tripartite Conference in Athens was a major step in the military cooperation of the three countries. "The talks of the military delegations reflected a systemic approach to elaborating a military component and continuation of cooperation in the spirit of the Ankara Agreement."²⁰⁵

Quickly, Athens once again hosted the annual meeting of foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey on 7 July 1953, which was planned under the provisions of the Balkan Pact. The meeting approved

²⁰³ Dalibor Denda, "The Second Tripartite Conference of the Representatives of Balkan Pact Countries in Athens, June 3-12, 1953," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 148.

²⁰⁴ Milošević, "Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact," 188.

²⁰⁵ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 53.

the report on the activities of the military delegations and passed a decision on developing specific action plans by general staffs. It was agreed to establish specific committees, which were tasked with expanding the possibilities of economic and cultural cooperation between the three countries. An agreement was also reached to establish a standing secretariat that would make proposals to governments related to all major issues of political and cultural cooperation. However, major rifts emerged during the meeting among the members, in their views about the changes in the USSR. Everything pointed to the fact that future cooperation within the Balkan Pact would from that point proceed much more slowly.²⁰⁶

As part of the big powers' aspirations, which involved the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Western allies' defense plans, a Yugoslav military delegation participated in the Washington Conference on 24-28 August 1953. Yugoslav attendance caused great attention, especially in the West. The conference also saw an encounter of the representatives of armed forces of France, Britain, U.S., and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). Participants discussed the assessments of Yugoslavia's vulnerability to potential Soviet aggression and possible military assistance that would be provided; drafting Yugoslav strategic concepts for defending the country, with a particular emphasis on northwest Yugoslavia; as well as the need for the provision of operational and material assistance and the continuation of military negotiations with the Yugoslav side. The Western allies tended to reduce the role of the Balkan alliance solely to the formation of a single front with Greece and

²⁰⁶ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 56-58.

Turkey, where Yugoslavia's task would be to thwart all operations aimed at securing a gateway to the Aegean Sea. Yugoslavia had a major strategic importance as an integral part of Europe's defense, since it resulted in the fusion of the Austrian front with the Greek and Turkish front, into an uninterrupted frontline.²⁰⁷ It is noteworthy saying that the representatives of three Western powers paid particular attention to the defense of the so-called Northwest Route, namely the "Ljubljana Gates." The problem of defending the Northwest Route was further complicated by the unregulated relations between Yugoslavia and Italy due to the Trieste dispute. Therefore, the Western representatives at the conference distanced themselves from the Trieste problem, branding it a political and not a military matter, insisting that the best possible solutions be found for including Yugoslavia in the West's defense plans.²⁰⁸

Striving for continuing cooperation, the Third Conference of the members of the Balkan Alliance was held in Belgrade on 10-20 November 1953. On the eve of the meeting in Belgrade, the Greek general staff drafted defense plans, which it submitted to the representatives of the Yugoslav and Turkish general staffs. That defense plan was made for the event of an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey by Bulgarian, Soviet, or other satellite forces. The so-called "emergency action defense plan" (in the case of need for Greece, Yugoslavia, or Turkey for the year 1953) provided for the use of forces, equipment, and resources of the three countries in the early stage of the war. The draft plan consisted of three parts: the basic, tripartite

²⁰⁷ GS, k.16, f.2, 2/1, VA

²⁰⁸ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 58-60.

energy action plan; the tripartite plan for air forces; and the coordination of operating plans of neighboring commands. At the Belgrade meeting, the delegations of the three countries agreed to review each item of the Greek plan separately. A special emphasis was put on jointly-controlled parts of the battlefield – the ones of Yugoslavia and Greece and the Turkish region in Thrace. The Greek version of the plan had an offensive character, since it entailed a counter-offensive after an initial attack by Soviet forces. Such a counterstrike would first be led by Yugoslav forces towards Sofia, followed by a Greek strike towards Nevrokop and Turkish one toward Plovdiv. However, Yugoslav representatives did not believe that the Balkan allies were capable of supporting such an ambitious plan, since they had limited forces. Simultaneously with the work of the General Committee during the conference, subcommittees too started working on the drafting of the Defense Plan and the Coordination Plan. The activities of the Intelligence Subcommittee, the Subcommittee for Drafting Annex B, as well as the Air Force Committee ensued. The meeting of the representatives of general staffs ultimately ended with the drafting of the Tripartite Defense Plan with annexes, which included: the Tripartite Defense Plan with annexes, Annex A – Enemy forces; Annex B – Our Land Forces; Annex C – Our Air Forces; Annex F – Coordination of Land Forces Operational Plans; a Memorandum; a press release for NATO; as well as a Communiqué. This fulfilled the plan of defining and specifying the military component of the Balkan Alliance.²⁰⁹ In the Memorandum, the three countries' delegations agreed to convey to their respective general

²⁰⁹ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 60-67.

staffs the proposals on holding the next conference of general staff representatives in Ankara, which was to review the annexes to the plans: Annex D – Our Battle Fleet; Annex E – Counter Strikes; Annex G – Coordination of Intelligence Services; Annex J – Rear Forces Plan; and Annex K – Communications. In order for the commanders and officers of the three armies to meet and get familiar with each other, it was recommended to draft a program of mutual visits. The press release for NATO said that Yugoslav and Greek “coverage” forces had been tasked to keep the enemy on the borders, while the main forces had to operate a joint defense effort on a specific defensive strip of the territory. Turkish forces were tasked with keeping control of the Straits and keeping the enemy away from the border front, as well as to maintain an active defense, relying on the Kataldza-Demir Kapija strip. Part of the land forces of the two neighboring countries were to be enabled to reciprocally cross their respective territories. The air forces of the three countries that were assigned for battle in the zones of joint interest were supposed to coordinate offensive activities and actions in order to be able to fight the joint enemy to the best of their abilities. The task of the battle fleets of the three countries was to support the operations of the land forces of their respective countries and if needed to provide mutual assistance as appropriate in the areas of mutual interest. Communication between the military commands were to be ensured by delegating a group of liaison officers or liaison officers assigned to same-level commands.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ GS-2. k.15, f.2, 3, VA

The Balkan Alliance Becomes a Military Pact

In early 1954, the relations between Yugoslavia and the West took a positive turn – the overcoming of the Trieste crisis, provision of economic aid to Yugoslavia, and the attempt to restore confidence over the “Djilas case.” As early as January 1954, the London talks started on economic aid and the settling of the Trieste problem. The Turkish side believed that the Balkans defense plans needed to be coordinated with NATO, while the Trieste dispute ought to be the *condition sine qua non* for further cooperation with the Alliance. Negotiations also continued with Greece and Turkey on the potential transformation of the Pact in a full-fledged military defensive alliance.²¹¹ Meanwhile, a powerful pro-American fraction worked actively to dismantle the cooperation with the three Balkan countries, with the ultimate goal of transforming Greece into a mediator between Yugoslavia and the U.S. However, in the course of the many meetings with Greek and Turkish military emissaries, the possibility of making Yugoslavia part of NATO still loomed. This was supposed to remove all the obstacles to the making of complete plans for the defense of the Balkans.²¹²

In spite of the constant pressure by NATO and the U.S., military talks regarding their joint defense resumed between the three Balkan countries. Accordingly, the Fourth Conference was held in Ankara between 24 March and 1 April 1954. The talks in Ankara enabled the updating of all plans adopted at the Belgrade meeting. The Greek general staff was tasked with working on plans that would later be

²¹¹ GS YPA, Seventh Department, k.375, f.1, 24, VA.

²¹² Milošević, “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact,” 190.

reviewed on the General Committee. There were also subcommittees to deal with specific matters. The agenda of the Conference included: Annex D – Actions of the Battle Fleet; Annex E – Counter Strike Plan; Annex G – Coordination of Intelligence Services; Annex J – Rear Forces Plan; Annex K – Communications. The following documents came out this meeting: the Memorandum and documents from the talks of military representatives, with Annex D – Battle Fleet Actions with two appendices; Annex E – Reserve Forces and Counter Offensive Plan; Annex G – Intelligence Services Coordination Plan with two appendices; Annex J – Rear Forces Plan; Annex K – Communications with an appendix; Press Release for NATO; and Official Communiqué.²¹³ In the memorandum, the representatives of the three respective general staffs agreed to hold the next meeting in Athens. That meeting was to brainstorm all the topics and plans concerning the joint assessment of the situation, a review and approval of joint operational plans of the First Greek Army and the Third Yugoslav Army and the relevant commands, the review and approval of the detailed activities of the Communications Committee, as provided by the plan signed in Ankara; review and approval of the Detailed Plan of the Rear Forces Commission; organization of mutual visits laid down by the programs based on which the commanders and officers of the three armies would have the opportunity to get to know each other better.²¹⁴

The conference also discussed and adopted appendices to the Tripartite Defense Plan (Annex D – Actions of the Battle Fleet, Annex G –

²¹³ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod,71-73.

²¹⁴ GS-2, k.16.f.4, 1/1, VA.

Coordination of Intelligence Services, Annex E – Counterstrike Plan, Annex J – Rear Forces Plan, and Annex K – Communications).²¹⁵

After the conference in Ankara, the military talks continued, but this time solely in bilateral form, between the Greek and Yugoslav armies, the first time on 9-15 June in Strumica and then in Thessaloniki from 26 July to 4 August. These meetings elaborated on the plans on joint actions of the two neighboring countries on joint battlefields. At the same time, Turkish and Greek representatives talked with NATO and the U.S. The Americans made the signature of an alliance between Balkan countries conditional on Yugoslavia joining NATO and the settlement of the Trieste dispute. Therefore, an initiative was launched for the Pact to become a military alliance. The Yugoslav representative supported such initiative, but kept opposing the possibility of his country becoming a member of NATO. However, the Americans retained their goal of including Italy in the Balkans Alliance. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav President visited the capitals of Turkey and Greece. Tito's visit to Ankara took place on 12-18 April, and he also travelled to Greece on 2-6 June 1954. Tito's visits were merely the continuation of his international diplomatic activities: "The visits were important for continuing to lay down the specifics of the Balkans Alliance, Yugoslavia's relations with the West and future stance towards the power-holders in Moscow."²¹⁶

The three parties quickly continued to negotiate the opportunities for the further development of the alliance on 28 June

²¹⁵ GS-2, k.17, f.1,1/1, VA.

²¹⁶ Milošević, "Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact," 192, and Darko Bekić, *Yugoslavia in the Cold War (Relations with the Big Powers)* (Zagreb:Globus, 1988), 612.

1954 at the so-called “Experts’ Conference” in Athens. During the Athens talks, the stance of the Balkan Alliance towards NATO proved to be the biggest point of discord. Two different viewpoints collided at the meeting – the Greek and Turkish standpoint and the Yugoslav perspective. The Yugoslav faction wanted the tripartite alliance to be given the priority, while the Greeks and the Turks believed that the BA should be a mere pendant to NATO. The three sides ultimately managed to reach a compromise. A proposal was drafted that was the closest to the Yugoslav position. However, the Greek proposal involving a meeting of foreign ministers in Bled on 17 August was also approved, where the participants were supposed to sign an agreement about the alliance. However, the Americans tried through Turkey to slow down the process in Bled. They aimed at pulling Yugoslavia into NATO through the alliance, using for that purpose Italy, which had the possibility to also slow down the entry of both Greece and Turkey into the Balkan Alliance, since such development required the prior approval and consent of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty.²¹⁷

Nonetheless, the Ministerial Conference in Bled managed to take place on 6-9 August 1954, resulting in the creation of the military alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The session was opened by the Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović.²¹⁸ Committees were soon established in order to consolidate the text about the alliance. The Yugoslav proposal related to Article 6 was then approved (*In the case of a military aggression against a*

²¹⁷ Milošević, “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact,” 193.

²¹⁸ Bekić, *Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, 646-648.

country, which one or more signatories committed to mutually assist, the signatories will consult each other about measures to be taken in accordance with the goals of the United Nations in order to address the situation created in their region), which concerned Yugoslavia's obligations according to which it had the possibility to take decisions independently. In such a way and owing the aforementioned clause, Yugoslavia succeeded in its intent to keep the Balkan Alliance merely a defensive organization independent from NATO, but still in accord with the principles of the UN.

During the summit in Bled, a meeting of the representatives of the three countries' general staffs was also held. The meeting gave birth to the idea to draft joint defense plans on the entire territories of the three countries. The cooperation between the tripartite alliance and NATO's military organization was also discussed. The participants touched on the issue of commanding the armies of the BA.²¹⁹ The Bled Agreement was finally signed on 9 August 1954. It involved the creation of a military alliance between the three Balkan countries for a period of twenty years. Its signature deepened the relations between the Balkan allies, taking it to a higher level. Comparing the two treaties (the Ankara Agreement and the Bled Agreement), ostensible differences may be noted, starting from the title, or the number of clauses. The full name of the Bled Agreement was "Treaty about the Alliance, Political Coope-

²¹⁹ GS, k.17, f.2, 1/1, VA

ration and Mutual Assistance” and it contained fourteen clauses. The Bled Agreement was ratified by Yugoslavia in October 1954.²²⁰

Soon after the Bled Agreement was signed, the predominant assertion in the Western press was that, by signing the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia *de facto* became a member of NATO. Accordingly, *Time* Magazine concluded that the Balkan Pact amounted to filling in the last gap in the European defensive ring, stretching from Iceland to Ararat, which ring was established by NATO.²²¹

It is important to emphasize that in this period the American and Italian plans concerning the Balkan Alliance (BA) were completely identical. Both sides advocated for Yugoslavia entering NATO or Italy joining the BA, mainly for full synchronization of BA military plans with NATO or connecting NATO's plans and those of the BA countries through consolidated Yugoslav and Italian plans. Just like the Italians, the Americans were not happy with the formation of the BA, seeing it as a purely regional military pact. Its only advantage, in the eyes of the two countries, was the possibility to connect it, at some point, to the command of NATO.²²²

After the Bled Agreement was signed, the three countries continued to work together, by holding a conference of heads of general staffs of the Balkan Alliance in Athens on 20-29 September 1954. The purpose of the conference was to review the achieved results of the tripartite military cooperation and the Bled Agreement. As the top

²²⁰ Milošević, “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact,” 194-195, and *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 96-97.

²²¹ Ristić, “The Balkan Pact in Western European and US Press,” 412.

²²² Milošević, “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact,” 195.

priority questions at the conference, the Turkish side put forward the question of a joint command and relations between the BA and NATO. In the course of the conference, the Yugoslav side got the impression that Turkey was doing its best to subordinate the Balkan Alliance to NATO. However, without an adequate political context, it proved to be impossible to implement the planned alliance in practice. Everything pointed to the conclusion that, instead of strengthening the role of the military alliance, the conference actually hinted at the termination of the military cooperation between the three Balkan countries.²²³

The Fifth Tripartite Conference, also held in Athens on 4-12 November 1954, was considered as the continuation of the September talks. The agenda of the conference hardly differed from the one that was initially set (from the Fourth Conference in Ankara). The delegations of the three countries discussed the tripartite cooperation plan, as well as all issues related to the annexes A, E, C, J, and K. The discussion about enemy forces and the general air force plan was postponed until the next meeting. The conference resulted in documents such as Annex A, which concerned operational matters. The participants exchanged general viewpoints on the use of the air forces of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Annex B), rear forces (Annex C), communications (Annex D), and maps (Annex E). It was proposed to leave all outstanding issues aside and to address them at the next gathering, the so-called Sixth Tripartite Conference that was to be held in Belgrade.²²⁴

²²³ Milošević, "Yugoslavia, USA and NATO and the Balkan Pact," 196, and *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 99-101.

²²⁴ N. Milošević, *ibid*, 197, *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 102-105.

In the scope of the conference, meetings of the operational, air force, and rear forces subcommittees were held, as well as of the subcommittees for communications and exchange of maps. The topics discussed in the subcommittees were practically the agenda of the Fourth Conference in Ankara. The topics of enemy forces and the general air force plan were left for the next meeting (the planned conference in Belgrade), while Plan 31 of the First Greek and Third Yugoslav Army was reviewed at the meeting of the General Committee. The Air Force Commission discussed the issue of support for Greek and Yugoslav forces on the joint battlefield. The following documents emerged from the conference: the Memorandum; Annex A, Operational Matters (concerning the cooperation of the Greek and Yugoslav armies on the joint battlefield and also complemented by meetings with the Turkish side, with the aim of preparing a similar plan of action on the joint battlefield); Annex B, Air Force Matters; Annex C, Rear Forces (where a consensus should be reached on operational matters, in order to prepare, in the deliberations of the conference, the necessary elements for calculating the material requirements of neighboring armies, the provision of aid in relation to transportation means, and the organization of communications and financial remunerations); Annex D, Communications, Armies' Network, Corps' Network, System of Codes, Couriers, Radio-Relay Communications; and Annex E, Exchange of Maps.²²⁵

In the Memorandum, the delegations of the three countries expressed their agreement related to the Sixth Tripartite Conference in

²²⁵ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 102-103.

Belgrade. That gathering was supposed to review the matters of joint enemy forces assessment and enemy actions against the three allied countries of the tripartite alliance, the Coordinated Tripartite Plan based on the national defense plans of the three countries, the air forces, rear forces, communications, and the adoption of the Yugoslav proposal for mutual visits between the heads of the geographical institutes of the three countries.²²⁶

All the developments in late 1954 pointed to a cooling down of relations between the allies, seemingly hindering further cooperation between the Balkan states.

The Roots of the Crisis of the Balkan Alliance and the Beginning of its End

The year 1955 was one of major shifts in international politics. First, a gradual normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR took place. While Yugoslavia went on establishing and pursuing a policy of equidistance, a rift emerged between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. Nonetheless, Western governments continued to pressure Yugoslavia, wanting to bind the Balkan Alliance (and the country in particular) to NATO. As early as in the beginning of the year, the Foreign Ministers Conference was held in Ankara from 28 February-2 March 1955. The Conference took place amid a steep deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey after the Cyprus issue was tabled before the

²²⁶ GS-2, k.17, f.3, 1/1, VA.

United Nations. The relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey were also tense, due to Turkish aspirations and attempts to bind Yugoslavia, as a member of the BA, to NATO.²²⁷ Despite all the contradiction that emerged during the conference, an agreement on establishing a Balkans Advisory Assembly was signed, and the decision on the Balkans Institute was approved, as well as on the organization of a tripartite economic conference. On the other hand, the summit in Ankara rejected, at the great joy of the Yugoslavs, the proposal for a potential coordination of plans between the BA and NATO. However, in accordance with clause 4 of the Bled agreement, the Conference was transformed into a Standing Council of Ministers of the three countries.²²⁸

The misunderstandings between the three countries culminated after the end of this conference. They reached their peak during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Belgrade, in May 1955. The visit was actually a covert attempt of the United States to put indirect pressure on Yugoslavia in order to reduce its increasing prestige, which fueled hostility around the world towards the two major political blocks. In Belgrade, the Turkish PM attempted to convince the Yugoslav leadership in the necessity to attach the Balkan Alliance to NATO, for the purpose of diversifying their military cooperation, improving joint defense, and obtaining greater military aid from the Americans. The talks in Belgrade, however, failed to meet Turkey's expectations. On the contrary, they marked the definitive failure of the

²²⁷ Tatjana Lečić (Milošević), "The Roots of the Crisis of the Balkans Alliance," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute 2008), 154.

²²⁸ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 107-109.

Turks to draw Yugoslavia into the West's military arrangements.²²⁹ The Yugoslav leadership saw the Turkish government as an American exponent and a mere conductor of U.S. policy in the Balkans. In the eyes of Yugoslavia's public opinion, Turkey was seen as a disloyal ally in the BA, contributing to the weakening of that arrangement.²³⁰

At the same time, Turkey's task was to launch an initiative to persuade Italy to join the Balkan Alliance. After the formation of the latter, the Italian government started creating the necessary political conditions for taking the initiative for political and military cooperation with Yugoslavia, namely entering into the BA. Such a policy was in accord with British and American suggestions. However, part of the Italian general staff was against military cooperation with Yugoslavia. Such a stance was justified by assertions that the BA was merely a regional defensive pact, tasked with defending the Macedonian sector, which would entail Italy defending the remaining part of the Yugoslav territory. The most contentious issue proved to be the defense of the Ljubljana Gates, since Yugoslavia was not a member of NATO. However, certain diplomatic circles in Italy advocated for a fast entry of the country in the BA and for establishing a link between the Alliance and NATO. Failing such an outcome, Italy's mission was either to undermine the BA and reduce its importance or to break it up completely and isolate Yugoslavia. The BA's importance at the time was considerable,

²²⁹ "Visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes to Yugoslavia," 18319, f. 68, 1955, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DA MFA, RS, PA (Political Archives)).

²³⁰ "Visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes to Yugoslavia," 18319, f. 68, 1955, DA MFA, RS, PA (Political Archives).

especially amid the failure of the European Defense Community and the ensuing panic of Western European governments, particularly Italy; it seemed that the gaps in the West's defense system in the Southeast sector could be filled only by linking Italy to the BA. This meant that without the BA and joining its defense system to that of NATO through Italy, all plans to organize military pacts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Middle East would be seriously undermined.²³¹

Due to such acts by the Turkish side, the Greek government was in constant fear. Periodical statements by the Turkish government about Italy's possible accession to the Balkan Alliance angered the Greeks, who believed such calls to be insincere and disloyal towards Greece and Yugoslavia. The Greeks assumed that Italy would be called to join the BA during the visit of Turkish PM Menderes to that country. In the course of that visit (from 31 January-2 February 1955), Turkey held the belief that the path to Italy joining the BA would be opened with the settling of the Trieste dispute. This would, in turn, make the BA an integral part of the Atlantic defense system. The Italian government believed that the resolution of the Trieste standoff would be a sacrifice for the sake of the realization of the West's plan and that becoming part of the BA was not vital for Italy only, but for NATO as a whole. According to the viewpoint held by the Italian general staff, the sacrifice of Trieste could be justified only if Italy became part of the BA.

Since the Balkan Alliance was a valuable contribution to the defense of Southeast Europe, the view prevailed that such defense would not be entirely successful without Italy, which constituted the

²³¹ Lečić (Milošević), "The Roots of the Crisis of the Balkans Alliance," 156-157.

necessary foundation between the Balkan countries and those of NATO. Italy was to assume the role of a stabilizing factor in the political sense, in view of the divergences that existed between the three Balkan countries.²³²

Yugoslavia's policy remained consistent with the independence and equal distance from the two blocks. The Yugoslav government believed that the function of the Balkan Alliance was a strictly regional one and that it should involve not only military and technical aspects, but also those related to political, economic, and cultural cooperation. They demonstrated the willingness to cooperate with the West, but only through the BA, as opposed to the Turkish leadership, which wanted to bring Yugoslavia, at least strategically, into NATO. It became increasingly clear that Yugoslavia, due to the strength of its system and internal structure, was the country with the biggest chances to become dominant in the BA. The view held in Belgrade was that Yugoslavia would stand a lot to lose with Italy becoming a member of the alliance and that the Yugoslavs would also find themselves under a tighter grip of the West, since it stood alone against three countries that implemented the policies of the West.²³³

Further developments demonstrated that the Balkan Alliance was rapidly losing its substance and that its existence became a mere formality. The gaping rift between its members and especially the dispute between Greece and Turkey about Cyprus²³⁴ had seriously

²³² Lečić (Milošević), "The Roots of the Crisis of the Balkans Alliance," 158-159.

²³³ CPR, I-5-b, 1955, 9/55, AY.

²³⁴ The row between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus erupted in the second half of 1955. and culminated on 15 July 1974, when the military junta organized a coup

undermined its survival. In order to overcome the stumbling block in the relations between the two members of the BA, the Greek government was compelled to submit to the UN, on 25 July 1955, a proposal for including the issue of Cyprus in the agenda of the 10th Session of the UN General Assembly.²³⁵

The further evolution of the Cyprus issue, which led to a deterioration of the relations between Greece, Turkey, and Britain, resulted in a tripartite conference on political and defense matters concerning, among others, Cyprus. The conference was held at British initiative. However, on the eve of the London Conference, on 29 August 1955, the relations between Greece and Turkey took a sharp downturn due to fundamental differences on how to settle the Cyprus problem. The Greeks denied Turkey any right to participate in the process, believing that the Turkish relinquished such rights in 1923, with the Agreement in Lausanne. Near the end of the conference in London, on 7 September, popular rallies in Turkey escalated into unrest, resulting in a pogrom of the Greek population. The London Conference ended with no results. The Greek request for Cyprus to become part of the UN General Assembly agenda also failed. The relations between the two countries

against the rule of Archbishop Makarios. The coup was greeted in Istanbul as a trigger for conflict, which led to the disembarkment of Turkish troops in the northern part of the Island on 20 July 1974. In the ensuing offensive in August, around 40% of Cyprus was placed under Turkish control, with Ankara saying that it wanted to restore the constitutional order and protect its nationals from Greek aggression. The island was subsequently divided and the population exchanged. For details, see Tatjana Milošević, "Yugoslavia and the United States in the Detente: Meetings between Josip Broz Tito and Henry Kissinger in 1970 and 1974," *History of the 20th Century* 2 (2018): 177-202.

²³⁵ "Note about the discussion between Milan Bulajić and the First Secretary of the Greek embassy in Washington Themistocles Hristopoulos on July 25, 1955," f. 59, 411408, 1955, DA MFA RS, PA.

deteriorated even further and the Greek pavilion in Smirna was attacked and ransacked by the protesters. Due to these incidents, the Greek government was forced to ask Turkey to guarantee the safety of the Greek minority in that country.²³⁶

All these developments affected the formation of the Greek government's stance towards the Balkan Alliance. Namely, the Greeks underlined that they had always believed the BA to be primarily one between Greece and Yugoslavia, while considering Turkey a mere exponent of U.S. policy. Athens' position reflected bitterness towards the West and especially the U.S., which voted against the Cyprus question to be included in the UN agenda.²³⁷

However, Turkey considered Cyprus as their territory, since in historical, military, economic, and even ethnic terms, the Turks had made the majority of the population of the island for more 300 years. Such a state of affairs opened the path for Yugoslavia to mediate in the dispute between the Greeks and the Turks. Hence, in addition to being positioned between the East and the West, Yugoslavia found itself in the role of mediator between two of its allies in conflict. The Yugoslav government took all measures with the aim to avert misunderstandings between Greece and Turkey, which were seen as a threat to the joint interests vested in the tripartite alliance. While the Cyprus conflict brought Yugoslavia and Greece closer and ultimately resulted in bilateral cooperation, everything wasn't perfect. There were lingering misunderstandings around the issue of Macedonia. All the existing

²³⁶ "The London Conference," f. 55, 412593, 1955, DA MFA RS, PA.

²³⁷ CPR, I-5-b, 414467, AY.

disagreements between the members of the Balkan Pact made it clear that only the Yugoslav side tried to maintain a semblance of an alliance.²³⁸

In addition to the Cyprus conflict, the Balkans Alliance was also affected by the normalization of the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, as well as the visit of the Soviet delegation to Belgrade in June 1955.²³⁹ The talks between Yugoslav and Soviet representatives made the skepticism of the Greeks and the Turks even worse. They also caused fear and concern that Yugoslavia would return to the Eastern, Communist camp. The opening and reaching out to the newly-liberated countries of Africa and Asia was the third element of Yugoslavia's new foreign policy course, which increasingly became not only the main determinant of the country's international bilateral contacts, but also a significant premise of the collective, multilateral actions of the new group of countries on the international stage, the mainstays of the non-aligned policy in the world.²⁴⁰

Despite all the misunderstandings and disagreements that existed between the allies, their military cooperation continued in 1955. The result of this cooperation was the Sixth Tripartite Conference held on 5-14 April 1955 in Belgrade. The conference was to jointly assess the enemy forces, enemy plans of action against the Balkan allies, the

²³⁸ Lečić (Milošević), "The Roots of the Crisis of the Balkans Alliance," 164.

²³⁹ The Bangladesh declaration was signed on 2 June 1955 by the representatives of the FНРY J.B. Tito and the President of the Council of Minister of the USSR Nikolai Bulganin on the normalization of relations between the two countries based on the principle of sovereignty, independence, and equality in mutual relations and in relations with other countries. For details, see Vladimir Petrović, *Tito's Personal Diplomacy* (Belgrade: Contemporary History Institute, 2010), 70-88.

²⁴⁰ Bogetić, "Incentives and Restricting Factors," 252-253.

coordinated basic tripartite plan based on national defense plans, a possible simultaneous attack against allied countries by all neighboring countries, the issues of air forces, rear forces, and communications, as well as to adopt the proposals of the three delegations concerning annexes A, B and E. The talks in Belgrade were held in the scope of the General Committee, as well as the Intelligence, Air Force, and Rear Forces Subcommittees. The deliberations on the meeting in Belgrade took place according to a predetermined agenda. The following documents were agreed and harmonized: the Basic Tripartite Cooperation Plan; Annex A, Assessment of Intelligence Data in the Tripartite Cooperation Plan; appendices to Annex E (Air Forces Coordination Plan of the Tripartite Cooperation Plan), encompassing the Plan of Areal Reconnaissance and Meteorology; Communications; Annex K, Rear Forces; and Annex J. The meeting resulted in a memorandum, consisting of conclusions and recommendations for follow up work, and the press release for NATO, as well as an official communiqué.

Meanwhile, military cooperation was being strengthened by information exchanged between military envoys. Such cooperation was continued and shaped at the meetings of the First Greek Army and the Third Yugoslav Army within their scope of activity. The Head of the Greek General Staff advocated for an increase of the capacity of the road network in Greece and Yugoslavia, for the purpose of organizing defense in the tactical zone on the Strumica Route (the road Valandovo-Strumica). The conference proceeded according to an agenda involving the approval of the proposed plan of fortification works on the Bjelasnica and Karaula mountains; the approval of the plan of changing

of the 44th Yugoslav Brigade and the 2nd Greek Infantry Division; the issue of correcting and amending Plan 31; preparing the basis for drafting Annex E to Plan 31 on the Reserves and Counter Strike; etc. The only change concerning the deliberations of the conference pertained to options that included counter attacks, namely offensive actions, which were postponed for a future meeting. The gathering also saw the adoption of the memorandum.²⁴¹

It is important to underline that the military segment of the cooperation between the allies was the smoothest to implement. Accordingly, the Fourth Conference of the commanders of the First (I) Greek Army and the Third (III) Yugoslav Army was held in Thessaloniki on 17-24 October 1955. The agenda included the Reserves Plan, discussions concerning defense on the position L-3, exchange of views concerning to rear forces and communications, as well as amending Plan 31. In the course of the conference, meetings were held by the Operational Subcommittee, as well as committees for communications, rear forces and engineer corps. It is worth stressing that the Operational Subcommittee worked on analyzing possible enemy attack options and defense in the joint operational area.²⁴²

U.S. Secretary of State Dulles visited Yugoslavia on 6 November 1955, opening the possibility for the further strengthening of Yugoslavia's foreign policy position. This visit had far-reaching consequences for securing U.S. support to the new Yugoslav foreign policy agenda. On

²⁴¹ *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 110-112.

²⁴² *Balkan Pact 1953/1954*, cod, 110-112, and "Minutes from the 4th Conference of Commanders of the (I) and (III) Yugoslav Armies," Thessaloniki, 17-24 October 1955.

this occasion, attention was also devoted to the Balkans Alliance and the possibility of escalation of the conflict between Greece and Turkey and Yugoslavia's mediating role.²⁴³

While analyzing the current activities of the Balkan Alliance, Tito revealed to Dulles the aspirations of Yugoslavia to put emphasis on the economic and political component without, however, neglecting the military segment. Dulles was particularly interested in Yugoslavia's role as the mediator between the Greeks and the Turks. He believed that Yugoslavia's energetic action within the BA, with the aim of reinforcing tripartite cooperation, as well as repeated meetings between the members, would lead to a better atmosphere on the negotiations between the confronted parties. That is why the meeting between President Tito and Dulles in Brioni contributed to the increased confidence between the U.S. and Yugoslavia. The joint communiqué confirmed that the talks were relaxed and friendly. As evidenced by Dulles' report to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, Tito managed to improve the image of Yugoslavia's foreign policy and convince his guest in his country's resolve to defend its national independence (Dulles wrote he was convinced that "Tito had no intention to return under Soviet claw."²⁴⁴) The Turks expressed their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the talks between Tito and Dulles and particularly with U.S. views concerning Tito's role as a mediator between the East and the

²⁴³ Dragan Bogetić, *Yugoslavia and the West 1952-1955* (Belgrade: Official Gazette of the FRY, 2000), 261-266.

²⁴⁴ Bogetić, *Yugoslavia and the West 1952-1955*, 263-264. For details, see Vladimir Petrović, *Tito's Personal Diplomacy* (Belgrade: Contemporary History Institute, 2010), 88-91.

West, as well as with Washington's support for the restructuring of the BA, so as to put emphasis on its cultural and economic dimension.²⁴⁵

In 1956, all activities among Balkan Pact members were reduced to the bilateral cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece, in the scope of which Tito visited that country.²⁴⁶ The Yugoslav President visited Corfu on 24-30 July 1956 on his ship "Galeb" ("Seagull"). He talked to the Greek PM Konstantin Karamanlis about the need to strengthen the already good relations between their two countries. Tito used the opportunity to convey to the Greek President the Soviets' position and opinion about the Balkan Pact. Explaining the USSR's position, the Yugoslav President said that the Soviets had nothing against the Balkan Pact as a factor of peace, economic, political, and cultural cooperation in the Balkans, which was, according to them, the only way for the three countries to overcome their mutual antagonisms. Furthermore, Tito also discussed the conflict in Cyprus.²⁴⁷

Tito's visit to Greece, however, caused suspicion towards Yugoslavia's intentions in the context of that conflict. On the other hand, Tito's visit to Greece was merely a continuation of the intensified cooperation with Yugoslavia's southern neighbor, as an important aspect of the country's foreign policy activities, which were less significant than Tito's travel to India and meetings with Khrushchev.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ "Telegram sent from Ankara to the Secretariat of Foreign on November 12, 1955," f. 60, 887, 1955, DA MFA RS, PA.

²⁴⁶ Darko Bekić, *Yugoslavia in the Cold War (Relations with the Big Powers 1949-1955)* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 667-734.

²⁴⁷ "Note by Ambassador Pavicević in the Talks Between Tito and Karamanlis," I-2/8, AY CPR.

²⁴⁸ Bekić, *Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, 667-734.

Ultimately, it may be concluded that the Balkan Alliance's gradual phasing out began back in 1954, as evidenced by the progressive boycott and slowing down of its institutions, as well as by escalation of the Cyprus crisis. All the problems (the Trieste dispute and the Cyprus conflict) that burdened the relations between Balkan allies affected the Pact's survival. Yugoslav President Tito pursued a policy catering to the needs of his country and played on the contradictions and animosities between the big powers. He strived for retaining military and economic assistance, after the threat from the East dwindled down, as well as for resisting the requests for formally joining the West's defense structures. "Tito gradually reinforced such a position in the Cold War confrontations by choosing a 'third path' outside of the two blocks. With the normalization of the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and Tito's visit to India and Burma in 1955, followed by the Brioni meeting with Nehru and Nasser in 1956, the Yugoslav leader cemented his extra-European path."²⁴⁹

All these facts point to the short existence of the Balkan Alliance which, with time, increasingly became a dead letter. However, its importance was significant, since it represented the highest point of the military cooperation with the West in Yugoslavia's history. Success was all the greater because the initiative for its establishment came in a highly-complex international context, with the looming threat of Soviet invasion, when Yugoslavia was still an ideological enemy of the West.

²⁴⁹ Milan Terzić, "Tito's Role in the Creation of the Balkan Pact 1953/1954," in *The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of Papers*, ed. Nemanja Milošević (Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, 2008), 110.

The BA definitely helped Tito leave a mark on the international stage and cement his leadership in Yugoslavia. The absence of durable coordination at the military strategic level, merely partial coordination with Greece, as well as the refusal to put its defense in the function of NATO defense plans (Ljubljana Gates) all lead to the inference that Yugoslavia was not part of NATO's defense system and that it was treated as a separate case and not as an associated member of the alliance. When one also considers the political content of the BA and the caution in the position of the big powers towards its creation (USA, Britain, and France), it can only be concluded that Yugoslavia has never been part of the collective security system of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Summary

Moving away from the East due to Tito's resistance to Stalin in 1948 put Yugoslavia on the path of building new relations with the West. The idea of connecting three Balkan states emerged amid a sense of vulnerability of these countries to a potential aggression by the Soviets and their satellites. However, the entry of Greece and Turkey in NATO in 1952 opened the issue of organizing the Middle East Command and, in the same vein, the issue of defending Thrace and the Balkans in general, in the scope of the NATO defense system. The Balkan Alliance was by the Ankara Agreement in 1953. The newly-established regional alliance consisted of three countries: Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. The alliance contained the usual formulations about aspirations for peace and stability, and the establishment of economic and cultural

cooperation in the region, as well as provisions on the internationalization of such cooperation. For the first time in diplomatic history, countries with conflicting and opposing social and political systems and interests entered into an alliance and established cooperation on regional basis.

With time, the alliance turned into a pact, which meant introducing the military component, namely the formation of the so-called military defense alliance. The political alliance finally grew into a military one during the Bled Conference in 1954. Its epilogue was the formation of the military alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia for a period of twenty years. However, the West strove for a military bond with Greece and Turkey, with the ultimate goal of Yugoslavia joining NATO. Yugoslavia succeeded in its intention to keep the BA a defensive organization only, independent from NATO and in accord with UN principles. While for Yugoslavia, the BA represented merely a short-term protection mechanism for the Soviet Union and its satellites; for the West, from the geostrategic point of view, it was a means to finalize the bulwark against the Eastern Bloc, which would include Yugoslavia and West Germany. The creation of the BA amounted to a mere indirect inclusion of Yugoslavia in the West's defense system. However, the many disagreements between the members of the alliance (the Cyprus crisis, the Trieste dispute, the normalization of the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, as well as Yugoslavia's new foreign policy course) led to its phasing out. In reality, the alliance did not function, cooperation between its members dwindled, and it ultimately died.

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NATO and the Second Conflict on Cyprus, 1964: The (Failed) Plan to Establish a NATO Peacekeeping Force

by

Stefan Maximilian Brenner

A new crisis broke out on the island of Cyprus in December 1963. The young republic had gained independence in 1960 after long, violent clashes between the British colonial power, the Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots.²⁵⁰ However, the conflicts between the Greek-born and the Turkish-born ethnic groups were by no means resolved. In the course of the Cypriot independence treaty, Britain, Greece, and Turkey had been designated as "guarantor powers," with the right to intervene with armed force in the event of a civil war. The recent armed clashes between the two ethnic groups urged London to look for a solution to defuse the tensions and restore peace on the island.

Ankara and Athens, however, were hostile to each other because of the conflict in Cyprus. It was thus up to the British government as the only neutral power to intervene with its own military forces. Nevertheless, London was unwilling to shoulder the burden alone and

²⁵⁰ Stefan Brenner, *Die NATO im griechisch-türkischen Konflikt* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), 84-85, and Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 51-56.

therefore urged its U.S. partner and NATO to set up a NATO peacekeeping force for this purpose.²⁵¹

The British Foreign Office instructed its NATO ambassador, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, to present the proposal for a NATO peacekeeping force to the NATO Council. The British delegate discussed the issue with the British military representative at SHAPE.²⁵² Shuckburgh finally suggested to London to consider the deployment of the NATO Allied Mobile Force (AMF). This quick reaction force had been created in 1961 to deter any aggression of the Warsaw Pact against the flanks of NATO and at the same time to demonstrate the solidarity among the Alliance members.²⁵³ A deployment of the AMF as a peacekeeping force, however, had never been intended or attempted before. Shuckburgh then pointed out that most Alliance members would probably oppose such an idea.

As the situation on the island of Cyprus continued to deteriorate, the Foreign Office sought to involve its American partner more strongly.²⁵⁴ The British put pressure on Washington, pointing out the British must either reduce the number of their troops in the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany, or to withdraw completely from Cyprus. Contrary to its original plans, however, London no longer insisted on the creation of a force under the banner of NATO, but only

²⁵¹ Telegram, British Foreign Office (FO) to British Permanent Representative at NATO (UK NATO), 7 JAN 1964, No. 177, 397, DEFE 11, TNA.

²⁵² Telegram, UK NATO to FO, 8 JAN 1964, No. 16, 397, DEFE 11, TNA.

²⁵³ Bernd Lemke, *Die Allied Mobile Force* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015).

²⁵⁴ Telegram, West German Embassy Nicosia (DEU Nicosia) to German Foreign Ministry (AA), 24 JAN 1964, PA AA, B 26 IA4, Nr. 41/64, and FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 16, doc. 1, Memorandum of Conversation British ambassador and U.S. Secretary of State, 24 JAN 1964, <<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d1>>.

spoke about a contingent to be recruited from the countries of the NATO Allies. On 24 January 1964, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ormsby Gore, sought to persuade U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to support the proposals from London. He tried to persuade the State Department to establish its own peacekeeping force in order to relieve the British on the island. The Americans, however, hesitated. Rusk did not oppose the idea, but refused to make any commitments to a possible American contribution. In his view, the deployment of American troops in Cyprus could jeopardize the deployment of U.S. forces in Turkey, where American soldiers could run the risk of shooting at the Turkish military contingent on the island. Rusk therefore offered to relieve the British Army of the Rhine with American troops if London took over the lead of the Cyprus operation without American participation.²⁵⁵

As the State Department and White House remained reluctant to agree with the British proposal, the Foreign Office made another move.²⁵⁶ London reminded the U.S. that the issue did not concern only Cyprus, but the whole southeastern flank of NATO. Thus, the British government demanded military burden-sharing by its Allies. Ankara, for its own part, gave the British unintentional help. Turkish President İsmet İnönü informed the American ambassador in Ankara about the forthcoming invasion of Turkish troops on Cyprus. The Turkish Army and Navy had been starting to prepare troops and amphibious landing equipment for relocation in the seaport of İskenderun.

²⁵⁵ Claude Nicolet, "American and British NATO-Plans for Cyprus, 1959-1964," *Thetis* 8 (2001): 318.

²⁵⁶ James Ker-Lindsay, *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2004), 53-58.

Washington now responded immediately.²⁵⁷ In view of the new situation, the State Department and the Pentagon were able to persuade U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to make a military contribution to the planned NATO peacekeeping force. Johnson merely insisted that the British ally was the Lead nation of the operation. With the commitment of the American partner, London finally consulted the other NATO members.²⁵⁸ Turkey itself was sympathetic to the project.²⁵⁹ In general, Ankara was ready to take part with troops from its own armed forces, whereas Athens was in a dilemma. Although the Greek political decision makers also favored the plan, the Greek Cypriots rejected the concept and demanded the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The Greek government had to decide whether to stand side-by-side with their Greek Cypriot “compatriots” and to risk a Turkish landing on the island, or to accept a military pacification by NATO forces.

In the face of a possible Turkish military intervention, the Greek government under Ioannis Paraskevopoulos agreed to the plan of their NATO partners.²⁶⁰ In any case, from a legal perspective, the Cypriot head of state Archbishop Makarios only had a limited veto. Under the terms of the Zurich and London Treaties, the guarantor powers had gained the common right to enforce peace on the island, even – if considered necessary – without the consent of the Cypriot communities. Therefore,

²⁵⁷ Ker-Lindsay, *Britain*, 53-58.

²⁵⁸ Telegram, UK NATO to FO, 30 JAN 1964, No. 66, 399, DEFE 11, TNA.

²⁵⁹ Ker-Lindsay, *Britain*, 57-63, and Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish American Relations, 1959-2003* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 31.

²⁶⁰ Telegram, West German Embassy Athens (DEU Athens) to AA, 23 JAN 1964, No. 32, PA AA B 26 IA4.

the Greek government not only agreed with the NATO partners' plan, but openly defended it against diplomatic interference by Moscow.²⁶¹ The USSR had tried to accuse NATO of planning to violate the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

The German government in principle supported the mission. The Federal Cabinet had already consulted the high command of the Bundeswehr.²⁶² Although the Auswaertiges Amt (the Foreign Office) hesitated, the Federal Ministry of Defense declared to send German officers to London to discuss details of the operational planning.²⁶³ The planned contingent should consist of combat troops with 4,000 British, 1,200 German, and 1,200 French, in addition to 1,200 American soldiers. Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands were also in favor of the project. Norway wanted to wait for the Danish and the Canadian attitude.

It was only France that refused to participate in this project. Indeed, the background to the French position was less to find in the Eastern Mediterranean than in Washington and Paris. The Grande Nation had been wrestling with the American partner for years about the French ambition to receive, after Washington, a leadership role within the Alliance.²⁶⁴ The French displeasure had been expressed above all in the secondary role of France as well as in inadequate participation in nuclear defense planning issues. As a result, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d'Orsay) opposed Washington in many

²⁶¹ Telegram, DEU Athens to AA, 1 FGEB 1964, No. 50, PA AA B 26 IA4.

²⁶² Ker-Lindsay, *Britain*, 64.

²⁶³ "Circular Decree of Permanent State Secretary Carstens to German Ambassadors in NATO Member Countries," Document 37, vol. 1, AAPD, 1964, 168-170.

²⁶⁴ Anna Locher, "A Crisis Foretold: NATO and France, 1963-66," in *Transforming NATO in the Cold War*, ed. Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2007), 108.

of the Alliance's internal affairs. Therefore, the French disagreement in the Cyprus question increased French-American differences. Not only did Paris refuse to give its consent, but also imposed its general veto on the "Anglo-American" project within the Alliance.²⁶⁵

The Quai d'Orsay argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been consulted for the London and Zurich Agreements. Accordingly, Paris was also unwilling to accept such a peacekeeping mission. The French claimed to understand the NATO treaty had been signed exclusively for the purpose of a collective defense against a Soviet aggression.

As the Western Alliance hesitated, the resistance of the Greek-Cypriots also stiffened.²⁶⁶ The local press in Nicosia vigorously attacked London and Washington, compared the planned operation to British intervention in the Suez Canal, and called on the Soviet Union to provide military assistance to Cyprus. Thousands of students demonstrated in the Cypriot capital and chanted slogans hostile to NATO. Under these circumstances, it became nearly impossible for the Western Alliance to transfer troops to the island without assuming the role of an unpopular occupying power. German General Heinz Trettner, former World War II paratrooper, feared that the Bundeswehr contingent might have to fight as savagely against the Greek-Cypriot population as it had during the invasion of Crete in 1941.²⁶⁷ In his opinion, this was not compatible with the Bundeswehr's principles and philosophies, the so called "Innere

²⁶⁵ "Note Sous-Direction d'Europe Méridionale, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères," Document 70, 4 FEB 1964, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1964, t. 1, 153.

²⁶⁶ Ker-Lindsay, *Britain*, 61.

²⁶⁷ Thorsten Kruse, *Bonn - Nikosia - Ostberlin. Innerdeutsche Fehden auf fremdem Boden, 1960-1972* (Mainz: Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2013), 118.

Führung,” and the image of humanity within the modern German armed forces. Eventually, the NATO members canceled the British-American plan. The conflict in Cyprus therefore continued.

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The Role of Slovakia in Alliance Warfare throughout the 20th Century

by

Miloslav Čaplovič and Matej Medvecký

For Slovakia, the twentieth century was a period of changing allegiances. Slovaks twice fought on the losing side of the two world wars while at the same time some Slovaks fought against their homeland for the future victorious powers. Then again, Slovaks wore the uniform of a part of totalitarian countries only to join NATO once Slovakia became a free nation. From the point of view of history, this made Slovak twentieth-century history an interesting period for both description and analysis.

Slovakia entered the twentieth century within the imperial framework of the Habsburg monarchy, and thus became a part of the Central Powers shortly thereafter. At the time, according to the highly untrustworthy 1910 census (due to the Magyarization politics), there were approximately 2 million Slovaks living in Hungary. Slovaks represented 3.6 percent of the total peacetime strength of the army of the monarchy. Representatives of Slovakia were, with only few exceptions (mostly due to the corrupt election system in Hungary and repressive measures of the government) unable to push forward their views or to have any meaningful impact on the policy of the monarchy.

After the outbreak of hostilities in summer 1914, Slovak politicians were forced to declare loyalty and abandon political activities. Slovak soldiers, despite the notorious lack of political rights in Hungary, were praised for their bravery by superiors and newspapers, and even one Austrian military intelligence report labeled Slovaks as the “most reliable nationality of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the frontline.”²⁶⁸ The morale of Slovak soldiers in imperial Habsburg uniform declined in a similar manner as did the morale in any other army involved, mostly due to long service on the frontline, long-term suffering from bad living conditions, diseases related to their stay in the unhealthy trenches, etc.

At the same time, political circles around Czech politician Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk decided to form a resistance movement in order to dismantle the old monarchy and create a national state for Czechs. Their efforts changed later and they declared the will to establish a state for both Czechs and Slovaks. Among the most important tools of the effort to influence entente governments were the Czechoslovak Legion, recruited from Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war and deserters as well as from Czech and Slovak volunteers living abroad. These troops were to fight with the Entente armies against the Central Powers. The first such units were the “Nazdar” Platoon in the French Army and the “Czech Cohort” fighting as a part of the Russian Army, both active since 1914.

²⁶⁸ Peter Chorvát and Miloslav Čaplovič, “Slovak Soldiers on the Frontlines of the World War I,” in *Doctrinal Change. Using the Past to Face the Present*, ed. Harold E. Raugh, Jr. (Bratislava: Institute of Military History, 2015), 47.

At the end of World War I, the political body representing the non-existent Czechoslovak state included these most prominent figures: T. G. Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, and Milan Rastislav Štefánik. They had over 100,000 men at their disposal. The majority of this body was the 71,000+ man (among them 6,000 Slovaks) strong contingent in Russia, at the time suffering from the civil war. Another 20,000 (600 Slovaks) men fought the Central Powers on the Italian Front and another approximately 12,000 (2,600 Slovaks) in the trenches in France. This considerable number of men backed the political effort of the resistance and led to the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris as the representative of an allied nation by all the major Entente governments, starting with France (June 1918), and followed by Great Britain and Italy (August 1918), and finally by the United States (September 1918).

As a result, the establishment of the Czechoslovak state was declared on 28 October 1918, and Slovak politicians joined this by the Declaration of Martin, signed two days later. Despite the fact that Czech and Slovak nations had many more men fighting for the Central Powers and stayed loyal to the monarchy, they still could be counted among the victors and the victorious powers granted the free and democratic Czechoslovak state. This was largely due to the activities of diligent and determined leaders who were capable of conducting diplomatic missions and leading military forces.

The end of the war and establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918 did not bring peace to Central Europe. From the beginning, the new country had to use force to protect itself and its territory as at the time

its borders were not guaranteed by any “Great Powers” or by military means. This was especially difficult as its major force – the Czechoslovak Legion – was abroad. Transporting soldiers from France or Italy was relatively easier, but to transport the 71,000-man-strong legions from Russia, torn apart by bloody civil war, posed a much more difficult task. There were several areas, where aspirations of neighboring countries met, including the German border areas in Czechia, Silesia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and Slovakia. In case of the latter, Slovak territory that was controlled by Hungarian authorities had to be taken by force and Slovakia witnessed several fierce battles until the ceasefire was signed on 1 July 1919. Only then could the needed consolidation of the country and the development of its armed forces begin.

In 1918-1919, Czechoslovakia had two types of military units available: the home army, consisting of soldiers in Austrian uniforms (with some changes) and commanded mostly by Czech officers who stayed loyal to the imperial army, and legionaries. Only in 1920 did both types of units started to merge into a single Czechoslovak Army. The leaders of the new country admired French military achievements and Czechoslovakia agreed to host a French military mission by an agreement signed in Paris in January 1919. It had an enormous impact among the highest army commanders and until the mid-1920s and it fulfilled not only an advisory role but became a major agent in the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces. French officers influenced the first organizational structure of the Ministry of National Defense and the establishment of Main Staff in May 1919. In fact, the French Military mission influenced all aspects of Czechoslovak military

affairs and French officers held relevant posts on the Main Staff as well as at higher units (especially in the eastern part of the country) and in military schools. Czechoslovakia made a considerable effort to strengthen its ties to France, resulting in an alliance agreement signed in January 1924 that incorporated Czechoslovakia into the alliance system formed by France after WW1.²⁶⁹

Leading Czechoslovak politicians initiated or supported cooperation on the basis of bilateral military agreements with Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 Yugoslavia) signed in years 1920-1921. Later, on the basis of bilateral agreements an alliance, known as the Little Entente, was formed. The interest to cooperate was strengthened by three multilateral agreements on cooperation in the political and economical sphere signed in 1922. In 1930, the countries agreed to host meetings of foreign ministers on a regular basis and finally the organizational pact of the Little Entente was signed in 1933. The goal of the alliance was clear: to maintain the status quo in Central Europe, especially against Hungarian revisionism and territorial claims.

When one focuses on Slovakia, it is clear that its territory was of strategic importance. Together with Subcarpathian Ruthenia, it provided a direct route to allied Romania. The necessity to secure this territory is clear from the dislocation of Czechoslovak military units and

²⁶⁹ Radko Břach, "Spojenecká smlouva mezi Československem a Francií z 25. ledna 1924 a garanční dohoda čs.-francouzská z 16. října 1925" [Treaty of Alliance Signed Between Czechoslovakia and France on 25 January 1924 and the Treaty of Guarantee Signed Between Czechoslovakia and France on 16 October 1925]. *Historie a vojenství* 43, no. 6 (1994): 3-21.

from the fact that in the 1920s, the security of Slovakia became a key part of the defense system of the country. This was closely related to the operational planning and distribution of new weapons for infantry, artillery, cavalry and air force units, which was realized first in the eastern part of the republic in 1926-1929.²⁷⁰

The situation started to change at the beginning of 1930s when the posture in Europe and elsewhere worsened and tensions in international and economic relations increased. Once the demilitarization conference in Genoa (1932-1933) failed, Czechoslovak political leaders and military authorities had to adapt to the idea that Czechoslovakia may be the first target of a hostile coalition.²⁷¹ The rise of the National Socialists to power in Germany in 1933 made the geopolitical situation of Czechoslovakia even worse. Germany started its ambitious rearmament program and was very active in foreign policy, too. Germany under Adolf Hitler aspired to acquire Czechoslovak territory inhabited by a strong German minority. This pressure, together with Hungarian aspirations for the restoration of pre-1918 Hungarian monarchy and Polish territorial claims, forced Czechoslovakia to sign an agreement of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The country thus became a member of a three-party alliance against Germany, and its leaders considered these guarantees as sufficient. Czechoslovak army

²⁷⁰ For more information, Jan Anger, "Obrana Slovenska v operačných plánoch čs. generálneho štábu v druhej polovici 20. rokov" [The Defence of Slovakia in Operational plans of Czechoslovak General Staff in the Second half of 1920s], *Vojenské obzory* [Military Review] 1, no. 2 (1994): 31-41, and Ibid., *Vojenské obzory* [Military Review] 1, no. 3 (1994): 21-32.

²⁷¹ Václav Hyndrák, "Kotázce vojenské hodnoty čs. armády v druhé polovině třicátých let" [To the Question of Military Value of Czechoslovak Army in the Second Half of 1930s], *Historie a vojenství* 13, no. 1 (1964): 92.

planners thus elaborated plans of a coalition war in case the nation would have to wage isolated war against enemy (Germany, Hungary, or maybe even Austria) with superior numbers. Therefore, planners considered necessary to secure borders until mobilization was finished, then prevent isolation of individual units in Czechia and finally lead defensive operations to allow the army to withdraw to Slovakia. Here, the army was expected to re-group and once allies join the war start a counterattack. However, no plan was prepared in case that country had to rely on its own resources and without help from allies. Due to the German threat, the military importance of Slovakia changed – plans presumed that effective defensive positions could be manned in Czech-Moravian Highlands or even on borders between Moravia and Slovakia. Therefore, Slovakia was expected to provide rear area facilities for the army and safeplaces for evacuated institutions such as the president, government, and parliament, as well as relevant arms producing facilities.²⁷² However, due to the Munich agreement these measures were never executed. For political reasons leading Czechoslovak politicians decided to capitulate and accepted the agreement.²⁷³ Border territories of Czechia where strong fortification system was build ceded to Germany and in November 1938, the 1st Vienna Award resulted in ceding another territory to Hungary and in December to Poland. The

²⁷² For more information, see Pavel Minařík, "Reorganizace armády ve 2. polovině 30. let a vytvoření operační sestavy vojsk po vyhlášení mobilizace" [The Reorganisation of the Army in the Second Half of 1930s and Establishment of the Operational Composition of Forces after the Mobilisation], in *Mezníky Československé státnosti a armáda*. [Milestones of Czechoslovak Statehood and the Army] (Brno: Vojenská akademie 1999), 65-70.

²⁷³ For more details, see Miloslav Čaplovič, "1938: Twilight of the Czechoslovak Republic," *Slovak Army Review* (Spring/Summer 2003): 26-27.

country, now containing two autonomous regions (Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia), was left at Hitler's mercy and the German Führer planned for the liquidation of the country. On 14 March 1939, one day after the meeting of the future Slovak prime minister Jozef Tiso with Hitler, Slovakia declared independence and one day later the German Wehrmacht occupied the "Rest-Tschechei."

Much had changed in Slovakia. Since autumn 1938 Czechoslovakia ceased to be a democratic country. When one looks only on the development in Slovakia, Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party became the only ruling party of the autonomous Slovak territory and had its representative in Czechoslovak coalition government. However, Slovak politicians did not expect the declaration of Slovak independence to happen so soon but still considered it a necessity. Tiso referred to his party colleagues that Hitler expected the independence to be declared "blitzschnell"; otherwise, he threatened, Germany, Hungary, and Poland would divide Slovak territory. The sovereignty of the country was at the end of March 1939 restricted by a Treaty of Protection (*Schutzvertrag*). According to this treaty, Slovakia agreed to conduct its foreign policy in accordance with German interests and Germany guaranteed Slovak political sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the exception of a strip along western borders of the county where a security zone (*Schutzzone*) was created and where the German military administration exercised considerable authority. At the same time, the Slovak Army was to be built up according to German needs.²⁷⁴ It is

²⁷⁴ For more details, see Jan Anger, "Vznik Slovenskej armády v roku 1939" [Establishment of the Slovak Army in 1939], in *Z vojenskej histórie Slovenska 1918-1948*

needless to say that the treaty was in fact less obligatory for Germany than for the Slovak republic.

Nevertheless, when the occasion occurred Slovakia became the first German ally to join their war effort. September 1939 brought a first combat experience for the Slovak Army, although this limited encounter was led only ad hoc with German approval and Slovakia was not a formal ally. Initially, German plans expected Slovak forces only to guard and defend borders and to tie down enemy forces as it is stated in the letter of Colonel General Wilhelm List to Slovak Minister of National Defense 1st Class General Ferdinand Čatloš. However, after the outbreak of war Slovak units, with German approval, advanced into Polish territory to regain the area ceded in 1920, 1924, and 1938. An Attempt to reach the city of Sanok was stopped at German request.

After the Polish defeat, Slovak leaders and military planners considered only one country as a potential threat – Hungary. Therefore, operational plans for the Slovak Army calculated with possible hostilities and defensive operations at the southern borders. These operational plans were not approved, probably due to German refusal,²⁷⁵ since Hungary maintained good relations with Germany and was to become its ally. The negative attitude towards Hungary led to efforts to strengthen the relations with Romania and the Independent State of Croatia. However, the modification of the former Little Entente

[Chapters of Slovak Military History 1918-1948], ed. Ján Korček (Trenčín: Institute of Military History 1994), 59-85.

²⁷⁵ Igor Baka, "K problematike zaistenia hraníc Slovenska v rokoch 1939-1944" [Regarding the Issue of Securing Slovak borders in Years 1939-1944], *Vojenská história* [Military History Magazine], 7, no. 3 (2003): 121-130.

faced Hungarian and Italian counter pressure as well as German opposition, and discussion on possible cooperation had to be kept secret.

On 24 November 1940, Slovakia officially joined the Tripartite Pact and for the first time as a country became a member of an alliance. It agreed to follow the foreign policy of the tripartite powers and this step finally resulted in declaration of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941 and Great Britain and the United States in December 1941.²⁷⁶

Germans considered Slovakian territory an important route to the East. Even before the war, Slovak leaders allowed German troops to use the transport network of the country. One day before hostilities started, Hitler decided to include Slovakia in German war plans. On 21 June 1941, Slovak President Jozef Tiso and Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka were requested to join the war and both agreed. Even before these events, in May 1941, Minister of National Defense Gen. F. Čatloš probed the German military attaché on the possibility of Slovak participation in the war against USSR in case Hungary joined the war. On this occasion, he shared with the attaché thoughts regarding the possibility to revive Slovak-Hungarian borders.

At the beginning of July 1941, Slovak participation in the German campaign against the USSR totalled over 50 000 soldiers, mainly infantrymen. Due to slow progress, two regular divisions were formed

²⁷⁶ Ján Korček, "Slovenský štát vo vojnovom stave so západnými spojencami" [Slovak State in State of War Against Western Allies] in *Vojenskopolitické a geopolitické súvislosti vývoja Slovenska v rokoch 1918-1945* [The Military, Political and Geopolitical Contingency of the Development of Slovakia in Years 1918-1945]. (Trenčín: Institute of Military History, 1992), 71-85.

in summer 1941. The first, called Fast Division (despite the fact that it was not fully motorized), was to fight on the frontline. The second, the Security Division, was to carry out security tasks in the occupied territories. For a limited period of time several other smaller units also fought there. Slovak units, especially the Fast Division, suffered heavy losses during the Soviet counteroffensive in the winter of 1942/1943 and was later reorganized into a technical (labor corps) division and stayed in the East until the end of the World War II. The Security Division was reorganized into a technical (labor corps) division as well and served in Italy until 1945. There, in April 1945, parts of the units joined the insurrection.²⁷⁷

An evaluation of this period of Slovak history suggests that Slovak leaders joined the German military effort willingly and there was no real attempt to switch sides even at the end of the war. On the one hand, it may be understandable, since Moscow, London, and Washington recognized the Czechoslovak government in exile as early as 1941. On the other hand, the fatalism of Slovak representatives (with the only exception of the Defense Minister Čatloš), did not even think seriously about the possibility to find contacts “on the other side” once the tide of war turned against Germany. When evaluating the first Slovak assignment in coalition warfare, one has to point out several issues that influenced the Slovak participation in the war: first of all Slovakia had no territorial claims against the USSR. Therefore, politicians had to relay

²⁷⁷ Jozef Bystrický, “Pozemné vojská slovenskej armády na východnom fronte 1941-1945 [Slovak Ground Forces in the Eastern Front 1941-1945], in *Slovensko a druhá svetová vojna* [Slovakia and the Second World War], ed. František Cséfalvay and Miloslav Púčik (Bratislava: Institute of Military History, 2000), 191-216.

solely on ideological explanations of the war, confirming German propaganda. Slovak leaders declared the war as just, as a struggle for European culture, as the liberation of nations against the yoke of Judeo-Bolshevism and supported these claims by evidence of Soviet atrocities. On the other hand, when words of German atrocities (and to some degree of atrocities committed by Slovak units) reached Slovakia, these were suppressed. When looking at Slovak soldiers the picture is quite clear: in times of German successes problems with loyalty did not occur very often. But later, once the Soviet pressure became enormous, the morale of Slovak frontline divisions broke down. Another reason was the situation in the rear. Security division soldier morale seems to have broken down in 1943 due to additional factors – disagreement with German atrocities/active participation on these, and intense contacts with local civilians or unsuccessful antiguerilla operation resulting in higher casualties and frustration.

The only Slovak government minister who made such efforts was Gen. Čatloš. At first, he requested German approval to withdraw Slovak units from Soviet territory and later, he developed a plan where Slovak units would attack German units from the rear and thus open Dukla Pass and Dargov Pass to advancing Soviet troops and allow them to cross Slovak territory without a fight, thus outflanking German defense lines. Čatloš ordered the head of the military intelligence department, Captain of General Staff Ján Stanek, to find means to deliver his plan to the Soviets. Stanek had contacts in the most important resistance group in Slovakia, “Flora,” and found contacts with the Communists and forwarded Čatloš’s plan to the resistance. Officers active in the

resistance used this plan to prepare their own plans for a military uprising, and at the end, both plans were sent to Moscow. At the end, Čatloš's plan was not accepted by Soviet authorities as the Soviets legally recognized the Czechoslovak government in exile. In December 1943, a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty on cooperation was signed.²⁷⁸

As mentioned previously, there were anti-German resistance groups active in Slovakia. At the end of 1943, some influential members of the resistance agreed with the Communists to create a central body (called illegal Slovak National Council) that would be responsible for political aspects of the preparation of an anti-German uprising. At the same time, they visited Chief of Staff of the Slovak Army Col. of the General Staff Viliam Talský to establish a network of trustworthy officers with influence over more important garrisons. Talský, however, failed to fulfil this task and it was passed on to Lt. Col. Ján Golian. In 1943, several guerrilla groups emerged in Slovakia and in 1944 these groups became more and more active. In the spring and summer of 1944, additional groups were formed by Soviet paratroopers.

Lt. Col. Ján Golian was entrusted with developing the plan for the uprising. Similar to Čatloš's plan, Golian's calculated with several factors. According to this plan, once the Red Army reached Cracow, the Slovak Army (two divisions) garrisoned in eastern Slovakia was to attack the German lines from behind, help Soviet troops to cross mountain passes, and thus allow the Soviets to attack Vienna in a few days. In the case of the German occupation of Slovak territory, the

²⁷⁸ Jozef Jablonický, *Povstanie bez legend* [Uprising Without Legends] (Bratislava: Obzor, 1990), 22-36.

Slovak Army was to defend as long as possible the strategic triangle of Banská Bystrica-Zvolen-Brezno.

Due to partisan action, German leaders at the end of August 1944 decided to occupy Slovakia and thus the defensive posture had to be taken. The illegal network of officers did not manage to secure the Army in the East and almost all units were disarmed by the Germans. Resistance leaders declared an uprising and established a provisional government (corps of commissariats) in Banská Bystrica; at the same time declared the territory as part of Czechoslovakia and its army as 1st Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia. At this point, Slovakia was split, had two governments, two armies, and was part of both belligerent pacts – Axis and Allies.

The uprising was defeated by the end of October 1944, but irregular units continued to fight until liberated from German forces. The Slovak National Uprising is one of the most important anti-German resistance actions in Europe. Slovaks mobilized tens of thousands of men and tied down several German units for two months. However, due to failed preparations, the best equipped and prepared divisions in eastern Slovakia were surprised and disarmed by the Germans. This was a major failure of the uprising. For the first month, Slovak soldiers fought against only second-rate German units. Since the Germans realized that these were not sufficient to suppress the uprising, better units were ordered to deal with the situation. At this point, the Slovak situation worsened since the army lacked modern weapons, most of all air support and anti-tank guns. Also, the performance of several commanders in face of the enemy was poor. Commanders of the army

had to weaken better performing sectors to help the insecure ones and very soon run out of better equipped reserves and had to rely on units equipped mostly with rifles and machine guns. The lack of tanks, artillery, and air defence resulted in defeat at the end of October 1944.

In 1945, Slovakia again became part of the Czechoslovak republic. Pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship, signed by Czechoslovakia and the USSR in December 1943, the country was bound to close cooperation with the future hegemon of the region. The majority of Czechoslovak politicians considered the Soviet Union a guarantee that Germany would not threaten the country again as it did in 1938. Therefore, growing Soviet influence over the country was considered as less dangerous. Beneš and other politicians agreed to establish a system of limited competition between political parties (so-called National Front Coalition with no opposition parties allowed), agreed to nationalization of banks or heavy industry and, last but not least, to invite Soviet advisors to the army and to build up the army according to Soviet structures.

The general security strategy of Czechoslovakia after WWII was quite similar to that from the 1930s. It presumed that Germany would be able to reconstruct its capacities and there was a general fear from revanchism (even more because of the mass expulsion of the German minority after 1945) and militarism. In 1945, armed incidents occurred quite often on borders with Hungary and Poland, and therefore these borders were also considered to be under potential threat. Politicians and general staff officers at the same time presumed the return of the USA to its policy of isolationism and the further decline of French and

British influence. As a result, an alliance with the Soviet Union was considered the best course of action.

Since Communists were after the 1946 elections the strongest political party in the country, they focused on increasing their influence in the army (with the help of counterintelligence and political-educational apparatus of the army). Despite this fact, their efforts were less than effective, and they did not succeed in totally controlling the army.²⁷⁹ The coup in February 1948 changed the situation. Communists finally succeeded to take over power in the country. Czechoslovakia became an integral part of the Soviet bloc and started to prepare for a war between East and West. Leaders of the party decided that it is inevitable to change officers in important (and later in all) command positions of the army (since 1954 the Czechoslovak Peoples Army). As President Klement Gottwald said: “We won’t make communists out of generals but we intend to make generals out of communists.” Many formerly high-ranking officers were forced to retire and a substantial number of them were even imprisoned. Loyal cadres were promoted.²⁸⁰

With the arrival of Soviet instructors and advisors, the “Sovietization” of the Czechoslovak Army started. They first arrived in summer 1945 and within one year, there were dozens of them in the country. Before 1948, most of them taught in military schools. After the coup, Soviet advisers and experts became discontent with the

²⁷⁹ Alex Maskálík, “‘Sovietizácia’ pri výstavbe armádnych štruktúr čs. Armády” [„Sovietisation“ during the Rebuilding of the Structures of Czechoslovak Army], *Obrana* [Magazine Obrana] 5 (2016): 46.

²⁸⁰ Jan Štaigl and Michal Štefanský, *Vojenské dejiny Slovenska* [Military History of Slovakia], Vol. VI, 1945-1968 (Bratislava: Magnet Press Slovakia, 2007).

cooperation of Czechoslovak officials, especially from the Main Staff. This resulted in personal changes as well as a growing influence of the Soviet Union over the Czechoslovak Army (similarly in other areas of public life). After the escalation of tensions in the international relations during the Berlin crisis, Czechoslovakia decided to reorganize the army and speed up the transfer of its units to western borders of the country.

After 1949, Czechoslovakia requested additional advisors to army units, but the Soviets made this conditional with the resignation of Minister Ludvík Svoboda. After he left the post, several hundred Soviet advisors came within a short period of time and they worked at the ministry, Main Staff, and schools, as well as at commands of military districts, army corps, divisions, and battalions. Others worked at the defense industry facilities and elsewhere with a major task to supervise the massive build-up of Czechoslovak (People's) Army and its preparation for the expected war with the West. Pursuant to Soviet military doctrines, after the 1950 reorganization of the army, all tank and mechanized divisions were relocated to the western part of the country.

The massive build-up of the armed forces went along with the construction of defense industry facilities. At the turn of 1940s and 1950s, the army was equipped with a variety of arms and equipment: pre-war Czechoslovak and German (war trophies), as well as weapons produced during the war in the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA. To improve the situation, the Soviets provided the Czechoslovak Army with a large number of Soviet weapons and equipment in the early

1950s. At the same time, Czechoslovak leaders agreed to start massive investments in heavy industry, and especially defense industry facilities.

In the 1950s, Czechoslovak production of weapons (under Soviet licence) quadrupled and this led to a much faster pace of re-equipping of its own units as well as increased exports to other Warsaw Pact countries. The rearmament of the army was almost finished by the end of the 1950s. These investments meant a heavy burden for the economy of the country. When one looks at the role of Slovakia, the eastern part of the country was expected to become a rear area in the case of war and a large part of the defense industry was located here. These facilities were expected to produce weapons, ammunition, and other equipment under war conditions. Among the most important was the factory of J.V. Stalin (later Heavy Engineering Enterprise Martin), where at first T-34/85 tanks and SD 100 self-propelled artillery pieces were produced; its production later switched to T-54 tanks. Podpolianske Engineering Works specialized in the production of armored personal carriers, and facilities in Dubnica and Váhom mostly produced artillery weapons.

At the end of the 1950s, the Czechoslovak Peoples Army, as one of the Warsaw Pact's forces, copied the Soviet model of armed forces. It was a robust force with an oversized officer corps (almost 55,000 officers). At the same time, the Army suffered from massive recruitment of cadres who were not always able to meet high professional military standards. Admiration of, and confidence in and reliance on the USSR led to an uncritical application of Soviet experiences that were en bloc applied without any adjustments and this at the end had negative effects

on the fighting capabilities of the army. Officers also often lacked initiative and were frequently passive and ineffective leaders.

When talking about alliances, the Soviets at first considered the system of bilateral treaties with individual countries as satisfactory. In May 1955, European allies of the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in Warsaw. It laid a foundation for the establishment of a united command and specified contingents of individual countries (with the exception of the German Democratic Republic, or GDR). Participating countries explained the step only as a reaction to the rise of German militarism (in May 1955, the Federal Republic Germany joined NATO, against enormous Soviet diplomatic efforts). Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev expected that founding of the alliance would make it easier to put forward his plan to build a new security architecture in Europe following the dissolution of both pacts. Its leading body became the Political Consultative Committee, where political leaders of individual countries and commanders of Joint Armed Forces negotiated.²⁸¹

The role Czechoslovakia played in the alliance was given by the geographical setting of the country and its industrial capacities. Apart from arms producing facilities mentioned earlier, the Czechoslovak People's Army stood in the first line. In the case of NATO attack or in case Moscow decided on a preemptive attack, the two Czechoslovak armies with massive artillery and air force as well as with strong reserves and in coordination with the army of GDR were expected to

²⁸¹ Vojtech Mastný and Malcolm Byrne, *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005).

launch an attack with the help of Soviet tactical nuclear strikes. Since 1961, Czechoslovakia was expected to have a front within the organization of allied armed forces, and the Soviet Union provided the Czechoslovak People's Army missile sets capable of firing missiles with nuclear warheads. In 1955, it was agreed that in case of war, Czechoslovakia was to mobilize 850,000 men; the planned figure was later reduced to 600,000 soldiers and officers. Within the framework of the alliance, the rear and logistic position of Slovakia even deepened. This was related to the proposed neutrality of Austria and therefore even more investments into industrial facilities, communications, or other necessary facilities were made.

Fortunately, with the exception of engagement in the Korean War (Czechoslovakia provided a military hospital with staff to the North), the country was not involved in any coalition warfare and only participated in military exercises. The only exception was a passive involvement in August 1968, when the country was invaded by its allies. In January 1968, Alexander Dubček became the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The new leader had to face the criticism of the Soviet Union and other allied countries who disliked the democratization process.

Leaders of the USSR and its East European satellites criticized the Czechoslovak "counter-revolution." Shortly after the March 1968 meeting in Dresden, Soviet Defense Minister Andriy A. Grečko ordered to prepare a plan for the invasion. In July 1968, bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations took place in the east Slovak villages of Čierna and Tisou, and a few days later in Bratislava. A Declaration was signed there and the document included a sentence declaring it necessary to

support, protect, and strengthen socialist achievements if necessary with “joint international help.” It was most probably also in Bratislava where the infamous “invitation letter” was given to the Soviets by Communist conservatives. On 17 August 1968, leaders of countries involved in the invasion and responsible Warsaw Pact commanders met in Moscow and stated that armies were prepared. Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovskij was put in charge of the invading armies (operation codenamed “Dunaj”). The first occupation units entered Czechoslovak territory shortly before midnight of 20/21 August 1968.

Soviet and allied troops invaded Czechoslovakia from all directions. Until midnight paratroops and special units occupied Prague airport and allowed transport airplanes to unload large quantities of soldiers and equipment to be transferred by air. Early in the morning of 21 August 1968, Dubček and several other party and government officials were arrested and later on transported to the USSR. At about midnight, the western borders of the country were crossed by the Soviet 1st Guards Army that marched along the borders with West Germany. In the north, units of the Soviet 20th Guards Army marched to occupy northern part of the country, including the capitol. East German soldiers mostly acted as a reserve for the Soviet units. The northern border of the country was crossed by Polish Army units and the Soviet Northern Army Group, the latter occupying northern Bohemia and Moravia. They met the only resistance when members of the 7th Paratroop Battalion (part of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) refused to give up their weapons and the possibility to start guerilla resistance or even to prepare a surprise attack in Polish territory (where Dubček and

others were supposed to be detained) was discussed. Other Soviet troops marched into Slovak territory from Poland and from the Ukraine. Bulgarian units also advanced from the east. Southern Slovakia was invaded by Soviet Southern Army Group divisions in the direction Győr-Bratislava-Břeclav, and at the same time Hungarian troops entered Slovak territory at the Nové Zámky border crossing. Party and state leaders decided that the army should not resist. Therefore, for Czechoslovakia the only military engagement within the framework of the Warsaw Pact remained military exercises and permitting the occupation of its own country.²⁸²

In the 1960s, there were many discussions on changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and some suggestions of the “smaller” allies materialized from 1969 and some minor changes were adopted throughout the following twenty years. The Pact was finally dissolved after the fall of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990. For Slovak soldiers, being part of the Pact meant most of the time participation in military exercises. However, from the point of view of Czechoslovakia, the 1968 intervention dealt a fatal blow to the Pact and after the fall of the Communist regime it became unwanted and unneeded.

The post-Communist Czechoslovakia declared its ambition to join NATO. When the country split in 1993 and the Slovak Republic was established, new leaders declared the intention to join NATO. Slovakia became a member in 2004, but for historians it is still too soon to evaluate our experience.

²⁸² Jan Štaigl and Michal Štefanský, *Vojenské dejiny Slovenska* [Military History of Slovakia], Vol. VI, 1945-1968 (Bratislava: Magnet Press Slovakia 2007), 306-330.

Georgian Armed Forces in Contemporary Coalition Warfare

by

Lana Mamphoria

Abstract: *This paper examines Georgia's contribution to international missions, as part of coalition forces, to promote stability worldwide and bolster its position in international limelight as a participant in the global security system. Georgia's decision to fight a possible war alongside with Euro-Atlantic partners is seen as a strategic objective and cornerstone of foreign policy to balance Russia's influence in the region and enhance the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. This paper highlights the benefits that Georgia receives from coalition partnership and how it promotes defense transformation process and institutional reforms.*

Introduction

The reasons for forming alliances and conducting coalition warfare have differed from time to time. Over the centuries, coalitions tended to be short-termed, only for the duration of a single war and even disbanded during it or when *raison d'état* suggested. The contemporary approach of coalition warfare means wars fought by ad hoc multinational forces that are formed to undertake a specific mission to promote security of individual states and deter the probability of war.

Coalition building with its multilateral efforts has assumed enormous significance in the past decades. The dangers from terrorism and other trans-national crimes have been the prompters of states' decisions to join contemporary multinational coalitions and respond together to global security challenges. Hence, since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased willingness of countries to engage in coalition operations for peacekeeping or peace enforcement reasons in order to resolve different regional conflicts and bolster international security. The majority of coalition operations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been mandated by the UN and conducted by an alliance or a great power. This has boosted international political legitimacy of the operations and eased the states' burden sharing of fighting.

In the meantime, contemporary coalition warfare has brought about a plethora of novel hitches and challenges, as the allies and partners are bringing their own sovereign perspective to the fight. There are no commonly accepted and everlasting doctrines for coalition warfare that challenges the multinational military collaboration and makes it difficult to manage the differences in rules of engagement. Besides, the fighting effectiveness of multinational forces requires a clear chain of command, decision making, interoperability, equitable burden sharing, human resources, and the establishment of liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and so on.

Considering the aforementioned, the decision to join coalition or alliances, particularly for small states, depends on the judgment that the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs. Against the backdrop of

globalization where internal and external threats to a nation are hard to separate, Georgia's national interests are intertwined with the effort of ensuring global and regional security. Georgia has been participating in peacekeeping missions since 1999, when the first Georgian servicemen joined NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) to support international humanitarian efforts and establish a secure environment in Kosovo. Later, Georgia participated in Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I, 2003-2008), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2004-2014) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2004-present) in Afghanistan. In total, approximately 28,000 Georgian soldiers, a significant number for a small country like Georgia, have participated in coalition operations. As a coalition partner, Georgia received unique combat experience and proved that it is a significant participant in the global security system.

Georgian Armed Forces (GAF): Coalition Partner in International Missions

The first international mission in which Georgian troops participated was in Kosovo Force (KFOR), from 1999 to 2008, where Georgia provided company-sized units as part of the German brigade and an infantry platoon within a Turkish battalion task force.²⁸³The first

²⁸³ NATO-led international peace support operation Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established in June 1999. The mission derived its mandate from UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Serbia. The aim of KFOR was to deter hostilities and establish secure environment in belligerent countries, especially in Kosovo.

Georgian contingent, consisting of thirty-four soldiers attached to the Turkish battalion, served in the village of Mamusha in 1999. Later, since 2003, one Georgian company of 150 soldiers served in the German brigade in the city of Prizren. In October 2005, the 31st Light Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade (129 soldiers) joined this contingent. Before being sent to Kosovo, Georgian units took special training courses in Germany. The courses included patrolling, firearms training, map reading and land navigation, first aid, and similar subjects. In April 2008, the Georgian peacekeeping contingent departed Kosovo.²⁸⁴ In total, 2,225 soldiers participated in the mission with 17 rotations of platoon- and 11 rotations of company-sized units.

Participation in KFOR set the precedent of GAF engagement in international missions. However, while the contingent was small with a limited mission, it showed Moscow that Georgia can determine its foreign policy, fulfill international obligations, and can balance Russia's meddling in Georgia. It signaled to Western powers that Georgia was determined to strengthen Euro-Atlantic ties. Consequently, Georgia's decision to join KFOR and the keen interest of the USA and other alliance countries toward the region were seen by the Kremlin as evidence of NATO's intention to extend its southern flank and attempt to diminish Russia's control over post-Soviet countries.

As a consequence of engagement in Kosovo, Georgian troops participated in NATO-sponsored military exercises and Georgia hosted a major Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise in 2001 as a sign of Georgia's

²⁸⁴ Elene Gogsadze, *Georgia in International Peacekeeping Missions*, trans. Goga Askurava (Tbilisi: Information Center on NATO and EU, 2014), 8-9.

Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Meanwhile, some NATO member countries, especially the USA, United Kingdom, and Turkey began active financial and equipment support to the armed forces and border guards of Georgia. Additionally, under the U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, the (GAF) was permitted to participate in U.S. military training and educational programs.²⁸⁵ While the GAF at that period required significant restructuring, Georgia's participation in NATO and U.S.-sponsored military exercises and training significantly increased Georgian defense readiness interoperability with NATO standards.

In August 2003, several months after coalition forces entered Iraq, a Georgian military contingent joined the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)²⁸⁶ as part of the United States-led coalition. By 2008, Georgia had deployed 2,200 troops in Iraq and became the third largest contributor among the coalition forces after the USA and the United Kingdom. Additionally, Georgia provided a battalion of approximately 550 troops to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which was stationed in Baghdad.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Chufrin Genady, ed., *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region* (Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2001), 93-97.

²⁸⁶ MNF-I was coalition forces led by the U.S. since 2003. The status of the multinational forces was determined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1546. The objectives of MNF-I under unified command was to "contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting the territory of Iraq" (UN. Res. 1546). More than thirty countries contributed to the multinational forces in Iraq. The biggest contributor was the USA, followed by the UK, Italy, and Poland. In 2010, the name of the mission was changed to U.S. Forces-Iraq. As of May 2011, coalition military forces withdrew from Iraq.

²⁸⁷ Gogsadze, *Georgia in International Peacekeeping Missions*, 9-11.

Georgia's initial deployment was a 70-soldiers platoon of engineers and a medical team to the city of Tikrit. In 2004, the number of Georgian servicemen among the coalition forces increased to 555 and peaked at 2,200 soldiers in mid-2008.²⁸⁸ At first GAF elements were stationed in Baghdad and later they were deployed along the border with Iran, with the main base at Al-kut (province of Wasit). The Georgian contingent, which worked primarily within the U.S. area of operation, was tasked to prevent smuggling of weapons, goods, and drugs.²⁸⁹

In total, 8,495 Georgian soldiers served in Iraq during nineteen contingent rotations.²⁹⁰ The largest contingents deployed were the 3rd Infantry Brigade (July 2007-January 2008) and the 1st Infantry Brigade (January-August 2008) in the city of Al-kut. The decision to double the military contingent was made by the President of Georgia with the consent of the Parliament in 2007.²⁹¹ By the summer of 2007, the Georgian brigade controlled the entire province of Wasit and had the critical mission to prevent the smuggling of weapons from Iran to Shiite militia groups. In 2008, when fighting between Georgian troops and Russia in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region took place, the national government announced the redeployment of 1,000 troops to Georgia, but the remaining forces were later recalled and Georgia ended its mission in Iraq.

²⁸⁸ Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars* (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 480-801.

²⁸⁹ Stephen A. Carney, *Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), 62-65.

²⁹⁰ Tucker, *Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars*, 481.

²⁹¹ "Iraq: As Third Largest Contingent, Georgia Hopes to Show it off," Radio Free Europe, modified: 10 September 2007, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1078614.html>, accessed 12 September 2018.

Despite the fact that Georgian military contingents were engaged in KFOR and MNF-I, in August 2004, Georgia joined the war in Afghanistan, as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)²⁹² to secure an Interim Administration of Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda. During an initial phase, a reinforced 50-soldier infantry platoon tasked to secure the presidential election in Kabul as part of the German contingent. In 2010, 31st Infantry Battalion, 3rd Infantry Brigade, Georgian Armed Forces was sent to Helmand and conducted operations under the command of the U.S. Marine Corps. Later, they were replaced with 32nd and 33rd Battalions of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

In 2011-2012, Georgian artillerymen performed their mission as part of the French contingent in the province of Kandahar. At various times, Georgia also deployed an infantry company serving with the French contingent in Kabul, medical personnel within the former Lithuanian Provincial Reconstruction Team, and individual staff/liaison officers at the Regional Command in Kabul.²⁹³ As of May 2013, Georgia became the largest non-NATO and the largest per-capita troop contributor to ISAF with over 1,560 personnel on the ground. At its peak deployment, Georgia provided two full infantry battalions serving with United States forces in Helmand Province. Since the beginning of their

²⁹² In December 2001, UN Security Council Resolution #1386 mandated the creation of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support Afghanistan's interim government, deter terrorism, and provide effective security across the country. NATO took the lead of ISAF in August 2003, and it was the largest coalition in history of NATO with more than 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations. From 2011, responsibility for security was gradually transitioned to Afghan forces, with the ISAF mission officially completed in 2014.

²⁹³ Gogsadze, *Georgia in International Peacekeeping Missions*, 13-17

mission, about 17,000 Georgian soldiers have served in Afghanistan during 84 troop rotations.

In 2014, when NATO made its decision to end its participation in the ISAF mission, the Government of Georgia declared its readiness to contribute to the new NATO-led non-combat assistance Resolute Support Mission (RSM).²⁹⁴ As of May 2016, Georgia became the third largest contributor, after the United States and Germany, to the RSM with 861 troops on the ground, deployed in Kabul at the Bagram Air Field and Camp Marmal in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Political Context and Public Support

The deployment process coincided with the challenging period for Georgia when the country was facing a range of internal and external threats, including the August War in 2008. Despite the fact that Georgia regained its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's military, economic, and political presence remained high in the 1990s. In the context of Russia's strategy – not to lose control over post-Soviet countries – the Kremlin insisted to safeguard its position by maintaining a military presence in Georgia with an estimated 15,000 Russian troops.²⁹⁵ It should be underlined that when the Government of

²⁹⁴ Following the completion of the ISAF mission in 2014, the follow-on NATO-led mission Resolute Support was launched on January 2015. The mission is concentrated on training, advice, and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, the decision was made to extend the mission until conditions are appropriate. Currently, over 16,000 personnel from 39 NATO and partner states are deployed in support of RSM.

²⁹⁵ Since 1992, Russia continued its military presence in Georgia. Under the agreement signed in 1995, Russia was allowed to retain four bases: at Vaziani (near Tbilisi);

Georgia decided to deploy troops in international missions, the country had begun historic negotiations with Russia regarding withdrawal of its military bases.

The milestone event was on 17 November 1999, when participant countries at the OSCE Istanbul Summit made the joint declaration (part of the adapted Conventional Armed Forces Europe [CFE] treaty), about launching negotiations about withdrawing Russian military troops from Georgia. This U.S.-backed achievement represented the first move toward Georgia establishing international credibility. Throughout the 1990s, U.S.-Georgia relations were informal with limited cooperation, but the OSCE Summit and the U.S. position to pressure the Russians about military bases appeared to be a turning point in the countries' bilateral relations. The U.S. and other NATO states' inspectors demonstrated steadfast support to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity during the withdrawal of Russian weapons from Georgia.

During this period, the President of Georgia was Eduard Shevardnadze,²⁹⁶ known for his pro-Russian sentiments. Despite his affiliations with Russia in the last years of his tenure, Shevardnadze laid

Gudauta (in the breakaway republic of Abkhazia); Batumi (in the Ajarian Autonomous Republic); and Akhalkalaki (in South Georgia's Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti region). However, while the agreement was never ratified by the Georgian Parliament, the Russian military bases remained in Georgian territories. Although the bases had little military value, Moscow regarded them as a source of leverage over Tbilisi.

²⁹⁶ Eduard Shevardnadze, former president of Georgia (1992-2003), served as a First Secretary of Georgian Communist Party (1972-1985) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (1985-1991). Shevardnadze was involved in many key decisions of Soviet diplomacy, including the reunification of Germany. He was the second president of Georgia for two terms and was forced to retire as a consequence of the "Rose Revolution."

the groundwork for a further evolution of U.S.-Georgia and NATO-Georgia relations that occurred in the following years. The U.S. backed reformist young leaders in the Shevardnadze Government, who later conducted the “Rose Revolution” with the leadership of former president Mikheil Saakashvili. By the time of Saakashvili, strengthening the Euro-Atlantic ties and becoming part of Europe was a centerpiece of the political agenda. Within months of Saakashvili’s 2004 election, Georgia doubled its contingent in Iraq and made the decision to extend the U.S. military program to train additional Georgian soldiers. Saakashvili continued to increase the Georgian contingent in Iraq until it became the third largest contributor in 2008. At the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008, the Saakashvili Government had high expectations of receiving the Membership Action Plan (MAP), but the alliance decided not to offer Georgia MAP due to opposition from several member states. The achievement was the wording inscribed in the Bucharest Summit declaration where NATO members promised that Georgia would eventually join the alliance. In 2008, Georgia’s August War with Russia prompted the withdrawal of all Georgian troops from Iraq.

In several months, President Saakashvili shifted forces away from Iraq to the NATO-led ISAF mission that marked the beginning of a new phase of GAF deployments. Georgian soldiers were sent to what appeared the most dangerous region of Afghanistan, Helmand, where casualties increased. In Iraq, the loss was three soldiers, while in Afghanistan the number increased to 32 killed and more than 400 wounded. Despite the losses, President Saakashvili was persistent in his

decision by focusing on the issue that deployment was pivotal to Georgia's credibility as an international actor.

After the August War and in the context of increasing casualties in Afghanistan, Georgian troop deployment has been the subject of heated debates with opponents and proponents, especially after Georgia maintained large number of troops while most of European countries have been decreasing their manpower contributions. The opponents argued that a small country, like Georgia, that has territorial disputes and is under direct threat of renewing hostilities should not send a large number of troops outside the country's territory. Opposition parties also highlighted that on-the-ground experience of counter-terrorism operations gained in international missions was irrelevant to address the domestic security threats. The debates about the withdrawal of Georgian troops became fierce in 2013 when Georgia lost nine servicemen in Helmand province. The Georgian Labor Party even initiated the referendum about the withdrawal of forces in Election Administration of Georgia (CEC), but after consultations, CEC concluded that there was no need of a referendum. Despite opposition parties' arguments, there had not been harsh protests from society or a public outcry. The reason is that the deployment has been perceived to be related to the political process as a pivot for the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations and to receive further security guarantees. As the decision of increasing deployments in international missions was one of the top priorities of former President Saakashvili, the opposition often criticized that it was his personal initiative. However, the fact that after the successful transition of power, the current government maintained the

high number of troops in Afghanistan, suggests that “on the whole, the decision was more strategic than personal.”²⁹⁷

Benefits of Coalition Partnership for Georgia

Coalition partnership benefited Georgia from foreign security assistance programs, mainly with the U.S. and NATO countries that served to enhance GAF’s readiness in multinational operations and at the same time increase the capacity to respond to domestic security challenges. The first training programs conducted in Georgia were initiated by the U.S.: the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP 2002-2004) and Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP 2005-2009), that were a catalyst for transforming the Georgian Army from its Soviet model into a fighting force with NATO standards. The training effort was intended to prepare Georgian troops to fight alongside allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia and Russian-backed secessionist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region portrayed the training as a serious menace and a precondition to a U.S.-backed invasion of occupied territories.²⁹⁸ It was

²⁹⁷ Mccarrel Ryan, *Strategic Deployment of Georgia’s Expeditionary Forces* (Tbilisi, Georgia: Georgian Foundation for Strategic Studies and International Relations, 2015).

²⁹⁸ Armed conflict in Abkhazia (1992-1993) and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (1991-1992) broke out after the dissolution of the USSR and Georgia’s declaration of independence. Political disputes concerning the question of self-government, territorial control, and political participation led to nationalist mobilizations and separatist movements that ended with Russia-backed armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in the early 1990s. With Russia’s military support, separatists established de-facto states and expelled approximately 300,000 civilians of Georgian origin from their homes who are still prohibited to return to their places of origin. In 2008, Russia formally recognized the independence of breakaway states,

evident to the Kremlin that the battalion-level training could not be a threat to Russian security, but as Russia vehemently opposes any expansion of NATO to its borders, those activities were seen as a launching pad for boosting military relations with the U.S. and NATO.

On 29 April 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the beginning of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), the first enhanced military-to-military cooperation between U.S. and Georgia. This Program implemented President George W. Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the threat posed by Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge.²⁹⁹ Beside its counter-terrorism mission, GTEP was designed to assist GAF in military reform, increase its defense capabilities, and further underscore U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.³⁰⁰ Initially, the GTEP was conducted by members of the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). After nine months, the responsibility for training Georgian forces was transferred to the U.S. Marine Forces

followed by Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The international community does not recognize de-facto states and supports Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

²⁹⁹ Pankisi Gorge has been populated by Georgians, and Muslim minorities of the North Caucasus origin, mostly ethnic Vainakhs, locally known as Kists. During the Second Chechen War (1999), there was an influx of Chechen refugees that fled from Russian government repression. By the early 2000s, Chechen irregulars attempted to use Pankisi as a staging area for fighting with Russia, but the real threat was not the Chechens themselves but the Kremlin's accusations that Georgia was sheltering "terrorists." The Government of Georgia has always attempted to hold the situation under control to prevent the deterioration of the region's security. In the early 2000s, the situation was manipulated by Russia to justify its unlawful penetration into Georgia's territory to launch strikes.

³⁰⁰ Zachary Selden, *Alignment, Alliance, and American Grand Strategy* (N.p.: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 111-117.

Europe (MARFOREUR). As a result of the GTEP, the Georgian military significantly increased its capability to execute combined operations in a multinational environment and enhanced its ability to defeat transnational terrorists' cells. During the GTEP, approximately 2,600 Georgian soldiers, including a headquarters staff element and five tactical units, received training.

The Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP) was launched in January 2005 to help solidify the progress made during the GTEP and continue to assist in the implementation of western standards in the GAF. This program was designed to create an increased capability in the Georgian military to support coalition forces in Iraq. The GSSOP evolved into a 5-phased initiative that on average consisted of about 70 U.S. soldiers training 600-man GAF battalions. GSSOP was designed initially to train two infantry battalions for peacekeeping missions in Iraq; two logistics battalions; specialized units for the Georgian 1st Brigade; staff training for the 1st and 2nd Georgian Brigades; the Land Forces Command Staff; and the Operations Cell of the Georgian General Staff.³⁰¹ The training was conducted, primarily at the Krtsanisi National Training Center³⁰² near Tbilisi, by SOCEUR and MARFOREUR. The training concentrated on ground combat skills and tactics, including marksmanship, first aid, urban drills, and search

³⁰¹ "Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operation Program," [global security.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/gssop.htm](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/gssop.htm), accessed 19 September 2018;

³⁰² The Krtsanisi National Training Center is a major training military facility for the GAF where U.S. instructors have been training Georgian troops. In August 2015, the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) was opened on Krtsanisi National Training Center and is designed for training not only Georgian, but also NATO and partner nations' troops. It hosts joint military exercises for troops from Georgia, NATO, the U.S., and partner nations.

techniques. It also included training the reconnaissance, engineer, and signal companies, as well as training and equipping the military staffs and logistics battalions of both brigades. Four brigades were trained under GTEP and GSSOP.

After Georgia declared its readiness to engage in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan, the U.S. initiated other special training programs prepare the Georgian unit for the deployment in Afghanistan. The responsibility of training programs: Georgia Deployment Program – International Security Assistance Force (GDP-ISAF, 2009-2014) and then Georgia Deployment Program – Resolute Support Mission (GDP-RSM, 2009-present) was given to MARFOREUR. The objective of GDP-ISAF program was to prepare Georgian Units for the deployment to southern Afghanistan in support of counterinsurgency operations. The training was designed to support at all levels, from basic first aid to the more advanced, battalion staff-level planning processes, and culminating with a Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany.³⁰³

Against the backdrop of launching new NATO-led mission Resolute Support, originally planned as a two-year engagement of GDP-ISAF, was extended as the Georgia Deployment Program – Resolute Support Mission (GDP-RSM). GDP-RSM is the current training and deployment program where Georgia has been contributing about 861 troops to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. The aim of GDP-

³⁰³ “Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia,” Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53985/pdf/CPRT-111SPRT53985.pdf>

RSM is to prepare Georgian infantry battalions to contribute troops to NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is responsible of training GAF serviceman for six months at Krtsanisi Training Area, before being assessed during the Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany.³⁰⁴ U.S. pre-deployment training involves variety of technical aspects, force protection techniques, and foreign weapons familiarization, as well as cultural aspects and additional topics.

Conclusion

Why did Georgia, a small state with four million inhabitants, became one of the largest per capita contributors among coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan? To answer this question it is important to contextualize the subject by analyzing the political and historic context of the relevant period.

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and regaining independence, Georgia embraced western values of liberal democracy. Against the backdrop of Russia's policy to exert influence over post-Soviet countries and due to the lack of strong democratic institutions, Georgia found it difficult to develop any viable foreign and security policy. In this context, active cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community had strategic importance for the further development of the

³⁰⁴ Cpl. Dallas Johnson, "6thAnglico Marines and Georgian Soldiers Prepare for Deployment in Support of Operation Freedom's Sentinel," modified 21 August 2017, [marines.mil,http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1283989/6th-anglico-marines-and-georgian-soldiers-prepare-for-deployment-in-support-of/](http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1283989/6th-anglico-marines-and-georgian-soldiers-prepare-for-deployment-in-support-of/) accessed 19 September 2018.

country and for the realization of the vital strategy of Georgia's security: balancing Russia's power. The decision of Georgia to fight coalition wars alongside Euro-Atlantic countries was undertaken in conjunction with the foreign policy goals and represented the first symbolic step of progressive security reforms. Georgians were accustomed to Soviet-style military management, a very centralized, politicized type of organization where commissioned officers gave very little leadership responsibility to enlisted soldiers. The on-the-ground experience that the GAF gained by working and fighting alongside NATO members in coalition operations and training programs were new and crucial for the modernization of the GAF. This represents how small unit training programs operating at the tactical level could produce strategic results for the country.

As a coalition partner in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan and other international missions, the Georgian Armed Forces benefited through participation in foreign security assistance programs, support in institutional reforms, joint international military exercises, training, etc., that also contributed to the development of the country's military capacities. Moreover, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation prompted the GAF's transformation process and Georgia is still actively pursuing defense system institutional building and modernization through existing cooperation mechanisms with NATO and other partner countries. Moreover, at the strategic level, participation in international missions was considered a valuable step toward securing Georgia's NATO membership. Indeed, it is not sufficient factor for Georgia's eventual membership but coalition partnership has significantly

promoted GAF compliance with NATO standards and enhanced partnership with the alliance. By participation in coalition warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, Georgia was put in the international limelight and has burnished its position not only as a strategic ally but also as a reform-minded and democratic one.

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Polish Armed Forces in NATO Multinational Operations: Strategic Threats or Chances?

by

Dariusz Kozerawski

ABSTRACT: *The paper presents the phenomenon of Polish Military Contingents' participation in NATO peace and stabilization operations. Poland was the first Eastern Bloc country which sent military contingents to UN peace operations (first in 1973, UNEF II). The problem of the international political aspects of Polish participation (impact of global strategic players) and close cooperation with foreign partners (NATO, American military contingents) are based on unique results of archival research conducted by the author. Moreover, the article also presents the role and tasks of Polish Military Contingents' participation in peace and stabilization operations in regard to strategic threats and chances of Polish security policy. This paper is based on unpublished archival documents and unique field research conducted in zones of NATO multinational operations, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.*

Introduction

The outbreak and escalation of armed conflicts are often associated with activities undertaken to stop them, or aimed at counteracting

their continuation, and the reduction of the effects of hostilities (mainly in political, military, economic, and social aspects). The second half of the twentieth century, through the process of maintaining international security, the United Nations conducted peace operations³⁰⁵ to limit or prevent the escalation of local and regional armed conflicts and to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population.

Polish Armed Forces contingents were first involved in peace operations under the United Nations (UN) auspices when the Polish Special Forces Unit participated in the Second United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt³⁰⁶ (UNEF II) in 1973. Prior to that period, Polish diplomats and the Ministry of Defense of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) gained substantial experience regarding the participation of Polish military-civilian personnel in international observer missions.³⁰⁷ The issue of a compact military contingent in the UN peacekeeping operation was a completely new kind of challenge that the Polish authorities were to face. It should be noted that the next operations in which Polish military contingents participated were the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) missions in

³⁰⁵ A peacekeeping operation is defined as a set of activities undertaken by entities of international relations in order to prevent, interrupt, mitigate, limit, or extinguish armed conflicts of an interstate (international) or internal nature through the intervention of peacekeepers with the mandate of an international organization to restore and maintain peace in the crisis situation, Dariusz S. Kozerański, *Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973-1999. Konflikty-interwencje-bezpieczeństwo* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo A. Marszałek, 2012), 42.

³⁰⁶ 18.91.1169, The Information from New York on Logs Units, 23 November 1973, c. 314; Ibid., 18.91.1264, urgent note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 1974, p. 4, AIMOD (Archive Institution of Ministry of Defense), located in Modlin.

³⁰⁷ In the supervisory and control committees in Korea, Indochina and the International Observer Group in Nigeria.

Syria³⁰⁸ since 1974 and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia since 1989.³⁰⁹

During the so-called “Cold War,” Poland was the first and for a long time the only state of the Eastern bloc to frequently and actively participate in international peacekeeping operations and military observer missions. The experience gained and the level of mandated tasks performed positively influenced the image of the PPR as a country significantly involved in the process of strengthening peace and international security, despite the lack of independence in conducting its own foreign and security policy.

Polish Armed Forces contingents in the 1990s began to take part in peace and stabilization operations³¹⁰ in the Balkans led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the auspices of the United

³⁰⁸ 18.91.2275, UNEF Manual of the Operating Rules in Force, [1974], c. 69, AIMOD; 18.91.1610, Report on the Performance of Works Commissioned on the Basis of the Inspection Guidelines of the Operational Group of the Camp of the Separated Group in Syria, 26/05/1976, c. 70, AIMOD; and Ibid., 18.91.1610, Operational Report of the PWJS Operational Team for the Period 17/11/12/1976, c. 134, AIMOD,

³⁰⁹ Order of the Minister of National Defense No. Pf 6, 2 March 1989; Order of the Chief of the General Staff of Polish Armed Forces No. Pf 25, 2 March 1989; Etat PWJL No. 02/123; The Ordinance of the Chief Quartermaster of PAF No. Pf 8, 8 March 1989; Guidelines of the Chief of the Main Educational Board of PAF No. Pf 3, 8 March 1989; Guidelines of the Chief of the Department of Finance of the Ministry of National Defense, 13 March 1989; Guidelines of the Chief of the Health Service - Deputy Chief Quartermaster of the Polish Army from 6 March 1989; The Ordinance of the ŚWI Quartermaster No. 12, 10 March 1989; PWJL Interim Range of Activities at the UN GPP in Namibia, 5 April 1989, AIMON; and 10.94.95.91, Report on the Activities of the Polish Military Logistics Unit for the period 17 April 1989 to 15 October 1989, 1.

³¹⁰ The concept of operations / stabilization activities is understood as activities using components of armed forces and/or police, taken by international organizations or coalitions of states (not always with the support/mandate of international community) to maintain or restore peace and overthrow the authorities who do not respect the principles of human rights in the region operation (conflict). Dariusz S. Kozerański, ed., *Działania stabilizacyjne -- aspekty strategiczne. Konflikty, interwencje, bezpieczeństwo*. (Warsaw: National Defence University Press, 2011), 7.

Nations (IFOR, Implementation Force; SFOR, Stabilization Force; and KFOR, Kosovo Force), and then in Afghanistan and Iraq led by NATO (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) or coalitions of states (Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq).³¹¹

The definition of the term coalition operation/actions is of crucial importance here, understood as activities involving the use of components of the armed forces undertaken by a group of states to jointly conduct war, military operations against another state or group of states in order to obtain the desired political, economic and social benefits.

The main types of activity of the United Nations during this time were the observer missions under its auspices and operations using UN military contingents. Relying on the NATO typology, international operations are led in order to: prevent conflicts; create, maintain, and enforce peace; and provide humanitarian aid.

Polish Military Contingent Tasks in International Operations

Since 1951, there has been an evolution of tasks performed by the Polish Armed Forces in peace and then in stabilization operations. In the 20th century, Polish Armed Forces soldiers conducted observer

³¹¹ Dariusz Stanisław Kozerawski, "Irregular Warfare as a Primary Threat to Multinational Stabilization Forces in Afghanistan (2002-2011)," in *Regular and Irregular Warfare: Experiences of History and Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, ed. Harold E. Raugh, Jr. (Belgrade: Institute for Strategic Research, 2012), 167-178; Dariusz Stanisław Kozerawski, *Międzynarodowe działania stabilizacyjne w świetle doświadczeń X zmiany PKW Irak w 2008 roku* (Warsaw: National Defence University Press, 2010).

(1953-1973); logistics and observer (1973-1992); and operational, logistics, and observer missions (1992-2003). From 2003-2018, Polish soldiers conducted combat and training missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Political and economic reforms initiated in 1989 in Poland were also associated with specific activities aimed at an integration with Western security structures. The fully-independent foreign policy of the Republic of Poland (RP) has evolved, among others, into:

- Participation of contingents of Polish Armed Forces in international operations in the Persian Gulf and Haiti conducted under the leadership of the United States (1991-1994);
- Accession and active participation in the "Partnership for Peace" program;
- Participation in international peace support operations in the Balkans (FIFG, SFOR, AFOR, KFOR) conducted under NATO and UN auspices (1995-1999).

The aforementioned examples provide practical confirmation of the efforts of Polish authorities to integrate with the transatlantic collective security system, and were crowned on 12 March 1999 by the accession of the Republic of Poland to the North Atlantic Pact.

In the period preceding Polish accession to NATO, Polish Armed Forces units performed mainly operational tasks under IFOR (1995-1996), SFOR (since 1996), KFOR (from 1999), and logistics under AFOR (1999).

Another important stage of Poland's involvement in international operations conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance includes:

- Operations as part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (2007-2014);
- Training as part of the NTMI operation in Iraq;
- Airspace control of the Baltic states as part of the Baltic Air Policing operation (2006-2018 - rotational share);
- Training as part of Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan (2014-2018).

It should be added that Polish soldiers also participated in the implementation of tasks by the North-East Corps (whose staff is stationed at Szczecin, Poland), and creating the command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. In addition, groups of Polish officers actively carried out training tasks under the NATO program called DEEP, inter alia, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Currently, in 2018, Poland participates in two operations of the North Atlantic Alliance: "Resolute Support" in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo; two European Union operations (EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic); as well as in two coalition operations led by the United States (in Kuwait and Iraq). In addition, Polish military contingents serve as part of NATO's eastern flank support operation in Latvia (with the main contingent consisting of the PT-91 Twardy tank company, which is part of the multinational NATO battalion), Polish Military Contingent "Orlik 7," with rotational participation and in Romania (approx. 200 soldiers of the 17th

Mechanized Brigade from Międzyrzecze).³¹² In addition, in 2017, Polish soldiers commanded the Permanent Defense Team Group NATO 2.³¹³ In turn, in 2017, upon the request of the NATO, Poland undertook the role of lead nation that coordinates the mission of training and capacity building in Iraq, NATO Training and Capacity Building Iraq (NTCB-I). Its main task is to train specialists who in the future will repair and maintain post-Soviet armored equipment, whose large stocks are located in the Euphrates and Tigris River areas. Other countries from the region, including Slovakia and Bulgaria, also participate in the operation.

Strategic Threats

The performance of tasks by the contingents of Polish Armed Forces in NATO peace and stabilization operations may limit a number of strategic threats, namely:

- Discrepancies in the perception of security policy priorities among NATO member states in the national and International dimension, resulting from different particular interests of individual strategic players (e.g. in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia);
- Clash of the Alliance's ambitions/interests with the real opportunities/ capabilities (political, economic, military) of other member states. One example of this phenomena may be economic and

³¹² The nature of operations in Latvia and Romania is also changing, where the Poles do not carry out stabilization or training tasks, but are ready to undertake combat operations in the event of a crisis and war, and participate in training on a daily basis.

³¹³ SNMCMG2: Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2.

social activities of the United States, Germany, and France in Afghanistan during the ISAF operation, related to the implementation of their own national interests;

- Differences in the level of military capabilities of individual member states of the Alliance associated with lowering the real degree of interoperability, resulting from the fact that there is no direct involvement of national ties of parts of allied countries into joint multinational operations;

- Reactivation of long-term or escalation of existing armed conflicts on a religious, national-ethnic, political, economic, etc., basis. An example showing this may be the escalation of armed conflict in Afghanistan after the end the ISAF operation and the withdrawal of most operational forces;

- Problems in formulating the priorities of the security policy of the border states of the alliance resulting from excessive involvement in NATO's international operations. An example was the discussion on the selection of strategic directions of developing the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces. In the first decade of the 21st century, priority was focused on expeditionary capabilities related to the participation of tens of thousands of WP contingents in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and from the middle of the second decade the authorities of Poland prefer to develop defensive capabilities to increase the defense effectiveness of the collective alliance;

- Extreme attitudes of excessive passivity or activity of political elites of individual member states (political, economic, military

dimension) in the process of involvement in NATO's multinational operations;

- Involvement of a member state in operations with the use of military components (in the short- and medium-term strategic perspective) without specifying/including their realistic final effects not only in the military, but above all on political, social, and economic factors (e.g. ISAF);

- Too simple and fast decision-making procedures involving the armed forces of individual allied states in multinational operations of a typically militant character, which would later determine a significant decline in public support for the activities carried out in the area of the conflict;

- Significant differences in the level of financing national military capabilities of individual member states of the alliance. Only 5 of the 28 NATO member states allocate 2 per cent or more of their GDP for defense purposes, which has negative consequences in the process of building joint defense capabilities and in responding to emerging crisis situations in the international security environment.

Strategic Chances

The significant involvement of NATO member states (including Poland) in conducting peace and stabilization operations also creates strategic opportunities, including:

- Poland's active participation in the process of stabilizing the situation in various regions and countries (e.g. the Balkans);

- Real increase in the level of security of the state and eastern flank of NATO, through the presence of alliance troops in Poland, allied exercises, the purchase of new weapon systems, technology transfer, and the exchange of information;
- Transformation of the Polish Armed Forces, allowing for the real development of military capabilities in the national dimension;
- Development of the state's training and defense infrastructure, which has a positive impact on the level of trained personnel and increasing the number and quality of objects used in the defense system of the state and the alliance;
- Distribution of multinational structures related to NATO on Polish territory, allowing for the improvement in the level of interoperability of allied operations (e.g. MNC NE, 1999; JFTC, 2004; 3NSB, 2010, and MP COE, 2013);
- Coordination of allied exercises in Poland, illustrated by conducting the multinational "Anaconda" exercises every year in Poland, in which about 30,000 soldiers from member states took part in 2017;
- Joint forces initiatives (since 2012, maintenance and development of interoperability of allied forces after the ISAF operation in 2014);
- Enhancing the airborne recognition capabilities of individual member states through access to AWACS and AGS systems (early warning during allied military operations, against potential terrorist threats, to securing airspace during large-scale mass events and other important events);

- The development of particular types of troops, exemplified by Polish Special Forces and the Special Operations Center in Krakow, which has been certified to command special forces of NATO countries;
- Improving the level of interoperability of the Polish Army with other member states of the Alliance through joint implementation of tasks during international operations (e.g. peace/stabilization), exercises, and service on multinational staffs;
- Development of political and military cooperation in the Central and Eastern Europe region as part of joint initiatives and projects (e.g. Visegrad Group - V4, BAL TIC AIR POLICING, MNC NE, JFTC, 3NSB, MP COE).

Conclusions

The participation of Polish Armed Forces soldiers and contingents since 1999 as part of multinational peace and stabilization operations has supported the performance of such projects, including: continuation of previous operational tasks (SFOR and KFOR); combat operations as an element of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (2007-2014); training of local security forces (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo); protection of the air borders of allied countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia); and support for the protection of the eastern flank of the alliance (Romania).

The ability of Polish military elements was limited by a number of strategic threats, such as discrepancies in the perception of security policy priorities among NATO member states; significant differences in

the level of real military capabilities of individual member states of the Alliance; reactivation of long-term or escalation of existing armed conflicts; excessive passivity or activity of ruling elites in the process of involvement in NATO's multinational operations; invoking the member state caveat without specifying or taking into account the realistic final effect of a given operation not only in a military dimension, but above all in political, social, and economic terms; and differences in the level of financing the national military capabilities of individual member states of the alliance.

Poland's participation in NATO operations was also associated with taking advantage of emerging strategic opportunities such as: building a positive image of the state by stabilizing the situation in various regions and countries (e.g. in the Balkans); a real increase in the level of security of the state and the eastern flank of NATO; development of the state's training and defense infrastructure; the deployment of multinational structures affiliated with NATO on Polish territory; co-organization of allied exercises in Poland; increasing the ability to recognize from the air through access to AWACS and AGS systems; development of particular types of troops (special forces and the Special Operations Center in Krakow); improving the real level of interoperability of the Polish Army with other member states of the alliance; and the development of political and military cooperation in the Central and Eastern Europe region.

To sum up, it should be emphasized that the significant involvement of the Polish Army in NATO's multinational operations has a positive impact on the image of Poland as a credible member of the

Alliance and raises the real level of interoperability of Polish Armed Forces. Moreover, this participation should also be in accordance with international law and strategic objectives of the Alliance and Polish security policy.

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Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Its Role in Russia's Foreign Policy

by

Vladlena Tikhova

ABSTRACT: *The paper studies the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the foreign policy of Russia. It outlines the main cooperation lines in the organization's activity and suggests prospects for future strengthening of cooperation between the CSTO member states.*

Key words: *CSTO, collective security, foreign policy, Central Asia, parliamentary cooperation.*

The Russian Federation's foreign policy, approved by the Russian Federation President V. Putin on 30 November 2016, in Chapter "The Russian Federation's Foreign Policy's Regional Priorities," clearly outlines the main lines of effort of Russia's cooperation both at the bilateral level between states and the multilateral between organizations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization's work is one of the priorities in cooperation aimed at bolstering the stability in the region in the former Soviet republics. The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation reads:

Russia regards the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as one of the essential elements of modern security in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia is committed to qualitative development of the CSTO and its conversion to an authoritative multifunctional international body capable of countering the current challenges and threats in the context of growing influence of multifarious global and regional factors in the CSTO zone of responsibility and its adjacent areas.³¹⁴

The CSTO is actually one of the priorities of the foreign political activities of the former Soviet Union.

The CSTO or, more exactly, the CST (Collective Security Treaty) was signed on 15 May 1992. It was joined by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Later, in 1993, this treaty was also signed by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia.³¹⁵ In 2002, the CST obtained the status of an international organization. Thus, the CST turned into the CSTO.

The CSTO has a clearly-defined structure, including the CSTO Council of Defense Ministers, the CSTO Foreign Ministers' Council, and the Military Council. The CSTO has its own Secretary General. This position is currently held by Yuri Khachaturov, who was appointed on 14 April 2017.

The CSTO cooperates with different international organizations. Active contacts are promoted with entities such as the OSCE

³¹⁴ *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 2232-01-12-2016, p. 52.

³¹⁵ Collective Security Treaty Organization, official website. <http://www.odkb-csto.org/> .

(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and the UN. In 2004, the CSTO became an observer at the UN General Assembly.³¹⁶

Immediately after the fall of the USSR, the Central Asian republics faced the issue of ensuring their own security. As is generally known, Central Asia is encountering severe political problems both in the domestic and international arenas. Moreover, the neighborhood with countries such as China, Afghanistan, and those of the Middle and Near East adds quite a few difficulties to the hard times of the Central Asian states.

The situation is becoming particularly precarious in Tajikistan, as it shares a border with Afghanistan. A civil war took place in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997. At that time, Tajikistan was confronted with a grave danger, especially at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, while Russia and Kazakhstan were actively involved in resolving the conflict in the country.³¹⁷

Another complex issue for Central Asia was the penetration, in 1999-2000, of Uzbekistan's armed Islamic Movement fighters into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The spread of terrorism and extremism threatened the countries of the region.³¹⁸ Overall, it is safe to say that the situation in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is rather dangerous in terms of religious extremism and terrorism. In addition, in Tajikistan people

³¹⁶ CSTO: History and Perspectives. The Newest States' International Institute. 25 November (n.d.), p. 2.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³¹⁸ L. Gusev, *Fighting Terrorism and Extremism in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Role of the CSTO/International Studies Institute of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (N.p.: 2018), 2.

are being actively recruited, mostly via the Internet, to the Islamic State. The country's precarious position is aggravated by its common border with unstable Afghanistan. The government's troops are fighting the Taliban at the border, which undermines its security at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan stretch.

One of the biggest threats, however, is illegal drug trafficking that has spread from Afghanistan to Central Asia. Today the border is guarded poorly, with too few border guards to protect it properly, especially following the transfer of Russia's Kulyabsky regiment from base 201 to Dushanbe.³¹⁹

It should be noted that the CSTO's permanent task has always been ensuring security in Central Asia. Also, much attention has been paid to the military technical cooperation between the member states. It has become clear over time that cooperation in security alone is not enough. A legal framework for more concerted efforts of the member states is needed.

The parliamentary dimension of CSTO is now of a great importance. The CSTO Parliament Assembly was established in 2006 in Saint Petersburg as a body of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the Organization. The parliaments of Serbia and Afghanistan, the Parliamentary Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus have the observer status under the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. Representatives of Cuba, Pakistan, and additional countries participate in the meeting of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly as guests.³²⁰

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³²⁰ CSTO: History and Perspectives, p. 8.

Of special note is the cooperation between the CSTO and Serbia within the framework of the organization. For example, on 3 April 2018, the Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin met in Moscow with Yuri Khachaturov, CSTO Secretary General. They discussed the main trends of cooperation between the CSTO and Serbia, focusing on Serbia's participation as a strategic and military partner in the CSTO collective forces. It was agreed that the Serbian representatives would participate in the CSTO International Youth Schools in Armenia and Russia. (The CSTO International Youth Schools is an educational program for studying Eurasia's current security problems. This is a new project launched by the organization in 2015).³²¹ Thus, the CSTO member states' range of issues to tackle has considerably increased from defense and security, and political and international cooperation, to social and economic problems.

Currently (mid-2018), the CSTO has several types of military tools and four military units:

1. *Collective Force of Rapid Deployment of Central Asia Collective Security* (5,000 soldiers). Established in 2001, its main tasks are repelling foreign aggression and joint counter-terrorism operations.

2. *Collective Rapid Reaction Force* (18,000 soldiers). Established in 2009, the force's main tasks are: force deployment on the territory of any member state; repelling foreign aggression or military attack; and fighting against terrorism and drug trafficking.

³²¹ Collective Security Treaty Organization, official website. <http://www.odkb-csto.org/>

3. *CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Force* (3,600 soldiers). Established in 2007.

4. *CSTO Collective Air Force*. Established in 2014, this force was formed to improve operational efficiency of transportation service and traffic and to secure means of collective security system.

Also, the CSTO holds different drills, such as anti-drug drills, counter-terrorism operations, rescue simulation trainings, etc.

Some experts believe that the CSTO does not fully realize its potential, which would have made it an essential tool for integration of the former Soviet republics in the defense effort.³²² Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the CSTO has a rather powerful potential for becoming the member states' unprecedented defense body. In this case, Russia has the principal obligation of preserving the organization and its biggest donor bearing over 50 per cent of the CSTO budgetary expenses. One of the promising trends in the advance of cooperation could be the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly that would strengthen the member states' diplomatic cooperation. Incidentally, it should be noted that the parliamentary cooperation is fairly important for the organization's operation. This holds much promise for the advancement of the CSTO.

It is also possible to involve the CSTO member states' emergency ministries in addressing joint issues, e.g. industrial disasters. One of the interesting areas of cooperation could be coordination in cyberspace. Cyber security drills are now held and it would make sense to toughen national laws in compliance with the CSTO guidelines. The mechanisms

³²² A. Karavaev, "What Is to Be Done With the CSTO: Are There Prospects for Expanding the Organization's Programs? 14 March. 2017, *Politcom.Ru*, p. 3.

of stimulating educational and scientific programs could become another cooperation driver. The CSTO should not ignore cooperation with individual states and regions. Collaboration with the South-Eastern Asian states and strengthening of cooperative links in the region could consolidate the CSTO and significantly expand its prospects for development.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the CSTO is determined to continue its development. Testifying to this is the fact that the Russian Federation's foreign policy puts a premium on cooperation within the CSTO. Of special importance for Russia is the Central Asian region, which is why it seeks to maintain stability in Central Asia and is determined to place special emphasis on cooperative efforts within the CSTO.

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Slovenia in NATO: A Defense Alliance between the Political Elite and the People

by

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ABSTRACT: *The creation of a defense system by the newly-established Republic of Slovenia was heavily influenced by war experiences between the Yugoslav Peoples of Army and defense structures of Slovenia on one side and war in the region (e.g., Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina) that left horrible consequences in both now- independent countries on the other. Slovenia decided to develop its national security system on the policy of armed neutrality but with aspirations of joining NATO. The Territorial defense organization was in 1994 transformed into regular armed forces with the official name Slovene Armed Forces (SAF). In the process of NATO membership accession between 2000 and 2004, military professionalization within SAF was developed. The SAF was reorganized and consisted of all volunteer forces with 7,600 professional officers and other ranks. In 2005, the transformation of the SAF was introduced with the main goal of specialization. However, the economic crisis beginning in 2009 caused the whole defense system to be greatly under-financed. The consequence was stagnation of further development that left the SAF almost inoperable when required to execute its defense tasks.*

Key words: *NATO, security, defense, Slovene Armed Forces, Slovene national security system*

Introduction

The fifteenth anniversary of Slovenia's ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and its full membership in NATO was noted a short time ago. Before that, Slovenia as a federal Yugoslav republic was a member of the 1953 Balkan Pact (the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation), while even earlier as a part of Yugoslavia it had also been a member of other military alliances, including the Little Entente and the 1934 Balkan Pact (the Balkan Entente). In the decades before World War I, it had also been a part of the Triple Alliance.³²³ The Slovenian NATO membership was a process that took ten years and called for a significant effort of the Slovenian political elite as well as for a thorough military transformation. The attainment of Slovenian independence in 1991 coincided with the dissolution of the Cold War bipolar world. The socialist Warsaw Pact dissolved, and many countries that abandoned their socialist regimes at the time had to face the issue of national defense. In view of the political values of the world that these countries wanted to possess, as well as to political reality, NATO membership became the wish and goal of many Eastern European governments.³²⁴

During the Cold War, Slovenia – until 1991 a federal republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the northwest of that country – was completely integrated into the Yugoslav defense system, based on independent total defense, independent defense policy, and

³²³ Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan: Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2008), 26-32.

³²⁴ Alojz Šteiner, *Slovenska vojska med tranzicijo in transformacijo* (Ljubljana: Slovenska vojska, Center vojaških šol, 2015), 20-21.

rejection of any military alliances. In 1991, the Slovenian public opinion was half in favor of the armed neutrality of the future Slovenia, while only 10 per cent of respondents to a survey supported the transition into collective defense (NATO). Some 72.3 per cent of respondents rejected the idea of joining NATO.³²⁵

On 25 June 1991, after a year-long process of emancipation, Slovenia declared its withdrawal from the Yugoslav federation. Already during this process, Slovenia had formed and partly established a defense system based on new foundations, which were partially pragmatic (Territorial Defense) and partially strategic as well. In 1990 and 1991, Slovenia discussed how to establish its own defense system. One of the proposed solutions was a specific option of the new state not having an army, meaning that it would have to rely solely on civil defense. This option, however, was only supported by a political minority. In such internal political circumstances, Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia.³²⁶ After a short military conflict, in which it prevailed, it finally attained its independence.

Efforts for the Slovenian Accession to NATO

In 1993, after the Yugoslav Wars had become somewhat more distant, but nevertheless represented an imminent threat in the Slovenian security assessments, the Slovenian state and its political elite started considering collective defense. The prevailing aspirations of the

³²⁵ Špela Kranjc, "Članstvo v NATO: študija primerov Slovenije in Estonije," thesis, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2009, 19.

³²⁶ Tomaž Kladnik, *Slovenska vojska v službi domovine* (Ljubljana: Defensor, 2006), 79.

Slovenian state elite were to ensure that Slovenia ultimately ended up under the umbrella of collective defense, represented in Europe by the only remaining functional military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and this set out the new state's orientation.³²⁷ One can safely assess that trust in NATO, which would supposedly support Slovenian defense in case of a repeated attack by the Yugoslav Army, was the main reason why Slovenia wished to join NATO. However, for the new state's elite, the accession to NATO also represented a confirmation of Slovenian integration and dedication to democracy.

As a Slovenian goal, the accession to NATO was stated for the first time in its 1993 defense policy resolution, confirmed by the National Assembly. At that time, NATO was the goal that all Eastern Europe aspired to. The states expected this organization to ensure collective security and thus solve their security problems. In March 1994, Slovenia was included in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, while in the same year it also became an associate member country of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA). In the same year, the first Individual Partner Program was prepared as well, stating the Slovenian political goals as well as its military and other capabilities that the new state was able to offer to NATO.³²⁸

However, unlike the political elite, the Slovenian population kept supporting the concept of armed neutrality for a long time. The political parties were not equally eager to support the state's integration into

³²⁷ Anton Grizold, "Nekaj izzivov gradnji varnostne arhitekture v Evropi danes," *Teorija in praksa* 38, no. 5 (N.d.): 786.

³²⁸ "Slovenija in NATO: kronologija slovenskega vključevanja v NATO. Kronologija včlanjevanja," <http://nato.gov.si/slo/slovenija-nato/kronologija/> accessed 25 June 2016.

collective defense or NATO, even though none of the parliamentary parties explicitly opposed the accession. Furthermore, NATO's failed intervention in the Yugoslav Wars had a profoundly negative effect on its perception. According to the information of the public opinion center, in 1994 only 12.7 per cent of respondents supported the Slovenian accession to NATO. Armed neutrality had a far stronger support: around 40 per cent of respondents.³²⁹ In the following year, the situation remained the same.

In 1997, at the annual NATO meeting in Madrid, the Slovenian request for accession was denied. This was a temporary disappointment for Slovenian domestic policy, but did not result in a withdrawal. As the rejection was explained with the insufficient reforms of the Slovenian Army, Slovenia undertook a series of military innovation.³³⁰ In 1998, it drew up the National Strategy for the Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO.

The accession process involved a series of reforms of the military structure and of the defense system in general. The main goals of the reforms were described in the 1998 Military Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. The Strategy provided for the restructuring of the armed forces into rapid reaction forces, main defense forces, and

³²⁹ Niko Toš, Anton Grizold, Marjan Svetličič, et al., *Slovensko javno mnenje, Nacionalna varnost in mednarodni odnosi* (Ljubljana: Univeza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij, 1994/5).

³³⁰ Anton Bebler, »Slovenia and the 'Grey Zone' in Europe,« in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement* (N.p.: 1999), 155.

auxiliary defense forces.³³¹ The enlargement of the professional permanent staff was also planned.

In 1999, NATO adopted a Membership Action Plan that included Slovenia. On this basis, the reformation of the Slovenian armed forces in a dialogue with NATO took place. The four-year period until the accession included four annual national programs and represented the main transformation period of the Slovenian Army in the organizational and technical sense.³³² The most important aspect was the transformation of the security threat focus from military to non-military, as well as the consequent conversion of the armed forces from a mass army into a smaller-scale professional army. The mass army staffed with ordinary citizens had become unsuitable in light of the new security threats, and almost all NATO member states had already implemented professional armies. In 2003, Slovenia did the same. In 2002, Slovenia was invited to begin the accession negotiations for its membership in NATO. Swift changes began, including the scaling back of the reserve staff; abolishing the draft system; introducing a professional army; and establishing forces that could take part in the Allied contingent. After a decade of decline, the percentage of defense expenses once again came close to two percent of GDP.³³³

³³¹ Vinko Vegič, "Zavezništva in male države: nekaj dilem slovenskega približevanja Natu," *Teorija in praksa* 36, no. 6 (1999), 1001.

³³² "Akcijski načrt za NATO", 1999, <http://nato.gov.si/slo/dokumenti/akcijski-nacrt.pdf>.

³³³ *Nacionalna strategija Republike Slovenije za vstop v Nato* (Ljubljana: n.p., 1998, <http://nato.gov.si/slo/dokumenti/nacionalna-strategija.pdf>, accessed 4 June 2016.

The Attitude of the Slovenian Public to the Accession

The Slovenian public had been very divided with regard to the Slovenian accession to NATO. On the one hand, some people argued for reality (claiming that Slovenian defense would be best ensured with the state's membership in NATO) and others supported the accession (believing that NATO was an excellent defense alliance); while on the other hand, the sceptics expressed reservations, in particular due to NATO's unauthorised use of force against Serbia in 1999. The feelings of severe threat due to the Yugoslav attack, the war in the neighboring country, and then the war in Bosnia were appeased towards the end of the first decade of the new independent state, and the feelings of security increased. The perception of external military threat diminished significantly and no longer increased despite the war in the proximity of Slovenia.³³⁴ This resulted from the significant public disappointment with the effect as well as the concrete actions of the NATO alliance (and the main NATO members) in the Yugoslav Wars during the 1990s.

The information on the attitude of the Slovenian public towards NATO has been available as of 1994. In this year, the leading public opinion researchers asked respondents if they supported collective defense or if they preferred Slovenia's own defense. Two-thirds of the respondents supported the concept of Slovenia's own defense, even though more indigenous resources would have been required in order to maintain such a system. This can be interpreted indirectly as the idea of the Slovenian integration into NATO not yet being accepted by the

³³⁴ Anton Bebler, »Slovenia and NATO Decisions in Madrid,« *Le Monde Atlantique* 35 (1997): 31-33.

(majority of) the public in the spring of 1994. Approximately one year later, in January 1995, 44.2 per cent of the public was in favor of Slovenian membership in NATO; 47 per cent of respondents had no strong opinions about it; and 8.6 percent of respondents opposed it.³³⁵The relative majority of the public thus supported the efforts of the Slovenian government for the Slovenian accession to NATO, though not very strongly.

The Slovenian political elite and the state officials were surprised by this information, as it was not in line with their expectations. It came as a shock as well as a revelation, as it became evident that the public support of the Slovenian NATO membership was not self-evident, but that a more systematic and expert argumentation of this idea would be necessary. Quite surprisingly, the public opinion did not register that the NATO membership would impinge on the sovereignty of Slovenia, though the majority was resolutely against the establishment of any NATO military bases in the Slovenian territory. Rather than on the military aspects, the people mostly focused on the political aspects of NATO membership.³³⁶Around this time, the government also launched a more focused campaign for the promotion of NATO membership in order to ensure public support for the project. This resulted in the increased percentage of people supporting the accession.

³³⁵ Marjan Malešič, "Politične stranke in javno mnenje: zaznava NATO," *Teorija in praksa* 36, no. 2 (1999): 208.

³³⁶ Anton Bebler, »Slovenia and NATO,« *International Journal* 55, no. 1 (1999): 128.

Table 2: Public Support of Slovenian NATO Membership³³⁷

	Oct 1996	Jan 1997	Feb 1997	Mar 1997	Oct / Nov 1997
YES	66.4	61.3	58.3	64.1	55.4
NO	15.7	20.5	21.1	18.3	18.4
UNDECIDED	17.9	18.2	20.7	17.6	26.2
N=	958	996	942	965	2031

The percentage of supporters thus came close to two-thirds, and resolute opponents amounted to 15-20 per cent, while the percentage of those who were undecided or neutral was roughly the same as that. When NATO rejected the Slovenian accession request in 1997, the number of opponents increased to more than 25 per cent.³³⁸ The question once again became pressing before the conclusions with regard to the second stage of enlargement were reached, when Slovenia was among the candidates as well.

Membership Referendum

The suggestion that the Slovenian voters themselves should decide about accession to NATO was already voiced in 1994 and 1995. Afterwards the domestic political struggle focused particularly on the form of the referendum and the question of when to execute out. At the beginning of 2003, the political parties agreed to call a consultative referendum on the accession to NATO.³³⁹ The text resulting from the

³³⁷ Toš, et al., *Slovensko javno mnenje in NATO*.

³³⁸ Malešič, »Politične stranke in javno mnenje: zaznava NATO,« 208.

³³⁹ Jerneja Rebernak, "Poročanje slovenskih dnevnoinformativnih časopisov o vstopu v NATO," thesis, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2004, 4.

negotiations between the political parties asked the following question: "Do you agree that the Republic of Slovenia should become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?" On 30 January 2003, when the consultative referendum act was adopted, the day of the referendum was set for Sunday, 23 March 2003.³⁴⁰

At the referendum that took place on that day, the turnout amounted to slightly more than 60 per cent of registered voters. The referendum question, "Do you agree that the Republic of Slovenia should become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?" was answered as follows: 66.08 per cent of voters agreed, and 33.92 per cent opposed it.³⁴¹ Because the participation at another simultaneous referendum – the one about the Slovenian accession to the European Union – was far greater, one can conclude that at least some of the voters resented being asked about NATO membership at all. In comparison with the earlier statistics, the percentage of voters who disagreed with the Slovenian NATO membership had not decreased.

For the Slovenian political elite, the referendum represented a watershed and the foundation of the NATO membership that they desired so much, as it provided the political and state elite with enough support to pursue the accession. Eventually, NATO in fact extended an

³⁴⁰ Odlok o razpisu posvetovalnega referenduma o pristopu Republike Slovenije k Organizaciji Severnoatlantske pogodbe (NATO), *Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, Uradni list Republike Slovenije* (N.p.: 2003).

³⁴¹ Samo Uhan and Matej Kovačič, "Struktura podpre na referendumu o EU in NATO," in *Družbena gibanja in civilna družba danes* (Ljubljana: Slovensko sociološko društvo 2003), 41-42.

invitation to Slovenia, which became a member on 29 March 2004.³⁴² On the occasion of accession to NATO, the President of the Republic of Slovenia told the soldiers:

Slovenia has become a member of NATO. It has become a partner to the countries that we have wished to align with in the years since our emancipation. These are states with highly-developed democracies, market economies, and considerable living standards – but at the same time also the strongest armies. . . . With our NATO membership, we have received a significant security assurance, but at the same time also a great responsibility.

With its integration into NATO, the security and defense of the Republic of Slovenia are no longer merely nationally significant. The Slovenian security is becoming a part of the European and international security. We will participate in the decision-making process and take part in the solving of the most important issues in the world.³⁴³

At that time 2004, the NATO organisation was trusted by as many as 49.3 % of respondents.³⁴⁴ Aware of the much-needed adaptations, Slovenia undertook a new cycle of reforms and adjustments of its defense structures to NATO's standards. However, the profound economic crisis was already looming, and together with the internal Slovenian scandals (like the purchase of the Patria armored personnel carriers) it kept pushing the Slovenian Army to the very brink of

³⁴² Anton Bebler, "Iz preddverja za glavno mizo: ob vstopu Slovenije v NATO," *Delo, Ljubljana* 47, no. 79 (2003): 10-11.

³⁴³ Božo Repe, *Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2015), 142.

³⁴⁴ Niko Toš, *Slovensko javno mnenje in NATO* (Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij, 2005).

importance and necessary financing. In a few years, the budgetary envelope available for the matters of defense decreased by 40 per cent.³⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the public opinion was still not certain that the inclusion in the collective defense was a good decision at all.

Conclusion

Slovenia's NATO membership was an exceedingly important project for the Slovenian political elite, as it wanted to use it as a replacement for the shallow political programs and inability to carry out the much-needed structural reforms. At the same time the process of the "de-Balkanization" of Slovenia took place, as the local political elite did not wish to see the newly-established state as a part of the western Balkans, but rather as a part of Western Europe.³⁴⁶ This perspective was diametrically opposed to the opinion of the Slovenian public. Membership in NATO has paved the way towards the restructuring of the armed forces; but it has also presented opportunities for the conclusion of large-scale arms deals, which have been a source of extensive financial manipulations in Slovenia when allegations of bribes were disclosed.³⁴⁷ On the other hand, the structural reforms of the SAF that were started in order to fulfill NATO expectations in the field of military professionalism were never fully carried out. The constant

³⁴⁵ Klemen Veldin, »Obrambni proračun in stanje pripravljenosti v oboroženih silah: primer Slovenije,« 28.

³⁴⁶ Zlatko Šabič, »Slovenia and NATO enlargement: experience gained and lessons learned,» in *Small States in the post-Cold War World*, ed. Charles Bukowski and Zlatko Šabič (London: Praeger, 2002), 146.

³⁴⁷ Matej Šurc, *Domoljubje zapisano z ničlami* (Ljubljana: Založba Sanje, 2016), 21.

reformation and transformation gravely eroded the military tradition and had an enormously negative impact on the members of SAF.³⁴⁸ Moreover, the blame for a less-than positive image of the SAF was attributed to NATO itself by Slovene political elites and Slovene public opinion. Based on that fact it could be concluded that entering NATO was definitively a great political success but was not enriched through defense capabilities. Instead of NATO being the reliable partner and positive framework in the area of security provision, it is more and more perceived as a security demanding factor with low positive image among Slovene public opinion.

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³⁴⁸ Vladimir Prebilič, "Von der Staatsgründung bis zur EU- und NATO-Mitgliedschaft: permanente Reformierung der slowenischen Streitkräfte?" in *Strategische Wende -- Technologische Wende: die Transformation der Staitkräfte am Übergang zum 21. Jahrhundert*, ed. Rudolf Jaun and Michael Olsansky (Zürich: Militärakademie an der ETH, 2008), 31.

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The Impact of Neutrality on National Doctrine Development

by

Veljko Blagojevic

ABSTRACT: *This paper deals with the key theory and practice of doctrinal development and achievements in the field of defense and security policy of the neutral states. Every neutral state has adopted its own concept of neutrality, concerning its unique tradition, geopolitical position, and national interests. Nevertheless, there are certain levels of similarity in doctrinal solutions of contemporary neutral countries, such as total defense, conscript army, reliance on national defense industry, and engaging in international crisis management. There are “successful” examples of neutrality concepts, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, but also different ones, such as Belgium and Nederland before 1949, etc. The paper will analyze the key experiences of European neutral states in the field of foreign policy, as well as security and defense doctrine and policy.*

Key words: *International relations, Geopolitics, Neutrality, Military Doctrine, Total Defense.*

Introduction

The main point of view of the theoreticians of international relations is to classify neutral European states as “small states” which

are often treated in literature as "weak" or "vulnerable" in material and geopolitical terms.³⁴⁹ However, neutrality is contrary to the usual policy implemented by small states, as they are expected to increase security by entering into military alliances with other countries.³⁵⁰ Conversely, neutrality represents a policy in which a relatively small country chooses to rely more or less exclusively on internal/national resources and strengths rather than strong allies.

The fact is that the interdependence in international relations has grown stronger in the last two centuries. During the same historical period, there were two world wars, and many regional and local wars. Economic interdependence inevitably causes political moves on the foreign policy plan that follow economic interests. The networking of economic interests and their antagonism leads to hostility on the political level, which ultimately results in an increasing need for states to join international economic, political, and military organizations. There is considerable evidence for this, especially in the present era of globalization, but also in a historical context. Neutrality is in a historical decline, mostly due to the growing process of globalization, but also the negative experiences of neutral countries such as Belgium and the

³⁴⁹ Christine Agius and Karen Devine, "Neutrality: A really dead concept? A reprise," *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3 (2011): 265-284, and Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Varieties of Neutrality: Norm revision and decline," *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3 (2011): 285-311.

³⁵⁰ For more on alliances, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ed., *Security Communities* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York: Penguin, 2018); and Hee-Yong Yang, "A Study on Role-Based Approach to Bilateral Alliances in Northeast Asia," *Journal of International And Area Studies* 23, no. 1 (2016): 33-57.

Netherlands. For example, in the First World War there were eighteen neutral countries, while in the Second, only six remained neutral.³⁵¹

Origins of Neutrality

Although neutrality has been present since ancient times, many theoreticians take the period of sovereign state creation as a turning point for neutrality's modern legal and political application. More specifically, since the signing of the Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648, the concept of neutral states can be considered as a legitimate choice of sovereign states in international relations in case of a fundamental war conflict or as a permanent foreign policy strategy.³⁵²

The modern state of neutrality begins with the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when the participants agreed to recognize the status of the neutral state of Switzerland. The status, politics, and experiences of Switzerland were a model in a process of making the rules for neutrality in international law. National laws and practices of Switzerland influenced the international standards for rights and obligations of neutral countries which were transformed into a legal norm in the

³⁵¹ Avramov Smilja, *Međunarodno javno pravo (Akademija za diplomatiju i bezbednost* (Beograd: 2011), 765.

³⁵² Veljko Blagojevic, "The Potential of Neutrality Policy of The Republic of Serbia in Contemporary International Relations, in *Uticaj vojne neutralnosti Srbije na bezbednost i stabilnost u Evropi*, Srđan T. Korać (Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu and Hanns Seidel Stitung, 2016), 241.

Hague Conventions (V and XIII) Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land and Sea, 1907.³⁵³

Although it is rather out of date today, this document remains a key reference point for the basic rights and obligations of neutral states during the armed conflict. The validity of the document can be summarized as follows:

- Territory of neutral states is inviolable;
- Warring parties are prohibited from using the territory of neutral states for the transport of troops and military equipment;
- Warring parties are not allowed to use the territory of neutral states to mobilize troops;

Additionally, from a state that has declared itself neutral in relation to a particular armed conflict, it is expected to be impartial during conflicts in relation to all warring parties, regardless of their own dominant national values and ideology. However, this does not concern trade or economic relations of the neutral countries with other states. They have the right to develop economic cooperation with others, which is based on the principles of equality and equal treatment of all trading parties while being impartial in ideological matters.³⁵⁴

In this way, a legal system had been established that, at least theoretically, compelled others to respect all recognized neutral states during armed conflicts. Although the Hague Convention (V) evolved

³⁵³ The Hague Convention (XIII) Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land and Sea, 1907, was never ratified by the United Kingdom, Italy, and some other states.

³⁵⁴ Ove Bring, "Koncept neutralnosti: Poreklo i izazovi od Vestfalskog mira do Evropske unije," in *Neutralnost u XXI veku – pouke za Srbiju*, Igor S. Novaković, (Beograd: ISAC Fond, 2011), 21-26.

from the legal system of a permanently neutral Switzerland.³⁵⁵ a similar document has not been created to defend the rights and obligations of contemporary neutral states. However, based on the Swiss case it is possible to perform some of the basic characteristics of a permanent neutral state. In this regard, it is important to note significant theoretical conclusions of Cyril Black:

- A neutral state should avoid engaging in warfare;
- A neutral state should maintain its national defense resources; and
- A neutral state should conduct a foreign policy in a manner that avoids potential military engagement.³⁵⁶

Despite the different circumstances, there are, however, some conditions in international relations that are similar in all cases of neutrality in Europe. It is about the regularity in international relations in each and every case of neutrality as a result of the balance of power of the leading European powers and geopolitical position of the state concerned in a concrete, historical context. The example of Switzerland is perhaps the most obvious combination of internal and external factors that have created the conditions for permanent neutrality. It is the following key factors:

- The geographical position among the great European powers;
- Multinational and multi-confessional population;

³⁵⁵ Mark R. Rubin and Laurent Wehrli, "Switzerland," in *Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, I. Papacosma and S. Victor (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1989), 49.

³⁵⁶ Cyril Black, *Neutralization and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 22.

- Lack of natural resources and raw materials;
- The necessity of forcing international trade, as a condition of the survival of the population, and the like.³⁵⁷

It is necessary to mention another term that historically preceded the creation of a legal institute of neutrality. It is the term “neutralism,” which is purely a political term and represents a certain foreign policy course of a state towards potential or actual war, most often by adopting unilateral resolutions, declarations, and similar documents on a national level that are not legally binding. Very often, such acts are not adopted, but there are implementations of concrete foreign policy of neutralism. Therefore, neutralism does not require international recognition, but it also has no binding effect on national leadership that can change the foreign policy without legal consequences. In other words, neutrality is based on an international treaty and neutralism on the unilateral will of the state, and is therefore irrelevant in international law. It is relevant only as an expression of the political will of the state as a sovereign subject of international law and politics.³⁵⁸ Good examples for long-lasting neutralism are Sweden and Finland.

All permanently neutral countries, however, have the right to self-defense, as well as the right to invite another state to help if their status is endangered. Neutral states have the right to discourage other countries from potential aggression by their own military power. It

³⁵⁷ Avramov Smilja, *Međunarodno javno pravo* (Beograd: Akademija za diplomatiju i bezbednost, 2011), 760.

³⁵⁸ Evans Graham and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 365-366.

should be added that permanent neutrality can be recognized formally and informally, or through an international agreement (for example Switzerland and Belgium at the time), or without documented international recognition (i.e., Sweden).

During the twentieth century, it became clear that *realpolitik* had a primacy over some “idealistic” setting of international law. Brutal violations of the status of neutrality of some states during the First and Second World War showed that the declared permanent neutrality often had little relevance in international relations. In spite of all, the Hague Convention (V and XIII) still remains an important reference point for understanding the rights and obligations of states that want to remain neutral in the case of a real or potential war.

Modern international relations recognize a few types of neutrality. Permanent neutrality is a term predominantly defined by international law and implies non-engagements in all actual and future conflicts. Typical examples for this kind of neutrality are Switzerland and Austria.

A second type of neutrality is neutralism, or a policy of political/military neutrality. It is a predominantly political term, because a state declares neutrality towards specific conflict on a unilateral basis. In this case, states can change their status, and engage in war, without any legal consequences. Of course, there are political and security risks, but there are no legal obligations in the case of neutralism.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁹ For more, see Miloš Jončić, “Geneza neutralnosti u izvorima međunarodnog prava” (Origins of Neutrality in Sources of International Law), in *Uticaj vojne neutralnosti Srbije na bezbednost i stabilnost u Evropi*, Srđan Korać, (Belgrade: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 2016,), 11-28;

The Non-Aligned Movement is a relic of the Cold War, still active in international relations. Members of this international organization refused to be allied in two major blocs during the Cold War, and they supported the processes of decolonization, disarmament, and peaceful co-existence.³⁶⁰ The Modern Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) declares these objectives:

- Strengthening and revitalization of the NAM;
- Strengthening international peace and security;
- The right to self-determination. The only case specified is a demand to end Israeli occupation of Palestine's West Bank and East Jerusalem, and an end to Israeli occupation of Syria's Golan Heights.
- Disarmament and a nuclear-free Middle East (here, Israel and its nuclear weapons stockpiles were not mentioned by name);
- The protection and promotion of Human Rights and the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- Condemnation of terrorism, including specifically Da-esh, Boko Haram, and al-Shabbab, and condemning the destruction of cultural heritage and religious sites.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ Non-Aligned Movement policy was defined in those principles: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in domestic affairs; and equality and mutual benefit. Most influencing members were: Egypt, India, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.

³⁶¹ <http://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057>, (accessed 12 June 2018).

Total Defense as a Doctrinal Response to Neutrality


One of the key elements in teaching strategy and doctrine at almost all military staff colleges around the globe is the strategy framework. Conceptually, one defines strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means. Ends are the objectives or goals of strategic or doctrinal document. Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And ways or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources. Each of these components suggests a related question. What do we want to pursue (ends)? With what (means)? How (ways)?³⁶² Answers to these questions are important for all states and societies, regardless of whether they are members of an alliance or neutral. However, there are some limitations that are related to the concept of neutrality that affects the various limitations in the methods and means by which the strategic and doctrine objectives can be achieved.

The essence of the concept of neutrality is based on voluntary nonparticipation of states in military alliances. This fact represents a great limitation in strategic and doctrinal sense for all neutral countries. That is the reason why neutral countries developed national doctrines that rely on internal (national) resources and strengths. Defense and military doctrine of almost all neutral states (Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Serbia, among others) are based on the concept of total defense, which includes participation of the whole society in the defense

³⁶² Robert Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development," in *Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, Jr. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 11.

of the country. Ythe contemporary concept of total defense is based on a comprehensive approach to national defense issues that include military defense, civil defense, economic defense, social defense,cyber defense, and the like.

Contemporary interstate conflicts are very complex and crisis management involves large-scale implementation of different tools and measures, as can be seen in the following chart.³⁶³



Furthermore, recent Russian military operations in Georgia and Ukraine reveal that Russia relies on landpower to achieve its military objectives, relies on decentralized special operations forces (SOF) to conduct irregular warfare, and incorporates extensive information operations that link strategic messaging to operations on the ground.⁹⁹

Since Russian Tsarist times, Russia's expansionist policy has been based on the principle "divide and rule." Today's political and military analysts call such a policy "Hybrid strategy or Strategy of Ambiguity."¹⁰⁰ However, Russia's "ends and ways" have never changed, only the means have varied. Russia's "end-state" has always been maintaining the role of a superpower in Eurasia. The ways have focused on using all the instruments of national power to intimidate and by using the strategy of ambiguity to disrupt the opponent's political decision-making processes; and, if this does not work, to change the opponent's policy toward Russia, to launch a massive and rapid land attack into the opponent's territory. Later, depending on how internal and external audiences react to this action, Russia will either maintain counterinsurgency warfare or will enjoy a quick and incredible victory.

Graphic 1: Using both military and non-military measures in interstate conflict

³⁶³ Douglas Mastriano, *PROJECT 1721: Assessment on Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe and Recommendations on How to Leverage Land Power to Maintain the Peace* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), 34.

Military defense of a neutral country must be able to maintain a credible capability to deter, and if deterrence fails, to prevent and repel military threats. Switzerland's military doctrine is based on the concept of total defense that implies participation of the entire society in the defense of the country.³⁶⁴ Switzerland has three basic elements of the defense system:

- Military defense (armed forces) as a means of force projected to deter aggression and to lead an armed struggle in the war;³⁶⁵
- Civil defense planned for the protection of people and material goods in the case of emergency situations and war; and,
- Economic defense (territorial organization) that ensures the production of equipment and goods necessary for the conduct of war.³⁶⁶

The classic doctrine of Switzerland is based on preparation of the national defense system (national armed forces) to deter military aggression through a well-established state; the national armed forces could mobilize immediately and fight as a conventional force to defend its territory and its population. In case of mobilization, obstacles and barriers would be activated; key bridges and tunnels would be destroyed; important infrastructure destroyed and similar measures that makes and control of the territory almost impossible for an

³⁶⁴ Igor Novaković, "Stalno neutralne države u Evropi u posthladnoratovskom periodu 1989-2011," doktorska disertacija, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade, 2016, p. 118.

³⁶⁵ For more, see Veljko Blagojević, *Defense Diplomacy: Concept, Legal Basis, Organization* (Duesseldorf, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2017).

³⁶⁶ Siniša Tatalović, "Odbrambeni sustav Švicarske," *Politička misao* 28, no. 4 (n.d.): 102.

occupying force.³⁶⁷ The Swiss deterrence strategy is a combination of strong conventional resistance forces, a suitable topography for maintaining guerilla warfare as an effective resistance measure, and the readiness to destroy industrial, communications, and transport infrastructure in case of military aggression. Occupation would mean an exhausting struggle against the resistance-oriented population that was well-trained and armed.³⁶⁸ In practice, deterrence doctrine is formulated by following motto: "Switzerland does not have an armed forces, Switzerland is an armed forces."

The objective for Sweden's total defense, for example, is to preserve the country's peace and independence by:

- "Helping to manage and prevent crises in the world around us,
- Asserting our territorial integrity,
- Defending Sweden against armed attack,
- Protecting the civilian population and safeguarding the most important functions in the event of war."³⁶⁹

Finland's experiences in the field of total defense have proven to be effective in great challenges throughout history. Finland has a well-functioning tradition of preparedness, trusted by its citizens. For decades this has established the basis for cooperative arrangements between different actors of the society. Comprehensive security has been developed in concert with the authorities, the business community,

³⁶⁷ Mannitz Sabine, *The Normative Construction of the Soldier in Switzerland: Constitutional Conditions and Public Political Discourse – The Swiss Case* (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2007), 17.

³⁶⁸ Sabine, *The Normative Construction*, 17.

³⁶⁹ *Our Future Defence: The Focus of Swedish Defence Policy, 2005-2007* (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2004), 10.

and other organizations. Each actor aims to further develop the level of cooperation. It is increasingly important to engage citizens in security-related activities and to improve their competencies. Finland's experience emphasizes the importance of good preparedness through systematic exercises to prevent and repel threats while managing their potential consequences.

How will Finland's defense establishment plan to meet the requirements of the contemporary operating environment? The requirements of the operating environment will be met by:

- 1) Generating comprehensive situational awareness and a situational picture;
- 2) Maintaining an early-warning capability;
- 3) Maintaining continuous decision-making and command and control readiness, and a robust C4 system;
- 4) Maintaining a flexible readiness control capability;
- 5) Maintaining the appropriate capability for territorial surveillance and the protection of territorial integrity;
- 6) Maintaining the suitable mission-oriented capabilities of operational, regional and local troops;
- 7) Developing and maintaining the most efficient units and weapon systems capable of rapid response;
- 8) Securing an appropriately self-sufficient and centralized logistics system;
- 9) Guaranteeing the mobility of military force in the entire territory of the nation;

10) Securing the collaboration capability between different authorities and other actors in society;

11) Ensuring international interoperability and compatibility; and

12) Improving the capability to participate in military crisis management.³⁷⁰

All these requirements are based on manpower, as a vital component of every defense system. Conscripts are needed for the manpower of the armed forces (both active and reserve component) and civil defense elements. Switzerland, for example, has obligatory conscript service for men, and voluntary service for women. During the period of serving in the Swiss reserve, they keep their weapons and military equipment at home. Finland has compulsory service in its armed forces for men older than seventeen years that lasts eleven months.

A conscript army gives the societies of neutral countries the opportunity to organize and implement comprehensive concepts of total defense, including civil, economic, social, cyber, and psychological defense.

Engagement in Multinational Operations Out of National Territory

Globalization and internationalization continue to foster increased interdependence among the different peoples and countries of the world. Interdependence, despite being basically positive for peace

³⁷⁰ *Finnish Security and Defence Policy, 2012* (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2013), 102.

and stability, also makes society more vulnerable and sensitive to disruption. The nature of threats to peoples and countries has changed as have their implications. It is no longer possible for countries to safeguard their security in isolation from the development of the rest of the world. The technical infrastructure and increased mobility that characterize and underpin the open society of neutral states are becoming increasingly transboundary and therefore constitute part of one's common vulnerability. The nature of contemporary threats also has an impact on both allied and neutral states. All subjects of international relations face new threats that are on the one hand more multifaceted, but on the other less predictable. These threats and challenges come from regional conflicts, the break-up of states and unions, humanitarian crises, migration crises, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.³⁷¹

Neutral countries became aware of the necessity to improve their own security by engaging in multilateral cooperation in the field of security, especially in conflict prevention efforts and conflict management in the relevant areas, the world can help stabilize the situation and hence restrict the effects of conflict and counter terrorism. Neutral states are frequently making efforts to promote international peace, solidarity, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.³⁷²

³⁷¹ *Our Future Defence: The Focus of Swedish Defence Policy, 2005-2007* (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2004), 6-7.

³⁷² For more, see Veljko Blagojević, *Srbija i izazovi odbrambene diplomatije* (Serbia and Challenges of Defense Diplomacy, MC ODBRANA, Beograd, 2017).

Apart from these interests, connected to conditions in international relations, there is at least one more reason, related to national strategic and doctrinal interests, why neutral states are engaged in international operations abroad. This is called interoperability.³⁷³

Why interoperability if they are not a member of alliance? There are a few answers to this question, and each of them is, in itself, a sufficient reason for engagement. These are the following:

- To ensure that their armed forces are able to participate in multinational peace-promoting operations abroad;

- To gain experience in the field of modern military operations, staff procedures, weapons employment, crisis management, civil-military cooperation, etc. – to keep in touch with the supposed “revolution in military affairs”;

- To be able to engage together with allies in case that their country is attacked. It is a very important task for every armed force, including neutral ones. Experiences of Belgium or the Netherlands in World War II, suggests that neutral states have the right and obligation to defend neutrality, and to find and act with allies if they are attacked. If the armed forces have not developed and adopted modern procedures, organization, and weapons and equipment, then it is difficult to expect successful cooperation with allies in defending the country.

³⁷³ Interoperability is the ability of military equipment or units to operate in conjunction with each other. In that sense, it is most important “staff believe interoperability” among forces is crucial to effectiveness of multinational forces.

Without maximum levels of interoperability it is almost impossible to be successfully engaged in, both civilian and military, contemporary multinational peacekeeping and stability operations abroad.

Conclusion

A history of neutrality suggests that neutrality is a reflexive phenomenon of war and an integral part of the law of war, while also becoming an increasingly integral part of the peacetime international relations and law. Additionally, neutrality is not a static term, but a dynamic political and legal category that has been dialectically changed together with the development of international relations and international law. For example, experiences of Belgium in the two world wars, and of the Netherlands in the World War II, would seem to justify the importance of deterrence for neutral states.

All permanently neutral states have the right to self-defense, as a universal right recognized by international law, as well as other states or other subjects of international law. In addition, neutral states have the right to invite another state to help them if their status is endangered by armed aggression. Neutral states have the right to deter other countries from potential aggression by building up their own military power. It is another issue, however, whether they have a political will or resources to be engaged in large-scale operations, and how effective they can be.

Structural changes in the international system have raised a question mark over the traditional concept of security known as national security. This state-centered approach dominated international relations from 1945 to the end of the Cold War and was characterized by the core belief that international security is essentially defined by the military interactions of sovereign states. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent break-up of the USSR in 1991 left the U.S. as the world's only "superpower" and prompted some writers to characterize the post-Cold War period as "the American unipolar age." At the same time, the post-Cold War world has been subjected to deepening globalization, a process that is associated with the growth of international linkages, an erosion of the autonomy of the sovereign state, and the creation of a new security environment in which the pattern of conflicts has moved far beyond the protection of the nation state.

Consequently, modern states have an essential necessity for defending mutual values from challenges, risks, and threats that rise from various state and non-state actors in international relations. Globalization in the field of security brings a huge amount of interdependence among far away subjects of international relations, while instability in the Middle East could massively affect European or African stability and security. Neutral states, by nature of their position in the international arena, are very sensitive to war conflicts and instability in security matters. Because of these facts, there is no need to be surprised that modern neutral states are highly engaged in multinational peacekeeping and stability operations abroad, as well as

with allied states. Of course, they are engaged according to their neutral status and principles, with the roles of engagement in multinational operations much more rigid than other participant countries regarding their neutral status.

Interoperability, understood in a broader context including strategic, operational, tactical, and technological aspects, represents a very important benefit for neutral states in their engagement in multinational operations abroad. The armed forces of permanently neutral states lack the opportunity to gain combat experience and the ability to ensure the effectiveness of modern weapons and military equipment. In order to serve as a credible deterrent force on the national level, the armed forces of neutral states have to be familiar with contemporary levels of military knowledge and practice.

On the other hand, they have to develop and update defense plans on the national level, based on contemporary security challenges risks and threats. Without important benefits from interoperability, the armed forces of neutral states will not be able to define a realistic national defense plan, and consequently, they will fail to deter a potential aggressor.

At the end or it was maybe better to put it first, it is important to reflect on Sir Winston Churchill's great thought: "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies – it's a fight without them." In this short sentence one can find, maybe, the biggest strategic dilemma ever.

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AND COALITION WARFARE:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES**

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Compiled by

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Published by

Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd (e-mail: isi@mod.gov.rs)

Co -publisher:

Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Wien (e-mail: contact@hgm.at)

Print: EtnoStil, Beograd

Printed in 200 copies

ISBN 978 - 86 - 81121 - 24 - 5

Belgrade, 2019

CIP